Kerala High Court
S. Ushakumari vs State Of Kerala on 18 February, 2011
Author: T.R.Ramachandran Nair
Bench: T.R.Ramachandran Nair
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
WP(C).No. 7312 of 2008(U)
1. S. USHAKUMARI,
... Petitioner
Vs
1. STATE OF KERALA,
... Respondent
2. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION,
3. DISTRICT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER,
4. ASSISTANT EDUCATIONAL OFFICER,
5. MANAGER,
6. SMT. P.J.USHA KUMARI,
For Petitioner :SRI.B.RAGUNATHAN
For Respondent :SRI.N.NANDAKUMARA MENON (SR.)
The Hon'ble MR. Justice T.R.RAMACHANDRAN NAIR
Dated :18/02/2011
O R D E R
T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J.
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W.P.(C) Nos. 7312/2008-U & 7327/2008-V
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Dated this the 18th day of February, 2011.
JUDGMENT
W.P.(C) No.7327/2008 is filed by the Manager and W.P.(C) No.7312/2008 is filed by the Headmistress of a school. The dispute is with regard to the claim for the post of Headmistress between the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.7312/2008 and the 6th respondent therein who is the first respondent in W.P.(C) No.7327/2008 filed by the Manager. The facts of the cases and exhibits are mentioned herein as available in W.P.(C) No.7327/2008.
2. The Manager contends that the school is one which is entitled to have minority status under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. Two vacancies arose in the school, viz. one vacancy of H.S.A. (Social Science) due to the retirement of Smt. Joylet Ruby and the other vacancy arose on 1.5.2006 consequent on the voluntary retirement of the Headmistress. The Manager, by Ext.P1 order, promoted the first respondent to the post of H.S.A. (SS) with effect from 1.4.2006. It is the case of the Manager that the first respondent accepted the promotion as evident from Ext.P2 letter wherein she requested the Manager to allow her to continue as UPSA till wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 2 reopening of the school for the academic year 2006-2007. This was made on the pea that no appointment could be made during vacation. Subsequently, the Manager received Ext.P3 letter from the Asst. Educational Officer, forwarding the relinquishment of promotion by the first respondent. It is contended that the relinquishment is not permissible as per the rules. When the vacancy arose in the post of Headmistress, the Manager promoted the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.7312/2008, (7th respondent in W.P.(C) No.7327/2008) as she was working as UPSA in the school. The proposal for approval was rejected by the Asst. Educational Officer as per Ext.P6 order stating that the first respondent is the seniormost graduate UPSA. It was also stated that the appointment of Smt. S. Nabeesathu Beevi as Headmistress with retrospective effect from 1.6.2004 has not been approved and hence, there is no established vacancy of Headmistress with effect from 1.5.2006.
3. Two writ petitions, viz. W.P.(C) Nos.12238/2006 and 13978/2006 filed by the first respondent were disposed of by Ext.P9 judgment, whereby this Court directed the District Educational Officer to consider the matters. The District Educational Officer rejected the claim of the petitioner in W.P. (C) No.7312/2008 as per Ext.P10 order and accepted the claim of the first respondent as she is yet to be promoted as H.S.A. and was having the wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 3 qualification also. The revision petition filed by the Manager was allowed by the Director of Public Instruction as per Ext.P14 order which was challenged before the Government and the Government by Ext.P15 allowed the revision petition filed by the first respondent, without hearing anybody. This was quashed in W.P.(C) No.12300/2007 with a direction to pass fresh orders after hearing all parties. Ext.P20 is the final order passed by the Government, allowing the revision petition filed against Ext.P14 order.
4. The Government took the view that the promotion of the first respondent on 1.4.2006 as H.S.A. did not come into effect in the light of Rule 7A(2) of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R.. No promotion could have been made on the last working day. Therefore, as on the date of occurrence of vacancy of Headmistress, the first respondent was available for promotion to the said post and she was qualified in terms of the rules also.
5. Heard learned Senior Counsel Shri Babu Varghese for the Manager, Shri B. Reghunathan appearing for the 7th respondent and petitioner in W.P.(C) No.7312/2008, Shri P.K. Manojkumar, learned counsel for the first respondent and Smt. N. Sudha Devi, learned Govt. Pleader.
6. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Babu Varghese argued that when the wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 4 vacancy arose on 31.3.2006, the first respondent was eligible to be promoted as H.S.A. The qualification for promotion has to be considered as on the date of occurrence of vacancy and accordingly she was promoted. She also accepted the promotion as evident from the letter given by her. The relinquishment of promotion cannot be accepted, as it is not valid. Therefore, as on the date of occurrence of vacancy to the post of Headmistress, she is already promoted as H.S.A. It is further pointed out that the school being a minority institution, the Manager is having ample power to promote a person of their choice, herein being the 7th respondent in W.P.(C) No.7327/2008. It is further pointed out that the decision taken by the Government is too hasty and even though the view of the Law Department was sought for, the Government straight away issued the order and the relevant page of the Note files have been produced as Ext.P19.
7. The above arguments are supported by the learned counsel appearing for the promotee Shri B. Reghunathan. Learned counsel for the first respondent relied upon Rule 7A(2) of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. to submit that no appointment order could be issued on the last working day and therefore the promotion as H.S.A. never took place. Various other contentions have also been raised and both sides relied upon various decisions of this Court.
wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 5
8. Ext.P1 order is dated 30.3.2006, wherein the first respondent is promoted in the retirement vacancy as H.S.A. (SS) from 1.4.2006. By Ext.P2 letter the first respondent pointed out that as per the rules in the K.E.R., no appointment of teachers other than Headmaster, can be made during vacation and therefore, she requested that she may be allowed to continue as UPSA till reopening. The Asst. Educational Officer forwarded her relinquishment letter as per Ext.P3, to the Manager. The same is dated 10.4.2006. Ext.P5 is the order dated 27.4.2006 by which the seventh respondent was promoted as Headmistress with effect from 1.5.2006.
9. The Government, by Ext.P20 took the view after considering various aspects that: (a) the promotion given to the first respondent as H.S.A. is in gross violation of Rule 7A(2) of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. Therefore, the same is void ab initio; (b) the first respondent has not held the post of H.S.A. at any time and the relinquishment is immaterial. Therefore, she has to be treated as never been promoted as H.S.A. Both the first respondent and the 7th respondent are U.P.S.As. as on 1.5.2006. Rule 45 of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. provides for preference for a graduate teacher over a senior undergraduate teacher. The first respondent is a senior graduate teacher and the 7th respondent is an under graduate teacher. Therefore, the first respondent is eligible to be promoted as Headmistress. wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 6
10. Much arguments have been raised on the importance of the date of occurrence of vacancy and the effect of Rule 7A(2) of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. Rule 7A(2) provides as follows:
"(2) Posts that may fall vacant on the closing date shall not be filled up till the reopening date except in the case of posts of non-vacation staff."
Sub-rule (3) provides that "vacancies, the duration of which is less than one academic year, shall not be filled up." By relying upon the decision of this Court in Mini Joseph v. Director of Public Instruction (2005 (4) KLT SN page 15, Case No.17), Shri Babu Varghese, learned Senior Counsel submitted that Rule 7A(2) applies only for filling up of temporary vacancies and herein it is a permanent vacancy. The other rule relevant is Rule 43 of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. under which the first respondent was promoted. It provides that "vacancies in any higher grade of pay shall be filled up by promotion of qualified hands in the lower grade according to seniority, if such hands are available." Note (2) provides that " promotion under this rule shall be made from persons possessing the prescribed qualifications at the time of occurrence of vacancy." It is pointed out that since promotions have to be made in terms of the qualification at the time of occurrence of vacancy, there is no illegality in granting promotion to the wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 7 first respondent as H.S.A. from 1.4.2006. The decision of the Apex Court in Manager, MDPS U.P. School and others v. Paulose E.A. and others (ILR 2010 (2) Ker. 89) is also relied upon, in this context.
11. Evidently, if the promotion has taken effect from 1.4.2006 in favour of the first respondent, then she will be deemed to be working as H.S.A. from 1.4.2006 and will not be eligible to be promoted as Headmistress. Shri Babu Varghese submitted that Rule 7A(2) will not apply in the light of the dictum laid down in Mini Joseph's case (2005 (4) KLT SN page 15, case No.17). Therein, it was held thus:
"Sub-rules (2) and (3) of R.7 as already indicated, can have application only in cases of posts falling vacant on the closing date and in the cases of temporary vacancies duration of which is two months or less."
Learned counsel appearing for the first respondent relied upon another decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court with regard to the interpretation of Rule 7A(2), viz. Manju v. State of Kerala (2005 (1) KLT SN page 98, case No.122) wherein the view taken is that it is a statutory interdiction against filling up of the vacancy till reopening date. The dictum laid down therein is as follows:
"All that sub-r. (2) of R.7A provides is that the posts that may fall wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 8 vacant on the closing date shall be left unfilled till the reopening date. A proper understanding of the said sub-rule will show that it concedes the situation that the vacancy occurs immediately on the vacation of office of an incumbent who superannuates on the closing date but a statutory interdiction is imposed against filling up of that vacancy till the reopening date. Sub-r(2) of R.7A of Chapter XIV(A) K.E.R. does not envisage postponement of date of occurrence of vacancy."
12. The question is whether Rule 7A(2) will apply only to temporary vacancies. The facts of the case in Mini Joseph (2005 (4) KLT SN page 15, Case No.17) shows that therein the vacancy arose on 5.2.1996. The approval was objected for the reason that the duration of the vacancy till closing date of the school is less than 60 days. It was contended that the said view is not correct, since the appointment is in a permanent vacancy which arose due to retirement. The finding that the duration of the vacancy is less than 60 days, was also disputed.
13. The learned Judge in para 9 of the judgment, after referring to sub-rules (2) and (3) of Rule 7A, held thus:
"Rule 7A(2) can have application only in the matter of appointments to posts which fall vacant on the closing date of the academic year and rule 7A(3) shall have application only regarding appointments to vacancies the duration of which is two months or less. Neither sub- wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 9 rule (2) nor sub-rule (3) of Rule 7A can have application in the case of appointments to regular vacancies or permanent vacancies. The vacancy which arose due to the promotion of Smt. P.T. Annamma as Headmistress was not a vacancy which was to fall vacant by the end of the academic year 1995-96; nor was it a vacancy the duration of which was less than two months. The appointment of Smt. Annamma even the Government concedes, was against a post which was duly sanctioned as per the staff fixation order pertaining to the academic year 1995-96. That being the position, petitioner's claim that she became part of the regular establishment cannot be turned down. This further means that at least till 15th July of the next year when the staff fixation order relating to the next year is promulgated, the petitioner's appointment will continue as will be seen when Rule 12 of Chapter XXIII is carefully analysed."
As is clear from the facts of the case, the vacancy arose not on the last working day and the finding is also that the vacancy was not one which fell vacant by the end of the academic year. Evidently, therefore, sub-rule (2) had no application. The rejection of approval was mainly relying upon sub- rule (3). The view taken by this Court is that vacancy exits at least till 15th July of the next academic year and therefore it is beyond two months. Of course, it was held that sub-rules (2) and (3) can have application only in the case of post falling vacant on the closing date of the academic year and in the case of temporary vacancies, the duration of which is two months or wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 10 less. A close reading of the judgment will show that emphasis was given on the concept under sub-rule (3) and therefore the dictum cannot be understood as one taking the view that sub-rule (2) applies only for temporary vacancies. This is clear from the judgment of the Division Bench in W.A. No.1826/2005 which arose from the same case. The Division Bench also noticed that the vacancy arose on 1.2.1996 consequent on the voluntary retirement of the Headmaster and the vacancy was filled up on 5.2.1996. The Bench took the view finally that "since the vacancy was having a duration of more than five months, i.e. from 1.2.1996 to 15.7.1996, her appointment is not hit by sub-rule (3) of Rule 7A. So, her appointment is liable to be approved from 5.2.1996 to the closing date of the school during that year. Therefore, it was held that reliance placed on sub-rule (3) for rejecting the approval is not correct. Hence, the dictum laid down in Mini Joseph's case (2005 (4) KLT SN page 15, case No.17) was mainly with respect to the interpretation of sub-rule (3) and that it relates to temporary vacancies.
14. In Manju's case (2005 (1) KLT SN page 98, case No.122) the question was considered with respect to the interpretation of Rule 7A(2) itself wherein this Court held that even though the vacancy occurs on the closing date, a statutory interdiction is imposed against filling up of the wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 11 vacancy till the reopening date.
15. A reading of the full text of the judgment shows the following:
One Shri Jathavedan Namboodiri retired on 31.3.2002. A vacancy of H.S.A. (Maths) thus arose on 1.4.2002. One Smt. Manju who did not possess B.Ed. qualification, became qualified on 4.4.2002. She contended that the vacancy occurs only on the reopening date, i.e. 5.6.2002 and therefore she is entitled to be appointed. The rival claimant Smt. Resmi was a rule 51A claimant who was having B.Ed. degree and was qualified as on 1.4.2002. This Court considered the effect of the Note (2) to Rule 43 also and considered the question whether eligibility has to be considered as on the date of occurrence of vacancy or on 5.6.2002. It was held thus in para 7:
"To answer this, Rule 7A of Chapter XIV(A) provides the clue. Sri Jathavedan Namboodiri retired from a permanent post in the A.N. of 31.3.2002. The post held by him fell vacant on that day. All that Sub-rule (2) of Rule 7A provides is that the posts that may fall vacant on the closing date shall be left unfilled till the reopening date. A proper understanding of the said sub-rule will show that it concedes the situation that the vacancy occurs immediately on the vacation of office of an incumbent who superannuates on the closing date but a statutory interdiction is imposed against filling up of that vacancy till the reopening date. sub-rule (2) of Rule 7A wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 12 of Chapter XIV(A) K.E.R. does not envisage postponement of date of occurrence of vacancy. In that view of the matter, the post held by Sri Jathavedan Namboodiri till his retirement on 31.3.2002, fell vacant on that day. So much so, it is the indisputable position that on that day Ms. Resmi, the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.31330/2003, was the person available to be appointed against that vacancy since admittedly, on that day, Ms. Manju did not possess the B.Ed. qualification which she obtained only on 4.4.2002. Accordingly, I do not find any illegality in the orders impugned in W.P.(C) No.31330/2003."
Therefore, for considering the eligibility for filling up of the post between the respective claimants, the date of occurrence of vacancy has to be considered. But this Court clearly held that in the light of Rule 7A(2) the post could be filled up only on 5.6.2002 which is evident from the following finding in para 3 which is extracted below:
"Rule 7A(2) provides that posts hat may fall vacant on the closing date shall not be filled up till the reopening date except in the case of posts of non-vacation staff. Therefore, the vacancy that occurred by the superannuation of Sri. Jathavedan Namboodiri on 31.3.2002 could have been filled up only on 5.6.2002 which is the reopening date for the school in that year."
16. Shri Babu Varghese, learned Senior Counsel relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Smitha Johny v. Josny Varghese (ILR wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 13 2010 (4) Ker. 533) to contend that the date of eligibility for promotion is the date of occurrence of vacancy itself. Therein, the facts of the case show the following: One Smt. Josney Varghese sought promotion to the post of H.S.A. (English) as she was a qualified UPSA in the vacancy which arose on 1.4.2005. The Manager wanted to recall a teacher who was on protection, viz. the fourth respondent therein and later on, he took the view that the petitioner was having superior qualification and wanted to withdraw the request to recall the protected teacher. This was objected to by the department. The writ petition was dismissed, upholding the right of the protected teacher.
17. A Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.1925/2005 considered the question with regard to eligibility as on the date of occurrence of vacancy. The additional fifth respondent also raised a claim on the basis of the date of acquisition of B.Ed. degree on 29.6.2005. The Division Bench therefore considered whether the vacancy arises on 1.4.2005 or only on 15.7.2005. In the course of discussion it was held with reference to Rule 7A(2) as follows in para 11:
"But we do not think the above argument is impressive, since the indication given by Rule 7A(2) of Chapter XIV-A of the Kerala Education Rules appears to be that posts do fall vacant on the wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 14 closing date, but they are to be filled up only by the reopening date. Though not specific, this is a guideline, which could be satisfactorily followed."
It was held that the date of occurrence of vacancy being 1.4.2005, the additional fifth respondent was not qualified. This judgment was challenged before the Apex Court and the judgment therein is reported in Smitha Johny 's case (ILR 2010 (4) Ker. 533). The Apex Court also held that candidates with requisite qualification as on the date of occurrence of vacancy, alone are eligible to be promoted. In para 13 it was held thus:
"It is not in dispute that as per Rule 43 of Chapter XIV-A of the Kerala Education Rules, a U.P.S.A. who is qualified for the post of H.S.A. has a claim for promotion to the post of HSA against a vacancy arising in the same School. As per Note (2) under Rule 43, promotion under the said rule shall be made from persons possessing the prescribed qualifications at the time of occurrence of vacancy (emphasis supplied). It is not disputed that as on 1st April, 2005, the petitioner, Smt. Smitha Johny, did not possess the prescribed qualifications for the post of H.S.A. (English) whereas the Respondent No.1 Smt. Josny Varghese did possess the qualifications. It is clear from the pleadings in the case that as on 1st April, 2005, Smt. Josny Varghese was the only U.P.S.A. working in the School who was qualified for promotion as H.S.A. (English). Even according to the petitioner, she acquired the qualification of B.Ed. in English only on 1st July, 2005, the Respondent No.1 Josny wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 15 Varghese, being the only U.P.S.A. qualified for the post of H.S.A. (English) was entitled to be promoted against the said vacancy in preference to the petitioner Smt. Smitha Johny who, though senior to Smt. Josny Varghese, was not qualified for the post of H.S.A. (English) on the date of occurrence of the vacancy."
The said decision will only show that for considering the eligibility for promotion, the date of occurrence of vacancy has to be considered in the light of Note (2) to Rue 43 of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R.
18. Learned counsel appearing for the first respondent Shri B. Reghunathan in this context, relied upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in Varghese and others v. State of Kerala and others (1981 KLT 458 - FB) to contend that the title to be promoted depends on the qualification as on date of occurrence of vacancy. My attention was also invited to the decision of another Full Bench of this Court in Sudheer v. Suheela (2009 (4) KLT 29 (FB)) on the same line. The decision of this Court in Chentrapinni Secondary School v. State of Kerala (2009 (2) KLT 636) was also relied upon by the learned counsel. Of course, the Full Bench decision in Varghese' case (supra) considered the question whether the qualification for promotion has to be considered as on the date of occurrence of vacancy. There cannot be any dispute regarding that wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 16 proposition. In Chentrapinni Secondary School's case (2009 (2) KLT
636) the question was considered in the light of claim under Rule 51-A of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. It was held that title to hold the office by a claimant under Rule 51A arises as on the date of occurrence of vacancy and not as on the date when appointment is made. I had occasion to consider the question therein in the light of a similar argument raised. It was held thus in para 21, after referring to Rule 7A:
"As noted already, going by Rule 7A of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. the manager could not have filled up the vacancy which arose on 31.3.2005, from 1.4.2005. In fact, Note 2 to Rule 51-A also will have to be complied with by the Manager. Thus, even though the filling up of the vacancy is postponed, importance is there only to the date of occurrence of vacancy while considering the qualification and the eligibility. Otherwise, it will be an uncertain and indefinite criteria which may crop up while determining the respective rights of the claimants. The law should be definite and such definiteness, if applied, then the date of occurrence of the vacancy is the safe and relevant criteria to determine the title to get appointment. If it depends upon the date on which it is filled up, that will be an indefinite and an arbitrary criteria. There can be a situation wherein different claimants may be trying to enforce their right to the very same vacancy. In that view of the matter, going by the amendment dated 25.6.2005, the 4th respondent gets a right to get appointment in a vacancy to a teaching post which arises only wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 17 from that date. Admittedly, the vacancy herein arose with effect from 1.4.2005. In that view of the matter, she will be entitled for appointment only for an appointment as HSA in a vacancy which arose subsequent to 25.6.2005."
19. Therefore, the scheme under Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. will show that under Rule 7A(2) the post that may fall vacant on the closing date, shall not be filled up till the reopening date. The same is a statutory interdiction. Of course, under Note (2) to Rule 43 of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R, the eligibility for promotion will have to be considered at the time of occurrence of vacancy. This position is now reiterated by the Apex Court in Manager, MDPS U.P. School's case (ILR 2010 (2) Ker. 89). Consideration of the eligibility, as on the date of occurrence of vacancy and the filling up of the vacancy in view of the interdiction under Rule 7A(2) are quite different. In the light of the statutory interdiction the post cannot be filled up if the vacancy arises on the closing date. But the eligibility will have to be considered as on the date of occurrence of vacancy. First of April will be during vacation. Only the post of Headmaster alone can be filled up during vacation.
20. Therefore, evidently, the promotion granted to the first respondent Smt. P.J. Usha Kumari as H.S.A. by Ext.P1 order in W.P.(C) wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 18 No.7327/2008 did not materialise and she had not joined the promoted post evidently. There was violation of Rule 7A(2) of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. which nullifies Ext.P1. Of course, she gave a letter as per Ext.P2 wherein also she pointed out that during vacation the post of teacher cannot be filled up. Shri Babu Varghese, learned Senior Counsel placed great stress on the letter and submitted that it amounts to acceptance of promotion. Such an argument cannot be accepted in the light of the fact that the promotion did not take effect on 1.4.2006, and she could not join the promoted post also. Thus, the only view possible is that the order issued by the Manager a per Ext.P1 promoting her from 1.4.2006 therefore did not take effect, especially in the light of statutory interdiction under Rule 7A(2) of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R.
21. The vacancy to the post of Headmaster arose on 1.5.2006, on which date the first respondent continued as UPSA. She being a qualified UPSA having the required years of service, under Rule 45 of Chapter XIV- A K.E.R. she was eligible to be promoted as Headmistress.
22. The Government in Ext.P20, therefore took the view that as on the date of occurrence of vacancy of Headmaster, she was available for promotion and if the claims of the first respondent and seventh respondent are considered, the first respondent is liable to be promoted. wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 19
23. The further question is whether the school is entitled to have minority right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. It is pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel that there are three schools under the Management, viz. Evans U.P. School, Evans High School, Evans TTI, Parassala. With regard to Evans TTI, already there is a declaration that it is a minority school and the same will apply to the U.P. School also. The first respondent disputed the same in the counter affidavit by stating that a minority status has not been declared in respect of the said school. By Ext.R1(a) order the claim for minority status for Evan's U.P. school, Parassala has already been rejected by the Government. In the reply affidavit filed by the Manager, with regard to this question reference is made to the various proceedings disputing the validity of Ext.R1(a). It is pointed out that the Manager had preferred a review petition under Rule 93 of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. and a hearing was conducted already, but orders are awaited. Therefore, with regard to the minority status of the school, there is no conferment as on this day and the same will not help the Manager to support the appointment of the seventh respondent.
24. There are controversies with regard to the notes in the Note file produced as Ext.P19 as well as the way in which the Government has taken the decision. Even though various allegations have been raised in the wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 20 matter, I am not going into the veracity of the same in the light of the fact that the view taken by the Government in Ext.P20 is a plausible view on the interpretation of the relevant rules of K.E.R. and it cannot be flawed.
25. Learned counsel for the first respondent further submitted that even though by Ext.P1, an order was issued showing that the first respondent was promoted, no valid appointment order was issued under Form 27, and the Manager will have to issue an order under Form 27 itself, going by Rule 7 of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. It is pointed out that Rule 7 is mandatory and therefore the procedure cannot be overlooked. Learned counsel also relied upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in Sudheer's case (2009 (4) KLT 29) to contend that the principle "he who decides must hear/he who hears must decide" does not apply to Governmental decisions.
26. The Full Bench in the above case held that the Government can take a decision in accordance with the particular procedure under the rules of business. Evidently, herein the revision was heard and the Government has taken a decision as allowed by the rules of business and the same cannot therefore be said to be incorrect.
27. Therefore, in the light of Rule 7A(2) of Chapter XIV-A K.E.R. it is evident that the promotion of the first respondent from 1.4.2006 has not wpc 7312 & 7327/2008 21 taken effect. If that be so, she continued as UPSA on 1.5.2006, on the date on which the vacancy to the post of Headmistress had to be filled up, as the earlier incumbent took voluntary retirement with effect from that date. The first respondent being eligible to be promoted, she had a preferential claim for promotion.
28. In that view of the matter, Ext.P20 order, wherein the Government took the view that the first respondent was available for promotion and was entitled to be promoted, is perfectly legal and valid.
Therefore, the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.
(T.R. Ramachandran Nair, Judge.) kav/