Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Amit Kumar Sharma vs Govt. Of Nctd on 7 April, 2025
1
Item No. 81/ C-4
C
O.A. No.829/2020
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench: New Delhi
O.A. No.829/2020
Reserved on 19.03.2025
Pronounced on 07.04.2025
Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J)
Hon'ble Dr. Sumeet Jerath, Member (A)
Amit Kumar Sharma
Aged about 36 years,
S/o Kiranpal Sharma
R/o D-12,
D 12, Sanjay Enclave, Uttam Nagar, Delhi
Delhi-110059
Mob. No. 9899971680
Post: PGT (Computer Science) (Male)
Post Code: 150/17
Group - B
........Applicant
(By Advocate: Mr. Nikhil Pawar with Mr. Shubham Bahl with Mr.
Anuj Aggarwal )
Versus
1.The Lt. Governor
Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
Raj Niwas, Raj Niwas Marg, Civil Lines, Delhi
Delhi-110054
Email: [email protected]
2. Directorate of Education
Govt. of NCT of Delhi
Through the Director of Education
Old Secretariat Building, Civil Lines, Delhi
Delhi-110054
Email: [email protected], [email protected]
3. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board (DSSSB),
Through its Chairman
Govt. of NCT of Delhi,
FC 18, Institutional Area, Karkardooma, Delhi
FC-18, Delhi-110092
Email: [email protected]
dsssb
...Respondents
(By Advocate: Ms Purnima Maheshwari with Mr. D.K. Singh and Mr.
Anuj Kumar Sharma)
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Item No. 81/ C-4
C
O.A. No.829/2020
ORDER
By Hon'ble Mr. Manish Garg, Member (J) By virtue of the present Original Application (OA), the learned counsel for the applicant seeks the following reliefs:
reliefs:-
"(i) set aside the impugned Post Graduate Teacher's (Computer Science) Recruitment Rules, 2014, notified by the Directorate of Education, Government of NCT of Delhi, in the Delhi Gazette:
Extraordinary, vide Notification Notification dated 03.03.2015, to the extent they provide the upper age limit for appointment of the direct recruits on the post of PGT (Computer Science) as "not exceeding 30 years" instead of "not exceeding 36 years", as provided in case of other PGT subjects;
(ii) set aside the impugned Notice/Advertisement No. 04/2017 dated 20.12.2017, issued by the Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board (DSSSB) to the extent the same provides the upper age limit for appointment on the post of PGT (Computer Science) (Male) (Post Code 150/17) in the Directorate of Education, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, as 30 years instead of 36 years;
(iii) set aside the impugned Order No. F.DE.2(28)/DRC(E F.DE.2(28)/DRC(E-
II)/PGT(Comp. Sc.)/Male/2019 dated 18.12.2019, issued by the Assistant Director of Education, Education, Direct Recruitment Cell, Directorate of Education, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, whereby the candidature of the applicant for appointment on the post of PGT (Computer Science) (Male) (Post Code 150/17) in the Directorate of Education was rejected on the ground of being overage;
(iv) declare that the applicant is duly qualified and fulfills all the requisite conditions including the condition of upper age limit, for appointment on the post of PGT (Computer Science) (Male) (Post Code 150/17);
(v) direct the respondents to relax the upper age limit in case of the applicant, for appointment on the post of PGT (Computer Science) (Male) (Post Code 150/17);
(vi) direct the Respondent No.1 to issue appointment letter to the applicant for appointment on the post of PGT (Computer Science) (Male) (Post Code 150/17) and appoint the applicant on the post of PGT (Computer Science) (Male) (Post Code 150/17) with all consequential benefits thereof including full back wages/salary, seniority, etc;
(vii) allow the present Original Original Application with costs in favour of the applicant; and 3 Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020
(viii) issue any other order or direction as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice and in the favour of the applicant;"
2. Learned counsel for the applicant submit submitted that the applicant has been working as a Software Developer on contractual basis in the Centre for Health Informatics project at the National Institute of Health and Family Welfare since 15.07.2013. The National Institute of Health and Family Welfare Welfare is an autonomous institute under the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India.
2.1 The applicant possesse possessed the requisite qualifications for appointment to the post of Post Graduate Teacher (PGT) (Computer Science) (Male) [Post Code 150/17].He 150/17].He further submit submitted that the pursuant to Vacancy Notice/Advertisement No. 04/2017 dated 20.12.2017, the Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board (DSSSB) invited applications for various teaching posts, including the post of PGT (Computer Science) (Male) [Post Code 150/17] in the Directorate of Education. The closing date for submission of applications was 31.01.2018.
2.2 Being eligible, qualified, and desirous of appointment to the said post, the applicant duly submitted his application. As of 31.
31.01.2018 (the closing date), the applicant was 34 years, 4 months, and 10 days old. The applicant's application for the post of PGT (Computer Science) (Male) [Post Code 150/17] was duly accepted by the DSSSB. Thereafter, an admit card was issued to the applicant, applicant, assigning him Roll No. 4 Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 111015000208. The DSSSB conducted the examination for the post of PGT (Computer Science) (Male) [Post Code 150/17] on 27.07.2018, and the applicant duly appeared in the said examination.
2.3 On 19.12.2018, the DSSSB declared the result of the written examination. The applicant secured 157.09 marks out of 300 and was shortlisted for appointment to the post of PGT (Computer Science) (Male) [Post Code 150/17]. The applicant obtained marks higher than the prescribed cut-off cut marks for the Unreserved (UR) category.
2.4 Vide notice dated 19.12.2018, the DSSSB declared the category category-
wise cut-off off marks for shortlisting candidates for uploading the ee-
dossier. Subsequently, the applicant duly uploaded his ee-dossier.
2.5 Vide Result Notice No. 381 dated 23.03.2019, the DSSSB provisionally nominated/selected the applicant for appointment to the post of PGT (Computer Science) (Male) [Post Code 150/17].
2.6 Thereafter, vide Memorandum dated 31.07.2019, the Directorate of Education issued an offer offer of appointment to the applicant for the post of PGT (Computer Science) (Male) [Post Code 150/17].
2.7 On 09.08.2019, the applicant was called for verification of documents and qualification certificates, and he duly appeared for the same.
5Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 2.8 The counterparts counterparts of the applicant were subsequently called for medical examination. However, the applicant was neither called for medical examination nor issued an appointment letter. Aggrieved by this inaction, the applicant submitted a representation dated 20.08.
20.08.2019, which was received by the Directorate of Education on 21.08.2019.
However, no response has been received till date.
2.9 Learned counsel for the applicant further submit submitted that the applicant also filed an application under the Right to Information (R (RTI) Act, seeking information regarding his candidature. However, the Directorate of Education failed to provide an appropriate response.
Aggrieved by the inaction of the Directorate of Education, Government of NCT of Delhi, in not issuing the appointment lletter, the applicant preferred an Original Application before this Hon'ble Tribunal.
2.10 On 07.02.2020, the applicant withdrew OA No. 3163 of 2019 with liberty to challenge the impugned Order dated 18.12.2019 where whereby the application of the applicant for seeking age relaxation has been rejected.
2.11 The learned counsel for the applicant submit submitted that he seeks to challenge the Post Graduate Teacher (Computer Science) Recruitment Rules, 2014,, issued by the Directorate of Education and published in the Delhi Gazette Extraordinary vide Notification dated 03.03.2015, to the extent that they fail to prescribe an upper age limit of 36 years for direct recruitment. He drew dr attention to the said notification, particularly the impugned advertisement, wherein the the upper age limit for PGT 6 Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 (Computer Science) is specified as not exceeding 30 years years, whereas for other PGT posts, it is 36 years.
2.12 The sum and substance of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the applicant challenging the Recruitment Rules (RRs) is as follows:
(i) It is contended that except for the post of PGT (Computer Science), the upper age limit prescribed for all other PGT posts is 36 years, and all such posts require a postgraduate qualification.
(ii) The feeder post of TGT (Computer Science) also has an upper age limit of 30 years. The applicant further contend contended that it is inexplicable how the respondents have created a distinction between the posts of TGT (Computer Science) and PGT (Computer Science) by prescribing the same upper age limit of 30 years, which is alleged to be artificial and arbitrary.
(iii) It is further argued that, as a departmental candidate, the applicant ought to have been granted age relaxation. Moreover, he ought to be treated as departmental candidate.
2.13 Learned earned counsel for the applicant further relie relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2294 2294-2329/2008, Union Public Service Commission v. Dr. Jamuna Kurup & Ors.
Ors., decided on 21.02.2008, and referred refer to the relevant paragraph of the judgment, which reads as under:-
under:7
Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 "9. The UPSC contended that the term 'age is relaxable for employees of Municipal Corporation of Delhi' in the advertisement dated 13.3.2004, is intended to refer only to regular and permanent employees of MCD. It was also contended that being short term contract contract employees, the respondents cannot claim to be 'employees of MCD'. For this purpose reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in UPSC vs. Girija Jayantilal Vaghela 2006 (2) SCC 482, wherein this Court held that persons working on short term contract basis cannot claim the status of Government Servants. UPSC submitted that on a similar interpretation, 'employees of MCD' will not include contract employees.
10. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the decision in Vaghela Vaghela did not apply to the respondents as they did not claim to be government servants. He submitted that the respondents claimed age relaxation as employees of MCD which was specifically provided in the advertisement. We have already noticed that the UPSC advertisement (No. SPLSPL-03-2004) clearly specified that the age limit of 35 years was relaxable for employees of Municipal Corporation of Delhi, up to five years.
Therefore, the only question that arises for consideration is whether the word 'employees of MCD' should be construed as referring only to permanent or regular employees of MCD as contended by UPSC or to all employees of MCD including contract employees, as contended by respondents.
14. The learned counsel for appellant submitted that the advertisement granted age relaxation to employees of MCD and advertisement employees of government of India, and that the words 'permanent' or 'regular' were not used either with reference to 'employees of government' or 'employees of MCD'. It is pointed out that in Vaghela (supra), (supra), this Court while dealing with persons employed in identical circumstances, that is 'engaged for a period of six months from the date of joining or till a candidate selected by UPSC joined on regular basis', held that the term 'government servant' did did not refer to or include persons employed on contract basis. It is argued that on the same principle, the term 'employees of MCD' cannot include a contract employee of MCD. We cannot agree. Vaghela (Supra) related to contract employment by a government whereas whereas in this case the contract employment is by a Municipal Corporation. The reason that weighed with this Court in Vaghela to hold that a contract employee was not a government servant, was in view of the special connotation of the term 'government servant'.
serva This Court after referring to the decision of the Constitution Bench in Roshanlal Tandan vs. Union of India 1968 (1) SCR 185, and the decision in Dinesh Chandra Sanpma vs. State of Assam 1977 (4) SSCC 441, held that employment under the government is a matter of status and not a 8 Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 contract even though acquisition of such a status may be preceded by a contract; and that contract employees of the government were governed by the terms of contract and did not possess the status of government servants nor were governed by rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, nor enjoyed the protection under Article 311. But a Municipal Corporation is not 'government', and municipal employees are not government servants governed by Article 309 to 311. Though permanent employees of municipal corporation or other statutory bodies may be governed by statutory rules, they do not enjoy the status of government servants. Therefore, the decision in Vaghela, rendered with reference to government servants may not be of any assistance in interpreting the term 'employees oof MCD'. In fact, for that very reason, these matters were de de-linked from the hearing of Vaghela.
15. In view of the above, we dismiss these appeals. We also direct UPSC to declare the withheld results of respondents who had participated in the examination in pursuance of the interim orders of this Court and grant the benefit of age relaxation as per the direction of High Court."
3. At this stage, learned counsel for the respondents oppose opposed the plea and submitted ted that the Recruitment Rules (RRs) for the post code applied by the applicant were amended in 2015, whereas the RRs for the post of PGT (Fine Arts), Art upon which the applicant relied upon, have never been amended. She contended contend that it is within the discretio discretion of the respondents to prescribe the method and standards for the functional requirements of the job profile for the applied post, which cannot be interfered with by the Courts.
3.1 In support support of her contention, she relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 10824 of 2016 2016, Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board v. Praveen Kumar Kumar, decided on 11.11.2016. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads as under:
9Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 "8. A copy of the said judgment dated 28.08.2008 passed in Sachin hin Gupta's case was produced before us and we have gone through it. On going through this judgment, one finds that, in that case, challenge was made to the Notification dated 13.07.2007, vide which Recruitment Rules for the appointment to the post of Assistant Assistant Teacher (Primary) in the Government of NCT, Delhi or Municipal Corporation of Delhi, as being unconstitutional, illegal and arbitrary. These rules were promulgated by exercising the power by virtue of proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. Insofar as the Government of NCT, Delhi is concerned, it exercised power under Section 98 read with Section 480(2) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, qua MCD. Vide these rules minimum and maximum eligible age for the candidates to the said post was fixed at 2020- 27 years respectively. However, before the promulgation of these Rules, as per the earlier Rules the upper age limit was 32 years for male candidates and 42 years for female candidates.
The main ground of the challenge was that by notification of such Rules petitioners therein had lost their chance as there was legitimate expectation given to them that they would be eligible till the age of 32 32 years. It was argued that the prospectus of the two years Elementary Teachers Education course expressly professed that it was "carefully designed to prepare teachers at elementary level in Delhi" and contained a minimum and maximum age of enrollment as 17 and 30 years respectively, thereby representing that aspirants between 19 to 32 years would be eligible for appointment to the post of teachers in Delhi. The High Court rejected the aforesaid contention and even other contentions raised by the petitione petitioners. It was further held that the Rules were statutory and had legislative character and such Rules could not be challenged on the ground of mala fides. It was also held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation has no application. Following portion of th the judgment of the High Court discussing these aspects is worth a mention and the same is re-produced re as under:
"45. Since the impugned RRs have been notified by the MCD and Government of NCT of Delhi by virtue of power conferred under Section 98 of DMC Act and by virtue of proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution respectively, we are of the view that the impugned RRs are statutory and legislative in character. In V.K. Sood Vs. Secretary, Civil Aviation & Ors. Reported in (1993) Supp 3 SCC 9 the Apex Court recognized this legal position when it held:-
held:
"3.......It would thus be clear that the rules made by the President or authorized person under proviso to Article 309 are subject to any law made made by the Parliament and the power includes rules regulating the recruitment and the conditions of service or post. They are statutory and legislative in character.10
Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 The statutory rules thus made are subject to the law that may be made by the Parliament......"
Parliament......" (emphasis supplied)
46. It is further settled law that the courts must approach subordinate legislative instruments with considerable amount of caution. Presumption of constitutionality and reasonableness ordinarily attached to legislative enactment, aapplies to statutory rules also. In P.V. Mani & Ors. Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1986 Kerala 86 a Full Bench of Kerala High Court observed as under:-
under:
"....It is therefore needless to add that the C Courts shall approach subordinate legislative instruments with considerable amount of caution and examination for absence of competence or reasonableness or fairness and other invalidating circumstances with almost the same standards as legislative enactments are dealt with by courts. The presumption of enactments constitutionality, competence and reasonableness ordinarily attaches to such instruments just as much as to legislative enactments, as is evident from the following observations from "Administrative Agencies and the Courts" by Cooper:
Cooper:-
" Where the legislature has clearly delegated such authority, the only issue that can normally be raised as to the validity of the rule concern the question whether it is ultra vires as exceeding the scope of the authority delegated, delegated, and whether it is violative of due process guarantees. These issues are not often presented and accordingly such regulations are normally treated on the same basis as legislative acts. It is not that such instruments are absolutely immune from attacks.
cks. But such attacks should be considered only on production of prima facie proof as to such invalidating circumstances. The Court shall not assume that a subordinate legislative instruments is invalid for absence of competence or bona fides or fairness or or reasonableness and cast the negative burden on the rule-making rule making authority. It should be just the other way; the person who challenges the vires of a rule has to prove his challenge just as much as a person who challenges a legislative enactment. If he fails fails in such attempt the challenge can only be thrown out....." (emphasis supplied)
47. In Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka reported in (1996) 10 SCC 304 para 13 it has been held that the test of the arbitrariness applicable to the delegated legislation is different from the one applicable to executive actions. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced for ready reference:
reference:-
"13. It is next submitted before us that the amended Rules are arbitrary, unreasonable and cause undue hardship and, therefore, violate Article 14 of the Constitution. Although the protection of Article 19(1)(g) may not be available to the appellants, the rules must, undoubtedly, satisfy the test of Article 14,, which is a guarantee against arbitrary action. Howe However, one must bear in mind that what is being challenged here under Article 14 is not executive action but delegated legislation. The tests of arbitrary action which apply to executive actions do not necessarily apply to delegated legislation. In order that necessarily delegated legislation can be struck down, such legislation must 11 Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 be manifestly arbitrary; a law which could not be reasonably expected to emanate from an authority delegated with the law law-
making power. In the case of Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) (P) Ltd. V. Union of India (SCR at p.243) this Court said that a piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature. A subordinate subordinate legislation may be questioned under Article 14 on the ground that it is unreasonable; "unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary".
Drawing a comparison between the law in England in India, the Court further observed that in England the judg judges would say, "Parliament never intended the authority to make such Rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires". In India, arbitrariness is not a separate ground since it will come within the embargo of Article 14 of the Constitution. But subordinate legislation must be so arbitrary that it would not be said to be in conformity with the statute or that it offends Article 14 of the Constitution."
48. Further, Further, as the Rules are legislative in character they cannot be challenged on the grounds of malafides. In Capt. B.D. Gupta V. State of U.P. reported in 1991 Supp(1) SCC 1 para 1 of the Supreme Court held:-
held:
"17....If the Rules were framed for making regular appointments in the Civil Aviation Department, there was no reason whey they should have been confined only to three posts which included the post of Director.
Secondly, he pointed out that whereas the ppost of Director was not a promotional one earlier and was, therefore, open to external candidates as well, it was made promotional to suit Captain Singh. These circumstances according to us do not prove the mala fides. Admittedly, the Rules are made under Article 309 of the Constitution of India and are, therefore, a piece of legislation. It is well settled that no legislation can be challenged on the ground of mala fides......"
49. In our opinion, the doctrine doctrine of legitimate expectation, referred to by the petitioners, has no application to the present case as the Respondents have never represented or held out to any student entering into an ETE course, that he would be given employment with the Respondents.
Respondents. In fact, ETE is a professional training course and the candidates securing such degrees are free to pursue other career options all over India with other agencies as well . The course does not confer any vested rights or employment with either the Government Government or MCD. In view of the absence of any representation regarding employability with the Respondents alone upon completion of a qualifying course, the petitioners' plea of legitimate expectation merits no acceptance."
9. The High Court also accepted the the well recognized principle that it is the employer's prerogative to decide the age limit and academic suitability of candidates which they wish to employ and so long as the same are not contradictory to the academic eligibility as prescribed by the NCTE Act Act, any challenge to the same, merely because it renders some candidates ineligible, 12 Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 ought to be rejected. Fixing of such age limit for a given post is a matter of policy as held by this Court in Union of India & Ors. vs. Shivbachan Rai reported in 2001 (9) SCC 356.
10. After rejecting the contentions on merits and upholding the validity of the Recruitment Rules, the Court went into the issue of hardship because of sudden reduction in the upper age limit and nd only on that ground one time relaxation was given to the petitioners in the said petition. A direction was given to permit all those candidates who had completed the ETE course either in the year 2006 or 2007 or 2008 to appear in the examination. Thus, this was one time relaxation given for the examination which was to be conducted in the year 2008, in order to ameliorate the hardship."
3.2 Opposing the grant of relief(s), relief(s), learned counsel for the respondents further contended contend that the cut cut-off date, as per the advertisement, was 31.01.2018,, which is relevant for the disposal of the present Original Application (OA).
3.3 She drew ew our attention to essential qualifications and experience experience, which are as follows:-
follows:
Essential Qualification:
1. B.E. or B. Tech. (Computer Science/IT) plus Post Graduate Diploma in Computer Application or 'B' or 'C' level diploma from DOEACC, Ministry of Communications and IT, plus one year of teaching experience;
experience OR
2. M.Sc. (Computer Science)/MCA, Science)/MCA, plus one year of teaching experience OR experience;
3. Master of Engineering (M.E.) or M.Tech. (Computer Science/IT).
Essential Experience: Nil.
Desirable Experience: Nil.
3.4. She further drew dr attention to Clause 6 of the paper book book, which prescribed the essential qualifications qualifications and experience as follows:
6. Departmental candidate with at Upto 5 years for Group 'B' least three years continuous service posts (which are in the same 13 Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 in Govt. of NCT of Delhi/its local line or allied cadres and or autonomous bodies. where a relationship could be established that the service already rendered in a particular post will be useful for the efficient discharge of the duties of post.
3.5 She further contended contend that the terms and conditions of the advertisement explicitly state that no contractual employee shall be considered and that consideration for departmental candidates pertains only to those covered under Clause 6 (quoted above).
3.6 She also argued argue that, even assuming the applicant's claim is accepted, the autonomous recommending body ought to be the Government of Delhi and not any institute within the purview of the Central Government.
Government 3.7 In support of her contentions, she relied relied upon OA No. 2120/2020, decided on 02.02.2024, titled Poonam Chaudhary v. Govern Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors. relevant para of the same read as under:
under:-
"13. While the learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in WP (C) No.2121/2023 in Sonu Lal Gupta and Anr. Vs. Union Public Service Commission and Ors., Ors., however, the same may not come to her rescue as the applicants in the relied upon matter were working as part of the Directorate of Education and had gone on deputation to the SCERT and were seeking benefit of that period in terms of experience and eligibility, while in the instant matter, the issue is the number of years on contractual basis spent by the applicant in the SCERT. We are guided by the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lt.
Governor of Delhi & Ors. Vs. V.K. Sodhi & Ors. (supra), as referred to hereinabove.) 3.8 Addition Additionally, she contended that the doctrine of estoppels applies to the present matter, as the applicant, having participated in the 14 Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 selection process and is precluded from seeking relief at a later stage.
She further relied relie on the decision of this very Bench in OA No. 1777/2015, Prama Pathak & Ors. v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors.
3.9 Lastly, she argued argue that the challenge to the Recruitment Rules (RRs) cannot be based solely on the contention that the age criteria for the post of PGT (Computer Science) differ from those of other PGT posts, particularly when the rules for those other posts have not been amended and doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be invoked in present facts of the case.
4. No further point had ha been en urged and argued.
5. Heard eard the counsel for the parties and perused the records of the case.
6. ANALYSIS 6.1 The plea of the applicant is two fold:-
(i) The RR's prescribing age limit up-to up to 30 years under RR's ought to be held to be arbitrary and illegal vis-a vis a-vis other PGT Teachers wherein the age limit is still 36 years .
(ii) The applicant ought to be treated as Department Departmental Candidate.
6.2 Taking note of submissions made by respective sides sides, this OA is sequel to first round of litigation wherein on 07.02.2020, the applicant 15 Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 withdrew his first OA No. 3163 of 2019 with liberty to challenge the impugned Order dated 18.12.2019. There was no challenged to the RR's notified in the year 2015 which is much prior in time or impugned advertisement in first round of litigation ation which cannot be ignored.
6.3 The applicant consciously knowing the parameter(s) laid down in advertisement qua the age criterion i.e., i.e 30 years as on 31.01.2018 (the closing date), being beyond the said age limit by 4 years, 4 months, and 10 days applied for the said post.. Vide memorandum dated 31.07.2019, the Directorate of Education issued an offer of appointment to the applicant for the post of PGT (Computer Science) (Male) [Post Code 150/17],, however no indefeasible right accru accrues to the applicant. More-
so,, the applicant's applicant candidature had been rejected after document verification. We observe that the applicant has been working as a Software Developer on contractual basis only in the Centre for Health Informatics project at the National Institute Institute of Health and Family Welfare since 15.07.2013.
6.4 In Civil Appeal NO.4461 OF 2021 (Arising Arising Out Of SLP (Civil (Civil) NO. 19968 OF 2019) Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board & Kapoor decided on 22.07.2021, the Hon'ble Apex Anr.. Versus Seema Kapoor.
Court observed as under:-
under:
"8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and find that the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal and that of the High Court are not sustainable. Firstly, the High Court has quoted a wrong provision in the order pa passed 16 Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 relating to subsequent advertisement. Secondly, the benefit of age relaxation is permissible for government servants and departmental candidates. It is not even the stand of the respondent that she is a government servant and, rightly so, as she is employed employed in an autonomous body i.e. Municipal Corporation established under a specific statute. The expression 'Departmental Candidates' is in respect of the candidates who are working in the concerned Department i.e. Education. The Circular of the Governmen Government of India dated 27.3.2012 has made it explicitly clear that the benefit of age relaxation is only meant for civil employees of the Central Government and not to the employees of the autonomous bodies, public sector undertakings etc. Therefore, the respondent, as an employee of the autonomous body, i.e. the respondent, Corporation, is not entitled to age relaxation either as a departmental candidate or as a government servant."
6.5 Such channel of feeder category ( TGT Vs PGT) aas submitted by the applicant vis-a-vis agee criterion is in no way comparable for appointment to the post of PGT as direct recruit to lay a challenge to RRs. Therefore, the applicant cannot seek age relaxation as a departmental candidate for appointment by way of direct recruit recruitment.
6.6 In matter of interpretation of Statute atute or to the challenge to RRs, we may highlight the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its recent decision in the case of Sajithabai And Ors. Versus The Kerala Water Authority And Ors.
Ors. decided on 18.03.2025 18.03.2025, the relevant excerpts of which are quoted hereunder hereunder:-
"28. It is trite law that the more absurd a suggested conclusion of construction is, the more the court will lean against that conclusion. That is ordinarily so whether one is 17 Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 construing a contract or a statute.
statute. [See: Hatzl v. XL Insurance Co. Ltd. (2009) EWCA Civ. 223] 223].
29. This Court in K.P. Varghese vs. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and Another, (1981) 4 SCC 173 has held as under: -
"6. .....It is now a well-settled well settled rule of construction that where the plain plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly absurd and unjust result which could never have been intended by the legislature, the court may modify the language used by the legislature or even "do some violence" to it, so as to to achieve the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a rational construction (vide Luke v. Inland Revenue Commissioner [(1963) AC 557] )....."
30. Further, this Court in Bishwajit Dey vs. The State of Assam, Criminal Appeal No.87 of 2025 has recently held as under:
under:-
'The presumption against absurdity is found in the brief observation of Lord Saville agreeing with his colleagues in the case of Noone [R [R (on the application of Noone) v. Governor of HMP Drake Hall [2010] UKSC 30 30]. Lord Saville says simply:
"I would allow this appeal. For the reasons given by Lord Phillips and Lord Mance, I have no doubt that by one route or another the legislation must be construed so as to avoid what would otherwise produce irrational and indefensible results that Parliament could not have intended intended."
6.7 In Civil Appeal Nos.. OF 2022(@ Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.12474-12475/2019) 12475/2019)- Government Of Nct Of Delhi & Ors Ors. Versus Ravindra Singh decided on 12.9.2022, the Hon'ble Apex Court further goes to the extent as under :-
:
"3.
3. Applications were invited for the post of Sub Sub- Officer in Delhi Fire Service - Group `C' post. The age prescribed for the post of Sub-Officer Sub Officer was not exceeding 27 years (relaxable in upper age limit for SC/ST - 5 years). The candidates belongi belonging to OBC were entitled to three years age relaxation. The respondent herein applied for the said post, however, he was not given the age relaxation of three years. Therefore, the respondent approached the Tribunal. It was the case of the respondent/original applicant that though he was found to be respondent/original more meritorious than the last candidate selected from the OBC category, he has not been appointed. The learned Tribunal 18 Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 dismissed the application. However, by the impugned judgment and order the High Court has allowed allowed the writ petition by observing that in the advertisement, there was no mention of age relaxation with respect to OBC candidates. The High Court observed that the respondent, who belong to OBC ought to have been given the benefit of three years age rrelaxation. A review application was filed pointing out that as the respondent belong to outside OBC candidate and, therefore, as per the advertisement, he was not entitled to three years age relaxation. The High Court has rejected the review application ob observing that such a plea was not taken up earlier.
4. Having gone through the impugned Judgment and orders passed by the High Court and even having gone through the advertisement issued in the year 2009 which fell for consideration before the High Court, it was specifically mentioned that a candidate belonging to OBC is entitled to three years age relaxation. In the note, it is also specifically provided that "OBC candidates seeking benefit of reservation should submit OBC Certificate issued by the Compete Competent Authority of Government of NCT of Delhi. All other OBC candidates with certificate issued from outside Delhi will be considered for the unreserved category only, if eligible otherwise". Therefore, OBC candidates belonging to outside the Government of NC NCT of Delhi were considered in the unreserved category.
5. In that view of the matter, the respondent being OBC outside the Government of NCT of Delhi and as the condition mentioned in the advertisement was not under challenge, the respondent was not entitled to the benefit of three years age relaxation and his case was to be considered in the unreserved category. Thereafter, when he was found to be over over-age, it cannot be said he was wrongly denied the appointment. When it was pointed out by way of review application, the High Court has refused to consider the review review application. The High Court ought to have considered the aforesaid aspect which goes to the root of the matter.
6. In view of the above and for the reasons stated herein -above, both the appeals succeed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in the Writ Petition as well as in the Review Application are hereby quashed and set aside.
aside."
6.8. In W.P.(C) 11322/2023 & CM APPL. 44003/2023 44003/2023-Staff Selection Commission & Ors.
Ors versus Ruby & Ors decided on 17.3.2025, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi Delhi has observed as under:
under:-19
Item No. 81/ C-4 C O.A. No.829/2020 "22. The principle of estoppels applies squarely in the present case. The respondents, having acquiesced to the eligibility conditions, cannot now challenge the same after failing to meet the prescribed criteria during document verification. Their failure to raise any objection before participating participating in the examination constitutes a waiver of their right to challenge the aadvertisement at a later stage."
6.9 Applying the above ratio laid down in judicial pronounc pronouncements to the facts of the case, case, the applicant has failed to make out a case oon all three counts.
7. CONCLUSION In view of the above, we do not find any infirmity in the action of the respondents in rejecting the candidature of applicant. The OA is dismissed. All pending application(s), if any any, are also liable to be dismissed. No costs.
(Dr. Dr. Sumeet Jerath) Jerath (Manish Garg) Member (A) Member (J) /arti/