Himachal Pradesh High Court
Manish Sharma And Others vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Others on 19 August, 2023
Author: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
AT SHIMLA
LPA No.90 of 2022
Decided on: 19th August, 2023
.
__________________________________________________________
Manish Sharma and others
....Appellants
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh and others
of
......Respondents
Coram
rt
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge
1 Whether approved for reporting? Yes
For the appellants: Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Arun Kaushal, Advocate.
For the respondents: Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General
with Mr. I.N. Mehta & Mr. Yashwardhan
Chauhan, Senior Additional Advocate
General, Ms. Sharmila Patial, Additional
Advocate General and Mr. J.S. Guleria,
Deputy Advocate General, for
respondents No.1 to 4-State.
Mr. Sudhir Thakur, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Somesh Sharma, Advocate,
for respondents No.5 and 6.
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS
-2-
Ranjan Sharma, Judge (Oral)
The appellants have come up, in appeal, assailing the judgment dated 27.09.2021, passed by the learned Single .
Judge in CWP No.230 of 2021, disallowing the claim of the appellants against alleged termination in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. FACTUAL MATRIX:
of 2(i). The appellants herein, filed the Civil Writ Petition No.230 of 2021, pleading that they were engaged by rt Respondents No.5 and 6, in different capacities and on different dates between 2011 to 2018, respectively, but their services were disengaged in August/September, 2020, in violation of principle of 'last come first go' and the mandate of the Industrial Disputes Act. Another claim was that once the termination was on account of COVID-19 Pandemic, their salary ought to have been given as per judgment in case of FICUS PAX Private Ltd. and others Versus Union of India and others, reported in 2020 STPL 4890 SC: [(2020) 4 SCC 810], Annexure P-7, and lastly the appellants claimed that the grant of 50% salary from March, 2020 to August, 2020, till the date they remained on rolls of ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS -3- Respondent No.6 in August, 2020, was improper. The appellants approached the Labour Inspector Dharamshala on 24.09.2020, Annexure P-2, who made various attempts for .
conciliation on 25.09.2020, 30.09.2020, 06.11.2020 and 13.11.2020, but in vain.
3. STAND OF RESPONDENTS BEFORE WRIT COURT:
3(i). Respondents No.1 and 3 filed a reply stating of therein that judgment in case of FICUS PAX was not applicable in the instant case.
3(ii).
rt Respondents No.2 and 4 filed a separate reply that on 11.01.2021, Annexure R-4/6, the appellants were directed to raise a demand notice under Section 2A of Industrial Disputes Act against alleged termination, but they refused to raise any demand notice as required by law. So far as the non-production of records and denial of full wages (instead of 50% wages given by Respondents), the Labour Conciliation Officer-Competent Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, directed the appellants on 13.11.2020, Annexure P-6, to approach the JMIC and thereafter the appellants filed a complaint before CJM on 23.01.2021, under Section 15 read with Sections 20(3) & (6) of Payment of Wages Act, vide ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS -4- Annexure R-4/3 and Annexure R-4/4 and in view of the above complaint the proceedings claiming full wages under Payment of Wages Act were closed.
.
3(iii). Respondents No.5 and 6 filed a separate reply, with the averments that their services were never terminated but were laid-off and the admissible salary till August, 2020 was released to them.
of
4. JUDGMENT IN CWP:
4(i). The Writ Court decided the writ petition on rt 27.09.2021, with the findings that the alleged termination of appellants in August 2020 is disputed by respondents No.5 and 6, who pleaded that their services were never terminated but they were only laid-off due to financial stringency.
4(ii). As regards the judgment in case of FICUS PAX (supra), a finding was recorded that this judgment covered cases of only those incumbents who were effected on account of COVID-19 Pandemic between the period 29.03.2020 to 18.05.2020 whereas, the cases of appellants were not covered by the aforesaid judgment as they were allegedly disengaged in August 2020.
::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS -5-4(iii). However, the findings recorded by Writ Court in Paras-15 to 17 are reproduced here-in-below:-
"15. Thus, it is evident from the order of the Hon'ble .
Supreme Court that the directions, which have been passed therein are relatable to those 50 days when the Notification which stood impugned before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was in force.
This period when the obligatory Orders were in force, is from 29.03.2020 to 18.05.2020. However, of when one peruses the pleadings made in the petition, the grievance of the petitioners is not relatable to this particular period, which stands rt mentioned in the order passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as the contention of the petitioners expressly is that they are primarily aggrieved by termination of their services by respondents No. 5 and 6, which, as per the petitioners, was done on 28.08.2020. In other words, the cause of action, on the basis of which, this writ petition has been filed, is post the period contemplated in the order passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above, relied upon by the petitioners. In fact, in this background, when one peruses the documents appended by the petitioners, the first complaint appended therewith addressed to the authorities is dated 24.09.2020, i.e. post 18.05.2020 when the Notification stood rescinded. It is on the basis of this complaint that Labour Inspector undertook the reconciliation proceedings
16. This Court is of the considered view that the case ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS -6- of the petitioners is not covered by the order passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, upon which much reliance has been placed by them. As the allegation of the petitioners is that their services have been arbitrarily terminated without following .
the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the stand of the private respondents is that services of the petitioners were laid off on account of the reasons specified in the reply, this court is of the considered view that these issues primarily of being disputed questions of fact and otherwise also covered under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, cannot be adjudicated by way of this rtwrit petition. The order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court being relied upon by the petitioners is dated 12.06.2020, yet, in the Annexure P-2, there is neither any reference of it nor it can be inferred from the said Annexure that the grievance being raised by the petitioners was akin to the one with the Hon'ble Supreme Court was seized of.
17. At the cost of repetition, this Court is stating that the grievance raised vide Annexure P-2 by the petitioners was that their services were arbitrarily terminated on 28.08.2020 by the employer. Therefore, in view of discussion held hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that as the petitioners are not covered by the order passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, being relied upon by them, and further as the issue of their alleged termination by the private respondents cannot be decided by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS -7- under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this writ petition, is devoid of merit. Accordingly the same is dismissed. No order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of accordingly."
.
[underlining ours)
5. CONTENTIONS IN LPA:
5(i). Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Arun Kaushal, learned counsel, for the appellants, has of made three-fold submissions. Firstly, the judgment in the case of FICUS PAX (supra) was applicable in the instant rt case; secondly, the order dated 13.11.2020, Annexure P-6, passed by the Labour Inspector, directing the petitioners-
appellants to file a claim before JMIC, for redressal of claims is without jurisdiction; and thirdly, that termination being violative of provisions of Industrial Disputes Act was void ab-initio.
5(ii). On the other hand, Mr. Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr. Somesh Sharma, learned counsel, for respondents No.5 and 6, vehemently opposed the claim and reiterated their stand in the reply.
6. ANALYSIS:
6(i). So far as the first contention of the learned ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS -8- Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, it is clear from the judgment in case of FICUS PAX (supra) that the same covered an eventuality, on account of COVID-19 Pandemic, .
only for the period from 29.03.2020 to 18.05.2020 and since the services of the appellants were allegedly terminated in August/September, 2020, therefore, the argument fails on this ground also. Moreover, the judgment in case of of FICUS PAX (supra), only deals with payment of wages for the lockdown period referred to above. The learned Single Judge rt has dealt with this issue elaborately in Paragraphs 15 & 17 of the impugned judgment. Further, the directives in the case of FICUS PAX (supra) nowhere mandate that these directions will continue in perpetuity so as to give wages or to re-engage employees who were allegedly disengaged post-COVID-19 Pandemic, in August/September, 2020.
Accordingly, we find no force in the contention as aforesaid.
6(ii). So far as the second contention, assailing the order dated 13.11.2020, Annexure P-6, whereby the appellants were directed to ventilate their grievances for unpaid salary or for full salary from March 2020 till August 2020 before the learned JMIC is based on rationale and ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS -9- statute when, in case of violation of the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act [Section 20(3) & (6) of the Act], the prosecution-complaint is to be launched before the Court, .
learned CJM or JMIC as the case may be; and a perusal of reply of respondents No.2 and 4 reveals that in compliance to Annexure P-6, dated 13.11.2020, the appellants have filed a complaint before the learned CJM Dharamshala on of 13.01.2021 for non-compliance of directions to release full salary to the appellants under the Payment of Wages Act.
rt In view of these facts, the order dated 13.11.2020 (Annexure P-6) passed by the Labour Officer-cum-Conciliation Officer-
Competent Authority (under Payment of Wages Act) directing the appellants to ventilate grievances for salary under Payment of Wages Act before the JMIC/CJM, which remedy has been availed of by the appellants is within the framework of law and the same is upheld.
6(iii). So far as the third contention of learned Senior Counsel for appellants praying for setting aside the alleged termination and for reinstatement, the same has to be considered in context of the reply filed by respondents No.5 and 6 that their services were never terminated but were ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS
- 10 -
laid-off due to financial stringency, which can only be adjudicated on the basis of evidence to be led by the respective parties. Moreover, the Writ Court has rightly .
recorded a finding in Para-16 of the impugned judgment that the disputed questions of facts and law cannot be adjudicated in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
of 6(iv). In 2021(9) SCALE 268, titled as Shubhas Jain Versus Rajeshwari Shivam & Ors., the Hon'ble Apex rt Court has held that this Court exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India, does not adjudicate disputed questions of facts, so as to make a comparative assessment of conflicting issues.
Relevant Para-26 is reproduced below:-
"26. It is well settled that the High Court exercising its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, does not adjudicate hotly disputed questions of facts. It is not for the High Court to make a comparative assessment of conflicting technical reports and decide which one is acceptable."
[underlining ours) ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS
- 11 -
Similar principle has been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in JT 2002 (4) SC 115, titled as Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai Versus K.V. Shramik .
Sangh & Ors., in support whereof, Para-19 reads as under:-
"19. Now, we proceed to consider the validity and correctness of the impugned judgment and order in the light of judgment of the Constitution Bench in SAIL case (supra). The High Court held of that the work entrusted to the members of the Union continued to be basically the work of the Corporation itself of perennial nature; the rt Corporation has chosen to carry out the work under so-called system of labour contract without complying with the provisions of the CLRA Act, and as such the labour contract was a camouflage. We must state here itself that the Union in the writ petition alleged that the labour contract was sham and the Corporation specifically denied it in its counter affidavit but the High Court did not go into this question and did not record a finding that the labour contract in the present case was sham or a camouflage considering the material on record; even otherwise this being a serious and disputed fact in terms of the Constitution Bench judgment aforementioned, the High court could not have appropriately adjudicated on the issue exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It appears to us that the High Court proceeded to conclude that the labour ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS
- 12 -
contract was not genuine and the workers of the Union were employees of the Corporation because the Corporation and the contractors did not comply with the provisions of the CLRA Act. Conclusion that the contract was sham or it was .
only camouflage cannot be arrived at as a matter of 'law for non-compliance of the provisions of the CLRA Act but a finding must be recorded based on evidence particularly when disputed by an industrial adjudicator as laid down in various of decisions of this Court including the Constitution Bench judgment in SAIL . The cases on which the High Court placed reliance were the cases where finding of fact was recorded by the labour rt courts on evidence. In para 34 of the impugned judgment, it is stated:-
"This court is hardly competent to record evidence or appreciate it in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
This Court as well as the Supreme Court have always taken the view that writ jurisdiction should not be permitted to be invoked if disputed questions of facts are involved, is the submission of the learned counsel. The submissions are wholly unexceptionable. If the facts were not clear, we would have hardly allowed our writ jurisdiction to be invoked. The material which we have referred to at several places hereinbefore, is more than adequate, in our view, to come to the conclusion we have arrived at."
[underlining ours] ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS
- 13 -
6(v). Besides the above, it is worth mentioning that the appellants have assailed their alleged termination to be violative of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. This .
Court is of the considered view that the extraordinary and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be invoked when an alternative statutory remedy is available under Industrial Disputes Act to the appellants.
of In JT 2022 (9) SC 282, titled as The State of Maharashtra and Others Versus Greatship (India) rt Limited, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that writ remedy cannot be invoked so as to by-pass the statutory remedies available to a litigant. In this context, Paragraphs 6 and 7 read as under:-
"6. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at length.
At the outset, it is required to be noted that against the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer under the provisions of the MVAT Act and CST Act, the assessee straightway preferred writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is not in dispute that the statutes provide for the right of appeal against the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer and against the order passed by the first appellate authority, an appeal/revision before ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS
- 14 -
the Tribunal. In that view of the matter, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the assessment order in view of the availability of statutory remedy under the .
Act. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of Satyawati Tondon (supra) in which this Court had an occasion to consider the entertainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by by-passing of the statutory remedies, is required to be referred to. After considering the earlier decisions of this Court, in paragraphs 49 to 52, it was observed rt and held as under:
"49. The views expressed in Titaghur Paper Mills Co.
Ltd. vs. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433 were echoed in CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. (1985) 1 SCC 260 in the following words: (SCC p. 264, para 3) "3. ... Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to bypass the ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS
- 15 -
alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article .
226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged."
of
50. In Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan (2001) 6 SCC 569 this Court considered the question whether a petition under Article 227 of the rt Constitution was maintainable against an order passed by the Tribunal under Section 19 of the DRT Act and observed: (SCC p. 570, paras 5-6) "5. In our opinion, the order which was passed by the Tribunal directing sale of mortgaged property was appealable under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short 'the Act'). The High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the provision for alternative remedy contained in the Act. We do not propose to go into the correctness of the decision of the High Court and whether the order passed by the Tribunal was correct or not has to be decided before an appropriate forum.
6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS
- 16 -
debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by .
taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court of under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands rt that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act."
51. In CCT v. Indian Explosives Ltd. [(2008) 3 SCC 688] the Court reversed an order passed by the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court quashing the show-cause notice issued to the respondent under the Orissa Sales Tax Act by observing that the High Court had completely ignored the parameters laid down by this Court in a large number of cases relating to exhaustion of alternative remedy.
::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS- 17 -
52. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v.
Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala [JT 2008 (12) SC 127] the Court highlighted the parameters which are required to be kept in view by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of .
the Constitution. Paras 29 and 30 of that judgment which contain the views of this Court read as under:
"29. In our opinion, the High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of of the Constitution is duty-bound to take all the relevant facts and circumstances into consideration and decide for itself even in the rt absence of proper affidavits from the State and its instrumentalities as to whether any case at all is made out requiring its interference on the basis of the material made available on record. There is nothing like issuing an ex parte writ of mandamus, order or direction in a public law remedy. Further, while considering the validity of impugned action or inaction the Court will not consider itself restricted to the pleadings of the State but would be free to satisfy itself whether any case as such is made out by a person invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty- bound to consider whether:::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS
- 18 -
(a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved;
(b) the petition reveals all material facts;
.
(c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute;
(d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches;
(e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation;
of
(f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors.
rt The Court in appropriate cases in its discretion may direct the State or its instrumentalities as the case may be to file proper affidavits placing all the relevant facts truly and accurately for the consideration of the Court and particularly in cases where public revenue and public interest are involved. Such directions are always required to be complied with by the State. No relief could be granted in a public law remedy as a matter of course only on the ground that the State did not file its counter- affidavit opposing the writ petition. Further, empty and self-defeating affidavits or statements of Government spokesmen by themselves do not form basis to grant any relief to a person in a public law remedy to which he is not otherwise entitled to in law."
::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS- 19 -
53. In Raj Kumar Shivhare v. Directorate of Enforcement [JT 2010 (4) SC 54] the Court was dealing with the issue whether the alternative statutory remedy available under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 can be .
bypassed and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution could be invoked. After examining the scheme of the Act, the Court observed:
"31. When a statutory forum is created by law for of redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal statute, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. rt In this case the High Court is a statutory forum of appeal on a question of law. That should not be abdicated and given a go-by by a litigant for invoking the forum of judicial review of the High Court under writ jurisdiction. The High Court, with great respect, fell into a manifest error by not appreciating this aspect of the matter. It has however dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
32. No reason could be assigned by the appellant's counsel to demonstrate why the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 35 of FEMA does not provide an efficacious remedy. In fact there could hardly be any reason since the High Court itself is the appellate forum."::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS
- 20 -
7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decision, the High Court has seriously erred in entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the assessment order, by- passing the .
statutory remedies."
[underlining ours] Likewise once the remedy against the alleged termination is available under Industrial Disputes Act then of in such eventuality the writ is not maintainable. In 2021(12) SCALE 180, titled as Milkhi Ram Versus Himachal rt Pradesh State Electricity Board, vide Paras-13, 14 and 16, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
"13. The above contentions of the parties indicate that the only issue to be considered here is whether the suit before the civil court at the instance of the terminated employee, was maintainable. The civil courts may have the limited jurisdiction in service matters, but jurisdiction may not be available to Court to adjudicate on orders passed by disciplinary authority. The authorities specified under the ID Act including the appropriate government and the industrial courts perform various functions and the ID Act provides for a wider definition of "termination of service", the condition precedent of termination of service. The consequence of infringing those, are also provided in the ID Act.::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS
- 21 -
When a litigant opts for common law remedy, he may choose either the civil court or the industrial forum.
14. In the present matter, the appellant has clearly .
founded his claim in the suit, on the provisions of the ID Act and the employer therefore is entitled to raise a jurisdictional objection to the proceedings before the civil court. The courts below including the executing court negated the jurisdictional objection. The High Court in of Revision, however has overturned the lower court's order and declared that the decree in favour of the plaintiff is hit by the principle of rt coram non judice and therefore, the same is a nullity.
16. As can be seen from the material on record, the challenge to the termination was founded on the provisions of the ID Act. Although jurisdictional objection was raised and a specific issue was framed at the instance of the employer, the issue was answered against the defendant.
This Court is unable to accept the view propounded by the courts below and is of the considered opinion that the civil court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a suit structured on the provisions of the ID Act. The decree favouring the plaintiff is a legal nullity and the finding of the High Court to this extent is upheld."
6(vi). In view of the discussions made here-in-above, the contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS
- 22 -
appellants are found to be devoid of any merit.
Consequently, the challenge to the impugned judgment dated 27.09.2021 passed by the learned Writ Court fails and the .
impugned judgment is affirmed.
6(vii). However, at this stage, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submits that once the industrial dispute was taken up for conciliation by the Labour Officer-cum-
of Conciliation Officer, Dharamshala, admittedly, on four occasions, between 25.09.2020 to 13.11.2020, therefore, on rt failure of conciliation, the Labour Officer-cum-Conciliation Officer, may be directed to refer the dispute to the appropriate Government for framing of a reference and adjudication in accordance with law. This prayer appears to be genuine. Accordingly, notwithstanding the observations-
findings made here-in-above and without prejudice to the rights of respective parties and to render substantial justice, we direct the Labour Officer-cum-Conciliation Officer, Dharamshala to forward the dispute in question to the appropriate Government, for framing of a reference under Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act within four weeks from today. Needless to add, that the ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS
- 23 -
appropriate Government shall take a decision for framing of a reference and to forward the same for adjudication by the Labour Officer-cum-Industrial Tribunal within six weeks .
thereafter.
7. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS:
Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we decline to interfere with the of judgment dated 27.09.2021, passed by the learned Single Judge in following terms:-
(i) rt The judgment dated 27.09.2021 passed by the learned Writ Court in CWP No.230 of 2021 calls for no interference; and
(ii) We direct that Labour Officer-cum-Conciliation Officer, Dharamshala to forward the dispute of the appellants herein, to the appropriate Government, for framing of a reference under Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act, within four weeks from today; with further directions to the appropriate Government to take a decision for framing of a reference and to forward the same for adjudication by the Labour ::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS
- 24 -
Officer-cum-Industrial Tribunal, within six weeks thereafter.
8. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, .
with no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, are also disposed of.
(Tarlok Singh Chauhan)
of
Judge
rt (Ranjan Sharma)
Judge
August 19, 2023
(Bhardwaj)
::: Downloaded on - 23/08/2023 20:32:50 :::CIS