Madhya Pradesh High Court
Omprakash Rameshwar Patidar And Ors. vs Ekbal Husain S/O Noor Mohd. And Anr. on 15 September, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1998(1)MPLJ349
ORDER A.R. Tiwari, J.
1. Undaunted by unsuccess in two Courts below, the applicants have filed this civil revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order dated 26-4-1997, rendered by 12th ADJ, Indore in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 23/95 thereby sustaining the order dated 5-9-1995 passed by 4th Civil Judge Class-II in MJC No. 9/94.
2. Factual matrix is in a narrow compass : The non-applicants had filed civil suit registered as 49-A/87 in the Court of 4th Civil Judge, Class-II Indore claiming relief of eviction on the ground of bona fide need under section 12(l)(f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act from the tenanted accommodation let at Rs. 200/- per month and for rent/mesne profit, on 2-5-1987. The applicants participated in the aforesaid suit till 8-9-1994. On 8-9-1994 the evidence of the plaintiff was present but on prayer of the defendants i.e. applicants, the court adjourned the case to 14-9-1994 subject to payment of costs of 100/-. On this date i.e. 14-9-1994 the counsel for the non-applicants however pleaded no instruction. The Court thus proceeded ex parte against the applicants. Exparte evidence was recorded and the case was adjourned to 22-9-1994 for arguments. On 22-9-1994 ex parte judgment and decree were passed. After delivery of the judgment the applicants had filed the application which was rejected as no hearing was left. Thereafter, the applicants filed the application, registered as MJC No. 9/94 under Order IX, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code. The cause projected in this application was that the applicants could not remain present on 14-9-1994 and could not contact their counsel as they were busy in the treatment of their aunt Smt. Laxmibai. This assertion was disputed by the non-applicants. The Court below rejected the application on conclusion that it was not proved that the applicants were prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. On un-success, the applicants then preferred misc. appeal. The Court re-appreciated the matter and dismissed the appeal as devoid of merit. Now the revision petition is in this Court.
3. Shri Jain submitted that the provisions of Order IX, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code are not penal and Courts below should have incinerated ex parte decree and reopened lis for biparte adjudication. He has also placed reliance on 1983 MPWN 496, Pritpal Kaur v. Chhedilal and has also read some portions from Lord Denning.
4. Shri Joshi contended that despite aforesaid nature of provisions, suitor cannot be kept lugged in the litigation and applicants cannot be permitted to litigate at their will. He urged that aforesaid decision is distinguishable on facts and portions, as read, do not suggest that law should be sent on holiday.
5. I proceed to consider the submission.
6. The scope of interference, as held in AIR 1973 SC 76, The Managing Director (MIG) v. Ajit Prasad is little and limited. I find that the trial Court concluded and the appellate Court affirmed, on reasons prima facie proper, that the applicants were not prevented by any sufficient cause to appear on 14-9-1994 when the suit was called on for hearing. Even their counsel reported to the Court on that date that the applicants have not bothered to appear and contact during several dates and that he had no option but to plead 'no instructions'. Courts below found no sufficient cause for non appearance on 14-9-1994.
7. Liberal approach does not and cannot mean that erring applicants should have license to disappear or appear at will and to regulate the course of proceedings to suit their comfort or convenience. If the courts adhere to mandate of law, they cannot be criticised for acting without or in excess of jurisdiction.
8. Law and justice are not distant neighbours and suitor cannot be expected to litigate without prospects of finality in near future. After all, "no instructions" were pleaded after about seven years.
9. If Courts were to accept mere absence as sufficient cause, as is sought to be argued in surge of an urged that provisions are not penal and adversary should have say, then it would create a situation of law shooting down justice in a simple eviction matter. Hon'ble Krishna Iyer, J., described the scene graphically thus:-
"Law is a means to an end and justice is that end. But in actuality, Law and Justice are distant neighbours; sometimes even stage hostiles. If law shoots down justice, the people shoot down law and lawlessness paralyses development, disrupts order and retards progress."
10. The appellate Court concluded that :
^^fQj fnukad 5&9&1994 dks rks ekSlh dks bankSj vLirky esa ys vk;s Fks] 5&9&1994 ds ckn rks izdj.k ds laca/k esa tkudkjh izkIr dh tk ldrh Fkh ysfdu ,slh Hkh dksbZ lk{; U;k;ky; ds le{k ugha gSA vr% bl izdj.k dh leLr ifjfLFkfr;k¡ ;g n'kkZ, tkus ds fy, iz;kZIr gS fd fnukad 14&9&1994 dks vuqifLFkfr dk tks dkj.k n'kkZ;k x;k gS] og lgh ugha gS vkSj ek= vuqifLFkfr dks n'kkZus ds fy, ;g vlR; dkj.k n'kkZ;k x;k gS tks Lohdkj fd, tkus ;ksX; ugha gSA**
11. The aforesaid conclusion is not shown to be infirm. There is no case in terms of (a) to (c) of section 115(1) of Civil Procedure Code. It is time to halt the proceeding and stop injustice to the other side. In famous words, Hon'ble Justice Brennan expressed himself thus:-
"Nothing rankles more in the human heart than a brooding sense of injustice. Illness we can put up with. But injustice makes us want to pull things down."
12. There is no visibility of any infirmity either of jurisdiction or of conclusion about insufficiency of cause. The ground is meretricious and prayer is not irrecusable. The order is non interferable in revisional jurisdiction.
13. The decision is unhelpful and portions do not help the applicants.
14. Consequently, I find this revision petition as devoid of merit. It is dismissed summarily with no orders as to costs. Order of stay now stands vacated. Records be returned.