Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 21.07.2025 vs State Of H.P. And Another on 30 July, 2025
2025:HHC:25013 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 552 of 2025 Reserved on: 21.07.2025 .
Date of Decision: 30.07.2025.
Rajeev Rana ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. and another ...Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Petitioner : Mr. Dixit Sahotra, Advocate.
For the Respondent No.1/State : Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 33 of 2019 dated 01.04.2019, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 504 & 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 177 and 179 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (M.V. Act) at Police Station Bangana, District Una, H.P. 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. It has been asserted that the parties have entered into a compromise and the informant does not want to proceed with .
the matter. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. be quashed based on the compromise.
3. I have heard Mr. Dixit Sahotra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1/State.
4. Mr. Dixit Sahotra, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the parties have entered into the compromise voluntarily without any influence from any person. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. be quashed based on the compromise between the parties.
5. Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent No.1/State, submitted that offences punishable under Sections 341, 504 and 506 of IPC are compoundable and an alternative remedy of approaching the learned Trial Court is available to the petitioner. The offences punishable under Sections 177 and 179 of the M.V. Act are regulatory offences which can not be quashed based on the ::: Downloaded on - 30/07/2025 21:25:17 :::CIS 3 2025:HHC:25013 compromise between the parties. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
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6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
7. The offences punishable under Sections 341, 504 and 506 of IPC are compoundable under Section 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.).
8. It was submitted that the offence punishable under Section 506 (ii) is not compoundable under Section 320 of CrPC.
This submission cannot be accepted. Section 320 of Cr.P.C.
mentions the offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC in Table 1. It does not mention Sections 506(i) or 506(ii). Section 359 of BNSS mentions Section 351(2) and 351(3) specifically, which corresponds to Section 506(i) and Section 506(ii) of IPC.
237th report of the Law Commission of India also mentions that the offences punishable under Sections 506 and 508 of the IPC are compoundable, whereas the offence punishable under Section 507 of the IPC is not compoundable and should be made compoundable to the extent it refers to Section 506(i) of the IPC.
This report also shows that the offence punishable under ::: Downloaded on - 30/07/2025 21:25:17 :::CIS 4 2025:HHC:25013 Section 506 of the IPC is compoundable, and it cannot be said that the offence punishable under Section 506 (ii) of the IPC is .
not compoundable.
9. It was held by this Court in Kamla Thakur v. State of H.P., 2024 SCC OnLine HP 859, that the offence punishable under Section 506 of IPC is compoundable. It was observed:
"7. From a perusal of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is evident that in so far as Sections 506 and 509 of the Penal Code, 1860 are concerned, the same are compoundable."
10. Hence, the submission that the offence punishable under Section 506 (ii) of IPC is non-compoundable is not acceptable.
11. It was held in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 that inherent power should not be exercised when a specific remedy exists. It was observed:
"At the outset, the following principles may be noticed in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court, which have been followed ordinarily and generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions:
"(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;::: Downloaded on - 30/07/2025 21:25:17 :::CIS 5
2025:HHC:25013 (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code."
12. It was laid down by the Full Bench of Delhi High .
Court in Gopal Dass vs State AIR 1978 Del 138 that the jurisdiciton under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is vested in the Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This jurisdiction cannot be exercised when a specific remedy is available under the other provisions of the Code. It was observed: -
"8. In order to determine the question under consideration, as to consider the scope of the inherent powers of the High Court becomes relevant. The inherent powers of the High Court inhere in it because of its being at the apex of the judicial set-up in a State. The inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by section 482 of the Code, are to be exercised in making orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 482 envisages that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court exercised by it with the object of achieving the above- said three results. It is for this reason that section 482 does not prescribe the contours of the inherent powers of the High Court, which are wide enough to be exercised in suitable cases to afford relief to an aggrieved party. While exercising inherent powers, it has to be borne in mind that this power cannot be exercised in regard to ::: Downloaded on - 30/07/2025 21:25:17 :::CIS 6 2025:HHC:25013 matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. (See R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C.
866) (1). This principle of law had been reiterated succinctly by the Supreme Court recently in Palanippa .
Gounder v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 2 SCC 634: AIR 1977 S.C. 1323 (2) therein examining the scope of section 482 it was observed that a provision which saves the inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express provision in the statute which saves that power. Putting it in another form, the Court observed that if there is an express provision in a statute governing a particular subject, there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because the Court ought to apply the provisions of the statute which are made advisedly to govern the particular subject matter." (Emphasis supplied)
13. It was held in Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., (1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 647 that jurisdiciton under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is extraordinary and should not be exercised when a specific remedy has been provided under the Code. It was observed:
"2. It appears that, unfortunately, the High Court, by exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (for short "the Code"), has prevented the flow of justice on the alleged contention of the convicted accused that it was polluted by the so- called misconduct of the judicial officer. It is true that under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions "abuse of the process of law" or "to secure the ends of justice" do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court, and the alleged ::: Downloaded on - 30/07/2025 21:25:17 :::CIS 7 2025:HHC:25013 abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law, including procedural law and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving .
the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where there is no express provision empowering the High Court to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. In the present case, the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer a statutory appeal against conviction of the offence. The High Court has intervened at an uncalled-for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial.
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9. In our view, the order passed by the High Court entertaining the petition of the convicted accused under Section 482 of the Code is, on the face of it, illegal, erroneous, and to say the least, unfortunate. It was known to the High Court that the trial court passed proceedings to the effect that a final judgment and order convicting the accused were pronounced by the trial court. It was also recorded by the trial court that, as the accused were absent, the Court had issued non-bailable warrants. In such a situation, instead of directing the accused to remain present before the Court for resorting to the steps contemplated by the law for passing the sentence, the High Court has stayed further proceedings, including the operation of the non-bailable warrants issued by the trial court. It is disquieting that the High Court has overlooked the important legal aspect that the accused has a right of appeal against the order of conviction purported to have been passed by the trial court. In such circumstances, the High Court ought not to have entertained a petition under Section 482 of the Code and stonewalled the very efficacious alternative remedy of appeal as provided in ::: Downloaded on - 30/07/2025 21:25:17 :::CIS 8 2025:HHC:25013 the Code. Merely because the accused made certain allegations against the trial judge, the substantive law cannot be bypassed.
14. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hamida .
v. Rashid (2008) 1 SCC 474 that the inherent jurisdiciton under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and should not be exercised when an alternative remedy is available. It was observed:
"7. It is a well-established principle that inherent power conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases, and that too to correct patent illegalities or when some miscarriage of justice is done. The content and scope of power under Section 482 CrPC were examined in considerable detail in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10: AIR 1978 SC 47], and it was held as under : (SCC p. 555, para 8) The following principles may be stated in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court:
(1) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. (2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.
8. In State v. Navjot Sandhu [(2003) 6 SCC 641: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1545], after a review of a large number of earlier decisions, it was held as under: (SCC p. 657, para 29) ::: Downloaded on - 30/07/2025 21:25:17 :::CIS 9 2025:HHC:25013 "29. ... The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be .
exercised very sparingly, as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out hereinabove fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment."
9. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. [(1999) 6 SCC 146:
1999 SCC (Cri) 1076] the High Court had entertained a petition under Section 482 CrPC after an order of conviction had been passed by the Sessions Judge and before the sentence had been awarded and further proceedings in the case had been stayed. In appeal, this Court set aside the order of the High Court after reiterating the principle that it is well settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. It was further observed that the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer a statutory appeal against conviction of the offence and intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial. The order of the High Court was accordingly set aside on the ground that a petition under Section 482 CrPC could not have been entertained as the accused had ::: Downloaded on - 30/07/2025 21:25:17 :::CIS 10 2025:HHC:25013 an alternative remedy of an appeal as provided in the Code. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with other decisions of this Court, as the consistent view throughout has been that a petition under Section 482 CrPC cannot be .
entertained if there is any other specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party.
10. In the case in hand, the respondents-accused could apply for bail afresh after the offence had been converted into one under Section 304 IPC. They deliberately did not do so and filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC in order to circumvent the procedure whereunder they would have been required to surrender, as the bail application could be entertained and heard only if the accused were in custody. It is important to note that no order adverse to the respondents-accused had been passed by any court, nor was there any miscarriage of justice or any illegality.
In such circumstances, the High Court committed a manifest error of law in entertaining a petition under Section 482 CrPC and issuing a direction to the subordinate court to accept the sureties and bail bonds for the offence under Section 304 IPC. The effect of the order passed by the High Court is that the accused after getting bail in an offence under Sections 324, 352 and 506 IPC on the very day on which they were taken into custody, got an order of bail in their favour even after the injured had succumbed to his injuries and the case had been converted into one under Section 304 IPC without any court examining the case on merits, as it stood after conversion of the offence. The procedure laid down for the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC, though available to the respondents-accused, having not been availed of, the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is clearly illegal and the impugned order passed by it has to be set aside." (Emphasis supplied)
15. Similarly, it was held in B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana 2003 (4) SCC 675 that the High Court can quash the F.I.R. for ::: Downloaded on - 30/07/2025 21:25:17 :::CIS 11 2025:HHC:25013 non-compoundable offences based on compromise, indicating that the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. should not be .
exercised regarding offences that are compoundable under Section 320 of Cr.P.C., except in exceptional cases.
16. In the present case, the petition is silent as to why the petitioner could not approach the learned Trial Court for compounding the offences, rather it is stated that there is no other efficacious remedy available to the petitioner except to file the present petition seeking quashing of F.I.R.
r This is an incorrect statement because Section 320(1) of Cr.P.C. confers a right upon the persons mentioned in the Section to compound the offence. Since the offences fall under Section 320 (1) of Cr.P.C., therefore, the permission of the Court is also not required, and it cannot be said that the Court is not likely to grant the permission, justifying the filing of the present petition. Thus, there exists no reason to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction vested in this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. when the alternative remedy is available.
17. The offences punishable under Sections 177 and 179 of M.V. Act are regulatory offences. Section 177 of the M.V. Act ::: Downloaded on - 30/07/2025 21:25:17 :::CIS 12 2025:HHC:25013 punishes a person for the contravention of the provisions of M.V. Act, Rules & Regulations or Notification.
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18. Section 179 of M.V. Act punishes persons who willfully disobey directions given by an authorised person or authority empowered to give directions. Such an offence is meant for the proper enforcement of the Traffic Rules. These are regulatory and cannot be quashed based on the compromise
19. to effected between the parties.
Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed.
20. The petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 30th July, 2025 (ravinder) ::: Downloaded on - 30/07/2025 21:25:17 :::CIS