Gujarat High Court
Patel Rukshamaniben Alias Kokilaben ... vs Patel Manjulaben Bhagwanbhai Wife Of ... on 30 September, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 20266 of 2017
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PATEL RUKSHAMANIBEN ALIAS KOKILABEN BHAGWANBHAI
Versus
PATEL MANJULABEN BHAGWANBHAI WIFE OF PATEL DASHRATHBHAI
BHAGWANBHAI & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR VISHAL C MEHTA(6152) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
SAMEE A URAIZEE(7747) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
DECEASED LITIGANT THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS/ REPRESTENTATIVES
for the Respondent(s) No. 5
MR PREMAL R JOSHI(1327) for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3
SERVED BY PUBLICATION IN NEWS for the Respondent(s) No. 4
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 30/09/2025
ORAL ORDER
1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned Advocate Mr. Premal R. Joshi waives service of notice of Rule for the respondent Nos.1 to 3. The presence of other respondents are not required.
2. Heard learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mehul S. Shah with learned Advocate Mr. Samee A. Uraizee for the petitioner and learned Advocate Mr. Premal R. Joshi for the respondent Nos.1 to 3.
3. The present writ application is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following reliefs: Page 1 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined "(a) YOUR LORDSHIPS may be pleased to issue a writ of Certiorari, or any other writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari, quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 6/7/2017 at Annexure-'I' passed by the Court of the 12th (Ad hoc) Additional District Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural), Mirzapur below application Exh. 4 in Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 94 of 2012 and directing to allow the said application Exh. 4 as prayed for;
(b) Pending hearing and final disposal of the present Special Civil Application, the Respondents may kindly be directed to maintain status quo as regards the properties as mentioned in the probate in question.
(c) Costs of the present Petition may kindly be awarded to the Petitioner from the Respondents;
(d) Any other/further reliefs as may be deemed expedient in interest of justice may kindly be granted."
4. THE SHORT FACTS OF THE APPEAL APPEAR TO BE THAT:
4.1. The petitioner and original respondent No.5 herein happen to be the daughter & son of late Bhagwanbhai Maljibhai Patel, albeit from his first wife. The father of petitioner died on 31st May 1978 who alleged to have executed a Will in favour of the respondent Nos.1 to 3 who happen to be his children, albeit from second wife (step sisters of petitioner) having appointed respondent No.4 as administrator happens to be his brother-in-
law.
4.2. It appears that on the strength of such execution of the Will, a Page 2 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined probate application came to be filed by respondent No.4-the executor/administrator of the Will, being Civil Misc. Application No.64 of 1980, before the Competent Court. The Court allowed the aforesaid application vide its judgment and order dated 31st March 1981, whereby granted probate in favour of respondent No.4.
4.3. The respondent No.4 herein appears to have filed one Special Civil Suit No.77 of 1992 against original respondent No.5, who died during the pendency of the present application. The suit came to be filed seeking possession of properties which were the subject matter of probate.
4.4. The suit came to be decreed by the Trial Court on 18th October 2001, whereby, respondent No.5 herein was directed to hand over possession of the suit properties to respondent No.4 herein. It further appears that after the period of limitation, such decree was challenged before the Appellate Court, which appears to have not condoned the delay, against which the writ application came to be filed by respondent No.5. Such writ application being Special Civil Application No.9936 of 2009, came to be rejected by this Court on 7th July 2010. Thereby, Page 3 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined the decree dated 18th October 2001 passed by the Trial Court stands confirmed.
4.5. The petitioner herein preferred an application under Section 264 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, 1925'), being Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 3 of 2009 before the Additional District Judge at Viramgam, for revocation of probate granted in favour of respondent No. 4, being the administrator of the Will, wherein the beneficiaries were respondents No. 1, 2 and 3. It appears that such application was wrongly filed before the said Court, thus, vide judgment and order dated 3rd May 2012, passed by this Court in Civil Revision Application No.109 of 2012, said application returned back to the petitioner to be presented before the District Court, Ahmedabad (Rural). Accordingly, the application being Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 94 of 2012, was presented before the District Court concerned. 4.6. As there was inordinate delay in challenging of the judgment/order granting the probate, inasmuch as such order was passed by the competent court granting probate on 31st March 1981, whereas in the year 2009/2012, by way of the Page 4 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined impugned application, the petitioner having questioned this order, so, impugned delay application below Exhibit 4 in aforesaid CMA Mo.94 of 2012 came to be filed. 4.7. The ground set out in the delay application was that in the probate proceeding, the petitioner being the real daughter of deceased Bhagwanbhai, was not joined by respondent No. 4, thereby, she is not having any personal knowledge about the probate proceeding. She further stated that when execution proceeding initiated by respondent No. 4 in pursuance to the judgment and decree dated 18th October 2001, as preferred hereinabove, it came to the notice of the petitioner about such probate granted in favour of respondent No. 4. It is also alleged that under suspicious circumstances, the Will was executed by her father when he was in coma in the hospital before his death. So, in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the impugned application came to be filed. The impugned delay application was contested by respondent Nos. 1 to 4 by filing their reply.
4.8. It has been so observed by the District Court that there was not only an inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner to Page 5 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined challenge the order granting probate, but considering the proceedings of the Mamlatdar of year 1985 wherein the petitioner, along with her brother i.e. respondent No. 5, questioned the revenue entry mutated in favour of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 on the basis of the Will/grant of probate, it would not be justified act on the part of the petitioner to question such order granting probate after huge delay. 4.9. After hearing the parties, the District Court vide its order dated 6th July 2017, rejected the impugned delay application, which is impugned in the present writ application
5. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONER/ORIGINAL APPLICANT:
5.1. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shah would submit that the District Court has taken a very hyper-technical approach while rejecting the impugned delay application, which caused great injustice to the petitioner. It is submitted that the petitioner was all throughout kept away from legal proceedings instituted at the instance of respondent Nos. 1 to 4, whereby, neither in the probate proceeding nor in the suit proceeding, she was joined.
So, there was as such no deliberate delay in filing an Page 6 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined application seeking revocation of probate. 5.2. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shah would submit that as such there would not be any period of limitation prescribed under the Act 1925, to question the order granting probate, thereby, the court should take liberal approach while adjudicating the delay application. It is submitted that when the petitioner having direct interest in the property of her father, who died under suspicious circumstances, she was not only necessary but also proper party to be heard prior to the granting of probate in favour of respondent No. 4 - administrator of alleged Will of her father.
5.3. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shah would further submit that so called revenue proceeding initiated in the name of the petitioner, decided by the Mamlatdar vide its order passed in the year 1986 is concerned, she was not at all aware about such proceeding. It is submitted having filed rejoinder in this matter, that the petitioner being an old lady, is not at all conversant with legal proceedings, being illiterate, and as such, without her knowledge and behind her back, it seems that the application came to be filed before the Revenue Authority, may be at the Page 7 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined behest of respondent No. 5 herein, who as such not objected the public notice issued on 28th August 1980. 5.4. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shah would respectfully submit that there is a good case on merits and if this Court would show one indulgence to the petitioner to an illiterate old lady, by condoning the delay in filing the application in question, it would meet the ends of justice.
5.5. Lastly, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shah would humbly urge to this Court that the explanation set out in the impugned delay application meet the criteria of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, inasmuch as sufficient cause made out, and therefore delay may be condoned in the interest of justice.
5.6. Making the above submissions, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shah would request this Court to allow the present application.
6. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT NOS.1 TO 3:
6.1. Per contra, learned Advocate Mr. Joshi, appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 3, has vehemently opposed the present writ application on all possible counts. It is submitted that there is a blatant lie on the part of the petitioner seeking Page 8 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined discretionary relief, seeking condonation of delay, having suppressed material facts, not entitled to get any relief.
6.2. Learned Advocate Mr. Joshi would assiduously submit that there is a clear suppression of fact by petitioner so far as date of knowledge of order passed by Competent Court granting probate in favour of respondent No. 4-administrator of the Will. It is submitted that revenue proceeding being RTS No. 6 of 1985, came to be filed by the petitioner along with her real brother i.e. respondent No. 5 herein, before the Deputy Mamlatdar, questioning mutation entry mutated in the revenue record in favour of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 on the strength of the order granting probate by the Competent Court. It is further submitted that the order passed by the Deputy Mamlatdar, which is annexed with the reply of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 herein, would clearly show that petitioner being one of the applicants of the aforesaid RTS proceeding, wherein, there is a clear reference of the order granting probate referred.
Such fact was not disclosed by the petitioner in her delay application, thus disentitled her to get any discretionary relief. 6.3. Learned Advocate Mr. Joshi would further submit that when Page 9 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined the petitioner was undisputedly co-applicant of the RTS proceeding, wherein, there was a reference of the probate proceeding and order passed thereon, clearly recorded in the year 1986, undoubtedly, the application seeking revocation of probate filed after about 23 or 26 years would be grossly time- barred.
6.4. It is submitted that the petitioner gathered the knowledge of probate and order passed thereon in the year 1986 itself. It is submitted that having not questioned either the Will of her father executed in year 1978 by challenging it before the Civil Court or not filed an appropriate application seeking revocation of probate within reasonable time upon gathering such knowledge in year 1986, the impugned delay application could not have been entertained, which was correctly rejected by the District Court.
6.5. Learned Advocate Mr. Joshi would submit that when there is gross negligence, inordinate delay, and dilatory tactics and so also, there is a mala fide on the part of the applicant, then such huge, inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the petitioner should not be condoned by putting any condition. Page 10 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined 6.6. Lastly, learned Advocate Mr. Joshi would submit that as per the settled legal position of law and recent past decisions of the Honorable Apex Court, in such type of cases, this Court should not take liberal approach, inasmuch as no sufficient cause made out by the petitioner.
6.7. Making the above submissions, learned Advocate Mr. Joshi would request this Court to reject the present application.
7. No other and further submissions are made.
8. The issue germane in the matter is in a narrow compass, inasmuch as whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, can it be said that the District Court having not condoned the delay on the part of the petitioner in filing an application under Section 264 of the Act 1925, committed any gross error of law and/or any jurisdictional error?
9. The facts which are narrated hereinabove are not in dispute.
The father of the petitioner died as back as on 21st May 1978 in Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad. The Will of the father of the petitioner alleged to have been executed on 13th May 1978, which was the subject matter of probate proceeding being Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 64 of 1980, filed at the instance Page 11 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined of respondent No.4, executor/administrator of the Will. The respondent No. 4 appears to have been the brother-in-law of the father of the petitioner. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3 appear to be daughters of the late Bhagwanbhai (father of the petitioner), born out from his second wife. Of course, the petitioner was named in such probate proceeding but not joined in it. Be that as it may, the probate application granted as prayed for by the Competent Court vide its judgment and order dated 31st March 1981. It also appears from the record that prior to granting such probate application, public notice came to be published in the local newspaper "Jansatta" on 28th August 1980.
10. The respondent No. 5 happens to be the real brother of the petitioner, who was born out from first marriage of late Bhagwanbhai, was evicted from suit properties due to decree passed by the competent Civil Court on 18th October 2001 in Special Civil Suit No. 77 of 1992. Such decree was confirmed by the District Court, having not condoned the delay in filing the appeal, which was also confirmed by this Court, having rejected the writ application on 7th July 2010 being Special Civil Application No. 9936 of 2009.
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NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined
11. It appears that from 1981 till 2009, the petitioner remained silent, having not questioned the order granting probate by the Competent Court on the strength of alleged Will of her father. Surprisingly, only in the year 2009, the petitioner questioned such order granting probate by filing an application under Section 264 of the Act 1925. It appears from the record that such application came to be filed before the lower court, which was returned back to the petitioner to be presented before the appropriate competent court vide its judgment and order dated 3rd May 2012, passed by this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 109 of 2012. Thus, the petitioner having filed an application before the District Court, Ahmedabad being Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 94 of 2012.
12. As such, there is no period of limitation in the Act 1925, to file an application under Section 264 for revocation of probate. So, as per Article 137 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "Act 1963"), such application requires to be filed within three years when the right to apply accrues.
13. The ground set out in the delay application is one-fold in Page 13 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined regards to gathering the knowledge of the order of probate by petitioner i.e. execution proceeding No. 156/2006, filed in pursuance to the decree dated 18th October 2001, passed by the court. It is the specific case of the petitioner that due to such execution proceeding, she came to know for the first time that any probate proceeding/order of granting probate in favour of the contesting respondents and thereafter, she applied for certified copy of such order, then filed appropriate application.
14. Such fact was specifically controverted by respondent Nos. 1 to 3, having filed a detailed reply pointing out that such averment is clearly falsehood on the part of the petitioner, inasmuch as a revenue proceeding being RTS Application No. 6 of 1985, was filed by the petitioner along with her brother-respondent No. 5 herein, questioning the mutation entry mutated on the basis of such order of probate, in favour of respondent No.1 to 3. It appears from bare reading of the order passed by the Deputy Mamlatdar in the year 1986 in the aforesaid proceeding, instituted at the instance of the petitioner being co-applicant along with her brother that there was a clear reference of the order of probate/probate proceedings. Thus, in light of the aforesaid order passed by the Deputy Mamlatdar, it would be Page 14 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined gainsaid that the petitioner was aware about the order of probate as back as in the year 1986.
15. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shah has tried to convince this Court by drawing attention of the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the petitioner, contending inter alia that the petitioner was not at all aware about any such RTS proceeding being illiterate and rustic lady. It is so submitted that such RTS proceeding might be filed at the behest of her brother-respondent No. 5 herein. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shah would emphasize on the aspect that there is no hand of the petitioner in any such RTS proceeding and she was not at all aware about it. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shah has requested this Court to believe the say of the petitioner being an old lady.
16. Such contentions made by learned Senior Counsel Mr. Shah cannot be accepted in light of the fact that in a quasi-judicial proceeding, where the name of the petitioner being reflected as co-applicant i.e. RTS No.6 of 1985), decided by the Deputy Mamlatdar concerned against the petitioner and respondent No. 5 in the year 1986, it clearly shows that the petitioner was aware about the order passed by the Competent Court granting Page 15 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined probate. Further, she never filed any complaint before any authority or police in regards to use of her false thumb impression in aforesaid RTS proceeding.
17. At least, considering the overall facts and circumstances of the present case, especially when in RTS proceeding, the petitioner happens to be co-applicant, this Court has no reason to believe that the petitioner was not at all aware about such proceeding. The petitioner may be old by now, but in the proceedings which were instituted in the year 1980 or 1985 in question, she was not that old lady at that given point of time. Her silence for all these years between 1981 to 2009 speaks volume and on such conduct, which otherwise constitutes waiver, estoppel and acquiescence on the part of the petitioner, having accepted the probate granted in favour of respondent No. 4-administrator of the Will.
18. Accordingly, considering the inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner, not questioning any act of respondent Nos. 1 to 4 after sad demise of her father in the year 1978 till 2009, when for the first time, she filed an application under Section 264 of the Act 1925, would clearly suggest that so-called ignorance of Page 16 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined the aforesaid RTS proceeding is nothing but an eyewash and an attempt to get out from the suppression of fact made by the petitioner seeking discretionary relief from the court.
19. At this stage, it would be apt to refer and rely upon the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court, wherein, it has been so held that where there is a suppression of material fact and/or any incorrect statement made in the delay application, the Court should not grant any relief to any applicant making falsehood in the delay application.
20. As such, the issue germane in the application is no longer res-
integra, which is already decided by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jagaon Medium Project and another reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448, wherein held thus :-
"11. Whether the respondent made incorrect statement in the application seeking condonation of delay? There is no dispute whatsoever that the respondent being the beneficiary of the acquisition has been duly impleaded as a party respondent in the reference cases as is required in law. It not only appeared in the matter through a properly instructed counsel but also filed its written statement opposing the claim for enhancement of compensation but did not choose to lead any evidence whatsoever. In the application filed in the High Court the plea taken by the respondent is as under:
"The applicant submits that, although the applicant Page 17 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined being Acquiring Body, was arrayed as opponent in the said reference, the opponent no. 4 herein (Original Opponent No. 1) S.L.A.O. or his subordinate contested the said reference by filing written statement. Therefore, this applicant was unaware about the stand taken by S.L.A.O. as well as the impugned judgment and award."
This averment in the application on the face of it is totally incorrect.
12. The Law & Judiciary Department as early as on 13.4.2000 i.e. to say within the period of 15 days from the date of the award of the Reference Court communicated its decision to acquiesce in the decision of the Reference Court and communicated the same to all the concerned including the beneficiary of the acquisition. It is not the case that the Executive Engineer did not receive the said communication. Having received the said communication the respondent did not act in the matter and initiated any steps for filing the appeals if it was really aggrieved by the decision of the Reference Court. There is no doubt whatsoever in our mind that the respondent made totally incorrect statement in the application filed in the High Court. We express our reservation as to the manner in which a public authority conducted itself in its anxiety to somehow get the relief from the court. In our considered opinion incorrect statement made in the application seeking condonation of delay itself is sufficient to reject the application without any further inquiry as to whether the averments made in the application reveal sufficient cause to condone the delay. That a party taking a false stand to get rid of the bar of limitation should not be encouraged to get any premium on the falsehood on his part by condoning delay. [See: (1993)1SCC 572]. xxxxxxxxx
14. It is true that the power to condone the delay rests with the court in which the application was filed beyond time and decide whether there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay and ordinarily the superior court may not interfere with such discretion even if some error is to be found in the discretion so Page 18 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined exercised by the court but where there is no sufficient cause for condoning the delay but the delay was condoned, it is a case of discretion not being exercised judicially and the order becomes vulnerable and susceptible for its correction by the superior court. The High Court having found that the respondent in its application made incorrect submission that it had no knowledge of the award passed by the Reference Court ought to have refused to exercise its discretion. The High Court exercised its discretion on wrong principles. In that view of the matter we cannot sustain the exercise of discretion in the manner done by the High Court. "
(emphasis supplied)
21. Furthermore, as per the settled legal position of law, when there is a gross negligence, inordinate delay, lack of bona fide and unexplained delay on the part of the applicant seeking condonation of delay, in such type of matter, the Court should not condone the delay on any condition irrespective of any sufficient cause made out. As such, this Court would not find any sufficient cause made out by the petitioner in the present case.
22. It is apposite to refer to and rely upon a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors., reported in 2024 (4) Scale 759, wherein, after revisiting the law on the aspect of condonation of delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:Page 19 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined "10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power of a Court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not to be exercised in cases where there is gross negligence and/or want of due diligence on part of the litigant (See Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18 SCC 384). The discretion is also not supposed to be exercised in the absence of any reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate explanation for the delay (See P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556). Thus, it is apparent that the words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act can only be given a liberal construction, when no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to the litigant (See Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer., (2013) 14 SCC 81). The principles which are to be kept in mind for condonation of delay were succinctly summarised by this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649, and are reproduced as under:
"21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause"
should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being Page 20 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the Courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale Page 21 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted, or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation."
(Emphasis supplied)
23. It is also profitable to refer to and rely upon ratio laid down by recent past decision of Honourable Supreme Court of India in a case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) BY L RS & ORS V/S Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 INSC 286 : 2024 (4) SCR 241 : 2024 (4) Scale 846, wherein after referring to its previous decisions, summarized the case law on the issue of limitation vis-a-vis condonation of delay in context of "sufficient cause". It has been so observed and held as under:
"[26] On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been Page 22 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the Court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."
(Emphasis supplied) Page 23 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined
24. It is also profitable to rely upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of case of Basawaraj and Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in 2013 (14) SCC 81 wherein it is held as under:-
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No Court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Even, recently also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (DEAD) By Lrs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. reported In 2025 INSC 1104, in clear terms held that Page 24 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined where there is delay/laches on the part of the applicant in not prosecuting the legal remedy, in the absence of any sufficient cause made out by the applicant, the Court should not condone the delay while exercising its power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the case of Shivamma (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus:-
"258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the Court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the Court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the Court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay."
(emphasis supplied) Page 25 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined
26. Thus, in view of aforesaid, it is clearly held that Court should not first looks at merit of the matter, when decides/adjudicate delay application. When the explanation is not found satisfactory and lacks bonafide, such delay application deserves rejection irrespective of good case on merit. When, such would be position of law stand as on date, this Court having found suppression of fact on part of petitioner as aforesaid, so also while bare reading of delay application, no any satisfactory explanation observed for such inordinate delay, and lastly not found any sufficient cause made out by applicant.
27. In view of aforesaid, no error much less any gross error of law and or jurisdictional error found in the impugned order, whereby District Court not condoned delay in filing an application under section 264 of the Act, 1925. Thus, this Court has no other option left but to reject the present application.
CONCLUSION
28. The upshot of the aforesaid observations, discussions and reasons, I do not find any merit in the present writ application, inasmuch as the present writ application bereft of merit, Page 26 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/20266/2017 ORDER DATED: 30/09/2025 undefined requires to be rejected, which is hereby rejected.
29. Consequently, the impugned order dated 6th July 2017, passed by the 12th Additional District Judge (Ad hoc), Ahmedabad (Rural), Mirzapur, below Exhibit 4 in Miscellaneous Civil Application No.94 of 2012, is hereby confirmed.
30. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.
(MAULIK J.SHELAT,J) Nilesh Page 27 of 27 Uploaded by MR. NILESHKUMAR RAMESHBHAI PARMAR(HCD0068) on Fri Oct 03 2025 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 04 09:33:09 IST 2025