Karnataka High Court
State Of Karnataka vs Anjini S/O Vaddara Ramesh on 15 December, 2021
Author: Suraj Govindaraj
Bench: Suraj Govindaraj
THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2021
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
AND
THE HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE J.M. KHAZI
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.100028/2019
BETWEEN
STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY TH E
CIRCLE INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
KURUGODU CIRCLE,
DIST: BALLARI
THROUGH THE ADDL.
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
ADVOCATE GENERL OFFICE,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
DHARWAD BENCH.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. V.M BANAKAR, ADDL.SPP)
AND
ANJINI
S/O. VADDARA RAMESH,
AGE:23 YEARS,
R/O. WARD NO.4,
NEAR GANESH TEMPLE,
KUDITHINI VILLAGE,
BALLARI DISTRICT.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI.S.C.BHUTI, AMICUS CURIAE)
2
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 378(1)
AND (3) OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO GRANT LEAVE TO APPEAL
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF ACQUITTAL DATED
22.06.2018 AND TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF
ACQUITTAL DATED 22.06.2018 PASSED BY I-ADDL. DIST. AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, BALLARI, IN SPL.S.C.NO.115/2014 AND TO
CONVICT THE RESPONDENT FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE
UNDER SECTIONS 366-A, 376 OF IPC AND SECTIONS 4 AND 6
OF POCSO ACT.
THESE CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 30.11.2021, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, J.M.KHAZI J.,
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
In this appeal filed under Section 378(1) and (3) of Cr.P.C. the State has challenged the acquittal of the respondent for offences punishable under Sections 366-A, 376 of IPC and under Sections 4 and 6 of POCSO Act.
2. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to by their rank before the Trial Court.
3. A charge sheet came to be filed against the Accused in SPL.S.C.NO.115/2014 on the file of I-Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Ballari, for the offences punishable under Sections 366-A, 376 of IPC and under Sections 4 and 6 of POCSO Act, 2012. The allegations 3 against the Accused are that on 14.04.2014, accused kidnapped the prosecutrix who was aged 15 years with an intention to have sexual intercourse with her and took her to Jattigi village, Muddebihal Taluk, Bijapur District and married her in the presence of CW.13 and committed rape on her till 26.04.2014 when he was arrested.
4. During the Trial in all 21 witnesses were examined including the complainant as well as the prosecutrix. The prosecution has relied on Ex.P-1 to 19 and MOs.1 to 19. During the cross examination of PW.19 the accused has got marked the Ex.D 1.
5. During the course of his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C the accused has denied the incriminating material in the evidence led on behalf of prosecution. He has not lead evidence on his behalf.
6. After hearing arguments of both sides, vide impugned judgment and order, Trial Court has acquitted the accused of all the charges.
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7. During the course of arguments, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor submitted that the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court is contrary to law, facts and evidence on record and as such it is liable to be set aside. As on the date of her kidnapping, the prosecutrix was below the age of 16 years. During the course of her evidence she has deposed on oath that the accused has committed forcible sexual assault on her against her will and without her consent. PW.16 M.Yerri Swamy who is the head master of the school has issued date of birth certificate as per Ex.P.10 and the transfer certificate as per Ex.P.11 and deposed that the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 18.05.1999 and as such as on the date of her kidnapping she was aged 15 years. This fact is not considered and appreciated by the Trial Court and thereby it has erred in acquitting the accused holding that the provisions of POCSO Act are not applicable.
8. He would further submit that in addition to the prosecutrix, PW 2 the complainant who is the mother, PW.3 Yallappa the brother as well as PW.4 Yerri Swamy 5 independent witnesses have supported the prosecution case. PW.19 Dr. K.N.M.Asha Rani the Medical Officer who has examined the prosecutrix and issued the Medical Certificate at Ex.P-13, has deposed that the prosecutrix was 15 years at the time of incident and that her hymen was not intact. The evidence of these witnesses have not been appreciated by the Trial Court in proper prospective and thereby committed error in acquitting the accused.
9. The Additional State Public Prosecutor further submitted that the Trial Court has erred in marking Ex.D-1 which was a document issued by PW.17, but it was marked through PW.19 Dr. K.N.M.Asha Rani who is not the Author of the said document. Even though at the time of marking it, the prosecution has raised objections, it was not considered while analyzing the evidence. Ex.D-1 is inadmissible. Therefore the impugned judgment based on Ex.D-1 holding that as on the date of incident the prosecutrix was major is not sustainable and it is liable to be set aside. The findings of the Trial Court in not relying upon the transfer certificate as a proof of date of birth of the prosecutrix is contrary to the judgment of the Hon'ble 6 Supreme Court reported in (2013) 14 SCC 637 in the case of Mahadeo S/o. Kerba Maste V/s. State of Maharashtra and another.
10. He would further submit that the testimony of the proseutrix is inherently truthful and deserves to be accepted without any reservations. It is a settled principal of law that a girl below the age of 18 years is not capable of giving consent and therefore the defense of consent is not maintainable and acceptable. This proposition of law have been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in 2015 (4) Crimes 541 SC in the case of Upendra Pradhan V/s. State of Orissa. In the light of this judgment the reasons assigned by the Trial Court in discarding the true version of the prosecutrix evidence is not sustainable.
11. Learned Additional State Public Prosecutor further submitted that the learned Special Judge has totally ignored the provisions of Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act. As per Section 29, where any accused is prosecuted for any offence punishable under Sections 3, 5, 7 7 and 9 of the POCSO Act, unless the contrary is proved, the Special Court shall presume that the accused has committed the said offence. This is a statutory presumption and the Court is bound to draw the presumption against the accused and the burden is on the accused to disprove the same. This statutory presumption creates an exception to the ordinary rule of presumption of innocence available to the accused in other criminal Trial. As such the presumption puts onus on the accused to establish his innocence. Similarly Section 30 of POCSO Act, raises presumption as to the mental condition of the accused and the said mental condition is inclusive of culpable mental state, including intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and the belief in, or reason to believe, a fact and this presumption is so strong that accused has to prove absence of culpable mental state beyond all reasonable doubt. The accused is not relieved by showing preponderance of probabilities. The Trial Court has not drawn the presumptions which are mandatory. It has evaluated the evidence and decided the case like any 8 ordinary case and mechanically acquitted the accused which calls for interference of this Hon'ble Court.
12. In support of his arguments the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor has relied upon (2013) 14 SCC 637 in the case of Mahadeo S/o. Kerba Maske V/s. State of Maharashtra.
13. On the other hand the learned counsel representing the accused submits that after examining the oral and documentary evidence placed on record, the Special Court has come to a correct conclusion that as on the date of incident, the prosecutrix was major and she was a consenting party. Relying upon the decision reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 in the case of Chandrappa and Others V/s. State of Karnataka, the learned counsel for the accused submits that where two views are possible on the evidence on record, one taken by the trial Court in favor of the accused should not be disturbed by the appellate Court and prays to dismiss the appeal.
14. In support of his argument the learned counsel representing the accused has also relied upon (2011) 2 9 SCC 385 in the case of Alamelu and Another V/s. State Represented by Inspector of Police.
15. We have heard the elaborate arguments of both the sides and perused the record.
16. It is the definite case of the prosecution that the prosecutrix was born on 18.05.1999 and as such, as on the date of incident i.e., on 14.04.2014, she was less than 15 years old i.e.,14 years 11 months and 26 days, to be precise.
17. The accused has taken up a defense that the prosecution has failed to prove that as on the date of the incident, the prosecutrix was below the age of 16 years. From the cross examination of the witnesses, it is evident that the accused has set up a defense that the prosecutrix has voluntarily accompanied him and they have married and thereafter they have stayed together as husband and wife and such as no offence either under the provisions of IPC or POCSO Act are attracted and therefore the Trial Court has rightly acquitted him of all the charges. 10
18. According to the prosecution, on 14.04.2014 the accused kidnapped the prosecutrix and after the complaint was filed, they were searched and ultimately, they were secured on 26.04.2014. On 28.04.2014, the statement of the prosecutrix is recorded before the jurisdictional magistrate under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. During the course of her statement, the prosecutrix has given her age as 15 years. However throughout her statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C, she has taken up a contention that she was in love with the accused since 3 years prior to giving her statement and as her parents were against their love affair and they were forcing her to join Bramha Kumari's Ashram and since she was not willing to join the same, she forced the accused to take her away from her parents or else she would commit suicide.
19. She has further stated that since the accused was very poor, she took gold ornaments with her weighing about 2 Tola's and after pledging the same for Rs.30,000/- they purchased cloths, Taali and other ornaments which are necessary for the marriage and on 15.04.2014 they got married at Anjaneya Temple which is near Jattigi 11 village in the presence of the friend of accused and his family members and thereafter they stayed in the house of the friend of accused from 15.04.2014 to 19.04.2014. From 19.04.2014 to 26.04.2014 they lived together as husband and wife in a rented house and during this period she voluntarily had sexual intercourse with the accused.
20. Though during the course of her evidence, the prosecutrix has reiterated all these aspects, so far as marrying the accused, she has deposed that forcibly the accused tied Taali and married her. With regard to having sexual intercourse, before the Court she has stated that Accused forcibly committed rape on her against her will. On the other hand, during the cross examination of the prosecutrix, the defense has made suggestions that she voluntarily accompanied the accused to all the places and married the accused on her own volition and similarly she led a marital life with him and there was no force on the part of the accused while they had physical relationship during their stay together as husband and wife. In the light of the specific defense taken by the accused, it is to be seen whether the prosecution has proved that as on the 12 date of incident, the prosecutrix was below the age of 16 years and as such a minor. In that event the consent of the prosecution would become immaterial.
21. PW.1 Hanumakka is the mother of the prosecutrix who is examined as PW.2. Both of them have deposed that as on the date of giving evidence, the prosecutrix was aged 15 years. PW.2 has specifically deposed that her date of birth is 18.05.1999 and she has studied in Government School up to 5th standard.
22. PW.16 M. Yerri Swamy is the Head Master of the Government Lower-Primary School, Kuduthini. He has issued the certificate at Ex.P-10 stating the date of birth of the prosecutrix as 18.05.1999. This information is based on the entries made in the school records as per admission No.37/2005-06. He has also issued the certified copy of her transfer certificate at Ex.P-11. PW.16 has deposed with regard to these documents and stated that he has issued these documents based on the school records. He has specifically stated that at the time of admission entries will be made based on the particulars furnished by the parents 13 or guardian of the child. On the date of his evidence, he has also produced the original school admission register. During his cross examination a suggestion is made to the witness that the particulars especially with regard to the date of birth of the child will be entered on the basis of birth certificate of the child. On this aspect PW 16 has specially stated that the parents have produced the birth certificate at the time of admission. He has denied the suggestion that the parents of the prosecutrix has not produced the birth certificate and that he has made false entry at the instance of the police. He has also denied that he has created this document for the purpose of this case.
23. As already noted at the time of his evidence PW.16 M.Yerri Swamy has produced original Admission Register and based on the same, the entries in the transfer certificate as well as the birth certificate at Ex.P-10 and 11 are made. Infact while this witness is being cross examined, the learned counsel for the accused had the advantage of looking into the original Admission Register. Consequently a suggestion is made on behalf of the defense that these entries are made based on the birth 14 certificate produced by the parents of the prosecutrix. Thus through the testimony of PW.1, 2 as well as 16 in as much as Ex.P-10 and 11 the prosecution has proved that the date of birth of the prosecutrix is 18.05.1999 and as on the date of incident i.e., 14.04.2014 the prosecutrix was aged 14 years 11 months and 26 days and therefore she has not completed 15 years of age.
24. As already noted Ex.P-2 is the statement given by the prosecutrix under Section 164 of Cr.P.C before the Jurisdictional Magistrate wherein she has given her age as 15 years. Ex.D 1 is the examination report of the prosecutrix issued by PW-17 Dr. Chaitanya R. However this document is not marked through him i.e., PW-17 Dr. Chaitanya R, even though he is the one who has examined the accused and given opinion as per Ex.P 12 that there is nothing to suggest that the person is incapable of performing sexual intercourse. On the other hand the defense has got it marked through PW-19 Dr. K.N.M.Asha Rani. The defense has not confronted Ex.D-1 to PW.17 who is the author of the document and as such it is not proved in accordance with law. Infact, the prosecution has 15 raised objections when Ex.D-1 was confronted to PW.19 Dr. K.N.M.Usha Rani on the ground that she is not competent to speak with regard to the same. Inspite of recording the objections, the Trial Court has not given any findings as to whether this document is proved or not. Directly it has come to the conclusion that as per Ex.D-1, the prosecutrix was aged between 18 to 20 years which is contrary to Ex.P-10 and 11.
25. At this stage it is relevant to look into Mahadeo's case (referred to supra), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court making reference to the statutory provisions contained in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007, (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 2007" for brevity) wherein under Rule 12, the procedure to be followed in determining the age of the Juvenile is set out, held that in every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with the law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the Court or the Board or as the case may be, by the committee seeking evidence by obtaining: 16
12(3)(a)(i) The matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) The date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended;
and in the absence whereof;
(iii) The birth certificate given by a
corporation or a municipal authority or a
Panchayat."
26. The Juvenile Justice Act is amended in 2015 i.e., The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 2015" for brevity). The State Government has not framed separate Rules. But, the procedure for determining age of the juvenile is incorporated in Section 94 of the Act, 2015.
27. However, in case of Sanjeevkumar Gupta Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in (2019) 12 SCC 370, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding the claim of juvenility of the accused in a criminal trial, held that Section 7A of Act, 2000 provides the procedure to be followed when a claim of juvenility is 17 raised before a Court. Upon a claim being raised that an accused was juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, the Court is required to make an enquiry, take evidence and to determine the age of the person. The Court has to record a finding whether a person is a juvenile or a child, stating the age as nearly as may be. Rule 12(3) of Rules, 2007 contains a procedural provision governing the determination of age by the Court or by the Board. In that case on appreciation of the facts the Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the entry in the matriculation certificate and by considering the voluntary disclosure made by the accused while obtaining both Aadhaar Card and driving licence, held that the accused was not a juvenile as on the date of the commission of the offence.
28. Similar view is taken by the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramvijay Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 2021 CRI.L.J. 2805. In this decision also the accused has taken the plea of juvenility. Referring to Rule 7A of Act, 2000 and Section 94 of the Act, 2015, wherein procedure for determining the age of a child in conflict with law is incorporated, the 18 Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the procedure prescribed in Rule 12 of Rules, 2007, is not materially different than the provisions of Section 94 of Act, 2015, to determine the age of the person. There are minor variations as the Rule 12(3)(a)(i) and (ii) having clubbed together with slight changes in the language. Section 94 of the Act, 2015, does not contain the provision regarding the benefit of margin of age to be given to the child or juvenile as was provided in Rule 12(3)(b) of the Rules, 2007. At para No.16 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Court is not precluded from taking into consideration any other relevant and trustworthy material to determine the age as in that case, all the three eventualities mentioned in Sub Section 2 of Section 94 of the Act, 2015 are either not available or are not found to be reliable and trustworthy.
29. Thus, in view of the above three referred judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the procedure contemplated under Rule 12 of Rules, 2007 and Section 94 of the Act, 2015, is only directory and the Court may examine any other evidence including the documents 19 referred to in Rule 12 of the Rules, 2007 which is synonym with Section 94 of the Act, 2015, and determine the age of the juvenile or a victim under POCSO Act.
30. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the date of birth certificate and transfer certificate at Exs.P-10 and 11 which are based on the entries made in the School Admission Register, which contains the date of birth of the prosecutrix is to be accepted as proof of her date of birth. As discussed above, in the light of Exs.P-10 and 11, the Medical Report at Ex.D-1 of the prosecutrix wherein her age is determined approximately is inadmissible especially when it is not proved in accordance with law. Consequently we hold that as on the date of the incident, the prosecutrix had not completed 15 years of age and as such a minor both under the provisions of Section 376 IPC and POCSO Act.
31. In Almelu's case (referred to Supra) relied upon by the learned counsel representing the accused, it was held that the prosecution has failed to prove that the victim girl was a minor. However in the present case it is 20 established that as on the date of the incident the prosecutrix has not completed the age of 15 years. Therefore this decision is not applicable for the case in hand.
32. Before discussing whether the prosecution has proved the allegations attracting provisions of Section 376 IPC and POCSO Act, it is necessary to examine whether the allegations that accused kidnapped her is required to be examined. As evident from the testimony of the prosecutrix i.e., PW.2, from Kudutini, accused took her to Ballari in a KSRTC Bus. From there they went to a pawn shop and pledged her gold ornaments for Rs.30,000/-. Thereafter, they purchased a bag and clothes. On the evening at 04:30 p.m. they boarded Guntakal Train and conducted pooja at Kasapura Anjaneya Temple. At 06:00 p.m. they boarded Train and went to Raichur. On that night they stayed in the Railway-Station. At 05:00 a.m. they boarded Bus and reached Muddebihal at 09:00 a.m. At Muddebihal they have purchased Taali, Gundu, 21 Kalungura (vÁ½, UÀÄAqÀÄ, PÁ®ÄAUÀÄgÀ) and went to the house of one Swamy, a friend of accused situated at Jattigi Village.
33. At Jattigi village, accused took her to Anjaneya Temple and along with them his friend Swamy, his wife and children were also present. Though in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the prosecutrix has stated that she got married to the accused on her own volition, before the Court she has stated that accused forcibly married her by tying the Taali. She has also stated that for four days she stayed in the house of Swamy and thereafter they went to Muddebihal and took a house on rent and for eight days, they stayed there. In her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., on this aspect she has stated that while she and accused stayed in the house of Swamy as well as in the rented house at Muddebihal, they led a married life. However, before the Court, she has stated that at all these places, accused committed rape on her forcibly. Her evidence reveal that she stayed in the rented house along with the accused till the complainant Police came and brought them back to Kudutini.
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34. Thus so far as allegations of kidnapping is concerned, the examination of the evidence of prosecutrix reveal that nowhere she has claimed that she was forcibly taken by the accused. In fact, a careful analysis of her evidence makes it evident that at no point of time she resisted the accused and she has readily gone with him at all these places. Therefore, as held by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Gowtham reported in 2016 (4) Kar.L.J. 60 (DB), wherein also the prosecutrix was aged 15 years and after analyzing the evidence, this Court held that having regard to the fact that at no point of time, the prosecutrix raised any hue and cry and it goes to show that she voluntarily went with the accused and therefore the provisions of Section 366 of IPC are not attracted i.e., the allegations of kidnapping are not proved. In the present case also the prosecution has failed to prove the offence punishable under Sections 366A of IPC.
35. In the same judgment, it was held that where the prosecutrix is aged below 16 years, whether there is consent or no consent, in case there is proof of offence of 23 rape, then the Court may proceed to convict the accused. In view of the fact that as on the date of the incident, the prosecutrix was below the age of 15 years, the next question that is to be decided is whether the prosecution has proved the allegations of Section 376 of IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of POCSO Act.
36. During the course of her evidence before the Court, the prosecutrix has deposed that while she stayed with the accused in the house of Swamy at Jattigi village and thereafter in a rented house at Muddebihal, accused committed rape on her against her Will. However, in her statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., at Ex.P-2, she has stated that at both the places namely Jattigi and Muddebihal, she had physical relationship with the accused on her own volition. During the cross-examination of PW.2 the prosecutrix, a suggestion is made by the accused that after the marriage, accused had physical relationship with her, which fact has been admitted by the prosecutrix, though in the next sentence she has stated that it was with force and she resisted the same.
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37. However the medical evidence is otherwise. As already discussed, PW.17 Dr.Chaitanya has examined the accused and given the report to the effect that there is nothing to suggest that the person is incapable of performing sexual intercourse, as per Ex.P-12. PW.19 Dr.K.N.M.Asharani has examined the prosecutrix and given report as per Ex.P-13, wherein it is stated that no external injuries were found on the person of the prosecutrix. The hymen was ruptured. In Ex.P-13 it is noted that as per the statement of the prosecutrix herself, for the past three weeks, she had sexual intercourse with the accused. It is further stated that she is used to regularly having sexual intercourse. Awaiting the FSL report, she has reserved her final report.
38. Ex.P-16 is the FSL Report. As per the FSL Report, the seminal stains were not detected in item Nos.1, 4, 6, 9 to 15, 17 and 18 which are Pubic Hairs, Vaginal Swab, Cervical Swab, Chudidar Top Colour White and Block, Green, Chudidar Bottom Green (Dark), Chudidar Duppatta Dark Green Colour, A Full Sleeves Shirt, A blue coloured pant, One Banian, One underwear, 25 Cut pubic hair samples, A cotton swab taken from penis. Similarly, as per this report, skin tissue was not detected in item No.2 i.e., the finger nails of the prosecutrix. Ex.P-16 further states that spermatozova was not detected in item Nos.3, 5 and 19 which are vagina smear, cervical smear and a glass lid smeared with Penie swab. It appears, after receipt of the FSL Report, the Investigating Officer has not taken the final opinion of the Medical Officer by showing the same. Therefore, the medical opinion regarding whether there is evidence of sexual intercourse is not complete. Therefore, we hold that the prosecution has failed to prove the ingredients of Section 376 of IPC as well as Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act.
39. So far as the evidence of the prosecutrix that accused had sexual intercourse with her against her will and without her consent, at the first available opportunity, during the course of her statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., the prosecutrix has given a clear go bye to the allegations that there was force exerted by the accused. Only during the course of her evidence, she has dramatically changed her version. We find her testimony 26 not reliable. She has no regard for the truth. As held by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Gowtham's case referred to supra, the factum of whether victim was sexually assaulted is not established by the prosecution especially when the presence of seminal stains not detected as noticed in the FSL Report and thereby it is not supporting the prosecution case. Similar view was taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Alamelu and another Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police reported in (2011) 2 SCC 385, wherein it was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that though the prosecutrix had several opportunities to protest and raise an alarm, she did not do so. Her behaviour of not complaining to anybody of any of the stages after being allegedly abducted is wholly unnatural. Therefore, conviction solely on the testimony of prosecutrix is not sustainable. In the light of these observations, we hold that taking into consideration, the oral and documentary evidence on record, the Trial Court has come to a correct conclusion that the charges levelled against the accused are not proved beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted 27 him. We find no reason to interfere with the conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court and accordingly, we proceed to pass the following:
ORDER Appeal filed by the State fails and accordingly it is dismissed.
We place on record our appreciations for the able assistance given by Sri.S.C.Bhuti, learned Amicus Curiae representing the accused/respondent.
Sri.S.C.Bhuti, learned Amicus Curiae submits that he has represented the accused/respondent pro bono and there is no need to order for grant of any remuneration, we appreciate his gesture.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sd/-
JUDGE PJ