Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
State Of Rajasthan vs Dinesh (2025:Rj-Jd:9222) on 14 February, 2025
Author: Manoj Kumar Garg
Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg
[2025:RJ-JD:9222]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Crml Leave To Appeal No. 96/2023
State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
----Appellant
Versus
Dinesh S/o Shyama Maida, Resident Of Chiroli Chhota Police
Stateion Kalinjara, District Banswara
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Narendra Gehlot, PP with
Mr. OP Choudhary
For Respondent(s) :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG
Order 14/02/2025 Instant criminal leave to appeal has been filed by the appellant-State under Section 398 Cr.P.C. challenging the judgment dated 29.06.2022 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Banswara, in Sessions Case No.142/2021 (CIS No.142/2021) to the extent of acquittal of the accused-respondent from the offence under Section 324 IPC.
Brief facts of the case are that on 21.08.2021 complainant Jagdish submitted a written report at Police Station Kalinjara to the effect that on 20.08.2021, his cousin brother Dinesh assaulted Smt. Kaila (wife of Dinesh). She sustained multiple severe injuries. On the said report, Police registered a case against the accused- respondent and started investigation.
On completion of investigation, Police filed challan against the accused-respondent. Thereafter, the trial court framed the charges against the accused-respondent for offences under (Downloaded on 17/02/2025 at 09:48:09 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:9222] (2 of 9) [CRLLA-96/2023] Sections 307, 323, 341, 324 IPC, who denied the same and claimed trial.
During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses and exhibited various documents. Thereafter, statement of accused respondent was recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C.
Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned trial court vide impugned judgment dated 29.06.2022 acquitted the accused- respondent from offence under Section 307 IPC on the basis of benefit of doubt and from offences under Sections 341, 323, 324 IPC on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties. Hence, this criminal leave to appeal on behalf of the state to the extent of acquittal of the accused-respondent from offence under Section 324 IPC on the basis of compromise.
Learned counsel for the appellant-complainant submits that the learned trial court has committed grave error in acquitting the accused-respondent from offence under Section 324 IPC on the basis of compromise as the said offence is not compoundable under the Act. To the limited extent, the impugned judgment deserves to be quashed and set aside.
Heard learned Public Prosecutor and perused the judgment passed by the trial.
Admittedly, the parties to the lis are family members and they have entered into a compromise. The question before this court is whether the court may allow the compromise between the parties where the alleged offences are non-compoundable in nature as per Section 320 of Cr.P.C.
(Downloaded on 17/02/2025 at 09:48:09 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:9222] (3 of 9) [CRLLA-96/2023] In Khursheed and others v. State of U.P., Appeal (crl.) 1302 of 2007, decided on 28-9-2007, the appellants were convicted by Trial Court under sections 325, 323 read with 34 IPC. Their appeal against conviction was dismissed by the Sessions Court and revision petition was also dismissed by High Court. The convicts approached the Apex Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-
[12]. An offence of causing grievous hurt punishable under Section 325 IPC is covered by sub-section (2) of Section 320 of the Code. It is thus clear that an offence punishable under Section 325 IPC is also compounded with the permission of the Court.
[13]. The parties have compounded the offences. As stated in the compromise deed, Gurfan Ahmad, complainant and his mother Kulsoom @ Bhoori (injured) did not want any action against the appellants (accused). The parties are neighbours, their houses are situated adjacent to each other and they have been living peacefully for last many years and there is no dispute among them. It is further stated that to continue sweet relationship and harmony, complainant side does not want to take any action against the accused. A prayer is, therefore, made to accept the compromise.
[14]. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and considering the Deed of Compromise and having heard learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, ends of justice would be met if we grant necessary permission for compounding an offence punishable under Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC as required by sub-section (2) of Section 320 of the Code. The offence punishable under Section 323 IPC has already been compounded by the parties.
[15]. Sub-section (8) of Section 320 states that the compounding of offence under the section shall have an effect of acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded. The resultant effect of compounding of offences would be that the accused should be acquitted. In other words, once the offences have been compounded and the requisite permission is granted by the Court, the accused must be acquitted."(Downloaded on 17/02/2025 at 09:48:09 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:9222] (4 of 9) [CRLLA-96/2023] In Ravinder Kaur v. Anil Kumar, (2015) 8 SCC 286, Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a matter arising out of conviction, permitted the compounding of offence under section 494 IPC.
In Sube Singh v. State of Haryana, [2013 (4) RCR (Cri) 102], a Division Bench of this Court holds as under:-
[17]. The magnitude of inherent jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code with a view to prevent the abuse of law or to secure the ends of justice, however, is wide enough to include its power to quash the proceedings in relation to not only the non- compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 Criminal Procedure Code but such a power, in our considered view, is exercisable at any stage save that there is no express bar and invoking of such power is fully justified on facts and circumstances of the case.
[21]. In the light of these peculiar facts and circumstances where not only the parties but their close relatives (including daughter and son-in-law of respondent No. 2) have also supported the amicable settlement, we are of the considered view that the negation of the compromise would disharmonize the relationship and cause a permanent rift amongst the family members who are living together as a joint family. Non-acceptance of the compromise would also lead to denial of complete justice which is the very essence of our justice delivery system. Since there is no statutory embargo against invoking of power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code after conviction of an accused by the trial Court and during pendency of appeal against such conviction, it appears to be a fit case to invoke the inherent jurisdiction and strike down the proceedings subject to certain safeguards."
In Maya Sanjay Khandare v. State of Maharashtra, [2021 (1) RCR (Cri) 450], a three-member bench of Bombay High Court observed as follows:
(A) In a prosecution which has culminated in a conviction, whether the power u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. ought to be exercised for quashing the prosecution/conviction altogether, (instead of maintaining it and considering the issue of modification of the sentence) upon a settlement between the convict and the victim/complainant?(Downloaded on 17/02/2025 at 09:48:09 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:9222] (5 of 9) [CRLLA-96/2023] [33] While answering Question (A) we may observe in the light of the settled legal position as under:
At the conclusion of the criminal trial the Court on finding the evidence on record led by the prosecution to be sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused would proceed to convict the accused. The remedy of challenging the order of conviction is available to the accused by way of an appeal. Any compromise entered into post-conviction for a non-compoundable offence cannot by itself result in acquittal of the accused. Similarly, the Court has no power to compound any offence that is non-
compoundable and not permitted to be compounded under Section 320 of the Code. The compromise entered into therefore is just a mitigating factor that can be taken into account while hearing the appeal/revision challenging the conviction and which factor has to be taken into consideration while imposing appropriate punishment/sentence. It is not permissible to set aside the judgment of conviction at the appellate/revisional stage only on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise. In a given case the appellate Court/revisional Court also has the option of not accepting the compromise. Thus if the judgment of conviction cannot be set aside in an appeal/revision only on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise similar result cannot be obtained in a proceeding under Section 482 of the Code.
Hence, we hold that ordinarily the contention that the convict and the informant/complainant have entered into a compromise after the judgment of conviction can be raised only before the appellate/revisional Court in proceedings challenging such conviction. It would be a sound exercise of discretion under Section 482 of the Code and in accordance with the law of the land to refuse to quash criminal proceedings post-conviction for a non-compoundable offence only on the ground that the parties have entered into a compromise. Instead the Court can permit the convicted party to bring to the notice of the appellate/revisional Court the aspect of compromise. Having said so, it is only in rarest of rare cases that the Court may quash the criminal proceedings post-conviction for a non-compoundable offence on settlement between the convict and the informant/complainant. To illustrate, where a jurisdictional issue going to the root of the matter is raised for challenging the conviction or in matrimonial disputes where the parties have agreed to settle their differences, jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised. Such exercise of jurisdiction should be limited to the rarest of rare cases when found (Downloaded on 17/02/2025 at 09:48:09 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:9222] (6 of 9) [CRLLA-96/2023] necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice. Thus while holding that inherent power under Section 482 of the Code could be exercised for quashing criminal proceedings even at the appellate/revisional stage as held in Kiran T. Ingale [(Kiran Tulshiram Ingale vs. Anupama P. Gaikwad and Ors., : 2006 2 Mh.L.J. (Cri) 402)] such exercise of jurisdiction should be limited to the extent stated hereinabove. The ratio of the decision in Kiran T. Ingale (supra) has to be applied subject to aforesaid limitations.
Further, the expression "criminal proceedings" would cover the entire journey of the proceedings commencing from its initiation till the proceedings culminate giving it seal of finality. Question (A) is answered accordingly. Recently, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramgopal & Anr. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No. 1489/2012) decided on 29.09.2021, considering the question whether High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C could quashed non-compoundable offences, based on a compromise/settlement arrived at between the accused and the victim-complainant, held as under :-
"19. We thus sumup and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences 'compoundable' within the statutory framework, the extra- ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.(Downloaded on 17/02/2025 at 09:48:09 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:9222] (7 of 9) [CRLLA-96/2023]
20. Having appraised the aforestated parameters and weighing upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the two appeals before us, we are inclined to invoke powers under Article 142 and quash the criminal proceedings and consequently set aside the conviction in both the appeals. We say so for the reasons that:
Firstly, the occurrence(s) involved in these appeals can be categorized as purely personal or having overtones of criminal proceedings of private nature;
Secondly, the nature of injuries incurred, for which the Appellants have been convicted, do not appear to exhibit their mental depravity or commission of an offence of such a serious nature that quashing of which would override public interest;
Thirdly, given the nature of the offence and injuries, it is immaterial that the trial against the Appellants had been concluded or their appeal(s) against conviction stand dismissed;
Fourthly, the parties on their own volition, without any coercion or compulsion, willingly and voluntarily have buried their differences and wish to accord a quietus to their dispute(s);
Fifthly, the occurrence(s) in both the cases took place way back in the years 2000 and 1995, respectively. There is nothing on record to evince that either before or after the purported compromise, any untoward incident transpired between the parties;
Sixthly, since the Appellants and the complainant(s) are residents of the same village(s) and/or work in close vicinity, the quashing of criminal proceedings will advance peace, harmony, and fellowship amongst the parties who have decided to forget and forgive any illwill and have no vengeance against each other; and Seventhly, the cause of administration of criminal justice system would remain un- effected on acceptance of the amicable settlement between (Downloaded on 17/02/2025 at 09:48:09 PM) [2025:RJ-JD:9222] (8 of 9) [CRLLA-96/2023] the parties and/or resultant acquittal of the Appellants; more so looking at their present age.
21. Consequently, and for the reasons stated above, read with the settlement dated 13th September 2006, we find it appropriate to invoke our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and quash the criminal proceedings in the aforesaid case. As a sequel thereto, all offences emanating out of the FIR leading to Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012 stand annulled, and the judgment and orders passed by the trial court, appellate court and the High Court are set aside.
Resultantly, the Appellants shall be deemed to have been acquitted of the charged offences for all intents and purposes."
In the present case, the parties to the lis are family members. The incident took place in the year 2021 and during the pendency of the appeal, they have decided to reconcile their differences and particularly the victim has forgiven the accused in the interest of justice and family harmony. As per the judicial pronouncements of the Hon'ble Apex Court, offence under Section 324 IPC does not pose a serious threat to public safety or societal order.
In the light of aforesaid judicial pronouncements and keeping in view the compromise/settlement between the parties, this Court is of the opinion that the learned trial court does not commit any error in acquitting the accused-respondent from the offence under Section 324 IPC on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties.
(Downloaded on 17/02/2025 at 09:48:09 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:9222] (9 of 9) [CRLLA-96/2023] Hence, the present criminal leave to appeal has no substance and the same is hereby dismissed.
Record of the trial court be sent back.
(MANOJ KUMAR GARG),J 42-MS/-
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