Punjab-Haryana High Court
Mohan Lal vs Smt. Gurcharan Kaur And Ors. on 19 August, 2005
Equivalent citations: (2006)142PLR77
Author: Hemant Gupta
Bench: Hemant Gupta
JUDGMENT Hemant Gupta, J.
1. The tenant has filed the present revision petition aggrieved against the order of ejectment passed by the Courts below whereby he has been ordered to be ejected on the ground that he has failed to pay the arrears of rent for the period from 1.6.1977 to September, 1982.
2. One Fauja Singh was owner of the demised shop. Said Fauja Singh died on 1.6.1977. His daughter Gurcharan Kaur filed the present ejectment petition on 31.10.1983, inter alia, on the ground that the tenant is liable to be evicted on the ground of non-payment of rent which is alleged to be Rs. 300/- per month. It was the stand of the tenant that the rate of rent is, in fact, Rs. 55/- and he has been making the payment of rent to Swaran Singh after the death of Fauja Singh. In the evidence led, the landlady examined herself as AW1 and deposed that the petitioner herein was inducted as a tenant at monthly rent of Rs. 300/-. AW2 Sadha Singh and AW3 Mat Singh deposed to the similar effect. To rebut this evidence, Swaran Kaur, wife of present petitioner, appeared as RW1. Ram Lal Sehgal appeared as RW2 and deposed that the rate of rent of the demised premises was Rs. 55/- per month. RW5 Mohan deposed that the rate the demised premises is Rs. 55/- per month.
3. Both the courts below relying upon such evidence as well as certified copy of the assessment register RW5/1 held that the rate of rent of the demised shop was Rs. 55/-per month but disbelieved the stand of the petitioner that he has made payment of rent to Swaran Singh for the period from 1.6.1997 to September, 1982. Since the stand of the petitioner regarding payment of rent for the said period was disbelieved, the learned Rent Controller passed the order of ejectment on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent which finding was affirmed in appeal.
4. The only argument raised by the learned Counsel for the. petitioner is that Gurcharan Kaur has sought ejectment on various grounds including that of materially impairing of the value and utility of the demised premises; nuisance to the occupiers of the building in the neighbourhood as well as of sub-letting. It was argued that since the landlady has been disbelieved on the other ground of ejectment as well as question of rate of rent, the statement of the landlady cannot be believed that the tenant has not tendered the arrears of rent from 1.6.1977. Still, further it cannot be believed that the landlady will remain keep quite for a period of six years as she sought ejectment in October, 1983. Reliance is placed upon a decision of this Court as Mehar Singh and Anr. v. Tilak Raj, 1981(2) Rent Control Reporter 657.
5. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties at length, I do not find any merit in the present revision petition.
6. While considering similar arguments that once the testimony of a witness is disbelieved on one aspect, the entire testimony of the witness is to be disbelieved was rejected. It was found that the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" has no application in India. Relying upon the judgments of the Supreme Court as Ram Udgar Singh v. State of Bihar, , Vatal Nagaraj v. Dayanand Sagar, and SGP Committee v. M.P. Dass Chela (dead) by LRs., (1998-2) 119 P.L.R. 547 (S.C.), it was held by this Court in Civil Revision No. 2242 of 1989 Joginder Singh v. Virender Kumar (2005-3) 141 P.L.R. 495 :decided on August 5, 2005 to the following effect:
On the basis of aforesaid judgments, the petitioner wants to apply the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything). It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus" has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The said maxim has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be discarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances. An attempt has to be made to separate the grain from the chaff and truth from falsehood.
7. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the said argument raised by learned Counsel for the petitioner.
8. The argument that ejectment petition has been filed after six years is against not tenable in law. There is no period specified under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, in respect of which the landlord can seek ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent. It is well settled that unless there is some embargo on the right of the landlord to seek arrears in an ejectment petition, the rent due include the entire rent. Admittedly, the landlady was resident of Ranchi. Therefore, mere delay in seeking ejectment will not disentitle the landlady to seek ejectment.
9. Both the Courts below have found that the stand propounded by the petitioner of payment of rent to Swaran Singh is not proved. Said Swaran Singh has not been examined by the petitioner. The argument that Swaran Singh was related to Fauja Singh and, therefore, could not be examined by the tenant is misconceived. It was the specified stand of the petitioner that rent has been paid to Swarant Singh. It was for the petitioner to prove such assertion. Swaran Singh was the best person to depose about the receipt of rent. Having failed to produce such witness, the petitioner has failed to prove his assertion. Therefore, I do not find any illegality in the finding recorded by the Courts below that the petitioner has failed to prove that payment of rent has been made for the period from 1.6.1977 to September, 1982. It is a finding of fact recorded on the basis of evidence led by both the parties before the learned trial Court.
10. No other point was urged.
11. Before parting, it has been noticed that the petitioner was dispossessed on 20.10.2000 in execution of warrants of possession during the pendency of revision petition.
12. In view of the above, I do not find any illegality or material iregularity in the findings recorded by the Courts below warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.