Calcutta High Court
Dr. Ranjit Kumar Bhattacharyya vs Smt. Sabita Bhattacharyya on 22 December, 1995
Equivalent citations: AIR1996CAL301, AIR 1996 CALCUTTA 301, (1996) 1 HINDULR 520, (1996) 1 CAL HN 360, (1996) 1 CAL LJ 465
JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 22nd January, 1992 passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, 10th Court, Alipore, South 24-Paraganas in Title Suit No. 90 of 1983 and preferred by the defendant No. I/appellant. The plaintiff/respondent filed the above-named title suit inter alia, praying for a declaration of her right to get maintenance as well as her right of residence in the property described in item No. 1 of the plaint schedule, being premises No. 95A, Tallygunge Circular Road, New Alipore, 24-Paraganas and also for arrear maintenance alleging inter alia, that she was the legally married wife of the defendant No. 1 Aappellant and their marriage was solemnised according to the Hindu rites and customs in or about 1967 and they lived together as husband and wife till November, 1977 and out of their wedlock, a child was born to them and thereafter she was driven away by the defendant No. 1 /appellant from her matrimonial home. 2. The defendant No. I/appellant in his written statement, however, categorically denied and disputed the allegations of the plaintiff that she was her lawfully married wife and that he had any obligation to maintain her and that the alleged marriage had taken place at all, but admitted that the plaintiff/respondent, who was a widow, became intimate with the appellant and a child was born out of the intimacy, but he never induced the plaintiff to marry him and no marriage was ever solemnised between them. In fact the defendant No. 1 and the added defendant Smt. Purnima Bhatta-chitryya were Indian Christians by birth and they were married according to the Christian rites on or about 3rd February, 1945 at St. Johns Church, Calcutta and the marriage was still subsisting. The added defendant/ respondent No. 2 Smt. Purnima Bhatta-charyya in her written statement, also denied and disputed the plaint case altogether and categorically stated inter alia that she and the defendant No. 1/appellant were Indian Christians by birth and a marriage solemnised between them on 3rd February, 1945 at St. Johns Church, Calcutta according to the Christian rites and customs and the said marriage is now still subsisting. 3. The plaintiff/ respondent No. 1 examined herself and also one Maniklal Chat-terjee as witnesses for the plaintiff being PWs Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. The plaintiff as PW 1 in her evidence stated inter alia, that the defendant/appellant was her husband and their marriage was solemnised according to Hindu Marriage Act in August, 1967 and she did not know that her husband was a Christian; that she lived with the defendant/ appellant as husband and wife for 7 (seven) years and achild was born out of the wedlock who was living with his father; that she was a maiden at the time of her marriage and she was not told that the defendant/ appellant was a married man, but subsequently, came to know of it. Shri Maniklal Chatterjee as PW 2 in his evidence stated inter alia, that he knew that the defendant had married the plaintiff and they lived together as husband and wife for about 7/8 years at 70A, Chetla Road, and during such living, the plaintiff gave birth to a male child; he also denied that the defendant/appellant was a Christian and he got such information from the defendant/ appellant's family. The defendant No. 1/ appellant as DW 1 in his evidence categorically stated that the added defendant being the respondent No. 2 was his legally married wife and they were Christians by religion and he was also Christian by birth and he was married to the added defendant/respondent No. 2 on 3rd February, 1945 according to Christian rites and customs at St. Johns Church, Calcutta and produced a certificate issued by the authority which was marked as Exhibit A; that he was baptised on or about 15th June, 1919 and a certificate to prove the same was also produced which was marked as Exhibit B. He, however, admitted that he came to know the plaintiff/respondent for the first time during 1966-67 and he had ready access to her and a male child was born as a result of such intimacy and he was still residing with the defendant No, 1 / appellant, but the defendant No. I/appellant did not marry the plaintiff/ respondent at any point of time and that the plaintiff/respondent subsequently used to live with one Sambhu Ghosal. He also denied that he was the owner of premises No. 95A, Tallygunge, Circular Road or that he had landed properties at Sarsuna. The added defendant/respondent No. 2 as DW 2 in cross-examination denied that the plaintiff/ respondent No. 1 and the defendant/ appellant were married and also categorically stated that her (DW 2) marriage with the defendant/ appellant was still in force as he did not divorce her. 4. The learned Judge, however, observed inter alia, that though the defendant/ appellant had produced the Baptism Certificate being Exhibit B, the said certificate had been issued in June, 1988, that is, long after the institution of the suit in 1979, and as such, the Certificate of Baptism was given no exclusive or conclusive authority by law as instrument of evidence under S. 91 of the Indian Evidence Act and the entry of baptism thus would not exclude independent proof of the fact, and further held that the defendants had failed to establish that they were Christians by religion. The learned Judge further held that the defendant No. 1 had admitted his long and continuous cohabitation with the plaintiff as a result of which a son was born to them and so there was a strong presumption of marriage from habit and repute and mere absence of proof regarding marriage rites and ceremonies could not dislodge the presumption which could only be rebutted by proof of insurmountable obstacles to a valid marriage, and such presumption also found support from the admission of the defendant No. 1/ appellant that the plaintiff was his wife while she gave birth of a child at a Nursing Home, and his statement made in connection with Misc. Case No. 39 of 1977 wherein he had categorically stated that he mentioned the plaintiff/ respondent as his wife in the hospital document (Exhibit C), also lent support to the presumption of marriage and the evidence of PW2 was of much importance on the question whether the plaintiff/ respondent and the. defendant/appellant No. 1 were married and such evidence was very much admissible under S. SO of the Indian Evidence Act. So far as the marriage between the defendant No. 1 and the added defendant No. 2 was concerned, though the learned Judge had referred to the extracts from the Register Book of Marriage kept at the St. John's Church (Old Cathedral), Calcutta (Exhibit A), showing that the marriage between the defendant and the defendant No. 2 was solemnised on 3rd February, 1945 according to the Christian rites, the said evidence was discarded by the learned Judge holding that such a document having been issued only on 6th May, 1985 might be considered as certificate of marriage but it did not prove the marriage conclusively, and no independent witness had been examined to prove such marriage and no suggestion was put to PW 1 to ascertain whether Purnima was the wife of defendant No. 1, and ultimately held, that the defendant No. 1 had failed to prove that they were legally married husband and wife, and accordingly, the learned Judge passed the decree for maintenance at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month from the date of filing of the suit, in favour of the plaintiff/ respondent. 5. Mr. Bhattacharyya, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, however, places strong reliance upon Exhibit A the true copy of the extract from the Register Book of Marriages kept by the St. John's Church (Old Cathedral), Calcutta which was duly certified by the Senior Chaplain of the said Church and also upon the evidence of the defendant's witnesses, especially that of DW2 to prove that the defendant No. 1 and the defendant No. 2 were married in 1945 according to the Christian rites and that the said marriage was still subsisting. 6. Mr. Bhattacharyya further contends that since the marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. 1 was alleged to have taken place in 1967, i.e., after the passing of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and that too at a time, when the marriage between the appellant and the respondent No, 1 held in the year 1945 was still subsisting, the alleged marriage of the respondent No. I with the appellant in the year 1967 was a nullity as on the date of the alleged marriage the appellant had a wife living and as such, the respondent No. 1 was not entitled to get any maintenance from the appellant No, I, inasmuch as, S. 18 of the Hindu Adoptions, and Maintenance Act, 1956 speaks of maintenance to be claimed by a legally married wife and the said Act does not contain any provision entitling a woman to claim maintenance from a person with whom she had entered into a void marriage, and in support of his contention Mr. Bhattacharyya refers to the Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Banshidhar Jha v. Chhabi Chatterjee, . References were also made to the decisions of the different High Courts namely, T.P. K. Natesan Chettiar v. Achiyayee Aminal, ; Kesarabai v. Haribhau, and Mutyala Satya-narayanamurthi v. Mutyala Jaggamma, AIR 1962 Andh Pra 439. 7. Mr. Nandi, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1, however, contends that since the certificate, Exhibit B, was not duly proved, no reliance could be placed on such Exhibit, and the learned trial Judge also had rightly discarded' such document in arriving at his finding, that the defendants had failed to prove that they were legally married husband and wife. Mr. Nandi further contends that in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above, the presumption of marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 drawn by the learned trial Judge in favour of the plaintiff, could not be rebutted by the defendants at all, and as such, the judgment and decree of the trial court should not be interfered with and/or disturbed. 8. Mr. Nandi, also contends inter alia, that since the trial Court had observed that there was a presumption of marriage between the respondent No. 1 and the appellant, the respondent No. 1 is entitled to maintenance no matter whether such marriage was valid or not under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 inasmuch as, the words "Hindu wife" in S. 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 cannot be interpreted to mean only a wife whose marriage is valid according to the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 as such an interpretation would render the provisions of S. 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 otiose. The words "Hindu wife" as contemplated by S. 18, according to Mr, Nandi, would mean a Hindu wife whose marriage is solemnised, though void under the Hindu Marriage Act, and in support of his contention refers to a single Bench Decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of C. Obula Konda Reddy v. C. Pedda Venkata Lakshamma, , and also to a single Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Govindrao Ranjoji Musale v. Sou. Anandibai, . 9. Mr. Nandi lastly contends that since Exhibit-A was not duly proved, no reliance could be placed on such Exhibit and the learned trial Judge had rightly discarded such evidence and the presumption of marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. 1 as drawn by the learned trial Judge, could not be rebutted in any way, by the appellant. 10. Let us now see, whether the appellant has been able to prove that he is a Christian by birth, and whether the alleged marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. 2 taken place in the year 1945 as claimed by them in their written statements, has been duly proved. 11. Exhibit A is the true copy of the extracts from the Register Book of Marriage kept by the St. John's Church (Old Cathedral), Calcutta and issued by the Church authorities and certified to be a true copy by a senior Chaplain of the Church. From the Exhibit A it appears, that the appellant and the respondent No. 2 were duly married at the St. John's Church, Calcutta on 3rd February, 1945 in presence of witnesses and they were given in marriage according to the Christian rites by the Archdeacon of Calcutta by proclaimation (Banns). 12. Sections of the Indian Christian Marriage Act (Act XV of 1872) speaks of the persons by whom marriage between the Indian Christians may be solemnised and they are as follows: "Persons by whom marriage may be solemnised. Marriages may be solemnised in India - 1) by any person who has received episcopal ordination, provided that the marriage solemnised according to the rules, rites, ceremonies and customs of the Church of which he is a Minister; 2) by any Clergyman of the Church of Scotland, provided that such marriage be solemnised according to the rules, rites, ceremonies and customs of the Church of Scotland; 3) by any Minister of Religion licensed under this Act to solemnize marriages; 4) by, or in the presence of, a Marriage Registrar appointed under this Act; 5) by any person licensed under this Act to grant certificate of marriage between Indian Christians." 13. Section 37 of the aforesaid Act inter alia, speaks of registration of marriages between the native Christians by persons referred to in clauses(l), (2) and (3) of S. 5 and states inter alia, that when any marriage, between the Indian Christians is solemnised by such person, Clerkguman Or Minister of Religion as is referred to in clause (1), clause (2) or clause (3) of S. 5, the person solemnising the same shall register the marriage in a separate Register Book, and shall keep it safely. 14. Section 64 of the said Act speaks of the books in which the marriages of Indian Christians are registered and states inter alia, that the provisions of Ss. 62 and 63 of the said Act, which speak of keeping of Register Book and depositing extracts therefrom with Registrar General, form of such Register Book, allowing searches thereof and giving copies of the entries therein etc., shall mutatis mutandis apply to the booksYept under S. 37 of the Act. 15. Section 80 of the Act states inter alia, that every certified copy of an entry of a marriage in the marriage Register, purported to be signed by the duly authorised person, shall be received as evidence of the marriage purporting to be so entered of the facts, purporting to be so certified therein, without any further proof of such register or of any entry therein. 16. In the present case, the respondent No. 1 deposing as PW 1, did not deny that the appellant was a Christian by religion or that he had married before. On the contrary, in the cross-examination she merely stated that at the material time she was not aware that the appellant was a married man, but subsequently, she came to know of the said fact and at the material time also she was not aware that the appellant was Christian by religion, but subsequently, she heard from the local people that the appellant was Christian by religion. 17. Shri Maniklal Chatterjee who deposed as PW 2 in his evidence had stated that the appellant and the respondent No. 1 lived as husband and wife for 7 or 8 years at 70A, Chetla Road, Calcutta. In the cross-examination, no doubt he had stated that the appellant was a Hindu by religion and he had got the said sources of information from the appellant's family without naming any such family member and no one from the appellant's family was examined by the plaintiff to corroborate and/or prove the said statement of PW 2 that the appellant was a Hindu by religion. 18. The appellant deposing as DW 1, however, in his evidence had stated that he was a Christian by birth and his mother's name was Shantilata Bhattacharyya and he also produced his Baptism certificate being Exhibit B issued by the Holy Trinity Church of Calcutta. From the said certificate it would appear that the appellant was Baptised by the priest of the Holy Trinity Church, Calcutta on 15th June, 1919 and the said Exhibit B was certified by the priest in Church, Holy Trinity Church, Calcutta to be a true copy from the Register of Baptism kept at the said Church at Calcutta. '19. from Exhibit D it further appears that the appellant's mother was buried at the Bhawanipore Cemetary, Calcutta and the said burial certificate (Exhibit D) was issued by the Secretary, Bhawanipore Cemetary Committee. All these documents and the evidence of the appellant are, therefore, sufficient to establish the fact that the appellant was a Christian by birth and/or by religion. The learned trial Judge, therefore, had acted illegally under such circumstances, in holding the appellant had failed to prove that he was a Christian by birth relying entirely upon circumstantial evidence only and discarding the documentary evidence being Exhibits B and D only on the ground that Exhibit B having been issued long after the institution of the suit could not be taken as instrument of evidence under S.91 of the Indian Evidence Act, more so when the respondent No. 1 in her evidence also did not make any statement at all denying that the appellant was a Christian by birth and/or by religion. 20. On the contrary, however, the appel-lant and the respondent No. 2 who were defendants in their evidence had categorically stated inter alia, that they were married according to the Christian rites in 1945 and in support of such statement produced Exhibit A, which was an extract from the relevant Marriage Register kept by the concerned Church authorities wherein the marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. 2 according to Christian rites in 1945 was entered into. 21. Secondly, the respondent No. 1 namely the plaintiff in her evidence also did not deny that the appellant and the respondent No. 2 were married, except making a statement that she was not aware at the material time that the appellant was married man but subsequently, came to know of the said fact. Thus, when Exhibit A was produced from the proper custody, the court below should have accpeted the said exhibit as evidence of the marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. 2 without any further proof thereof as per the provisions of S. 80 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 which section appears to have some sort of over riding effect over the Indian Evidence Act so far as the entries made in the relevant Marriage Register and/ or facts stated therein are concerned, and as such, the learned Judge had acted illegally in discarding the said Exhibit A on the ground that the said certificate was produced long after the institution of the suit, and it was merely a certificate of marriage but did not prove the marriage conclusively, totally overlooking the provisions of the said S. 80. Therefore, considering the evidence of the DWs Nos. 1 and 2, as Well as the Christian Marriage Act, 1872 especially S.80 thereof, we are however, of the opinion that the marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. 2 held in the year 1945 according to the Christian rites had been conclusively proved and so also its continuity. 22. Now, if the marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. 2 held in the year 1945 according to the Christian rites and its subsistence is sufficiently proved, let us see what would be the legal effect and/or consequence of the alleged marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. 1 purported to have been held in 1967. 23. Under the Old Hindu Law there was a bar against a woman marrying second hus band while her first husband was alive unless custom permitted her, but there was no such bar against men till some States passed laws for prevention of bigamous marriage,.so as to introduce the principle of monogamy among Hindus. However, the entire legal position has been changed with the coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Under the said Act only monogamous form of marriage has been accepted as legal and that too as per certain conditions. Section 5 of the Act refer to the necessary conditions of a valid and legal Hindu marriage and clause (i) of the said S. 5 states that for a lawful marriage, neither party should have a spouse living at the time of marriage. A marriage in contravention of such conditions is null and void ipso jure, that is, void from the inception, and has to be ignored as not existing in law at all if and when such a question arises. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in (Smt. Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav). 24. Accordingly, the alleged marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. 1 purported to have been held in the year 1967 i.e., long after the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 had come into force, was thus void ipso jure, as we have already observed, that the marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. 2 held in the year 1945 according to the Christian rites and which was still subsisting on the date of the alleged marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. 1 had been sufficiently and legally proved by the appellant. Thus' the alleged marriage between the appellant and the respondent No. 1 did not confer the status of a lawful wife upon the respondent No. i at all, since the same was void ipso jure in view of such proved facts and circumstances of the case and also under the law as discussed above. 25. Now, the question, is, if the alleged marriage between the appellant and: the respondent No. 1 is not a valid marriage or in other words is void ipso jure, whether the respondent No. 1 can claim maintenance from the appellant. 26. Under the personal laws of the Hindus prior to the coming into force of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, every Hindu was bound to maintain his wife, apart from his aged parents and minor children as was said by Manu that "the aged parents, a virtuous wife, and an infant child must be maintained even by doing a hundred misdeeds." 27. No doubt, the maintenance of a wife by her husband is of course, a matter of personal obligation which attached from the moment of marriage. It is a liability created by the Hindu Law in respect of the jural relationship of husband and wife and is not an obligation arising out of an contract. At the same time, however, one should bear it in mind that marriage being a status regulated and recognised by law, not merely the factum of marriage or union that matters, but also whethe it is in accordance with the requirements of the law in order that it may be called a valid marriage. The obligation to pay maintenance, follows from marital relationship. But if under the personal law, which governs the parties, the marriage is not valid, we are unable to assign a status to the unfortunate woman in between that of. a concubine and that of a wife. We are not inclined to that view, with respect, that there is such a thing as an "illegitimate wife" though the phrase picturesquely portrays the real state of affairs, but, in law, as we think tbat there is no such status as that of an ill-legitimate wife. 28. Though instances were not wanting in Hindu Law when a particular jurat relationship was created contrary to the Shastric injunctions, the relationship so created was not null and void for all purposes, however, invalid that might be for certain purposes only, for example, a wife married from within the prohibited degrees, and though the marriage was void, she was nevertheless entitled to be maintained by her husband. 29. Even under the Old Hindu Law, a concubine who had been kept by Hindu continuously up to the time of his death, was entitled to maintenance from the property whether ancestral or acquired, of her deceased paramour. In Bai Nagubai v. Bai Manghilibai, (1926) 53 IA 153, the Privy Council held that the right of maintenance was limited to one who among the Hindus was properly called "Avaruddhastri". The Privy Council further explained the meaning of "Avaruddhastri" in the said decision observing inter alia, that an "Avaruddhastri" was a woman prohibited by the master from intercourse with other men, with an injunction to stay at home, with the object of avoiding any lapse of service. 30. The wife's right to separate residence and claim maintenance was first regulated by the Hindu Marriage Women's Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946, but that Act has now been repealed by S. 29 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. 31. The personal law regarding maintenance has been throughly changed by the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The Act supersedes the rule of the Law of Maintenance previously applied to Hindu by virtue of any text or rule of Hindu Law or by custom or usages having the force of law, and there is no provision in the said Act enabling and/or entitling a woman to claim maintenance from a person with whom she had entered into a void marriage or of whom she was a concubine or even an "Avaruddhastri", as S. 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, speaks of the maintenance of a Hindu wife by her husband and according to us the expression "wife" as used in the said S. 18 obviously means a legally married wife. The expression must, therefore, be given the meaning in which it is understood in law applicable to the parties. Moreover a bigamous marriage contacted after coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 would be void ab initio and/ or void ipso jure. The marriage of a woman in accordance with the Hindu rites with a man having a spouse living at the time of marriage and held after the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has come into force, is a nullity in the eye of law and such woman, according to us is not entitled to get any maintenance under the Hindu Adop tions and Maintenance Act, 1956 since she is not a legally married wife. The reasonings given in the decisions cited by Mr. Bhatta- charyya, accordingly appear to be quite sound and logical. 32. No doubt in the case of C. Obula Konda Reddy (supra), which is a single Bench decision, it was held inter alia, that the expression "Hindu wife" in Sec. 18 would include a wife whose marriage is solemnised though the marriage is void. In that case, the claimant was married at a time, when the husband had another wife living, and hence her marriage was void. The Court, however, observed that if the expression "Hindu wife" was interpreted as a wife whose marriage was valid, it would render S. 18(2)(d) otiose as there could be no legally wedded wife if another wife was Jiving. The learned Judge while deciding the case also referred to Ss. 13 and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and observed inter alia, that even under the provi sions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a wife whose marriage was solemnised before the commencement of the said Act was entitled to maintenance, even if her marriage was void on the ground that her husband was having another wife living on the date of the marriage and/or on the date of presentation, of the petition for divorce. We, however, do not accept the view of the learned single Judge because of our discussions as ma^e here inbefore. 33. So far as the decision in Govindrao Ranjoji Musale (supra) is concerned, according to us, the said decision did not go contrary to the principle of law as decided by the decisions cited by Mr. Bhattacharyya. In that decision, the learned Judge while discussing the scope and ambit of the provision of S. 18(1) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and S. 25(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 observed inter alia, that the words "wife" and "husband" used in sub-sec. (1) of S. 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 would include within their scope, a woman and a man professing the Hindu faith who have gone through a ceremony of marriage which would, in law, have conferred the status of a wife or husband on them but for the provisions of S. 11 read with clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of S. 5 of the said Act. The learned Judge further observed that there was no inconsistency between the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of S.25 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 and assuming that on a true construction of the said S. 18, a right is conferred only on a lawfully married Hindu wife to claim maintenance, it did not follow that the provisions of another statute whereby parties to a Hindu marriage even other than alawfully wedded Hindu wife were granted rights of maintenance would be inconsistent therewith. 34. Thus we hold that the respondent No. 1 not being a legally married wife of the appellant for the reasons as aforesaid, is not entitled to gel any maintenance from the appellant under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The judgment and decree of the trial court also cannot stand for the reasons as aforesaid and, therefore, are set aside and the appeal is allowed without, however, no order as to costs. 35. But, though the respondent No. 1 is not entitled' to get any maintenance from the appellant tinder the law in view of our findings made hereinbefore, we should not be unmindful of the fact that admittedly, the appellant lived with the respondent No. 1 for quite some years, as a result of which a child was born and it is obvious that no woman would not surrender to a man completely, for years together, unless, there is some assurance and/ or act on the part of the man which may induce the woman at least to believe that she is his wife. Tn the present case, the appellant undoubtedly had lived with the respondent No. 1 for years together and it is obvious that for his such living with the respondent No. 1, he must have induced the respondent No. 1 by his acts and conduct to believe that she was his wife and accordingly, the respondent No. 1 surrendered her to the appellant completely. For such immoral activities, the appellant should not be spared altogether, though, the damage that has been caused by the appellant to the respondent No. 1 both physically and mentally cannot be compensated in any way. We, therefore, direct the appellant No. 1 to pay to the respondent No. 1 Rs. 30,000/- as damages for his above misdeeds within four months from the date of drawing up of the decree. D.K. Jain, J.
36. I agree.
37. Appeal allowed.