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Tripura High Court

Convict vs The State Of Tripura on 15 June, 2020

Author: Arindam Lodh

Bench: Akil Kureshi, Arindam Lodh

                               Page 1 of 32




                     HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
                           AGARTALA
                      CRL.A.(J) NO.29 OF 2018

   Sri Sajal Sarkar,
   S/O Sri Arun Sarkar,
   Resident of Durbasakhala, P.S. Nepaltilla,
   District: Dhalai, Tripura.
                                            ----Convict-appellant(s)
                                   Versus
   The State of Tripura, represented by the
   Secretary, Home Department,
   Government of Tripura.
                                                   ----Respondent(s)
   For appellant(s)            :      Mr. Raju Datta, Advocate
   For respondent(s)           :      Mr. Sumit Debnath, Addl. P.P.

   Date of hearing             :      09.06.2020

   Date of delivery of
   Judgment & Order            :      15.06.2020
   Whether fit for reporting   :      YES


        HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. AKIL KURESHI
            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH

                      JUDGMENT & ORDER

(Arindam Lodh, J)


              The instant appeal assails the correctness of the

   judgment dated 02.03.2012, passed by the learned Sessions

   Judge, North Tripura, Kailashahar in case No. Sessions Trial
                              Page 2 of 32




58(NT/K) of 2011, convicting the appellant for the offence

punishable    under   Sections   376(1)     and   302   of   IPC   and

sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine

of Rs.10,000/- for the offence under Section 302 of IPC and

also sentencing him to suffer imprisonment for 10(ten) years

for commission of offence under Section 376(1) of IPC and to

pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- with default stipulation and it was

directed that both the sentences shall run concurrently.


2.           FIR No.10 of 2011 dated 08.07.2011 was registered

by the Officer-In-Charge of Nepaltilla Police Station on the basis

of a complaint lodged by one Sankar Sinha, father of the

deceased, inter alia, stating that on 08.07.2011, he along with

his family members went to Jagannath Temple, and at that time

none but his elder daughter was alone in the house. Someone

raped her and killed her by strangulating her neck with

synthetic napkin and left her on the bed in naked condition.


2.1.         On the basis of the said information the investigation

was proceeded. In course of investigation, the appellant was

arrested. The police seized the wearing apparels of the

deceased-daughter of the informant(PW1). The bed-sheet, the
                            Page 3 of 32




blanket, the napkin and other articles were also seized by the

police. Inquest was prepared, post-mortem was conducted, the

vaginal swab, saliva and all the seized articles, including the

wearing apparels of the deceased, were sent to the State

Forensic Science Laboratory(SFSL) for report.


2.3.       After conclusion of investigation, the investigating

officer, being satisfied with the evidence and materials on

record submitted charge-sheet before the Court of learned

Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, who committed the case to the

Court of learned Sessions Judge for the purpose of trial.


2.4.       Being committed, the learned Sessions Judge framed

charges against the appellant under Sections 448/376(1)/302

of IPC.


           The appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be

tried.


2.5.       To establish the charges, the prosecution examined

17 witnesses and introduced some documents, including the

medical examination report of the victim-girl and the Forensic

Laboratory test report.
                             Page 4 of 32




2.6.       After the conclusion of recording of evidence, the

accused was examined under Section 313 of CrPC, where he

was noticed in regard to all the incriminating evidence and

materials revealed against him to which he claimed to be

innocent. However, he did not adduce any evidence in his

defence.


2.7.       Having heard the learned counsels and on perusal of

the records, the learned Sessions Judge found the appellant

guilty of committing offence under Sections 376(1) and 302 of

IPC and sentenced the appellant as afore-stated.


           However, the appellant was acquitted from the

charge under Section 448 of IPC.


2.8.       Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the

instant appeal before this Court.


3.         We have heard Mr. Raju Datta, learned counsel

appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. Sumit Debnath,

learned Addl. P.P. appearing for the State respondent.


4.         Mr.   Datta,   learned    counsel   for   the   appellant

contended that the prosecution has failed to establish the case
                           Page 5 of 32




of rape and murder as levelled against the appellant. He

assiduously argued that from a bare reading of the prosecution

evidence it would be revealed that the statements of the

witnesses were unworthy and without any credence. There are

lots of improvements in narrating the incident, involving the

appellant in connection with the crime and many statements

were made for the first time in course of adducing evidence

before the trial Court.


           Learned counsel had urged to set aside the judgment

of conviction passed by the learned Sessions Judge.


5.         On the other hand, Mr. Debnath, learned Addl. P.P.

contended that all the circumstances, as emerged from the

evidence of the prosecution witnesses pointed towards the guilt

of the appellant alone and none else. Relying upon the evidence

of PWs 2, 4, 5 and 14, he contended that the appellant had no

business to ask PWs 2 and 4, who would come to Jagannath

Temple and who would stay in the home.


           Next, the learned Addl. P.P. contended that PW5 in

his examination-in-chief deposed that he had seen the accused
                            Page 6 of 32




running away from the house of the informant, the father of the

deceased. PW14 deposed that at about 12.00 pm, he noticed

the appellant to enter into the house of his brother, Sankar

Sinha(PW1).


           Defending the judgment of the learned trial Judge,

learned Addl. P.P. had urged to maintain the conviction and

sentence, as imposed upon the appellant.


6.         In view of the aforesaid submissions of the learned

counsels appearing for the parties, we have perused the

evidence and materials on record to bring home the charges

levelled against the accused-appellant.


6.1.       PW1, Sri Sankar Sinha, the father of the deceased-

victim, is the informant of the incident. He deposed that on

08.07.2011, he along with his wife and two daughters went to

Jagannath Temple. His elder daughter, the deceased herein

could not accompany them as she had been suffering from

some ailments. They returned home at about 3.30 pm when he

saw the door was closed from outside. He further deposed that

he was hungry and after opening the door he saw his daughter
                            Page 7 of 32




was lying on the cot, but he did not notice her carefully. In the

meanwhile, his second daughter had called the deceased by

touching her body when she found that her body was tied with

hard substance. She called PW1 and when he went there he

saw the throat of the victim was bounded by a gamcha(napkin)

tightly. He noticed bloodstains in her mouth and ears. He also

noticed bloodstains on the bed and when he removed the

blanket he saw her in a naked condition. He found her pachra

was kept in another cot with bloodstain. Her panty was also

seen by the side of her pachra.


           Next, he deposed that his daughter was raped and

murdered as he had seen her.


           He further deposed that on that fateful day, his

brother Bimal Sinha(PW4) had called the appellant, Sajal Sarkar

in their house to prepare firewood for puja purpose, when Sajal,

the appellant herein, asked his wife who would stay in the

room, and who would go to the puja. He further deposed that

Sajal was seen by the witnesses while moving in the house and

his departure.
                             Page 8 of 32




           Thereafter, he wrote the ejahar and submitted the

same to the Officer-In-Charge of the police station. He

identified the ejahar and also identified the seized articles, like

pachra, panty, bloodstained bed-sheet, napkin, etc.


           In   his   cross-examination,     this   witness    was

confronted in regard to his statement which he made in his

examination-in-chief that the appellant had enquired in the

morning who would stay in the house and who would go to the

puja. When his attention was drawn to his 161 CrPC statement,

no such statement was found. He admitted that he did not

mention in the ejahar that his younger brother(PW4) had called

the appellant for wood-cutting.


6.2.       PW2, Smt. Emai Sinha is the mother of the victim

who deposed that on 08.07.2011 she went with her husband to

Jagannath Temple. The appellant came to her and asked her

who would go to the temple and who would stay in the home.

When she told him that her daughter would stay as she had

been suffering from dysentery and they would go to the temple.

She further deposed that at about 4.00 pm she returned home

and saw the dead body of her daughter-Manika.
                            Page 9 of 32




           She further stated that her sister-in-law, Rekha

Sinha had seen the appellant to enter into their house. She

further deposed, on that day the appellant came to their house

for wood-cutting as he was called by Bimal Sinha(PW4).


           Being   confronted    with     cross-examination,   she

admitted that she did not tell darogababu that Rekha(PW14)

had seen the appellant to enter into their house. She also

admitted that she did not tell the Officer-In-Charge that Bimal

Sinha(PW4) had called the appellant for wood-cutting.


6.3.       PW3, Sri Rasaraj Singha deposed that he had seen

the dead body of the victim.


6.4.       PW4, Sri Bimal Sinha, the younger brother of the

informant deposed that he called the appellant to prepare

firewood. He further deposed that the appellant asked him who

would go to Jagannath Temple and who would stay at home.


           In his cross-examination, this witness admitted that

he did not tell the investigating officer that the appellant asked

him that who would go to the temple and who would stay in the

house.
                             Page 10 of 32




6.5.         PW5, Sri Kishore Sinha deposed that on 08.07.2011

at 2-2.15 pm while he was going to market he saw the

appellant running away from the gate of the informant. When

he called him and asked why he was running from the house of

the informant? He further deposed that in reply to his query the

appellant told him that there was none in his house.


6.6.         PW6, Sri Kajal Deb Roy is a witness in presence of

whom the appellant had confessed his guilt on 17.07.2011 at

about 12 noon.


6.7.         PW7, Sri Mrinal Kanti Sinha is also a witness of the

confessional statement. He deposed that on 15.07.2011 at

about 10-11 am, the confessional statement was made by the

appellant.


6.8.         PW8, PW9 and PW10 are not the material witnesses

in relation to the crime.


6.9.         PW11, Sri Pranab pal is also a witness to the

confessional statement.


6.10.        PW12 is not a material witness.
                             Page 11 of 32




6.11.        PW13,   Sri   Sukhomoy    Sarkar   deposed   that   on

08.07.2011 at about 2-2.30 pm while he was going to his land

for grazing of cattle, he saw the appellant going towards Laljuri

road very fast. Being asked, the appellant told him that he was

going to search cattle. He further deposed that he found

suspicious movement of the appellant.


6.12.        PW14, Mst. Rekha Sinha is the younger sister of the

informant, Sankar Sinha. She deposed that on 08.07.2011 she

was working at the hospital wherefrom the house of her brother

was visible. She further deposed that at about 12.00 pm she

noticed that the appellant was entering into the house of her

brother, but, she did not take it otherwise as the appellant was

their neighbour. Proceeding further, she deposed that while

returning to home she saw the door of the house of her brother

was closed as they all went to Jagannath temple. Further, she

deposed that she noticed a pair of chappal belonging to the

appellant.


             In her cross-examination she denied that chappal

was not left by the appellant or that she did not see the chappal

outside. She further revealed in her cross-examination that the
                               Page 12 of 32




investigating officer recorded her statement after 4/5 days of

the occurrence.


6.13.        PW15 is the police witness.


6.14.        PW16, Sri Ratan Debbarma is the investigating

officer of the case. He deposed that after receipt of the

information he went to the place of occurrence, seized the

wearing apparels by preparing seizure list along with blanket,

bed-sheet, prepared site-map and recorded the statements of

one witness, namely Rangsaibati Reang. He arranged for

postmortem of the body of the deceased, arrested the accused

person and also arranged potency test of the accused. He also

seized the wearing apparels of the accused(Exbt.2 series).


             He further deposed that during police custody the

accused   had     confessed    his   guilt    and   he   recorded   the

confessional statement in presence of the witnesses. PW16 also

recorded the statements of the witnesses of the confessional

statement.


             He further deposed that he sent the vaginal swab,

the sample of saliva and bloodstained articles to the SFSL. He
                                Page 13 of 32




also sent the samples of semen/spermatozoa of the accused to

the SFSL. He received the reports thereafter.


6.15.      PW17, Dr. Subhankar Bhattacharjee, the Medical

Officer who conducted the postmortem examination over the

dead body of the victim. He found several injury marks on the

person of the deceased. He opined that before death, sexual

intercourse was done forcibly. As PW18 he further deposed that

one Dr. P.N. Darlong had examined the accused, who was found

to be capable for sexual intercourse.


7.         We have carefully examined the reports of the SFSL

where the vaginal swab of the deceased and other seized

articles of the deceased were scientifically examined. It would

be relevant to reproduce the details of the report:


           "Details of parcel(s) and exhibits(s) received:


           Parcel                      Description of Exhibit(s)
            No.

             01     One sealed wooden parcel put into a pitch board box
                    covered with cloth contained the following exhibits:

             1      Exhibit-     One white paper envelope contained a stick
                    E7           wrapped with cotton said to contain saliva of
                                 deceased, Manika Sinha

             2      Exhibit-     One white paper envelope contained a small
                    E8           piece of hard structure said to be the nail of
                 Page 14 of 32




                  deceased, Manika Sinha

3    Exhibit-     One white paper envelope contained some
     E9           black strands said to be the hair of deceased,
                  Manika Sinha

4    Exhibit-     One white paper envelope contained a stick
     E10          wrapped with cotton said to be the vaginal
                  swap of deceased, Manika Sinha

5    Exhibit-A    One sealed plastic container contained a small
                  piece of gauze cloth having dark brown stain
                  said to be the blood sample of accused person,
                  Sajal Sarkar.

6    Exhibit-B    One sealed plastic container contained a small
                  piece of gauze cloth said to contain semen
                  sample of the accused person, Sajal Sarkar.

7    Exhibit-C    One sealed plastic container contained three
                  pieces of black strands said to be the public
                  hair of accused person, Sajal Sarkar.

8    Exhibit-D    One sealed plastic container contained some
                  black strands said to be the plucked public hair
                  of accused person, Sajal Sarkar.

9    Exhibit-     One red color top (ganjee) said to be the
     F1           wearing apparel of the deceased, Manika
                  Sinha.

10   Exhibit-     One black-white-red color (check) gamchha
     F2           said to be seized from the place of occurrence.

11   Exhibit-     One blue color blanket with floral prints
     F3           (yellow-orange-red-white) said to be seized
                  from the place of occurrence.

12   Exhibit-     One red-black floral printed light brown color
     F4           bed cover said to contain blood stain.

13   Exhibit-     One violet color Manipuri Pachhra said to be
     F5           seized from the place of occurrence.

14   Exhibit-     One ash color pant said to be the wearing
     F6           apparel of the deceased, Manika Sinha.

15   Exhibit-     One long navy blue jeans pant said to be the
     F7           wearing apparel of the accused person, Sajal
                     Page 15 of 32




                          Sarkar

  16     Exhibit-         One black and white full sleeve ganjee said to
         F8               be the wearing apparel of the accused person,
                          Sajal Sarker.

11. Report No. SFSL. NO. 254/11, BIO/SERO NO. 103/11
Date 29.08.2011.

The exhibits marked E10, B, F1, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7 and
F8 were examined by visual examination under different
light sources, Acid phosphatase test and Microscopic
examination         for      detection     of     semen/seminal
stain/spermatozoa of human origin.

The exhibit marked E7 was examined by Starch-Iodine
test for detection of saliva. The exhibits marked E7 and B
were further examined by absorption inhibition test for
detection of blood group from saliva stain and semen
stain respectively.

The exhibits marked E8, A, F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7 and
F8 were examined by Tetramethyl Benzidine (TMB) test,
Phenolphthalein test and Takayama test for detection of
blood. The exhibits marked A, F1, F2, F3, F4 and F6 were
further examined by Gel diffusion test and Absorption
elution test for origin and grouping of blood respectively.

The exhibits marked E9, C,D, F2, F3, F4 , F5 and F6 were
examined    by      visual      examination     and   Microscopic
examination for detection and analysis of hairs.

Based on the examination, the results obtained are given
below:
                   Page 16 of 32




1. Seman/seminal stain/spermatozoa of human origin
could not be detected in the exhibits marked E10, F1, F3,
F4, F5, F6, F7 and F8.

2. Spermatozoa of human origin could be detected in the
exhibit marked B.

3. Blood group of the exhibit marked B could not be
determined.

4. Blood stain of human origin could be detected in the
exhibits marked A, F1, F2, F3, F4 and F6.

5. Blood stain could not be detected in he exhibits
marked E8, F5 and F7.

6. Blood group of exhibit marked A could be determined
as O group.

7. Blood group of exhibits marked F1, F2, F3, F4 and F6
could be determined as A group.

8. No hair could not be detected in the exhibits marked
F2, F3, F4, F5 and F6.

9. Human public hair could be detected in the exhibits
marked C and D.

10. Human hair could be detected in the exhibit marked
E9.

11. Saliva could be detected in the exhibit marked E7.

12. Blood group of the exhibit marked E7 could not be
determined."
                                  Page 17 of 32




8.         On close scrutiny of the evidence and materials and

having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties to

the lis, it has become apparent that in the present case there is

no direct evidence to connect the accused with the commission

of   offence     and      the   prosecution      case    entirely    rests      on

circumstantial evidence.


           The Apex Court as well as this Court in a series of

decisions has consistently held that when a case rests upon

circumstantial      evidence,     such    evidence       must      satisfy     the

following tests:

               " (i) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is
         sought      to    be   drawn,   must     be    cogently    and      firmly
         established;
               (ii) those circumstances should be of definite tendency
         unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
               (iii) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form
         a chain so complete that there is no escape from the
         conclusion that within all human probability the crime was
         committed by the accused and none else; and
               (iv) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain
         conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation
         of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused
         and such evidence should not only be consistent with the
         guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his
                               Page 18 of 32




        innocence.[(Reference       Gambhir v. State      of Maharashtra
        [(1982)     2   SCC   351   :   AIR   1982   SC    1157],   Rama
        Nand v. State of H.P. [(1981) 1 SCC 511 : AIR 1981 SC
        738] , Prem Thakur v. State of Punjab [(1982) 3 SCC 462 :
        AIR    1983      SC      61]     , Earabhadrappa v. State     of
        Karnataka [(1983) 2 SCC 330 : AIR 1983 SC 446] , Gian
        Singh v. State of Punjab [1986 Supp SCC 676 : AIR 1987
        SC 1921] and Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [(1987) 1
        SCC 1 : AIR 1987 SC 350]."

9.        Looking back to the case of Hanumant Govind

Nargundkar v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 we may

profitably take into account the following observations of the

Supreme Court: (AIR pp. 345-46, para 10)

           "10. ... It is well to remember that in cases where the
        evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances
        from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in
        the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so
        established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of
        the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be
        of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be
        such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed
        to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of
        evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable
        ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
        accused and it must be such as to show that within all
        human probability the act must have been done by the
        accused."
                                          Page 19 of 32




10.             Again, we may gainfully take note of the celebrated

decision        of        the   Supreme      Court       in Sharad    Birdhichand

Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, wherein

the Supreme Court while dealing with circumstantial evidence

held that the onus was or the prosecution to prove that the

chain is complete and the infirmity or lacuna in prosecution

cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The Supreme Court in

that case had laid down the following conditions which must be

fully established before convicting a person relating to a case

based on circumstantial evidence:(SCC p. 185, para 153)

                 "(i) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
           is        to    be    drawn     should    be    fully   established.   The
           circumstances concerned „must or should‟ and not „may be‟
           established;
                 (ii) the facts so established should be consistent only
           with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to
           say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
           except that the accused is guilty;
                 (iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
           and tendency;
                 (iv) they should exclude every possible hypothesis
           except the one to be proved; and
                 (v) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not
           to        leave      any   reasonable     ground    for   the   conclusion
           consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
                                Page 20 of 32




        show that in all human probability the act must have been
        done by the accused."


11.          A reference may also be made to a decision of the

Apex Court in C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P., (1996) 10

SCC 193, wherein it was observed thus: (SCC pp. 206-07, para

21)

             "21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the
        settled law is that the circumstances from which the
        conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such
        circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all
        the circumstances should be complete and there should be
        no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved
        circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis
        of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his
        innocence."


12.          In     Trimukh        Maroti      Kirkan    v.   State     of

Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681, the Apex Court held as

under: (SCC p.689, para 12)

             "12. In the case in hand there is no eyewitness of the
        occurrence and the case of the prosecution rests on
        circumstantial evidence. The normal principle in a case
        based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances
        from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must
        be        cogently   and    firmly     established;   that    those
        circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly
                            Page 21 of 32




        pointing towards the guilt of the          accused; that the
        circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so
        complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that
        within all human probability the crime was committed by
        the accused and they should be incapable of explanation on
        any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused
        and inconsistent with their innocence.
           The same principles were reiterated in Sunil Clifford
        Daniel v. State of Punjab, [(2012) 11 SCC 205], Sampath
        Kumar v. Inspector of Police, [(2012) 4 SCC 124], and
        Mohd. Arif v. State(NCT of Delhi, (2011) 13 SCC 621)] and
        a number of other decisions."

13.       In Kali Ram v. State of H.P., (1973) 2 SCC 808,

the Supreme Court observed thus: (SCC p.820, para 25)

           "25. Another golden thread which runs through the web
        of the administration of justice in criminal cases is that if
        two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case,
        one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his
        innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused
        should be adopted. This principle has a special relevance in
        cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be
        established by circumstantial evidence."


14.       It would be apposite to again refer the judgment of

the Apex Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda(supra) wherein

the Supreme Court observed thus: (SCC pp.127-28)
                             Page 22 of 32




             "Graver the crime, greater should be the standard of
        proof. An accused may appear to be guilty on the basis of
        suspicion but that cannot amount to legal proof. When on
        the evidence two possibilities are available or open, one
        which goes in the favour of the prosecution and the other
        benefits an accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to
        the benefit of doubt. The principle has special relevance
        where the guilt or the accused is sought to be established
        by circumstantial evidence."


15.          Thus, in view of the aforesaid principles laid down by

the   Apex    Court   we   may   un-hesitantly   hold   that   before

convicting an accused the Court must draw an inference with

respect to whether the chain of circumstances is complete, and

when the circumstances therein are collectively considered, the

same must lead only to the irresistible conclusion, that the

accused alone is the perpetrator of the crime in question. All the

circumstances so established must be of a conclusive nature,

and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the

accused.


16.          Now, keeping in mind the above settled propositions

of law, let us re-examine the evidence of the prosecution

witnesses. While convicting the appellant, the learned Sessions

Judge had arrived at the following findings:
                            Page 23 of 32




                "On scrutiny and evaluation of the evidence on
        record some circumstances come out for implicating
        the accused.

                The first circumstance is the presence of the
        accused in the house of the deceased;

                The second circumstance is the entry of the
        accused in the house of the deceased in the noon time
        and departure from that house;

                The    third   circumstance      is   the   suspicious
        movement of the accused seen by the witnesses; and

                The fourth circumstance is the abscontion of
        the accused just after the occurrence.

                Apart from this there is evidence of giving
        confessional   statement    by     the   accused    but   that
        confession though relevant is not admissible as given
        before the Police. Further the circumstance that comes
        out from the evidence on record it is transpired that
        none the else except the accused was responsible for
        commission of rape and murder on the victim."

17.       In view of the aforesaid findings returned by the

learned trial Judge, firstly, we are to examine whether the

presence of the accused in the house of the deceased or his

entry in the house has been established by cogent evidence.
                           Page 24 of 32




            The statement of PW2 that being called by Bimal

Sinha(PW4) the appellant came to their house for wood-cutting

and that the statement of PW2 that her sister-in-law, Rekha

Sinha(PW14) had seen the appellant to enter into her house

appears to be the first time statement made by her before the

trial   Judge. Being confronted with      cross-examination   she

admitted that these statements are not found in her statements

recorded under Section 161 of CrPC.


17.1.       Similarly, the deposition of PW4 that the appellant

wanted to know from him that who would go to the temple and

who would stay in the house is also found to be the first time

statement made by this witness in course of trial.


17.2.       The statement of PW5 that while he was going to

market he had seen the accused running away and on being

asked the accused replied that he was running from the house

of the informant as there was none in the house is also found to

be the first time statement made before the trial Judge in

course of trial. When his attention was drawn to his statement

recorded under Section 161 of CrPC it was found to be absent.
                           Page 25 of 32




18.        In our considered view, the prosecution witnesses as

stated   above   have   made   major      improvements   in   their

statements in course of trial, which they did not state in course

of their examination under Section 161 of CrPC. As such, the

presence of the accused in the house of the deceased and the

second circumstance that the accused had entered into the

house of the deceased in the noontime and his departure from

that house have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.


19.        The evidence of PW13 deposing that he asked the

accused where he was going and at that time, according to him,

his movement was suspicious.


           According to us, on the basis of this statement

without something more, one person cannot be held to be guilty

of commission of such offence, like rape and murder. We are of

the opinion, that it was his own perception when he perceived

the movement of the accused as suspicious.


20.        The fourth circumstance as relied upon by the

learned Sessions Judge is that of the abscontion of the accused

just after the occurrence. This is no more res integra that mere
                                    Page 26 of 32




abscontion of a person from the site of offence after the

incident is not enough to hold that person guilty of committing

offence   in    absence       of   other    circumstantial   corroborating

evidence, linking with the other circumstances prior to the

incident and subsequent to the incident.


            This aspect came for consideration before the Apex

Court in the case of Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam, (2013)

12 SCC 406 as relied upon by Mr. Datta, learned counsel for

the appellant. At para 22, the Supreme Court held thus: (SCC

p.415, para 22)


          "22. Whether the abscondence of an accused can be taken
          as a circumstance against him has been considered by this
          Court in Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B. [(2010) 12
          SCC 91] wherein the Court observed: (SCC pp. 98-99,
          paras 27-28)

               "27. In Matru v. State of U.P. [(1971) 2 SCC 75] this
               Court repelled the submissions made by the State that
               as after commission of the offence the accused had
               been absconding, therefore, the inference can be drawn
               that he was a guilty person observing as under: (SCC p.
               84, para 19)

                „19. The appellant's conduct in absconding was also
                relied upon. Now, mere absconding by itself does not
                     Page 27 of 32




     necessarily lead to a firm conclusion of guilty mind.
     Even an innocent man may feel panicky and try to
     evade arrest when wrongly suspected of a grave crime
     such is the instinct of self-preservation. The act of
     absconding is no doubt relevant piece of evidence to be
     considered along with other evidence but its value
     would always depend on the circumstances of each
     case. Normally the courts are disinclined to attach
     much importance to the act of absconding, treating it
     as a very small item in the evidence for sustaining
     conviction. It can scarcely be held as a determining link
     in completing the chain of circumstantial evidence
     which must admit of no other reasonable hypothesis
     than that of the guilt of the accused. In the present
     case the appellant was with Ram Chandra till the FIR
     was lodged. If thereafter he felt that he was being
     wrongly suspected and he tried to keep out of the way
     we do not think this circumstance can be considered to
     be necessarily evidence of a guilty mind attempting to
     evade justice. It is not inconsistent with his innocence.‟

                             ***

28. Abscondence by a person against whom FIR has been lodged, having an apprehension of being apprehended by the police, cannot be said to be unnatural. Thus, in view of the above, we do not find any force in the submission made by Shri Bhattacharjee that mere absconding by the appellant after commission of the crime and remaining untraceable for such a long time itself can establish his Page 28 of 32 guilt. Absconding by itself is not conclusive either of guilt or of guilty conscience."

While deciding the said case, a large number of earlier judgments were also taken into consideration by the Court, including Matru [(1971) 2 SCC 75] and State of M.P. v. Paltan Mallah [(2005) 3 SCC 169]."

Having held so, the Supreme Court in Sujit Biswas(supra) further observed thus: (SCC p.416, para 23) "23. Thus, in a case of this nature, the mere abscondence of an accused does not lead to a firm conclusion of his guilty mind. An innocent man may also abscond in order to evade arrest, as in light of such a situation, such an action may be part of the natural conduct of the accused. Abscondence is in fact relevant evidence, but its evidentiary value depends upon the surrounding circumstances, and hence, the same must only be taken as a minor item in evidence for sustaining conviction. (See Paramjeet Singh v. State of Uttarakhand [(2010) 10 SCC 439 : AIR 2011 SC 200] and Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B. [(2011) 11 SCC 754 : AIR 2011 SC 2283]"

Further, the abscontion of an accused cannot form the sole basis of conviction to an accused.
21. In the instant case what has transpired that the investigating officer has recorded the statement of PW14 after Page 29 of 32 five days of the incident. The prosecution has failed to provide any satisfactory explanation as to why her statement was recorded after five days of the incident, when according to her she had seen the accused entering into the house of the deceased. She could divulge the said fact immediately after the incident when the investigating officer had visited the place of offence at the house of the informant(PW1).
21.1. From the deposition of PW14, it is revealed that she came to the house of her brother-informant(PW1) and saw the dead body of the victim. We have noticed her further statement that she told all of her relatives present there that the crime was committed by none else than the appellant. According to us, this statement made by PW14 should not be believed for the reason that if she would have made such statement at that instance, then, there was no reason to lodge the FIR against the unknown assailants. It could be revealed in the complaint itself. In view of this, this statement of PW14 lacks credence. The delay of recording her statement, in our opinion had opened enough space to concoct and fabricate the story. More so, if PW14 would have made this statement, then, PWs 1, 2 Page 30 of 32 and 4 must have divulged this fact to the investigating officer while their statements were recorded under Section 161 of CrPC.
21.2. More importantly, the striking feature of the instant case is that from the postmortem and medical examination of the victim-girl, it is abundantly substantiated that before murder, the victim was forcibly raped. There are so many injuries found on the person of the victim. Her hymen along with labia majora and minora were found to be ruptured and there were multiple tears found on the vaginal mucosa and other parts in and around the vagina. It is revealed that substantial bleeding was seen on the vagina. There are biting marks found in her breasts.
22. As we said earlier that the investigating officer had seized all wearing apparels of the victim just after the commission of offence. He also seized the bloodstained bed- sheet and blanket, and also arranged for collection of sample of vaginal swab and saliva of the victim for forensic test. The sample of semen/spermatozoa also was collected by the investigating officer. But, during scientific examination, the Page 31 of 32 doctor did not find the semen/spermatozoa of the appellant mixed with the vaginal swab of the victim. Further, the blood sample taken out from the appellant did not match the bloodstains found in the wearing apparels of the victim as well as the bed-sheet and blanket which were seized from the cot where the body of the victim was lying.
23. In our independent analysis of the evidence on record, according to us, the circumstances as projected by the prosecution to establish the charges against the appellant, if taken cumulatively, are found to be deficient to draw an inference towards the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and in other words, the circumstances are found to be inconsistent to draw the exclusive hypothesis of guilt of the accused-appellant.
24. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence as afore-stated, passed by the learned Sessions Judge cannot sustain and the same are hereby set aside. Page 32 of 32
25. In the result, the instant appeal stands allowed and the appellant is acquitted from the charges levelled against him and he be set at liberty forthwith.
Issue release order accordingly.
Send down the LCRs.
(ARINDAM LODH, J)                      (AKIL KURESHI, CJ)