Madhya Pradesh High Court
Gangaram Bendil vs Rashmi Parihar And Ors. on 25 October, 1986
Equivalent citations: AIR 1987 MADHYA PRADESH 208, (1987) MPLJ 410
JUDGMENT K.M. Agarwal, J.
1. This Letters Patent Appeal by the returned candidate is directed against an order passed on 18-8-1986 by the learned single Judge of this Court in a pending Election Petition No. 23 of 1985.
2. The respondent No. 1 challenged the election of the appellant as a member of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Madhya Pradesh from No. 16, Lashkar East constituency in the election held in 1985 on the ground of corrupt practice. After service of notice of the election petition, the appellant filed his return and, inter alia, raised an objection about the maintainability of the petition on the ground that "the affidavit is an integeral part of the petition and a true copy thereof duly attested under the signatures of the petitioner has to be served on the respondents. But the petitioner has not served a true copy of the affidavit on the Answering Respondent. As such the petition is liable to be dismissed summarily under Section 81 read with Section 86 of the Act." On the basis of this objection, following issue was framed, tried and decided as a preliminary issue against the appellant by the impugned order of the learned single Judge : --
"(i). Whether the affidavit contemplated in the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act is integral part of the Election Petition? If so, whether the petition is liable to be dismissed for the alleged non-compliance of the provisions of Sections 81(3) and 83(1) of the Act?"
3. In view of a full Bench decision of this Court in Laxmi Narain v. Ramratan. 1986 Jab LJ 238 : (AIR 1986 Madh Pra 165), it was not disputed that a letters patent appeal against an interlocutory order, amounting to 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, passed in an election petition by a single Judge is competent. It was, however, submitted by Shri P.L. Dubey the learned counsel for the election petitioner that the impugned order in the present appeal did not amount to 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and therefore the appeal was incompetent. Several authorities were cited in support of the contention, but we do not propose to decide the preliminary objection about maintainability of the appeal, or to deal with various cases cited on either side and proceed to decide the appeal on merits.
4. It was not disputed that the election petition was accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form and that the requisite number of copies of the petition along with affidavit were filed with the election petition. It was also not in dispute that the affidavit was sworn in before a competent person and that the copies of affidavit filed with the copies of petition were attested by the election-
petitioner under her own signatures to be true copies of the affidavit. The copy of the affidavit supplied to the appellant was complete in all respect, it omitted to reproduce the designation of the person, who administered oath to the election-petitioner, as also the endorsement made by him in the original affidavit at the time of administering the oath. It was, therefore, contended that the appellant was not supplied with a true copy of the affidavit and as it formed integral part of the petition, the election petition was liable to be dismissed in view of the mandatory provisions of Section 81(3), read with Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, (for short, the "Act").
5. Shri R.K. Shinde, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned single Judge came to a right conclusion that the affidavit formed integral part of the petition, but erred in not holding that the endorsements made by the officer administering oath were intrinsic part of the affidavit and, therefore, omission to mention them in the copies furnished in accordance with Section 81(3) of the Act was fatal to the maintainability of the petition. According to him, an affidavit sworn before an unauthorised officer would be no affidavit in the eye of law. Consequently the omission to give the said particualrs in the copy of the affidavit supplied to the appellant would be a material omission, going to the root of the petition, in the light of the legislative intent and purpose in making strict provisions in Sections 81(3) and 86 of the Act.
6. In his elaborate and forceful argument, Shri P.L. Dubey, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 disputed the correctness of the finding recorded by the learned single Judge that the affidavit formed integral part of the petition and at the same time, supported his finding that "mere omission in the copy of the 'affidavit' R-l/2(b) of the rubber stamp endorsement of the Deputy Registrar did not render the copy served on the respondent invalid and violative of Sections 81(3) and 83(1) of the Act." In support the first part of his argument, Shri Dubey drew our attention to the provisions of Section 81(3), which speak of supply of copies of petition and not of an affidavit and those of Section 86(1), providing for dismissal of a petition, which does not comply with the provision of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the Act. He also relied on the provision of the Act prior to its amendment in 1956 and in Kidwai Hussain Kamil v. Yadav Ram Sewak. (1963) 25 ELR 35 : (AIR 1964 All 86) N. P. Chengalrava Naidu v. C. N. Pattabhi Reddi. (1963) 25 ELR 168 : (AIR 1964 Andh Pra 164) and Mahesh Prasad Sinha v. Manjay Lal (1963) 25 ELR 130 : (AIR 1964 Pat 53) and submitted that the requirement of filing an affidavit was given in proviso to Section 81(1) and therefore, the petition could not be said to be wanting in requirement of Section 81(3), or to be liable to dismissal under Section 86(1) of the Act.
7. Though Shri Dubey tried to distinguish the two decisions of the Supreme Court in M. Kamalam v. V.A.S. Mohammed, AIR 1978 SC 840; and M. Karunanidhi v. H.V. Handa, AIR 1983 SC 558, relied on by the learned single Judge for his conclusion that the affidavit forms integral part of an election petition, we do not find ourselves inclined to accept the argument, or to take a view contrary to one taken by the learned single Judge. Apart from the reasons given by the learned Judge, we find support to the view taken in the following passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in M. Kamalam (ibid) : --
"5. Now the first question which arises is as to what constitutes an election petition for the purpose of Section 81, Sub-section (3). Is it confined only to election petition proper or does it also include a schedule or annexure contemplated in Sub-section (2) of Section 83 or a supporting affidavit referred to in the proviso to Section 83, Sub-section (1)? To answer this question, we must turn to Section 83 which deals with contents of an election petition. Sub-section (1) of that section sets out what an election petition shall contain and provides that it shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for the verification of pleadings. The proviso requires that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the election petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. The context in which the proviso occurs clearly suggests that the affidavit is intended to be regarded as part of the election petition. Otherwise, it need not have been introduced in a section dealing with contents of an election petition nor figured as a proviso to a Sub-section which lays down what shall be the contents of an election petition. Sub-section (2) also by analogy supports this inference. It provides that any schedule or annexure to an election petition shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as an election. It is now established by the decision of this Court in Sahodrabai Rai v. Ram Singh Aharwar, (1968) 3 SCR 13 : AIR 1968 SC 1079, that Sub-section (2) applies only to a schedule or annexure which is an integral part of the election petition and not to a schedule or annexure which is merely evidence in the case but which is annexed to the election petition merely for the sake of adding strength to it. The scope and ambit of Sub-section (2) was explained in the following words by Hidayatullah, J., speaking on behalf of the Court in Sahodrabai's case (supra) at pages 19-20 (of SCR) : (at pp. 1082, 1083 of i AIR) :
"We are quite clear that Sub-section (2) of Section 81 has reference not to a document which is produced as evidence of the averments of the election petition but to averments of the election petition which are put, not in the election petition but in the accompanying schedules or annexures. We can give quite a number of examples from which it would be apparent that many of the averments of the election petition are capable of being put as schedules or annexures. For example, the details of the corrupt practice there in the former days used to be set out separately in the schedules and which may, in some cases, be so done even after the amendment of the present law. Similarly, details of averments too compendious for being included in the election petition may be set out in the schedules or annexures to the election petition. The law then requires that even though they are outside the election petition, they must be signed and verified but such annexures or schedules are then treated as integrated with the election petition and copies of them must be served on the respondent if the requirement regarding serviceof the election petition is to be wholly complied with. But, what we have said here does not apply to documents which are merely evidence in the case but which for reason of clarity and to lend force to the petition are not kept back but produced or filed with the election petitions. They are in no sense an integral part of the averments of the petition but are only evidence of those averments and in proof thereof. It would, therefore, be seen that if a schedule or annexure is an integral part of the election petition, it must be signed by the petitioner and verified, since it forms part of the election petition. The subject-matter of Sub-section (2) is thus a schedule or annexure forming part of the election petition and hence it is placed in Section 81 which deals with the contents of an election petition. Similarly, and for the same reasons, the affidavit referred to in the proviso to Section 81 Sub-section (1) also forms part of the election petition. The election, petition is in truth and reality one document, consisting of two parts, one being the election petition proper and the other being the affidavit referred to in the proviso to Section 81, Sub-section (1). The copy of the election petition required to be filed under first part of Sub-section (3) of Section 81, would, therefore, on a fair reading of that provision along with Section 83, include a copy of the affidavit. That is why the appellant attached a copy of the affidavit to the copy of the election petition proper and filed the two as one single document along with the election petition."
8. Now the main surviving controversy between the parties relates to the effect of omission to give particulars about the officer administering oath to the election-petitioner and his endorsements in the copy of the affidavit supplied to the appellant. Here also we are of the view that the conclusions reached by the learned single Judge calls for no interference. The learned counsel for the appellant could not give us any authority to snow that the defect of the nature pointed out in the copy of the affidavit supplied to the appellant was ever considered to be fatal to the maintainability of an election petition. He remained satisfied by citing authorities after authorities to establish that filing of copies of petition and their attestation to be a true copy of the petition under Section 81(3) were essential requirement for maintainability of an election petition and that the provisions required, strict literal construction. We have no dispute with the general principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court and different High Courts in their various decisions about strict interpretation of election law, but we see no reason to hold the alleged defect in the copy of the affidavit supplied to the appellant to be fatal.
9. Section 81 speaks of the contents of a petition. The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 81 requires an election petition based on corrupt practice to be "accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof."
In other words, what is material is the form and the contents of the affidavit pertaining to the allegations and particulars of corrupt practice in the election petition. The procedural formalities of administration of oath and endorsement on the affidavit about completion of the formalities cannot, therefore, be said to be the contents of the affidavit and their non-production in the copy of the affidavit cannot be taken to be fatal to the maintainability of an election petition.
10. It is also worthy to note that Section 81(3) of the Act speaks of copies of petition and provides attestation of every copy as a true copy of the petition. A petition means a petition conforming to the requirements of Section 83 of the Act. Neither Section 81(3), nor Section 81(1) anywhere provides that the endorsements of the officer administering oath would form1 part of the contents of the affidavit or of the petition, or that the copy of the petition or affidavit filed under Section 81(3) must show or reproduce such endorsements.
11. It may be seen that the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the endorsements of the officer administering oath, would amount to contents of the affidavit or petition, if accepted, would lead to very many absurd results. The argument may be extended to omission of mentioning in the copy of petition or affidavit the amount of Court-fee paid on the petition or the affidavit, as also the nature of stamps used, i.e., judicial or non-judicial, because a petition or affidavit without adequate Court-fee or proper stamps would not be a valid petition or affidavit in the eye of law. For all these reasons, we find no substance in this appeal and it must fail.
12. The respondent No. 3, Shri Dharti Pakad Madan Lal supported the impuged order of the learned single Judge and the arguments of Shri P.L. Dubey, counsel for the respondent No. 1. He did not argue any new point, requiring any separate dicsussion.
13. In the result, this Letters Patent appeal is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs of the appeal.