Allahabad High Court
Azadar Hussain Khan And Others vs Deputy Director Of Consolidation ... on 2 August, 2021
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2021 ALL 1979
Author: Rajnish Kumar
Bench: Rajnish Kumar
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Court No. - 17/Reserved AFR Case :- CONSOLIDATION No. - 1473 of 1981 Petitioner :- Azadar Hussain Khan And Others Respondent :- Deputy Director Of Consolidation Faizabad And Others Counsel for Petitioner :- S.K.Mehrotra,Ishwar Dutt Shukla,Santosh Kumar Mehrotra Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Rajeshwar,Rakesh Kumar Nayak Hon'ble Rajnish Kumar,J.
1. Heard, Shri I.D. Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioners, Shri Rajeshwar, learned counsel for legal heirs of opposite party no.3 i.e. 3/a and 3/b. Notice on behalf of opposite party no.1 and 2 has been accepted by the learned Chief Standing Counsel.
2. This petition has been filed challenging the judgment and order dated 05.03.1979 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation under Section 11(1) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953 ( here-in-after referred as the Act of 1953) and the judgment and order dated 09.12.1980 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad.
3. The facts, in brief, for adjudication of the present controversy are that the plot no.486/1 area 17 biswa and 10 dhur of Khata No.15 situated in village Simai Mohiapur, Pargana and Tehsil Akbarpur, District Faizabad was recorded in the name of Tazdar Khan, father of the petitioners as 'bhumidhar' in the basic year. The land in dispute was initially recorded in the name of one Zahoor Khan, which was subsequently came to be recorded in the name of Smt. Samagira. It was sold by Smt.Samagira by a registered sale deed dated 01.09.1965 to the father of the petitioners. Three objections were filed under Section 9(2) of the Act of 1953. One by Atta Abbas with the allegation that the sale deed executed by Smt. Samagira was not valid. Second objection was filed by Shiv Raj- opposite party no.3 (now dead and substituted by legal heirs) claiming the land in dispute on the basis of adverse possession. The third objection was filed by one Dhanju in respect of plot no.627. The petitioners filed objection to the objections claiming the entire property. The Consolidation Officer held Atta Abbas entitled to half share in land in dispute alongwith Tazdar Khan and also allowed in favour of the opposite party no.3 Shiv Raj and Dhanju by means of order dated 16.01.1972.
4. The order passed by the Consolidation Officer was challenged in four appeals filed by one Atta Abbas and three by Tazdar Khan, the father of the petitioners. The appeals were decided by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation by means of order dated 13.03.1972 by a common judgment. The appeals of Tazdar Khan, father of the petitioners were allowed and the appeal filed by Atta Abbas was dismissed and the name of Tazdar Khan, father of the petitioners was directed to be continued in the revenue records. A revision was filed by Atta Abbas, Dhanju and Shiv Raj i.e. opposite party no.3 bearing revision No.1640 under Section 48 of the Act of 1953 before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, which was decided by the Joint Director of Consolidation by means of order dated 18.03.1976 and the matter was remanded to the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation to decide a fresh in regard to the two issues considered and examined by the Joint Director of Consolidation.
5. The learned Settlement Officer Consolidation reconsidered the entire dispute including the present dispute with the opposite party no.3 and allowed the appeal of Tazdar Khan in whose place the petitioners were substituted in appeal on his death with respect to the dispute between them and Atta Abbas and the appeal of Atta Abbas was dismissed. The appeal of Tazdar Khan against the opposite party no.3 and others in regard to the present dispute was also dismissed. The appeal of Tazdar Khan against Dhanju was also allowed. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order a revision was filed by the petitioners and another revision was filed by Atta Abbas. Both the revisions were dismissed by means of order dated 09.12.1980 by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. Hence the instant writ petition has been filed.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners had submitted that four appeals, one by Atta Abbas and three by Tazdar Khan, father of the petitioners were decided by a common judgment and order dated 13.03.1972. One revision No.1640 under Section 48 of the Act of 1953 was filed by all the three, but the revision was decided only in regard to two issues considered with regard to the revision of Atta Abbas and the matter was remanded to reconsider and decide a fresh in regard to the said two issues. But the Settlement Officer Consolidation reconsidered the entire case, as such he travelled beyond the term of remand which could not have been done. The revision filed by the petitioners has also been dismissed without considering it and the grounds raised by the petitioners. Therefore the orders passed by the court's below are illegal and without authority of law and not sustainable in the eyes of law.
7. He further submitted that the opposite party no.3 had not challenged the order passed in revision no.1640 dated 18.03.1976, therefore the case of the opposite party no.3 could not have been reconsidered, even if the order was quashed, because his case was neither considered in revision nor remanded to decide a fresh. He further submitted that the case of opposite party no.3 was not proved as alleged entry was made in his favour on the basis of adverse possession without following the due procedure and issuance of PA-10 in accordance with law. Therefore, the case of opposite party no.3 was not tenable at all in the eyes of law but without considering it, his objection has been allowed. The grounds raised in the present writ petition by the petitioners are uncontroverted as no counter affidavit has been filed. In view of above the writ petition is liable to be allowed and the impugned orders are liable to be quashed and the names of petitioners are liable to be recorded and continued in the revenue records. In support of his contentions learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on Rama Kant Versus Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad and others; 2005(23) LCD 1057, Radha Raman Samanta Versus Bank of India; 2004 (1) SCC 605, Paper Products Limited versus Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai; 2007 (7) SCC 352, S.Ravindra Singh and another Versus 3rd Addl. District Judge, Faizabad and others; 1994(12) LCD 820, Pramod Kumar Chaturvedi Versus State of U.P. and others; 2006 (24) LCD 1364, Indrapal Singh Versus The Deputy Director of Consolidation Kheri and another; 2019 (37) LCD 1233 and Ishwarchand etc. Versus Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad and others; 2019 (142) RD 676.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the opposite party no.3 submitted that the petitioners have not come with clean hands. The courts below considered the case of the opposite party no.3 in accordance with law and allowed the objections of opposite party no.3 after remand and the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation was set aside by the Joint Director of Consolidation with costs. The opposite party no.3 was claiming on the basis of adverse possession which has rightly been considered by the courts below and allowed. Therefore, the concurrent finding recorded by the Court's below in favour of opposite party no.3 cannot be interfered with and set aside by this court. The writ petition has been filed on misconceived and baseless grounds. It is liable to be dismissed with costs. In support of his contentions learned counsel for the opposite party no.3 has relied on Ravinder Kaur Grewal Versus Manjit Kaur; AIR 2019 Supreme Court 3827, Chandrika (Dead) by LRs versus Sudama (Dead) through LRs; AIR 2919 Supreme court 2119, Deepak Tandon Versus Rajesh Kumar Gupta; AIRONLINE 2019 SC 72, Mohd. Musthfa Versus Deputy Director of Consolidation and others; Writ-B No.98 of 1976 and Ami Chand And another Versus Deputy Director of Consolidation and 18 others; Writ-B No.1440 of 2019.
9. I have considered the submissions of learned counsels of the parties and perused the documents and orders placed on record.
10. The land in question was initially recorded in the name of one Jahoor Khan, which was subsequently came to be recorded in the name of Smt. Samagira after litigation. She had got the 'bhumidhari' rights after depositing 10 times. She sold the same by a registered sale deed dated 01.09.1965 to Tazdar Khan i.e. father of the petitioners. Three objections were filed under Section 9(2) of the Act of 1953. The petitioners filed their objections to the objections claiming the entire property. The Consolidation Officer allowed the objection holding Atta Abbas entitled to half share alongwith Tazdar Khan and also in favour of opposite party no.3 Shiv Raj and Dhanju by means of order dated 16.01.1972. The order passed by the Consolidation Officer was challenged in four appeals, out of which one was filed by Atta Abbas and three by Tazdar Khan. The appeals were decided by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation by means of order dated 13.03.1972 by a common judgment. The appeals of Tazdar Khan, father of the petitioners were allowed and the appeal filed by Atta Abbas was dismissed and the name of Tazdar Khan father of the petitioners was directed to continue in the revenue records.
11. A common revision was filed by Atta Abbas, Dhanju and Shiv Raj i.e. opposite party no.3 The revision was considered by the Joint Director of Consolidation and decided by means of judgment and order dated 18.03.1976. The revisional authority after recording the facts of the case of Atta Abbas against Tazdar Khan observed in paragraph 3 that mainly two issues are for consideration. No.1; as to whether giving of half share each to both the parties in the land in dispute by the Consolidation Officer is justified. No.2; as to whether the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation, for continuation of the name of Tazdar Khan recorded in the basic year treating the sale deed valid in regard to the land in dispute, was appropriate. Thereafter after considering the same it was held that the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation has failed to examine certain aspects, therefore he would decide again after calling the relevant files in regard to both the issues. Accordingly allowed the revision and quashed the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation and remanded the matter. Therefore it is apparent that the Revisional Authority had considered the case of only Atta Abbas against Tazdar Khan and the two issues involved in the said case and thereafter remanded the matter for a fresh consideration. Therefore, the appellate authority was required to re-consider only the said issues. The other issues including the case of opposite party no.3 were neither considered by the revisional authority nor the case was remanded for re-consideration of the same. Therefore the other issues including the case of opposite party no.3 were neither required to be considered nor could have been considered by the appellate authority.
12. After remand the appellate authority re-considered all the four appeals and dismissed the appeal of Atta Abbas against Tazdar Khan and the appeal of Tazdar Khan against Shiv Raj i.e. opposite party no.3 and others and allowed the appeal of Tazdar Khan and directed that the name of heirs of Tazdar Khan shall continue in accordance with the basic year. The right of Dhanju was rejected. There was no direction in regard to the opposite party no.3 i.e. Shiv Raj but his case was also considered and the appeal against him was dismissed, which could not have been done. The opposite party no.3, if aggrieved against the revisional order, could have challenged the same in appropriate proceedings, but it was not challenged by him.
13. In the case of Rama Kant Versus Board of Revenue and others (Supra) this court has held that the defiance to carry out the directions issued by the superior Court or tribunal is in effect denial of justice and is destructive of the basic principles of the administration of justice based on hierarchy of Courts in our country. It has further been held that the order of remand became final between the parties as the same was not challenged. The relevant paragraphs 7 and 8 are extracted below:-
"7. It is not open to an inferior Court or Tribunal to refuse to carry out the directions or to act contrary to directions issued by a superior Court or Tribunal. Such refusal to carry out the directions or to act in defiance of the directions issued by the superior Court or Tribunal is in effect denial of justice and is destructive of the basic principle of the administration of justice based on hierarchy of Courts in our country. If a subordinate Court or Tribunal refuses to carry out the directions given to it by a superior Court or Tribunal in exercise of its appellate power, the result would be chaos in the administration of justice.
8. The order of remand dated 22.11.1979, became final between the parties an same was not challenged. Thus, it was not open to the trial court being an inferior court to reframe fresh issues and to record fresh findings. The only course open to the trial court was to give finding on the two issues reframed by the first appellate court and decide the suit accordingly as directed in the order of remand. The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by travelling beyond directions contained in the remand order and this vital aspect have been illegally ignored by the court of first appeal as well as second appeal."
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case Radha Raman Samanta Versus Bank of India (Supra), has held that once issues might and ought to have been raised but had not been done so, it must be taken that the Division Bench had rejected such contentions. Therefore, on remand the learned single judge was bound to address only on one issue upon which the matter had been remanded. The relevant paragraph 12 is extracted below:-
"12. On the earlier occasion when the matter was considered by the Division Bench, the respondent Bank did not raise any issue of alternative remedy or any question relating to non-maintainability of the writ petition. We may also notice that when such issues might and ought to have been raised but had not been done so, it must be taken that the Division Bench had rejected such contentions and the order of the Division Bench remanding the matter to the learned Single Judge was not carried in appeal and became final. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was bound to address only on one issue upon which the matter had been remanded. Thus, the Division Bench could not have overlooked these facts in the appeal arising from the order of the learned Single Judge on the second occasion after remand and need not have gone into the question as to whether the writ petition could have been entertained at all or not. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court could not have overlooked these facts and interfered with the order of the learned Single Judge."
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Paper Products Limited Versus Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai (Supra), considered the scope of limited remand and the case of Mohan Lal V. Anandibai and others; AIR 1971 SC 2177. The relevant paragraph 10 is extracted below:-
"10. A bare reading of para 10 makes the position clear that it only related to the particular plea and no other plea which was covered by para 8. The scope of limited remand has been highlighted by this Court in Mohan Lal v. Anandibai [(1971) 1 SCC 813 : AIR 1971 SC 2177] . It was observed at para 9 as follows: (SCC pp. 821-22) "9. Lastly, counsel urged that now that the suit has been remanded to the trial court for reconsidering the plea of res judicata, the appellant should have been given an opportunity to amend the written statement so as to include pleadings in respect of the fraudulent nature and antedating of the gift deed Exhibit P-3. These questions having been decided by the High Court could not appropriately be made the subject-matter of a fresh trial. Further, as pointed out by the High Court, any suit on such pleas is already time-barred and it would be unfair to the plaintiff-respondents to allow these pleas to be raised by amendment of the written statement at this late stage. In the order, the High Court has stated that the judgments and decrees and findings of both the lower courts were being set aside and the case was being remanded to the trial court for a fresh decision on merits with advertence to the remarks in the judgment of the High Court. It was argued by learned counsel that, in making this order, the High Court has set aside all findings recorded on all issues by the trial court and the first appellate court. This is not a correct interpretation of the order. Obviously, in directing that findings of both courts are set aside, the High Court was referring to the points which the High Court considered and on which the High Court differed from the lower courts. Findings on other issues, which the High Court was not called upon to consider, cannot be deemed to be set aside by this order. Similarly, in permitting amendments, the High Court has given liberty to the present appellant to amend his written statement by setting out all the requisite particulars and details of his plea of res judicata, and has added that the trial court may also consider his prayer for allowing any other amendments. On the face of it, those other amendments, which could be allowed, must relate to this very plea of res judicata. It cannot be interpreted as giving liberty to the appellant to raise new pleas altogether which were not raised at the initial stage. The other amendments have to be those which are consequential to the amendment in respect of the plea of res judicata."
16. In view of above, once limited issues were considered by the superior court and the matter was remanded to re-consider on the said issues the inferior court cannot travel beyond those issues and consider and decide the other issues and the whole case. If a person, whose issues were not considered, was aggrieved by the term of remand, could have challenged the same. But in the present case the appellate authority, to whom the case was remanded, travelled beyond the term of remand and considered the issues which were neither considered by the superior court nor the matter was remanded to consider the same. Therefore, this court is of the considered view that the appellate authority considered and decided the case of opposite party no.3 without authority of law. This was also not considered by the revisional authority on being challenged. Therefore the orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law.
17. Adverting to the second submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that the case of the opposite party no.3 was also not proved as alleged entry was made in his favour on the basis of the adverse possession without following the due procedure and issuance of PA-10 in accordance with law, this court finds that after remand the appellate authority has mentioned that during Padtal the possession of Shiv Raj was found and only Tazdar Khan has come to deny the possession of Shiv Raj, whereas by the oral evidence the possession of Shiv Raj was proved and the oral evidence cannot be ignored. Tazdar Khan also does not know the area and number of the plot. The possession of Shiv Raj is found from the time of Zahoor. Therefore, in his opinion, the Consolidation Officer has rightly found Shiv Raj as Sirdar. Admittedly the opposite party no.3 was claiming on the basis of adverse possession. The oral evidence of Kaledin, Saidu and Nusrat Jahan filed by the petitioners alongwith writ petition indicates that none of them have admitted the possession of the opposite party no.3, rather Saidu and Nusrat Jahan have specifically denied the possession of opposite party no.3 and the same are uncontroverted.
18. The party who is claiming, on the basis of adverse possession in some property, is to prove as to the date, time and manner in which he entered into possession and when the possession converted into open, hostile and adverse. The claim under Clause 9 on the basis of adverse possession is not tenable at all unless it is proved that the entry was strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Land Record Manual and thereafter the notice was sent to the recorded tenure holder. A joint reading of paragraph 89-A, 89-B and 102-B of the Land Records Manual makes it clear that if any entry is made in PA-10 the same is required to be communicated to the person or persons concerned or their heirs and their signatures are required to be taken on the communication. It was further required to be reviewed by the Revenue Inspector at the time of verification (Padtal) as to whether the signatures of the recipient has been obtained or not. Therefore in case any entry made on the basis of adverse possession the same has to be communicated to the person concerned and the person claiming on the basis of said entry is required to prove that it was in accordance with the Land Records Manual. Therefore it was required to be proved by the opposite party no.3, but he failed to do so.
19. This Court considered this issue in the case of Mohd. Raza Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Another; R.D. 1997 (R.D.) 276 and held that the entries in the revenue papers not prepared by following the procedure prescribed under the Uttar Pradesh Land Records Manual and PA-10 notice was not served on the main tenant, such entries are of no evidentiary value and would not confer any right.
20. This court, in the case of Gurumukh Singh and Others Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Nainital and Others; 1997 (80) RD 276, has also held that the entries will have no evidentiary value if they are not in accordance with the provisions of Land Records Manual and the burden to prove is on the person who is asserting the possession on the basis of adverse possession. In the case of Sadhu Saran and Another Vs. Assistant Director of Consolidation, Gorakhpur and Others; 2003 (94) RD 535, this court held that it is well settled in law that the illegal entry does not confer title. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and Others Vs. Revamma and Others; 2008 (26) LCD 15, has held that in case of adverse possession, communication to the owner and his hostility towards the possession is must.
21. This Court, in the case of Indrapal Singh Versus the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Kheri and another (Supra) considering the case relied by the petitioners in the case of Ishwarchand etc. Versus Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad (Supra), has held that the party laying his claim on the basis of adverse possession in some property has to prove as to the date, time and manner in which possession is converted into open, hostile and adverse. Relevant paragraphs 29, 30, 31 and 32 are extracted below:-
"29. A party laying his claim on the basis of adverse possession in some property has to prove as to the date, time and manner in which possession is converted into open, hostile and adverse. In the case of Marwari Kumhar and others vs. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri and another, reported in [MANU/SC/0501/2000 : (2000) 6 SCC 735], Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in absence of any proof as to the date, time and the manner in which possession gets converted into open, hostile and adverse, the claim for adverse possession can not be upheld.
30. Thus, Court in its latest judgment in the case of Ishwarchand vs. Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad and others, reported in [2019 (142) RD 676] has, in paragraph 17 observed as under:
"17. In my considered opinion, this argument cannot be accepted because possession can also be permissive. Till such time, it is proved that the Lekhpal had made the entry under Class 9 strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Land Records Manual and thereafter, a notice was sent to the recorded tenure holder in PA-10, no claim for adverse possession, could have been decreed."
31. Thus, from the aforequoted authorities, it is clear that to succeed in a claim based on adverse possession the parties so pleading must prove that possession was continuous, open, in the notice and knowledge of the other party against which such possession is claimed and hostile. The adverse possession thus, needs to be proved on the basis of evidence and in case of adverse possession being claim in landed property in the State of Uttar Pradesh, as has been held by this Court in the case of Mata Badal Singh and others (supra) adverse possession must be proved after producing PA-10 and after summoning PA-24.
32. So far as the order passed by the Consolidation Officer in this case on 05.08.1988 is concerned, except for the statement of the petitioner-Indra Pal Singh and one of his witnesses, who have stated that initially Shreepal and thereafter Indra Pal Singh forcibly took possession of the land in question, there was no other relevant documentary evidence available. PA-10 and PA-24 to prove column-9 entry, that too, in the name of Shreepal, have not been filed, neither were they summoned. It is further noticeable that the order dated 05.08.1988 passed by the Consolidation Officer also takes into account a compromise said to have been entered into between Indra Pal Singh and Babu Ram. If the claim is based on adverse possession and the original recorded tenure holder himself stated before the Consolidation Officer by way of compromise that Indra Pal Singh has been in possession, the necessary ingredients of adverse possession cannot be said to be proved. On account of procedural lapse where objection filed by the petitioner and objection filed by the respondent No. 2 were not clubbed together, the claim of respondent No. 2 on the basis of sale deed is being denied. The Consolidation Officer in his order dated 02.05.2012 has taken into account all the aforesaid aspects of the matter, specially the observations made by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation in his order dated 30.03.1991 and has thus allowed the revision petition by setting aside the orders dated 21.11.2001 and 20.08.2003 passed by the Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer, Consolidation."
22. In the judgment relied by learned counsel for the opposite party no.3, in the case of Ravinder Kaur Grewal Versus Manjit Kaur (Supra), also it has been held that the law with regard to perfecting title by adverse possession is well-settled. A person claiming title by adverse possession has to prove three "neck" nec vi, nec clam and nec precario. In other words, he must show that his possession is adequate in continuity in publicity and in extent.
23. The third submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that since the opposite party no.3 has not filed any counter affidavit, therefore, the pleas taken in the writ petition are to be taken correct. Once the plea has been taken and no counter affidavit has been filed raising any objection, that has to be taken correct on the face of it, if they does not otherwise seem to be incorrect on the basis of pleadings on record. This court, in the case of S.Ravindra Singh and another Versus 3rd Addl. District Judge, Faizabad (Supra), has held that the allegations have to be taken as having been admitted or in any case, the allegations go uncontroverted. This is well settled principle of law that allegations of fact made on affidavit by a party when require to be controverted by affidavit have not been denied and continued have got to be taken to have been admitted to be correct. The relevant paragraph 24 is extracted below:-
"24. A perusal of order-sheet per se shows that after the filing of the objections by the petitioners, the date of evidence was fixed and the parties had filed documentary evidence, no oral evidence was sought to be produced and nor the parties did seek to produce and to adduce any oral evidence. As I have mentioned earlier the allegations made in paragraph 14 of the counter-affidavit have not been controverted or denied by the petitioners in their rejoinder-affidavit. The allegations have to be taken as having been admitted or in any case, the allegations go uncontroverted. This is well settled principle of law that allegations of fact made on affidavit by a party when require to be controverted by affidavit have not been denied and continued have got to taken to be have been admitted to be correct. In the case of Juggi Lal Kamla Pat v. Ram Janki Gupta and another, reported in MANU/UP/0101/1962 : AIR 1962 Alld 407, it has been laid down by this High Court as under:--
"A statement on oath, whether true or false, has to be met by a counter-affidavit in reply, or by challenging the statement by cross-examining the deponent. If that is not done, it would be presumed that the allegations, if untrue would have been rebutted by the other side."
24. This court, in the case of Pramod Kumar Chaturvedi Versus State of U.P. and others (Supra), has held that when the counter affidavit was not filed, it is axiomatic that the respondents no.4 has nothing to say against the allegations and therefore the averments, by reason of remaining uncontroverted have to be treated as correct in view of law laid down by the Apex Court in its decision reported in AIR 1973 SC 627, 1982 SCC (2) 471 and 1987 SCR (4) 73.
25. In view of above since no counter affidavit has been filed by the opposite party no.3, the allegations made in the writ petition are uncontroverted and it can be safely presumed that the allegations made in the writ petition are true otherwise it would have been rebutted by the other side.
26. In view of above and considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case the other judgments relied by learned counsel for the opposite parties are of no assistance to him and are distinguishable. This court is of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment and orders have been passed in illegal manner beyond the term of remand and without authority of law and recording erroneous and perverse findings without application of mind. Therefore, the same are not sustainable in the eyes of law and are liable to be quashed.
27. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. The judgment and order dated 05.03.1979, passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Faizabad, contained in annexure no.3 to the writ petition and judgment and order dated 09.12.1980, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, contained in Annexure no.4 to the writ petition are hereby quashed. The consequences shall follow accordingly as per law. No order as to costs.
....................... ..................(Rajnish Kumar,J.) Order Date :-02.08.2021 Banswar