Karnataka High Court
Nandi Infrastructure Corridor vs The Land Tribunal on 19 December, 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2023
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE E.S. INDIRESH
WRIT PETITION NO.11700 OF 2023 (LR)
C/W
WRIT PETITION NO.15575 OF 2023
IN WP NO.11700 OF 2023
BETWEEN:
NANDI INFRASTRUCTURE CORRIDOR
ENTERPRISE LIMITED
NO.1, MIDFORD HOUSE,
MIDFORD GARDENS,
OFF MAHATMA GANDHI ROAD,
BENGALURU-560 001.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY
MR. SRINATH
MANGALURU.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. R.V.S.NAIK, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. NITIN PRASAD, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE LAND TRIBUNAL
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
D.C. OFFICE COMPOUND
KANDAYA BHAVAN
K.G. ROAD
2
BENGALURU-560 009.
REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY.
2. TAHSILDAR
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
D.C. OFFICE COMPOUND
KANDAYA BHAVANA
K.G. ROAD,
BENGALURU-560 009.
3. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION
OFFICER-1
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD
ARAVIND BHAVAN
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD
BENGALURU-560 001.
4. A.C. ANANTHASWAMY
AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS
S/O LATE PATEL CHIKKAHANUMAIAH
R/AT AVALAHALLI
KENGERI HOBLI
BENGALURU-560 026.
5. A.C. GURUMURTHY
S/O LATE PATEL CHIKKAHANUMAIAH
AGE NOT KNOWN
R/AT AVALAHALLI
MYSURU ROAD
KENGERI HOBLI
BENGALURU-560 026.
6. H. RAMAIAH
S/O HANUMAIAH
AGE NOT KNOWN
7. G. CHENNARAYAPPA
S/O GUMMAIAH
AGE NOT KNOWN
3
8. DEVAPPA
S/O GALAPPA
AGE NOT KNOWN
REPRESENTED BY GPA HOLDER
D. HEMANNA
S/O DEVAPPA
PANTHARAPALYA
KENGERI HOBLI, MYSURU ROAD
BENGALURU-560 026.
....RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K. SHAHSIKIRAN SHETTY, ADVOCATE GENERAL FOR
SRI. MOHAMMED JAFFAR SHAH, AGA FOR R1 AND R2;
SRI. B.R. SRINIVASA GOWDA, ADVOCATE FOR R3;
SMT. IRFANA NAZEER, ADVOCATE FOR R4;
NOTICE TO R5 TO R8 IS DISPENSED WITH V/O
DATED 08.06.2023)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 27.02.2023 PASSED BY RESPONDENT
NO.1 - LAND TRIBUNAL ON APPLICATION FILED BY RESPONDENT
NO.4 UNDER ORDER I RULE 10(2) OF CPC IN LRF/INA/CR/02/2020-
21 (ANNEXURE-M) AND QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED
27.02.2023 PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.1 - LAND TRIBUNAL IN
LRF/INA/CR/02/2020-21 (ANNEXURE-L); AWARD COSTS ETC.
IN WP NO.15575 OF 2023
BETWEEN
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY THE
TAHASILDAR
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
BENGALURU-560 009.
4
2. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION
OFFICER, KIADB,
ARAVINDA BHAVANA
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD
BENGALURU-560 001.
....PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. K. SHASHIKARAN SHETTY, A/W
SRI. MOHAMMED JAFFAR SHAH, AGA )
AND:
1. SRI. A.C. ANANTHASWAMY
S/O LATE CHIKKAHANUMAIAH
2. SRI. A.C. GURUMURTHY
S/O LATE CHIKKAHANUMAIAH
BOTH ARE R/AT AVALAHALLI
MYSURU ROAD
BENGALURU-560 026.
3. SRI. H. RAMAIAH
S/O HANUMAIAH
4. SRI. G. CHANNARAYAPPA
S/O GUMMAIAH
5. SRI. DEVAPPA
S/O GALAPPA
RESPONDENTS NO.3 TO 5 ARE
REPRESENTED BY GPA HOLDER
D. HEMANNA
S/O DEVAPPA
PANTHARAPALYA
KENGERI HOBLI, MYSURU ROAD
BENGALURU.
5
6. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR OF
NICE LIMITED
NO.1, MID FORD HOUSE
MID FORD GARDEN, M.G. ROAD
BENGALURU.
7. THE LAND TRIBUNAL
REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRMAN
BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK
BENGALURU.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. IRFANA NAZEER, ADVOCATE FOR R1;
SRI. R.V.S. NAIK, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. NITIN PRASAD, ADVOCATE FOR R6;
NOTICE TO R2 TO R5 DISPENSED WITH
V/O DATED 04.12.2023)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 27.02.2023 PASSED BY RESPONDENT
NO.1-LAND TRIBUNAL IN LRF/INA/CR/02/2020-21 (ANNEXURE-A),
AWARD COSTS, ETC.,
IN THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARGUMENTS BEING HEARD,
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR "PRONOUNCEMENT OF
ORDERS", THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
6
ORDER
1. In W.P.No.11700/2023, petitioner is assailing order dated 27.02.2023 (Annexure-L) passed by the Land Tribunal, Bangalore South Taluk, Bengaluru, granting occupancy rights in favour of one Sri. A.C. Ananthaswamy (respondent No.4), inter alia sought for quashing order dated 27.02.2023 (Annexure-M), passed by the Land Tribunal, in LRF/INA/CR/02/2020-21, on application filed under order I Rule 10(2) of CPC, deleting the applicant No.3 therein (petitioner herein), from the array of parties.
In W.P. No. 15575/2023, petitioner-State is assailing order dated 27.02.2023, passed by the Land Tribunal conferring occupancy rights in favour of Sri. A.C. Ananthaswamy.
2. Since, the petitioners in the above Writ Petitions are challenging common order passed by the Land Tribunal, both the Writ Petitions were heard and disposed of by this common Order.
7FACTS OF THE CASE:
3. The relevant facts for adjudication in these writ petitions are that, one Sri. Hanumanthappa, grandfather of A.C. Ananthawamy is said to have been the tenant of certain Inam lands including the land in question bearing Sy. No.47 of Pantharapalya Village, Bangalore South Taluk under two lease deeds dated 30.06.1937 and 09.05.1936. After the promulgation of Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), father of A.C.Ananthaswamy- Patel Chikkahanumaiah, filed application before the Special Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition, Bangalore, seeking occupancy rights in respect of the land in question. The Special Deputy Commissioner, by Order dated 17.10.1964, granted occupancy right in respect of fifteen survey numbers, including the subject land. The Pattanagere Group Panchayat, challenged order of conferment of occupancy rights in favour of father of A.C.Ananthaswamy - Patel Chikkahanumaiah, before the Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 1306/1971 and the said Appeal came to be partly allowed 8 whereby, the conferment of occupancy rights in respect of the Sy No.47 came to be set aside. Feeling aggrieved by the same, father of the A.C.Ananthaswamy-Patel Chikkahanumaiah, filed W.P.No.1814/1972 before this Court and this Court, set aside the order passed by the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal and remanded the matter to the Appellate Tribunal, for fresh consideration. Even on remand, the Appellate Tribunal set aside the order of Special Deputy Commissioner, conferring occupancy rights and feeling aggrieved by the same, father of A.C.Ananthaswamy - Patel Chikkahanumaiah, approached this Court in W.P.No.5202/1977. This Court, by order dated 08.01.1980 set aside the order of the Appellate Tribunal and remanded the matter to the Special Deputy Commissioner, to conduct spot inspection and to take decision on merits of the case.
4. At this juncture, it is to be noted that, the State Government had entered into an agreement with the Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprise Limited (Petitioner in W.P.No.11700/2023) to implement the express High Way and 9 Peripheral Ring Road connecting Bangalore and Mysore and other infrastructural facilities. The State Government passed Government Order disposing the Government lands including the subject land, in favour of KIADB for onward transfer by way of lease in favour of the petitioner in W.P.No.11700/2023. Pursuant to the same, KIADB has executed lease deed in favour of the petitioner to effectuate the project.
5. It is stated in the W.P.No.11700/2023, that the respondent No.4 herein challenged the lease deed executed by KIADB in favour of petitioner before this Court in W.P.No.33962/2001 and this Court allowed the Writ Petition on 24.02.2006 and quashed the Government Order as well as the lease deed in respect of the subject land on the ground of pendency of proceedings before the Land Tribunal. Feeling aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed Writ Appeal No.385/2006 before this Court and this Court vide Judgment dated 15.06.2011 (Annexure-C) dismissed the Writ Appeal and observed that, if the Land Tribunal grants occupancy rights in favour of claimant, then the land has to be acquired in 10 accordance with law and if the occupancy right is not granted, then it is a different situation.
6. Be that as it may, on remand by this Court in W.P. No.5202/1977, and Order dated 28.04.2005 in Civil Appeal No.5684-85/1999 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, the Special Deputy Commissioner had taken up the matter on merits and by order dated 29.06.2016, rejected the application made by the father of respondent No.4 for conferment of occupancy rights (Annexure-D). Being aggrieved by the same, respondent No.4 has filed W.P. No.37145/2016 before this Court and this Court by order dated 05.04.2017 allowed the writ petition (Annexure-G) and as such, set aside the order dated 29.06.2016 passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru. Feeling aggrieved by Order passed in W.P.No.37145/2016, respondent No.4 has filed W.A. No.2344- 47/2017 and the Division Bench of this Court, by Judgment dated 12.09.2019 (Annexure-J), remitted the matter to the Land Tribunal for fresh consideration. After remand by the Division Bench, the Land Tribunal, Bengaluru South Taluk, 11 Bengaluru took up the matter in LRF/INA/CR/2/2021, wherein A.C. Ananthaswamy (respondent No.1 therein) filed an application under Order I Rule 10(2) of CPC to delete the Applicant No.3 therein (petitioner in W.P. 11700/2023) in LRF/INA/CR/2/2021, and the said application came to be allowed by Order dated 27.02.2023 (Annexure-M in W.P. 11700/2023). Further, the Land Tribunal, by a detailed order dated 27.02.2023 conferred occupancy rights in respect of subject land, in favour of A.C. Ananthaswamy(Annexure-L in W.P. 11700/2023). Being aggrieved by the Orders at Annexures - L and M, Nandi Infrastructure Corridor Enterprise Limited has approached this Court in W.P. No.11700/2023.
7. The State of Karnataka has preferred W.P. No.15575/2023, challenging order dated 27.02.2023 passed by the Land Tribunal conferring occupancy rights in favour of respondent No.4, alleging that the land in question was declared as "kallu marati" (stonehill/rock) and therefore, it is contended by the petitioner - State that, the Land Tribunal ought not to have conferred occupancy right. 12
8. I have heard Sri. R.V.S. Naik, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri. Nitin Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No.11700/2023 and Sri. K. Shashikiran Shetty, learned Advocate General along with Sri. Mohammed Jaffar Shah, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State of Karnataka in W.P. No.15575/2023 and Smt. Irfana Nazeer, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent - A.C. Ananthaswamy.
ARGUMENTS OF THE LEARNED ADVOCATES:
9. Sri. R.V.S. Naik, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P. No.11700/2023, contended that the land bearing Sy. No.47 is Kallu marati - hillock and same is not a cultivable land and therefore, disputed the nature of the land in question. Learned Senior Counsel invited the attention of the Court to the scheme of the Act particularly referring to Section 1(4) and contended that, Sections 1(4), 2, 27, 38 and 40 of the Act came into force at once and the remaining provisions through the Notification issued by the Government. Learned 13 Senior Counsel referred to Section 6, 7 and 9 of the Act and contended that, the land in question excludes the purview of grant as per the provisions of the Act and therefore, the said aspect of the matter was not considered by the respondent No.1, and further contended that, the perusal of the record would indicate that, the entire land in question is a quarry land and in this regard, he refers to the meaning of "quarry" reflected in the concise Oxford Dictionary of current English and argued that the said land is not a cultivable land and accordingly, sought for interference of this Court. He also emphasised that, as on the date of vesting of the land with the Government, the land was not cultivable and therefore, the land in question is not capable of being granted under Section 9 of the Act. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that in RTC extracts, the land in question is classified as kallu marati / kharab land and the said aspect has not been considered by the respondent No.1 and urged that, the respondent No.1 - Tribunal was completely misdirected itself in relying upon the spot inspection conducted on 23.03.2022. 14
10. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, further contended that, the Assistant Commissioner, Chairman of the Land Tribunal was of the view that, the subject land is Government kharab and cannot be granted in favour of the respondent No.4, however, Members of the Land Tribunal erroneously arrived at a conclusion to grant occupancy right in favour of the respondent No.4/A.C. Ananthaswamy and the said finding of the Members of the Land Tribunal is contrary to the deposition made by the petitioners' witnesses and accordingly, sought for interference of this Court. Learned Senior Counsel, further contended that, Land Tribunal failed to consider that it had already dismissed the application made by the respondent No.4 seeking occupancy right and therefore, the Land Tribunal has become functus officio to re-open the case on merits and accordingly, he sought for setting aside the order passed by the Land Tribunal/respondent No.1. He also refers to the application filed by respondent No.4, which categorically says about the valuation and not the survey number and therefore, submitted that the finding recorded by the Land Tribunal is not correct and accordingly, sought for 15 interference of this Court. To buttress his arguments, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner refers to the Judgment of this Court in STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. KARNATAKA REVENUE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND ANOTHER reported in ILR 1977 KAR 360 and in the case of STATE OF GUJARAT Vs. GUJARAT REVENUE TRIBUNAL AND OTHERS reported in (1979) 4 SCC 40 and made a distinction between the waste lands and cultivable lands and further argued that these lands are abandoned land, where grass grew naturally and they were not desolate, abandoned or barren waste land with no vegetation and accordingly, sought for interference of this Court. He also referred to the Judgment rendered by this Court in W.P.No.1843/1969 dated 11.07.1972 (K.R. GOVIND AND ANOTHER Vs. STATE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS) and in the case of NINGANNA AND OTHERS Vs. NARAYANA GOWDA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1983 KARNATAKA 116, with regard to interpretation of Section 9 of the Act to the land in question.
16
11. Sri. K. Shashikiran Shetty, learned Advocate General for the State (Petitioner in W.P. No.15575/2023) argued that, the land in question is not a cultivable land and the name of the respondent No.1/A.C. Ananthaswamy was not reflected in the RTC extracts continuously and land in question is a waste land / quarry and as such, the Land Tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order conferring the occupancy right in favour of A.C. Ananthaswamy (respondent No.1 in W.P.15575/2023 and respondent No.4 in W.P. 11700/2023). He further contended that, subject land is a valuable Government land and is an integral part of Bangalore Mysore Infrastructure Corridor Project (BMICP) and subject land is required for implementation of the said project to link the portion of the Mysuru - Bengaluru Express Highway and accordingly, sought for setting aside the order passed by the Land Tribunal. Learned Advocate General, further invited the attention of the Court to Section 3 of the Act and argued that the competent authority has to exercise power to grant in favour of claimant/s under the provisions of the Act, only after ensuring that the land is vested with the State Government, 17 and therefore, as there is clear prohibition under Section 7 of the Act as the subject land is a quarry land / waste land and therefore, he contended that there would not be a case for grant in favour of the contesting respondents. In this regard, he places reliance on the Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of COMMISSIONER, SURVEY, SETTLEMENT AND LAND RECORDS, A.P., HYDERABAD AND OTHERS Vs. INDUPURU RAGHAVA REDDY AND OTHERS reported in 2011 SCC OnLine AP 712 and argued that the grant could not have been made in so far as the waste lands are concerned even if efforts have been made to cultivate the same. He also refers to the Judgment of this Court in the case of THE STATE OF KARNATAKA Represented by REVENUE SECRETARY Vs. H.B. MUNIVENKATAPPA reported in ILR 2007 KAR 1893 and argued that this Court in identical circumstances had arrived at a conclusion that no grant could be made in so far as " kere angala" or "tank bed"
notwithstanding the same being cultivated, though it is vested with the Government and accordingly, argued that the impugned order passed by the respondent No.1 is based on no 18 evidence and accordingly, sought for setting aside the impugned order passed by the Land Tribunal.
12. Per contra, Mrs. Irfana Nazeer, learned counsel representing the respondent No.4 / grantee of the land, raised preliminary objection relating to the locus standi of the petitioner in W.P. No.11700/2023 and contended that, the said petitioner is not an aggrieved party, nor having any legal right to challenge the impugned order passed by the Land Tribunal, not being an inamdar or rival claimant to claim occupancy right in respect of the land in question. She further contended that, the Land Tribunal, after considering the material on record and taking into account the direction issued by this Court in W.A. No.385/2006 and W.A. Nos.2344-47/2017, recorded the evidence of the parties and after appreciating the material on record, conducted spot inspection and arrived at a conclusion that the land in question is "vyavasaya yogya (cultivable)" and also she further contended that, the land in question does not come within the purview of eleven categories stipulated under 19 Section 7 and 9 of the Act and as such, sought to justify the impugned order passed by the Land Tribunal.
13. Mrs. Irfana Nazeer, invited the attention of the Court to sketch showing the cultivation made in the land bearing Sy. No.47, which is the subject land and argued that the said sketch has been prepared at the instance of the Chairman and Members of the Land Tribunal, which shows that the land is cultivable in nature and accordingly, she sought for dismissal of the Writ Petitions. She further contended that, this Court in W.A. No.385/2006, observed that the land in question is capable of being cultivated and as per doctrine of merger, the impugned order passed by the Land Tribunal, conferring occupancy right in favour of contesting respondent, is just and proper. She also referred to two lease deeds dated 30.06.1937 and 09.05.1936 and contended that the grandfather of the contesting respondent No.4 was tenant of certain inam lands including the land in question bearing Sy. No.47 and therefore, referring to order passed on 17.10.1964 by the Special Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition, Bangalore, in case 20 No.18/1959-60, contended that, the land bearing Sy. No.47 was excluded while rejecting application in respect of other survey numbers and as such, she submitted that, as on the date of vesting itself, the land was in cultivation by the grandfather of the respondent No.4 and therefore, countered the submission made by the learned Advocate General, referring to Section 3 and 7 of the Act.
FINDINGS OF THE COURT:
14. In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, before deciding the rights of the parties relating to conferment of occupancy right by the Land Tribunal in favour of the respondent No.4/grantee, it is relevant to extract Sections 1(4), 2(6), 2(10), 3, 6, 7 and 9 of the Act which read as under:
"Section 1(4) This section and Sections 2, 27, 38 and 40 shall come into force at once and the rest of this Act shall come into force [in all minor inams in unalienated village, on such date as the Government may by notification, appoint, and in any inam village, on such date as the Government may, by notification, specify in repect of such inam village].21
Section 2 (6) "Inamdar" means a person holding in trust or owing for his own benefit an inam village or minor inam or a share therein and includes the successors in interest of an inamdar, and
(i) Where an inamdar is a minor or of unsound mind or and idiot, his guardian, committee or other legal curator;
(ii) Where an inamdar is a joint Hindu family, such joint Hindu family;
Section 2(10) "Minor inam" means an alienated holding other than an inam village, situated in an alienated village or in an unalienated village; Section 3. Consequence of the vesting of an inam in the State :(1) When the notification under sub- section (4) of Section 1 in respect of any inam has been published in the Mysore Gazette, then notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, grant or other instrument or in any other law for the time being in force, with effect on and from the date of vesting, and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the following consequences shall ensue, namely,-
(a) the provisions of the Land Revenue Code relating to alienated holdings shall, except as respects minor inams to which this Act is not applicable, be deemed to have been repealed in their application to the inam; and the provisions of the Land Revenue Code and all other 22 enactments applicable to unalienated villages shall apply to the said inam;
(b) all rights, title and interest vesting in the inamdar including those in all communal lands, uncultivated lands, whether assessed or not, waste lands, pasture lands, forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and irrigation works, fisheries and ferries shall cease and be vested absolutely in the State of Karnataka, free from all encumbrances;
(c) the inamdar shall cease to have any interest in the inam other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of this Act;
(d) all rents and land revenue including cesses and royalties accruing in respect of lands comprised in such inam on or after the date vesting shall be payable to the State and not to the inamdar and any payment made in contravention of this clause shall not be valid;
(e) all arrears of revenue, whether as jodi, quit-rent, or khayamgutta and cesses, remaining lawfully due on the date of vesting in respect of any such inam shall after such date continue to be recoverable from the inamdar by whom they were payable and may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, be realised by the deduction of the amount of such arrears and cesses from the compensation money payable to such inamdar under this Act;23
(f) no such inam shall be liable to attachment or sale in execution of any decree or other process of any court and any attachment existing on the date of vesting or any order for attachment passed before such date in respect of such inam, shall, subject to the provisions of Section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, cease to be in force;
(g) the Government may, after removing any obstruction that may be offered, forthwith take possession of the inam and all accounts, registers, pattas, mutchalikas, maps, plans and other documents relating to the inam which the Government, may require for the administration thereof:
Provided that the Government shall not dispossess any person of any land in respect of which they consider that he is prima facie entitled to be registered as the occupant or as the holder of a minor inam 1 [or to be continued as a tenant;]
(h) the inamdar and any other person whose rights have vested in the State of Karnataka under clause (b) shall be entitled only to compensation from the Government as provided in this Act;
(i) the relationship of landlord and tenant shall, as between the inamdar and a kadim tenant or permanent tenant or quasi permanent tenant, be extinguished;24
(j) the relationship of superior holder and inferior holder shall, as between the inamdar and the holder of a minor inam, be extinguished;
(k) Kadim tenants, permanent tenants and quasi-
permanent tenants in the inam and persons holding under them and holders of minor inams shall, as against the Government, be entitled only to such rights and privileges and be subject to such conditions as are provided for by or under this Act; and any other rights and privileges which may have accrued to them in the inam before the date of vesting against the inamdar shall cease and determine and shall not be enforceable against the Government or such inamdar.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall operate as a bar to the recovery by the inamdar of any sum which becomes due to him before the date of vesting by virtue of his rights as inamdar and any such sum shall be recoverable by him by any process of law which but for this Act would be available to him. Section 6. Quasi-permanent tenants to be registered as occupants on certain conditions:
(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), every quasi permanent tenant shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an occupant in respect of all lands of which he was a quasi-
permanent tenant, provided.-
25
(i) he continued to be a tenant of such lands until the date of vesting; or
(ii) he had been unlawfully dispossessed of such lands by the inamdar between the 30th day of June, 1948 and the date of vesting:
Provided further that if by the operation of this sub-section the inamdar is left with less than two and a half acres of garden land or five acres of wet land or ten acres of dry land in respect of which he is entitled to be registered as an occupant, the right of quasi-permanent tenants to be registered as occupants under this sub- section shall be limited to the extent which shall be determined as follows,-
(1) The total area of lands in respect of which quasi-permanent tenants would have been entitled to be registered as occupants shall be divided among the quasi-permanent tenants and the inamdar in such manner as may be prescribed by rules so that the inamdar may get not less than two and a half acres of garden land or five acres of wet land or ten acres of dry land.
(2) In addition to the annual land revenue payable in respect of the land, a quasi-permanent tenant entitled to be registered as an occupant under sub-section (1) shall be liable to pay to the Government, as premium for acquisition of ownership of 26 that land, an amount equal to such number of multiples of the land revenue payable in respect of the land or such basic value per acre of the land, whichever is more as is specified in Columns 3 and 4 respectively of the Schedule as applicable to dry land, wet land and garden land, as the case may be situated in the area specified in the corresponding entry in column 2 of the said Schedule. The amount of premium shall be payable in not more than ten annual instalments along with the annual land revenue, and in default of such payment, the amount due shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue due on the land in respect of which it is payable.
Section 7. Lands and buildings to vest in the holder of a minor inam to which the Act is applicable: (1) Every holder of a minor inam to which this Act is applicable shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all lands which immediately before the date of vesting were included in his holding other than-
(i) communal lands, waste lands, gomal lands, forest lands, tank beds, mines, quarries, rivers, streams, tanks and irrigation works;
(ii) lands in respect of which any person is entitled to be registered under Section 4 or 5; and 27
(iii) lands upon which have been erected buildings owned by any person other than the holder of the minor inam;
Provided that no holder of an unenfranchised minor inam shall be registered as an occupant under this sub-section unless he pays to the Government, as premium, an amount equal to twenty-five times the difference between the jodi or quit-rent, if any, paid by him and the land revenue payable in respect of such lands.
(2) Every building situated within the limits of the minor inam (to which this Act is applicable) and which was owned immediately before the date of vesting by the holder of the minor inam, shall, with effect on and from such date, vest in the holder of the minor inam.
Section 9. Lands and buildings to vest in the inamdar: (1) Every inamdar shall, with effect on and from the date of vesting, be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all lands other than,-
(i) communal lands, waste lands, gomal lands, forest lands, tank beds, mines, quarries, rivers, streams, tanks and irrigation works;
(ii) lands in respect of which any person is entitled to be registered under Sections 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8; and 28
(iii) lands upon which have been erected buildings owned by any person other than the inamdar.
(2) Every building situated within the limits of the inam which was owned immediately before the date of vesting by the inamdar shall, with effect on and from such date, vest in the inamdar.
Explanation: In this section 'inamdar' means an inamdar other than a holder of a minor inam referred to in Section 7. "
15. It is also necessary to deduce Rule 7 of Mysore (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Rules, 1956.
"Rule 7. (1) For the purpose of claims under Section 10, a kadim tenant, a permanent tenant, a quasi- permanent tenant, the holder of a minor inam or inamdar claiming to be registered as an occupant under Sections 4, 5, 6,7 or 9, as the case may be, or the holder of a minor inam claiming to be registered as holder under Section 8[or any person claiming to be continued as tenant under Section 9-A shall within six months from the date of vesting apply to the Deputy Commissioner or any officer authorised by him under Section 32 of the Act:
Provided that application after the expiry of the said period of six months shall be made to the State 29 Government which may, if the applicant satisfies it that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period, direct the admission of such application by the Deputy Commissioner or any other officer authorised by him under Section 32 of the Act:
Provided further the State Government shall not consider any application received after the 28th day of February, 1970.
(1-A) Every such application shall be in writing and signed and verified by the applicant. Such application may be made in person or by Advocate or Pleader or authorised agent or sent by registered post.
(2) Every such application shall be restricted to a single inam.
(3) Where the application is made by any person other than the inamdar, the inamdar shall be made a respondent to the application.
(3-A) Where the application is made by the inamdar or any persons claiming through him, such Officer as the Government may by order from time to time specify, shall be respondent to the application.
(4) Every application shall contain the following particulars, namely:
(a) Name of the inam village or minor inam;
(b) Name of the applicant;
(c)Whether he is the inamdar or not;30
(d) If he is not the inamdar, the natue of interest possessed by him in the inam, along with detailed particular in support of his claim.
(5) The notice of the date on which an enquiry will be held in respect of the application shall be served on the parties to the application, and shall be published by affixture on the notice board of the office of the Deputy Commissioner or any Officer authorised by him under Section 32 of the Act. Service of the notice shall be effected by giving or tendering the notice to the person concerned or if it cannot be so effected by sending the notice to him by registered post.
(6) The Deputy Commissioner or any Officer authorized by him under Section 32 of the Act shall hold an enquiry at the inam village or the village in which the inam is situated and, in the case of an enquiry held by an Officer authorized by the Deputy Commissioner under the said section, such Officer shall make a report to the Deputy Commissioner within seven months from the date of vesting or within one month from the date of application:
Provided that in the case of Surveyed and Settled Inam villages which vested in the Government under Notification No.R.8347-1.S. 63-56-2, dated 15th September, 1956, he shall make a report to the Deputy Commissioner within fifteen months from the date of 31 vesting or within three months from the date of application.
(7) The Deputy Commissioner either on his own enquiry or on receipt of a report from any Officer authorised by him under Section 32 of the Act, shall examine the nature and history of the lands in question and decide in respect of which lands the claim of the applicants should be allowed."
16. On careful examination of the aforementioned provisions under the Act and Rules, make it clear that Section 3 of the Act empowers the vesting of an inam land with the State. At this juncture, it is relevant to cite the Judgment of this Court in the case of PATTANAGERE GROUP PANCHAYAT Vs. MUDDANNA, reported in 1990 (1) KLJ 181 wherein, this Court has held that the vesting of land takes place in respect of both cultivated and uncultivated lands.
17. It is pertinent to mention here that, after the exercise of power by the competent authority under Section 3, as the land is being vested with the Government, there are three types of tenants under the Act namely, kadim tenants (Section 4), 32 permanent tenants (Section 5), quasi permanent tenants under certain conditions (Section 6) and the occupancy right could be granted to such tenants if such tenants fulfil the conditions stipulated under Section 7, 8 and 9 of the Act.
18. On conjoint reading of Section 7 and 9 of the Act, emphasize that there are eleven categories of land, namely, communal lands, waste lands, gomal lands, forest lands, tank beds, mines, quarries, rivers, streams, tanks and irrigation works which are excluded from the purview of conferring occupancy right in favour of the applicants / claimants. It is well established principle that, whether the land is cultivable or not, has to be determined as on the date of vesting of inam village (See State of Karnataka Vs. KRAT reported in 1980 (2) KLJ SN 67.) Perusal of the record would indicate that the grandfather of contesting respondent No.4 - Hanumanthappa, filed application based on two lease deeds dated 30.06.1937 and 09.05.1936. After the promulgation of the Act, 1954, the father of the contesting respondent No.4 - Chikkahanumaiah, son of Hanumanthappa, sought for grant of occupancy right in 33 respect of subject land, and pursuant to the same, as per order passed by the then Additional Special Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition, Bangalore, granted occupancy right in respect of land bearing Sy. No.47 to an extent of 24 acres 37 guntas, however, in the said order, it is stated that the claimant has not proved his possession and enjoyment in respect of Sy. No.26 to 32 and 34 to 37 prior to date of vesting. In that view of the matter, it is not in dispute that the land in question was cultivable land as on the date of conferment of occupancy right in favour of father of A.C. Ananthaswamy, as per order dated 17.10.1964. On careful examination of the said order produced by the parties, makes it clear that the land in question was declared as Inam Land, since the entire village of Pantharapalya was declared as Inam Village, as per the Notification No. RD3MIN58 dated 13.01.1959.
19. It is also to be noted from the records that, the Division Bench of this Court at para 4, 6 and 13 in W.A. No.385/2006 disposed of on 15.06.2011, held as follows: 34
"4. So far as the nature of the land being a jodi inam and grand father of the writ petitioner being in possession and enjoyment of the land under lease deeds is not in dispute. Subsequent to the demise of the late Hanumanthappa his son Patel Chikka Hanumaiah continued in possession and enjoyment of the said land and after coming into force of the Inam Abolition Act, it was Patel Chikka Hanumaiah who applied for grant of occupancy rights before the Spl. Deputy Commissioner. This is also not in dispute. Occupancy right was granted not only in respect of Sy.No. 47 but was in respect of several other lands. However, the grant of occupancy rights was the subject matter before the revenue appellate authority and the said order was also questioned before the High Court as already state above.
***** ***** *****
6. Admittedly, it was not the writ petitioner who sought grant of occupancy rights but it was his father Patel Chikka Hanumaiah who sought grant of occupancy rights not only in respect of Sy.No.47 but also several other lands. When once vesting of inam land in the State comes into play, by virtue of coming into force of the enactment, the Act envisages the consequences of vesting of inam land in the State as well. When once notification under sub-sec.4 of sec.1 of the Act gets published in the gazette in respect of any inam land, 35 then notwithstanding anything contained in the contract, grant or other instrument or any other law for the time being in force, w.e.f. the date of vesting certain consequences provided under the Act will follow. In other words, if any pre-existing right, title or interest is created in favour of any other person, the same is subject to the consequences of vesting of the land under the Act. This is the law declared by the Apex Court in the case of LOK RAJ AND OTHERS vs. KISHAN LAL AND ORS. reported in (1995) 3 SCC 291. Even in respect of such vesting of the lands, it is always subject to the right of the person who is entitled to seek for grant of occupancy rights as envisaged under the Act. Therefore, such vesting of the land in the Government is subject to the right conferred on persons as envisaged under proviso to sec. 3 (1)(g) of the Inams Abolition Act. i.e. to say the person who is entitled to get occupancy rights cannot be dispossessed from the land.
***** ***** *****
13. In W.P.5202/77 the order of the Dy.
Commissioner came to be quashed and the matter was remitted to the Spl. Dy. Commissioner for fresh consideration with a direction to hold an enquiry and find out as to whether the lands in question were agricultural lands or waste lands or stone quarries and to decide the same afresh in accordance with law after giving opportunity to the parties concerned to lead 36 additional evidence, if any. This matter is still pending. Meanwhile, the eviction notice sent to the writ petitioner herein was also quashed by this Court in the writ petition filed by Mr. Ananthswamy as by that time Patel Chikka Hanumaiah was dead. The eviction notice was quashed on the ground that no notice was issued to the present petitioner as contemplated under the Karnataka Revenue Act. If the authority grants occupancy rights to the petitioner herein, then, the land has to be acquired in accordance with law if it is required for the project. If the occupancy right is not granted, then it is a different situation. We are of the opinion that the learned single Judge has dealt with the matter form all angles both factual and legal and it does not call for interference. There is no valid reason to interfere with the impugned order."
20. The Division Bench of this Court dismissed the Writ Appeal No.385/2006 preferred by the Appellant - NICE Ltd. therein. Thereafter, the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. Nos.2344-2347/2017, by Judgment dated 12.09.2019, remitted the matter to the Land Tribunal, reserving liberty to the parties to let in additional evidence. In conformity with the order passed by Division Bench of this Court, the evidence was recorded by the Land Tribunal, wherein, the perusal of the 37 evidence adduced by the parties would indicate that, the entire extent of land is in cultivation and establishes the fact of plantation made by the contesting respondent No.1 therein. It is also recorded in the deposition of witnesses by the Land Tribunal that there are three borewells and farmhouse situate in the schedule land. The said aspect has not been countered by the petitioner -State or NICE Ltd. The other witnesses examined along with the respondent No.1(A.C.Ananthaswamy), reiterate the fact that the land is in cultivation and fruit bearing trees as well as the animal husbandry is being made in the land in question.
21. Though the learned Advocate General as well as the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner - NICE Ltd. contended that the entire extent is covered with quarry / waste land and refer to the tippani and sketch appended to the writ petition at Annexure - Q by stating that the land in question is covered with kallu marati, however, on careful examination of the evidence adduced by the parties and the spot inspection conducted by the Members of the Tribunal along with the 38 Chairman, would demonstrate the fact that the land is under cultivation by the respondent No.1 before the Land Tribunal. At this juncture, it is relevant to reiterate the deposition of the neighbouring land owners namely Sriramaiah and Pulasaiah, wherein it is clearly established that the land in question is under cultivation of the father of the respondent No.1. The shanubhog - Sri. Narahariappa deposed about the cultivation of the land in question and same is supported by one Dr. K.R. Chandran, Retired Deputy Director, Horticultural Department, Bengaluru. The Land Tribunal, after considering the entire material on record, has arrived at a conclusion to conduct spot inspection and noticed the existence of three borewells and labour quarters and arrived at a conclusion that land is not a quarry or waste land and is under cultivation of the respondent No.1 therein and rightly conferred occupancy right in favour of respondent No.1 - A.C. Ananathaswamy.
22. In this backdrop of factual aspects on record, I have carefully examined the Judgments referred to by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for NICE Ltd. and learned Advocate 39 General, and these Judgments are relating to waste land / uncultivable land and therefore, the aforementioned Judgments cannot be made applicable to the facts on record as the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.385/2006 in unequivocal terms arrived at a conclusion that the land is under cultivation of Patel Chikkahanumaiah - father of A.C. Ananathaswamy.
23. In the light of these aspects on record, I am of the view that, the reasons assigned by the Land Tribunal to confer occupancy right in favour of the respondent No.1/A.C. Ananthaswamy is based on evidentiary value and as the said finding was that the land is cultivable one and therefore, the eleven categories of lands enshrined under Section 7 and 9 of the Act, is not applicable to the case on hand and therefore, I am of the opinion that, the contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner NICE Ltd., as well by learned Advocate General for the State cannot be accepted. The Judgments referred to by them are relating to waste land / tank bed / quarry and fact finding by the Land Tribunal would 40 make it clear that the subject land was under cultivation by father of A.C. Ananthaswamy and therefore, the ratio laid down in the Judgments referred to by the petitioners cannot be made applicable to the facts of these Writ Petitions. Having arrived at a conclusion that the land is a cultivable land, it is relevant to go through the observation of this Court in STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs. KARNATAKA REVENUE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND ANOTHER reported in ILR 1977 KAR 360. Para 4 to 6 therein read as under:
"4. It is clear from sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act that the inamdar will not be entitled to the registration of the lands as an occupant if the lands are communal lands, waste lands, gomal lands, forest lands, tank beds, mines quarries, rivers, streams, tanks and irrigation works or if the lands are such which are required to be registered under Sections 4 to 8 of the Act, or the lands are such upon which having errected buildings owned by any person other than the inamdar. It is nobody's case that the land Sy. No. 37 is one falling under clauses (ii) and (iii) of sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act. As already stated, the only controversy between the parties is as to whether the land S. No. 37 is a waste land or not. The expression 'waste lands' has not 41 been defined in the Act. The Tribunal has taken the view that the expression 'waste land' means uncultivable lands. The Tribunal rejected the contention put forward on behalf of the State that the expression 'waste lands' means lands which are not cultivated for a long period. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 of the Act provides for registration of all the lands which vested in the State under the Act except the lands specified in clauses (i) to
(iii). As already stated, it is not the case of the State that the land S. No. 37 is a communal land, gomal land, forest land, tank bed, mine, quarry, river, stream, tank and irrigation work. Its specific case is that the land S. No. 37 is a waste land.
5. The expression 'waste land' is used in Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (Central Act I of 1894). Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act gives special powers which can be exercised in case of emergency and can be invoked only in respect of any waste or arable land. The expression 'waste land' or 'arable land' has not been defined in the Land Acquisition Act. In Raja Anand Brahama Shah v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (AIR 1967 SC 1081) the Supreme Court after considering the meaning given to the word 'waste' in the Oxford Dictionary having regard to the context of Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, held that the expression 'waste land' means the land which is unfit for cultivation or habitation, desolate and barren land with little or no vegetation thereon. Having regard to the context in which 42 the expression 'waste land' occurs in Section 9(1) of the Act, the said expression has to be given the same meaning as given by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision.
6. It therefore follows that a land which is not unfit for cultivation cannot be regarded as a waste land. In other words, a land which is fit for cultivation cannot be regarded as a waste land. As the essence of the matter is the suitability of the land for cultivation, the question as to whether the land was in fact cultivated or not is not relevant. If the land is fit for cultivation even though the same is not actually cultivated, it cannot be regarded as a waste land. The discussion in the order of the Tribunal shows that the Tribunal has also taken the same view."
24. I have also noticed from the spot inspection (sthala tanikha varadi ) conducted by the Land Tribunal wherein it is stated as follows:
"F d«Ää£À°è ºÁzÀÄ ºÉÆÃVgÀĪÀ ©©JA¦ gÀ¸ÉÛ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀ®Äè §AqÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ºÉÆgÀvÀÄ¥Àr¹ G½zÀ ¥ÀæzÉñÀzÀ°è ««zsÀ PÀȶ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ºÉÊ£ÀÄUÁjPÉ ZÀlĪÀnPÉUÀ¼À£ÀÄß £ÀqɸÀÄwÛgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ¸ÀܼÀ vÀ¤SɬÄAzÀ w½zÀÄ §A¢gÀÄvÀÛzÉ."
25. It is well established principle in law that the interference of this Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of 43 India is very limited in respect of the fact finding made by the Tribunal. This Court cannot sit in appeal over the fact finding made by the Tribunal unless the same is based on no evidence. In this aspect, it is relevant to cite the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Case of GENERAL MANAGER, ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, ORISSA AND OTHERS Vs. GIRIDHARI SAHU AND OTHERS, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 695, wherein the scope of Certiorari jurisdiction is summarized and the relevant paragraphs 22 to 28 are extracted below:
"22. The question arose in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra (AIR 1957 SC 264). The question was whether the finding by the Tribunal under the Act about the party respondents being workmen was liable to be interfered with. After dealing with various tests relating to determining the issue, this Court also made the following observations: (AIR p. 269, para 19) "19. ... '... It is equally well settled that the decision of the Tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the 44 Constitution unless at the least it is shown to be fully unsupported by evidence.' "
(emphasis supplied)
23. A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Yakoob v. K.S.Radhakrishnan (AIR 1964 SC 477) , has spoken about the scope of writ of certiorari in the following terms: (AIR pp. 479-80, para 7) "7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals:
these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural 45 justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the tribunal was 46 insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised(vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque (AIR 1955 SC 233) , Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals (AIR 1958 SC 398) and Kaushalya Devi v.Bachittar Singh(AIR 1960 SC 1168))."
(emphasis supplied)
24. We may more importantly also advert to the view expressed by this Court in a matter which again arose under the Act in Parry & Co. Ltd. v. P.C. Pal (AIR 1970 SC 1334) . It was a case related to the scope of the jurisdiction of the tribunal in the matter of retrenchment under Section 25-F. This is what the Court held inter alia: (AIR p. 1340, para 11) "11. The grounds on which interference by the High Court is available in such writ petitions have by now been well established.47
In T.C. Basappa v. T.Nagappa (AIR 1954 SC
440) it was observed that a writ of certiorari is generally granted when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. It is available in those cases where a tribunal, though competent to enter upon an enquiry, acts in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure or violates the principles of natural justice where no particular procedure is prescribed. But a mere wrong decision cannot be corrected by a writ of certiorari as that would be using it as the cloak of an appeal in disguise but a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings based on a clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law or absence of or excess of jurisdiction, when shown, can be so corrected. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, this Court once again observed that where the Tribunal having jurisdiction to decide a question comes to a finding of fact, such a finding is not open to question under Article 226 unless it could be shown to be wholly unwarranted by the evidence. Likewise, in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao (AIR 1963 SC 1723), this Court observed that where the Tribunal has disabled itself from reaching a fair decision by some 48 considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or where its conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person can ever have arrived at that conclusion, interference under Article 226 would be justified."
(emphasis supplied)
25. We may advert to the decision of this Court in Mukand Ltd. v. Staff & Officers' Assn. (2004) 10 SCC
460. We may only advert to the following paragraphs:
(SCC pp. 486-87, paras 47-49) "47. In support of his contention that this Court while exercising its power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in an appeal from the judgment of the High Court rendered in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India will exercise the same power which the High Court could exercise and will not interfere with the finding of facts recorded by a tribunal, the learned counsel cited the judgment in Parry & Co. Ltd. v. P.C. Pal. In the said case, this Court held as under: (AIR p. 1341, para 13) '13. Since this is an appeal arising from a writ petition for certiorari we also would not 49 interfere with the conclusions arrived at by the Tribunal except on grounds on which the High Court could have done.'
48.In Fuel Injection Ltd. v. Kamger Sabha ((1978) 1 SCC 156) this Court observed as under: (SCC p.
157, para 3) '3. ... But the present appeals are from a judgment of the High Court under Article 226 and so the jurisdiction of this Court in entertaining an appeal by special leave under Article 136 must ordinarily be confined to what the High Court could or would have done under Article 226.'
49. In our view, the material that was placed before the Tribunal was not considered or discussed and that there was, as such, no adjudication by the Tribunal. The whole award of the Tribunal, in our view, is liable to be set aside on the ground of non-application of mind by the Tribunal to the material on record. In the first place, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain and decide a dispute which covered within its fold "persons who are not workmen". That the material on record before the Tribunal as regards the comparable concerns was admittedly "sketchy" and incomplete as observed by the learned Single 50 Judge of the High Court and that the award based on such material could not have been sustained."
(emphasis supplied)
26. In Durga Das Basu's Commentary on the Constitution of India, 9th Edn., in regard to the concept of no evidence, we find the following discussion:
" "No evidence" does not mean only a total dearth of evidence. It extends to any case where the evidence taken as a whole is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding, or where, in other words, no tribunal could reasonably reach that conclusion on that evidence. This "no evidence" principle clearly has something in common with the principle that perverse or unreasonable action is unauthorised and ultra vires. An order made without "any evidence" to support it is in truth, made without order made without "any evidence" is worthless, it is equal to having "no evidence" jurisdiction."
(emphasis supplied)
27. In fact, in the decision relied upon by the applicants viz. S. Viswanathan [Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. S. Viswanathan (2005) 3 SCC 193] it is, inter alia, held as follows: (SCC p. 196, para 12) 51 "12. Normally, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, is the final court of facts in these types of disputes, but if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence the High Court exercising a power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the writ court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon."
(emphasis supplied)
28. On the conspectus of the decisions and material, we would hold as follows: the jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is supervisory and not appellate. The Court considering a writ application of certiorari will not don the cap of an appellate court. It will not reappreciate evidence. The writ of certiorari is intended to correct jurisdictional excesses. A writ of prohibition would issue when a tribunal or authority has not yet concluded its proceedings. Once a decision is rendered by a body amenable to certiorari jurisdiction, certiorari could be issued when a jurisdictional error is clearly established. 52 The jurisdictional error may be from failure to observe the limits of its jurisdiction. It may arise from the procedure adopted by the body after validly assuming jurisdiction. It may act in violation of principles of natural justice. The body whose decision which comes under attack may decide a collateral fact which is also a jurisdictional fact and assume jurisdiction. Such a finding of fact is not immune from being interfered with by a writ of certiorari. As far as the finding of fact which is one within the jurisdiction of the court, it is ordinarily a matter "off bounds" for the writ court. This is for the reason that a body which has jurisdiction to decide the matter has the jurisdiction to decide it correctly or wrongly. It would become a mere error and that too an error of fact. However, gross it may amount to, it does not amount to an error of law. An error of law which becomes vulnerable to judicial scrutiny by way of certiorari must also be one which is apparent on the face of the record. As held by this Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath , as to what constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, is a matter to be decided by the court on the facts of each case. A finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence would be perverse and in fact would constitute an error of law enabling the writ court to interfere. It is also to be noticed that if the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not support the finding, it would render the decision amenable to certiorari jurisdiction. This would be the same as a finding which is wholly unwarranted by the 53 evidence which is what this Court has laid down (see Parry & Co. Ltd.)"
26. It is also relevant to cite the Judgment of Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of RAJENDRA DIWAN Vs. PRADEEP KUMAR RANIBALA AND ANOTHER reported in (2019) 20 SCC 143, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court, at paragraphs 85 and 86 has held as follows:
"85. The power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, however, supervisory and not appellate. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence must be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the limits of their authority. When a Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction, the High Court does not interfere in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction unless there is grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law. Jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be exercised "in the cloak of an appeal in disguise".
86. In exercise of its extraordinary power of superintendence and/or judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Courts restrict interference to cases of patent error of law which go to the root of the decision; perversity; arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation of 54 principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and usurpation of powers. The High Court does not re- assess or re-analyse the evidence and/or materials on record. Whether the High Court would exercise its writ jurisdiction to test a decision of the Rent Control Tribunal would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum, just because there is no other provision of appeal in the eye of the law."
27. Following the declaration of law made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned Judgments and applying the same to the case on hand, I am of the opinion that the Land Tribunal having noticed the entire factual aspects on record, based on the evidentiary value, rightly conferred occupancy right in favour of the respondent No.1 before the Land Tribunal and on the other hand, no acceptable document has been produced by the petitioners herein to declare that the land in question is not a cultivable land. In that view of the matter, the Writ Petitions are dismissed as devoid of merits and the order dated 27.02.2023 passed by the Land Tribunal, Bengaluru South Taluk, Bengaluru, in Dispute 55 No.LRF/INA/CR/02/2020-21 is hereby confirmed. Consequently, the order dated 27.02.2023 passed by the Land Tribunal under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of CPC relating to the petitioner - NICE Ltd. is hereby confirmed as the said petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the impugned order passed by the Land Tribunal based on the Government Order dated 07.10.1999 and Deed of Lease dated 04.07.2002, not being a tenant or Inamdar under the Act.
28. In the result, writ petitions are dismissed.
SD/-
JUDGE sac*