Delhi District Court
Bhai Manjit Singh vs Radhika Chowdhary Through Her Legal ... on 12 August, 2025
DLND010014472025 Page 1 of 16
Cr Appeal / 122/2025
Bhai Manjeet Singh
Vs.
Radhika Chowdhury
(Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor)
IN THE COURT OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-05
NEW DELHI DISTRICT : PATIALA HOUSE COURTS : NEW
DELHI
Criminal Revision No. 122/2025
In the matter of :-
Bhai Manjit Singh
Son of Late Sardar Inderjit Singh
R/o E-2, Khan Market,
New Delhi-110003
.....Petitioner/Accused
Versus
Radhika Chowdhury
(Deceased through Legal Representative
Ms. Shreya Kapoor)
Daughter of Late Deepak Chowdhury
R/o Flat No. 1359, Sector C, Pocket 1,
Vasant Kunj, New Delhi-110070
.....Respondent/Complainant
CRIMINAL REVISION UNDER SECTION 438 BNSS
Date of institution : 04.03.2025
Date when judgment reserved : 12.08.2025
Date of Judgment : 12.08.2025
JUDGMENT
Introduction
1. This criminal revision petition has been instituted under Section 438 of BNSS, by the petitioner, Bhai Manjit Singh, challenging the legality and propriety of the impugned order dated 25.11.2024 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (NI Act)-01, Patiala House Court, New SAURABH Digitally signed by SAURABH PARTAP PARTAP SINGH LALER SINGH Date: 2025.08.12 LALER 17:37:38 +0530 DLND010014472025 Page 2 of 16 Cr Appeal / 122/2025 Bhai Manjeet Singh Vs. Radhika Chowdhury (Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor) Delhi, in Complaint Case No. 1610 of 2023 titled Radhika Chowdhury v. Bhai Manjit Singh. The impugned order permitted the legal representative of the deceased complainant to introduce additional documents on record during the complainant evidence stage. The petitioner asserts that the order is afflicted with jurisdictional infirmities, procedural irregularities, and substantive errors, thereby necessitating revisional intervention to prevent miscarriage of justice. The respondent, represented by the legal heir Ms. Shreya Kapoor, contests the petition on grounds of non-maintainability, emphasizing that the order is interlocutory in nature and, in any event, justified on merits to ensure a fair adjudication. Arguments from both parties have been heard, the trial court records perused, and relevant judicial precedents examined. This Court now proceeds to adjudicate the matter systematically.
Brief Facts
2. The genesis of the dispute lies in a complaint under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act), initiated by the late Radhika Chowdhury against the petitioner before the Metropolitan Magistrate, Andheri, Mumbai, in 2021. The complaint alleged that the petitioner issued a cheque bearing No. 066576 dated 02.04.2021 for Rs. 3,63,44,000/- drawn on Punjab National Bank, Khan Market Branch, in discharge of a legally enforceable debt, which was dishonoured upon presentation on 07.05.2021 due to "account closed." A statutory demand notice dated 21.05.2021 was issued, eliciting a reply from the petitioner on 12.06.2021 denying liability and claiming the cheque was misplaced, with the bank account closed around late July 2020 and a police complaint lodged on 30.03.2021 regarding the lost cheques.
SAURABH Digitally signed by
SAURABH PARTAP
PARTAP SINGH LALER
SINGH Date: 2025.08.12
LALER 17:37:54 +0530
DLND010014472025 Page 3 of 16
Cr Appeal / 122/2025
Bhai Manjeet Singh
Vs.
Radhika Chowdhury
(Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor)
3. Summons were issued by the Mumbai court on 04.08.2021, prompting the petitioner to file a revision petition. The complainant prayed for transfer of both the complaint and the revision to New Delhi before Hon'ble the Supreme Court, which was granted vide order dated 28.02.2023. Post- transfer, the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala House, dismissed the petitioner's revision on 07.06.2023, upheld by Hon'ble Delhi High Court on 12.03.2024 in Crl.M.C.
4. The complainant expired on 31.07.2023, leading to substitution of her daughter, Ms. Shreya Kapoor, as legal representative vide order dated 22.12.2023 under Section 302 read with Section 256 CrPC. An application for interim compensation under Section 143A NI Act was filed on 12.01.2024, seeking 20% of the cheque amount (Rs. 72,68,800/-), which was partially allowed on 16.12.2024 for 10% (Rs. 36,34,400/-), though stayed by the Additional Sessions Judge on 01.03.2025.
5. The trial advanced to the complainant evidence (CE) stage. On 28.08.2024, fresh evidence was tendered, followed by an application on 11.09.2024 for additional documents, which was withdrawn. A renewed application dated 01.10.2024 under Section 311 CrPC read with Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act sought to introduce WhatsApp conversations, transcripts of phone/video recordings, and Section 65B certificates, asserting these evidenced the petitioner's admissions of liability as alluded to in Para 18 of the original complaint. The impugned order allowed this application, scheduling CE and orders on the interim compensation application for 16.12.2024.
SAURABH Digitally signed by
SAURABH PARTAP
PARTAP SINGH LALER
SINGH Date: 2025.08.12
17:38:05 +0530
LALER
DLND010014472025 Page 4 of 16
Cr Appeal / 122/2025
Bhai Manjeet Singh
Vs.
Radhika Chowdhury
(Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor)
Impugned Order
6. The impugned order dated 25.11.2024 is concise yet reasoned, stating as under:
"...An application for bringing additional document filed on behalf of the complainant is pending consideration.
Same be taken on record. Copy supplied.
The only argument of the counsel for the accused is that the additional documents have been filed after three years of recording of pre summoning evidence of the complainant. Ld.counsel for the accused further argued that the application on behalf of the complainant does not mention the provision under which it has been filed.
Per contra, it is submitted by LR of the complainant that in the meanwhile, the case was transferred by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India from Mumbai to Delhi and moreover, the complainant in the present case passed away and therefore, there is a delay in filing the additional documents. It is further submitted by LR of the complainant that the present application has been moved U/s 311 r/w 165 of Evidence Act and has been clearly mentioned in the application.
Arguments heard. Considering the submissions made and the fact that since the complainant evidence has not been closed, the complainant is not devoid of an opportunity to bring additional documents on record, if they are just and necessary to prove the complainant's case. The application moved on behalf of the complainant for bringing in additional documents is allowed as the documents appear necessary for the complainant to prove its case...."
(emphasis supplied) Though not explicitly referencing Section 311 CrPC, the order aligns with the application's invocation thereof, reflecting the Magistrate's assessment that the documents--electronic records of purported admissions by the petitioner and his son Vikramjit Singh--are essential for substantiating the transaction and rebutting the defence of cheque misuse. The order was rendered post-hearing arguments, ensuring procedural fairness, and SAURABH Digitally signed by SAURABH PARTAP PARTAP SINGH LALER SINGH Date: 2025.08.12 LALER 17:38:16 +0530 DLND010014472025 Page 5 of 16 Cr Appeal / 122/2025 Bhai Manjeet Singh Vs. Radhika Chowdhury (Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor) advances the trial without concluding it, thereby preserving the adversarial process.
Grounds of Revision
7. The petitioner impugns the order on multifaceted grounds, including:
(a) Absence of invocation of a specific legal provision in the application, rendering it procedurally defective.
(b) Unjustified delay of approximately three years from pre-
summoning evidence, absent cogent reasons, violating principles of diligence.
(c) Prior withdrawal of a similar application on 11.09.2024, precluding entertainment of the fresh one under res judicata or analogous doctrines.
(d) The legal representative's affidavit claiming personal knowledge of events, yet failing to produce documents earlier, indicating negligence or afterthought.
(e) Inconsistencies in affidavits, particularly regarding primary correspondence undermining credibility.
(f) Risk of document fabrication due to protracted delay, necessitating exclusion to safeguard evidentiary integrity.
8. The petitioner prays for setting aside of the order, supplemented by written submissions highlighting judicial precedents. Scope of Revision under section 438 BNSS (397 Cr.P.C 1973)
9. Prior to adjudicating the case on its merits, it is essential to delineate the scope and extent of these proceedings as well as the authority vested in this court under section 438 BNSS.
10. Section 438 BNSS read as under:
"438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.
(1)The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, Digitally signed by SAURABH SAURABH PARTAP PARTAP SINGH LALER SINGH LALER Date: 2025.08.12 17:38:31 +0530 DLND010014472025 Page 6 of 16 Cr Appeal / 122/2025 Bhai Manjeet Singh Vs. Radhika Chowdhury (Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor) legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation.-All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them."
11. The wording of the section is verbatim the same as of section 397 Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
12. A plain reading of Section 438 of the BNSS clearly indicates that Section 438(1) allows aggrieved parties to challenge the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order issued by the trial court. Such challenges can be brought before a revisional court, namely the High Court or the Sessions Judge, as Section 438 confers concurrent jurisdiction upon both judicial authorities.
13. Section 438 (2) BNSS prohibits the revision powers under Section 438(1) BNSS from being used on interlocutory orders in appeals, enquiries, trials, or other proceedings. This creates an explicit legislative bar against revising such orders.
14. It is well settled law that scope of revisional jurisdiction is limited to the extent of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order passed by the Trial Court and jurisdiction under section 438 BNSS to be exercised for setting right a patent defect or an Digitally signed by SAURABH SAURABH PARTAP PARTAP SINGH LALER SINGH LALER Date: 2025.08.12 17:38:46 +0530 DLND010014472025 Page 7 of 16 Cr Appeal / 122/2025 Bhai Manjeet Singh Vs. Radhika Chowdhury (Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor) error of jurisdiction or law cannot be equated with the power of Appellate Court.
15. As regards the scope of section 397 Cr.P.C (analogous to section 438 BNSS) in judgment titled as 'Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander', (2012) 9 SCC 460, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India observed as under:-
"8. ....Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law . There has to be a well- founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinize the orders, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law......."
16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in 'New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Krishna Kumar Pandey', Crl. Appeal No.1852 of 2019 decided on 06.12.2019, made the following observations :
"8. The scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court (or Sessions Court) under Section 397 Cr.P.C, is limited to the extent of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order passed by an inferior Court. The revisional Court is entitled to look into the regularity of any proceeding before an inferior Court. As reiterated by this Court in a number of cases, the purpose of this revisionsal power is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law."
17. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Sanjaysinh Ramarao Chavan Vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123 held:
"14. .........Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court SAURABH Digitally signed by SAURABH PARTAP PARTAP SINGH LALER SINGH Date: 2025.08.12 LALER 17:38:56 +0530 DLND010014472025 Page 8 of 16 Cr Appeal / 122/2025 Bhai Manjeet Singh Vs. Radhika Chowdhury (Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor) to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction". (emphasis supplied).
18. Scope of revision has been explained in para 9 of judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi Taron Mohan Vs. State & Anr. 2021 SCC OnLine 312 which reads as under:
"9. The scope of interference in a revision petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case. A court in revision considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence. "
19. The precise purpose of Revision is to examine the correctness, legality and propriety of the order in question and to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. Needless to say, that the power of revision needs to be exercised fairly, rationally and judiciously in order to put right any manifest error of law or jurisdiction.
Maintainability of Revision
20. The threshold inquiry pertains to maintainability under Section 438(2) BNSS/Section 397(2) CrPC, which prohibits revision against interlocutory SAURABH Digitally signed by SAURABH PARTAP PARTAP SINGH LALER SINGH Date: 2025.08.12 LALER 17:39:10 +0530 DLND010014472025 Page 9 of 16 Cr Appeal / 122/2025 Bhai Manjeet Singh Vs. Radhika Chowdhury (Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor) orders. An order is interlocutory if it does not finally resolve the case or determine substantive rights, merely facilitating procedural progression.
21. The main question which arises for consideration is: whether the order passed under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. is an interlocutory order or not?
22. In this regard catena of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court has settled the legal principle while holding that the meaning of the two words "final" and "interlocutory" has to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. However, generally speaking, a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final and simultaneously, an interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, if the decision on an issue puts an end to the proceedings, the order is undoubtedly a final one, but if the proceeding is still left alive and has yet to be tried in the ordinary way, no finality could be attached to the order.
23. The term "interlocutory order" as mentioned in Section 438(2) BNSS [Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.] denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties. An order which is pure and simple interlocutory order, which do not decide anything finally is to be considered as interlocutory order and no revision against that interlocutory order is maintainable under Section 438(1) BNSS [Section 397(1) Cr.P.C.] in view of the express bar imposed under Section 438(2) BNSS [Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.].
SAURABH Digitally signed by
SAURABH PARTAP
PARTAP SINGH LALER
SINGH Date: 2025.08.12
LALER 17:39:20 +0530
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Cr Appeal / 122/2025
Bhai Manjeet Singh
Vs.
Radhika Chowdhury
(Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor)
24. There are three categories of orders that a Court can pass- final, intermediate and interlocutory. There is no doubt that in respect of a final order, a Court can exercise its revision jurisdiction- that is in respect of a final order of acquittal or conviction. There is equally no doubt that in respect of an interlocutory order, the Court cannot exercise its revision jurisdiction. As far as an intermediate order is concerned, the Court can exercise its revision jurisdiction since it is not an interlocutory order. An intermediate order is one which is interlocutory order in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order.
25. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Amar Nath & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr.", {(1977) 4 SCC 137} that:-
"The main question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the connotation of the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in sub- section (2) of Section 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster's New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt SAURABH Digitally signed by SAURABH PARTAP PARTAP SINGH LALER SINGH Date: 2025.08.12 LALER 17:39:31 +0530 DLND010014472025 Page 11 of 16 Cr Appeal / 122/2025 Bhai Manjeet Singh Vs. Radhika Chowdhury (Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor) amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397 (2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court".
26. It was also held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "V.C. Shukla Vs. State through C.B.I.", (AIR 1980 SC 962] that:-
"(1) that an order which does not determine the rights of the parties but only one aspect of the suit or the trial is an interlocutory order; (2) that the concept of interlocutory order has to be explained, in contradistinction to a final order.
In other words, if an order is not a final order, it would be an interlocutory order;
(3) that one of the tests generally accepted by the English Courts and the Federal Court is to see if the order is decided in one way, it may terminate the proceedings but if decided in another way, then the proceedings would continue; because, in our opinion, the term 'interlocutory order' in the Criminal Procedure Code has been used in a much wider sense so as to include even intermediate or quasi final orders;
(4) that an order passed by the Special Court discharging the accused would undoubtedly be a final order inasmuch as it finally decides the rights of the parties and puts an end to the controversy and thereby terminates the entire proceedings before the court so that nothing is left to be done by the court thereafter;
(5) that even if the Act does not permit an appeal against an interlocutory order the accused is not left without any remedy because in suitable cases, the accused can always move this Court in its jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution even against an order framing charges against the accused. Thus, it cannot be said that by not allowing an appeal against an order framing charges, the Act works serious injustice to the accused."
27. It was also held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case titled as "Poonam Chand Jain and Anr. Vs. Fazru", (2004) 13 SCC 269 that:-
"Wharton's Law Lexicon (14th Edn. p. 529) defines interlocutory order thus:
'An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties.' Thus, summing up the natural and logical meaning of an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which does not terminate the SAURABH Digitally signed by SAURABH PARTAP PARTAP SINGH LALER SINGH Date: 2025.08.12 LALER 17:39:40 +0530 DLND010014472025 Page 12 of 16 Cr Appeal / 122/2025 Bhai Manjeet Singh Vs. Radhika Chowdhury (Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor) proceedings or finally decides the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order. In other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or a particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which does not however conclude the trial at all."
28. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye Vs. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order. Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind - an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour.
29. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed has the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceeding would continue.
30. The view expressed in Amar Nath (supra) and Madhu Limaye (supra), was followed in K.K. Patel V. State of Gujarat (2000) (6) SCC 195 wherein a revision petition was filed challenging the taking of cognizance and issuance of a process. It was said:
"11. ..... It is now well-nigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397 (2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether Digitally signed by SAURABH SAURABH PARTAP PARTAP SINGH LALER SINGH LALER Date: 2025.08.12 17:39:49 +0530 DLND010014472025 Page 13 of 16 Cr Appeal / 122/2025 Bhai Manjeet Singh Vs. Radhika Chowdhury (Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor) such order was passed during the interim stage (vide Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharastra, V.C. Shukla v. State and Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam). The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, it would result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code. In the present case, if the objection raised by the appellants were upheld by the Court the entire prosecution proceedings would have been terminated. Hence, as per the said standard, the order was revisable."
31. It was held by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as "Neelam Mahajan and Anr. Vs. The State & Ors.", (2016) 229 DLT (CN) 29 that:-
"........ In this regard catena of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has settled the legal principle while holding that the meaning of the two words "final"
and "interlocutory" has to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. However, generally speaking, a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final and simultaneously, an interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, if the decision on an issue puts an end to the suit, the order is undoubtedly a final one but if the suit is still left alive and has yet to be tried in the ordinary way, no finality could be attached to the order."
32. On perusal of impugned order, in light of the aforesaid judgments, it is clear that same is neither final nor intermediate but the same is purely an interlocutory order. The impugned order cannot said to be a final or intermediate order in any manner. If the impugned order is set aside, then there would be no culmination of the proceedings. This interpretation is fortified by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam (2009) 5 SCC 153, where orders under Section 311 CrPC were deemed interlocutory, barring revision.
33. In Sethuraman (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held as under:-
"Secondly, what was not realised was that the orders passed by the trial court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 CrPC, were interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2) CrPC. The trial court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the SAURABH Digitally signed by SAURABH PARTAP PARTAP SINGH LALER SINGH Date: 2025.08.12 LALER 17:40:01 +0530 DLND010014472025 Page 14 of 16 Cr Appeal / 122/2025 Bhai Manjeet Singh Vs. Radhika Chowdhury (Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor) respondent-accused and the only defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that the appellant complainant had falsely used one such cheque. The trial court also recorded a finding that the documents were not necessary. This order did not, in any manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both the orders i.e. one on the application under Section 91 CrPC for production of documents and other on the application under Section 311 CrPC for recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable. Under such circumstances, the learned judge could not have interfered in his revisional jurisdiction. The impugned judgment is clearly incorrect in law and would have to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed."
34. This ratio was reiterated in Situ Ramanath Shastri v. IFCI Factors Ltd. (CRL.M.C. 586/2021, Delhi High Court, 30.08.2022), emphasizing non- interference in evidential management absent finality.
35. It is trite law that an order passed under Section 311 Cr.P.C. is purely an interlocutory order and a Criminal Revision against an interlocutory order is clearly barred under Section 438(2) BNSS [397(2) CrPC]. Therefore, the present revision petition filed against order dated 25.11.2024 passed by the Ld. Magistrate allowing additional evidence under Section 311 Cr.P.C, is thus, not maintainable.
Discussion on Merits
36. Notwithstanding non-maintainability, the impugned order is unassailable on merits. Section 311 CrPC confers expansive discretion on trial courts to summon or recall evidence at any stage if "essential to the just decision of the case," as mandated in its latter part. This power, obligatory when truth demands, must be exercised judiciously to rectify omissions, as elucidated in Natasha Singh v. CBI (State) (2013) 5 SCC 741:
SAURABH Digitally signed by SAURABH PARTAP PARTAP SINGH LALER SINGH Date: 2025.08.12 LALER 17:40:10 +0530 DLND010014472025 Page 15 of 16 Cr Appeal / 122/2025 Bhai Manjeet Singh Vs. Radhika Chowdhury (Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor) " 14. The scope and object of the provision is to enable the Court to determine the truth and to render a just decision after discovering all relevant facts and obtaining proper proof of such facts, to arrive at a just decision of the case.
Power must be exercised judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as any improper or capricious exercise of such power may lead to undesirable results. An application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. must not be allowed only to fill up a lacuna in the case of the prosecution, or of the defence, or to the disadvantage of the accused, or to cause serious prejudice to the defence of the accused, or to give an unfair advantage to the opposite party. Further, the additional evidence must not be received as a disguise for retrial, or to change the nature of the case against either of the parties. Such a power must be exercised, provided that the evidence that is likely to be tendered by a witness, is germane to the issue involved. An opportunity of rebuttal however, must be given to the other party.
The power conferred under Section 311 Cr.P.C. must therefore, be invoked by the Court only in order to meet the ends of justice, for strong and valid reasons, and the same must be exercised with great caution and circumspection.
The very use of words such as 'any Court', 'at any stage", or 'or any enquiry, trial or other proceedings', 'any person' and 'any such person' clearly spells out that the provisions of this section have been expressed in the widest possible terms, and do not limit the discretion of the Court in any way. There is thus no escape if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case. The determinative factor should therefore be, whether the summoning/recalling of the said witness is in fact, essential to the just decision of the case."
37. The additional documents--transcripts and electronic records evidencing admissions--align with Para 18 of the complaint and bolster presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act, per Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441, shifting the onus to the accused post-dishonour. Filed at the stage of complainant evidence, they occasion no prejudice. The petitioner retains full opportunity for cross-examination, rebuttal under Section 313 CrPC, and forensic scrutiny, if fabrication is alleged. Considering the contents of the complaint and the defence presented by the accused, it is evident that the referenced documents or electronic records are essential SAURABH Digitally signed by SAURABH PARTAP PARTAP SINGH LALER SINGH Date: 2025.08.12 17:40:22 +0530 LALER DLND010014472025 Page 16 of 16 Cr Appeal / 122/2025 Bhai Manjeet Singh Vs. Radhika Chowdhury (Deceased through LR Ms. Shreya Kapoor) for a just resolution of the case.Delay, while noted, is not fatal under Section 311, which imposes no limitation
38. Accordingly, no patent error, illegality, or abuse of process is discernible in the impugned order.
Final Order
39. In light of the foregoing analysis, the criminal revision petition is hereby dismissed as non-maintainable under Section 438(2) BNSS [Section 397(2) CrPC], being directed against an interlocutory order. Even on merits, no grounds for interference are established. The trial court is directed to expedite proceedings in accordance with law, ensuring fairness to both parties.
40. Trial Court Records shall be remitted forthwith along with copy of this judgment.
41. No order as to costs.
Digitally signed by SAURABH SAURABH PARTAP
Announced in the open Court PARTAP SINGH LALER
on 12th of August 2025 SINGH LALER Date: 2025.08.12
17:40:35 +0530
(Saurabh Partap Singh Laler)
ASJ-05 New Delhi
Patiala House Courts
Delhi 12.08.2025