Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Chilukuri Krishna Babu, vs Kamana Neeraja, on 27 February, 2024
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T.MALLIKARJUNA RAO
APPEAL SUIT NO.325 OF 2010
JUDGMENT:
1. The Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'C.P.C.'), is filed by the Appellants/Defendants challenging the decree and Judgment dated 20.01.2010 in O.S.No.204 of 2007 passed by the learned I Additional District Judge, Guntur (for short, 'the trial court').
2. Respondent is the Plaintiff who filed the suit in O.S. No.204 of 2007 seeking primary relief of Specific Performance of pre-emption condition incorporated in the registered sale deed, dated 15.06.2006 with a request to direct the Defendants to execute a regular registered sale deed regarding suit 'B' schedule property, after receiving the consideration amount and also granting relief of Permanent Injunction, restraining them from interfering with the Plaintiffs' peaceful possession and enjoyment of 'A' schedule property.
3. Referring to the parties hereinafter as arrayed in the suit is expedient to mitigate potential confusion and better comprehend the case.
4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows:
(a) The 1st Plaintiff's husband is the managing partner of the 2nd Plaintiff's firm. The 1st Plaintiff and her brother, Anil, are the other 2 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 partners of the 2nd Plaintiff's firm. Defendants 1 and 2 are the brothers.
Plaint 'A' schedule property and another property measuring Ac.1.20 cents are owned by the 1st Defendant. The 1st Defendant acquired this property and its machinery through an auction conducted by the State Financial Corporation on 09.06.2003. Subsequently, the 1st Defendant executed a registered sale deed on 21.03.2005, selling Ac.0.45 cents of land on the western side of the property to Ravella Ravindra Babu. The remaining extent of Ac.0.75 cents of land, as well as the R.C.C., building and shed on the property, remained under the possession and utilization of the 1st Defendant. Initially, the 1st Defendant established Sri Rama Bio Formulations in the building and shed as mentioned above. However, after operating it for a certain period and determining its impracticality, the 1 st Defendant leased out the 'A' schedule property to the 1st Plaintiff's husband. This lease agreement was formalized on 05.11.2004, spanning five years.
(b) The husband of the 1st Plaintiff joined as a partner in the 2nd Plaintiff firm, engaging in business activities and providing the 1st Defendant with a payment of Rs.60,000/-. According to the agreement's stipulations, the 1st Defendant was obligated to reimburse the sum of Rs.60,000/- without interest upon surrendering vacant possession of the property mentioned in the plaint. Additionally, the 2nd Plaintiff was granted the right to possess and utilize the property from 01.11.2004 to 30.10.2009 at a monthly rent of Rs.7,000/- for the initial three years and Rs.8,050/- for the subsequent two years. The 2nd Plaintiff, adhering to the 3 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 agreement, developed the 'A' schedule property, acquired requisite licenses, and conducted business operations. Regular rental payments were made by the 2nd Plaintiff to the 1st Defendant for the half portion of the property specified in the plaint. The 1st Defendant consistently received rent directly or through intermediaries, including his father-in- law. However, a disruption in rent payments occurred when the 1st Defendant began avoiding receipt. Since June 2007, the 2nd Plaintiff has been unable to pay rent, although they express their readiness and willingness to settle the outstanding amount in due course.
(c) The 1st Defendant completed the sale of his undivided share in the 'A' schedule property to the 1st Plaintiff through a registered sale deed dated 15.06.2006. The transaction involved a sale consideration of Rs.9,75,000/-, received in the form of a cheque and Rs.25,000/- in cash, following which possession of the property was transferred to the Plaintiffs. During the execution of the sale deed, the 1 st Plaintiff committed to offering the remaining half of the 'A' schedule property, referred to as the 'B' schedule property, to the Plaintiffs whenever a sale was intended. However, contrary to this commitment, the 1st Defendant gifted the 'B' schedule property to the 2nd Defendant on 07.11.2006. This action was perceived as an attempt to harass the Plaintiffs and coerce them into accepting unfavourable terms and conditions. The Plaintiffs contend that the 1st Defendant is not entitled to sell the 'B' schedule property without first offering it to them. They assert their readiness and willingness to purchase the remaining half of the 'A' schedule property for a valuable 4 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 consideration of Rs.15,82,650/-. Despite oral demands, the Defendants have not responded to the Plaintiffs' demands.
5. The 2nd Defendant adopted the written statement of the 1st Defendant, refuting several averments made in the plaint. They admitted the original title of the plaint schedule property and asserted that after purchasing the 'A' schedule property from the State Finance Corporation, the 1st Defendant leased it to the 1st Plaintiff from January 2001 to December 2002. Following the lease period, the 1st Plaintiff returned possession to the 1st Defendant and the original license, as the property was intended to be leased to Chitti Subba Reddy. The 'A' schedule property was then leased to Subba Reddy from January 2003 to December 2007 at a monthly rent of Rs.15,000/-. The alleged lease deed executed by the 1st Defendant in favour of the 2nd Plaintiff on 05.11.2004 was deemed fabricated. The 2nd Defendant asserts that the 2nd Plaintiff's firm was a registered entity and was concocted, having been registered just before filing the suit. They claimed that Subba Reddy handed over the premises to K.V.Ranga Rao, who initially paid rent on behalf of Subba Reddy. After November 2006, the rent payment became irregular. The 1st Defendant then sold half of the 'A' schedule property to the 1st Plaintiff through a registered sale deed dated 15.06.2005, fixing the rent payable by Chitti Subba Reddy at Rs.7,500/- by mutual consent. Ranga Rao continued paying rent to the 1st Defendant on behalf of Subba Reddy until November 2006. The 1st Defendant, out of love and affection towards the 2nd 5 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 Defendant, gifted the remaining 'A' schedule property to the 2nd Defendant, a fact known to the 1st Plaintiff. The Defendants disputed having agreed to sell the remaining portion of the property to the 1st Plaintiff. They asserted that Subba Reddy and Ranga Rao continued illegal possession based on false claims made by the Plaintiffs.
6. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues:
(1) Whether the lease agreement dated 05.11.2004 in favour of 2nd Plaintiff by 1st Defendant is true and valid?
(2) Whether gift deed dt.07.11.2006 is in violation of any of the terms in the sale deed dated 15.06.2006?
(3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the specific performance of the terms in the sale deed dated 15.06.2006 in respect of the B schedule property?
(4) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a permanent injunction against the defendants?
(5) To what relief?
7. During the trial, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.W.1 was examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.4. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and marked Exs.B.1 to B.4 and Exs.X.1and X.2 documents.
8. After completing the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court decreed the suit, directing the Defendants 1 and 2 to execute a regular sale deed in favour of the 1st Plaintiff or her nominee in respect of 'B' schedule property, by receiving consideration of Rs.15,82,650/- with interest @ 7.5% p.a., from the date of suit till the date of deposit with costs; the Defendants are restrained by way of permanent 6 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 injunction from interfering the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property.
9. I have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties at length and have gone through the Judgment and findings recorded by the learned trial Court while decreeing the suit. I have also re- appreciated all the evidence on record, including the deposition of relevant witnesses examined by both sides.
10. Sri Devi Prasad Mangalapuri, the learned counsel representing the Appellants/Defendants, argued that the decree of specific performance cannot be granted mechanically without considering the Defendants' version. He pointed out that the trial court overlooked that the recitals in Ex.A.1 indicate that the 1st Defendant should not alienate the remaining half portion of the 'A' schedule property without the consent of the vendee. However, he emphasized that this provision cannot confer any legal right in favour of the Plaintiffs. Notably, the 1st Plaintiff did not testify in Court to present her version of events. Furthermore, the learned counsel contends that the execution of the gift deed by the 1st Defendant in favour of the 2nd Defendant cannot be challenged by the Plaintiffs under the guise of Ex.A.1. He highlighted that DW.1, in cross-examination, admitted that after the execution of the gift deed by the 1st Defendant in favour of the 2nd Defendant, the 1st Plaintiff obtained a lease under Ex.B.3 from the 2nd Defendant. According to the counsel, since the 1st Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with the 2nd Defendant regarding the suit schedule 7 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 property, she cannot question the validity of the gift deed marked as Ex.B.2.
11. Per contra, Sri Mutyala Sobhanadri Naidu, learned counsel representing the Respondents/Plaintiffs, argued that the trial Court appreciated the case facts and reached a correct conclusion. The reasons given by the trial Court do not require any interference.
12. Concerning the pleadings in the suit, the findings recorded by the Trial Court and in light of the rival contentions and submissions made on either side before this Court, the following points would arise for determination:
1) Is the trial Court justified in granting relief of specific performance of the sale agreement dated 15.06.2006 and permanent injunction?
2) Does the trial Court judgment need any interference?
POINT NOs.1 & 2:
13. After examining the pleadings, witness testimonies, and documents marked on behalf of both parties, it is apparent that the following facts are either admitted or undisputed:
The 2nd Plaintiff is a firm, and Kamana Venkata Ranga Rao, the husband of the 1st Plaintiff, serves as the Partner of the 2nd Plaintiff firm (PW.1). Defendants 1 and 2 are brothers. The 1st Defendant (DW.1) owns the plaint 'A' schedule property and another property measuring Ac.1.20 cents. He acquired these 8 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 properties and machinery through an auction conducted by the State Financial Corporation on 09.06.2003. Ac.0.45 cents of the land on the western side of the property was sold by the 1st Defendant to Ravella Ravindra Babu through a registered sale deed dated 21.03.2005. The 1st Defendant has been in possession and enjoyment of the remaining Ac.0.75 cents of land, where he initiated Sri Rama Bio Formulations in the existing R.C.C., building and shed. The 1st Defendant sold his undivided and unspecified share of the 'A' schedule property to the 1st Plaintiff through a registered sale deed dated 15.06.2006 (Ex.A.1). The 1st Plaintiff received the sale consideration and took possession of the property.
Subsequently, the Plaintiffs have been in possession and enjoyment of the 'A' schedule property. The 1 st Defendant's claim, which is not undisputed, is that after acquiring the 'A' schedule property from the State Financial Corporation, he initially leased it to the 1st Plaintiff.
14. The Defendants contend that the 1st Defendant leased out the 'A' schedule property to the 1st Plaintiff for only one year. After the expiration of this period, the 1st Plaintiff allegedly handed over possession to the 1st Defendant, who then leased the property to Chitti Subba Reddy from January 2003 to December 2007 at a monthly rent of Rs.1,500/-. The Defendants disputed the Plaintiffs' claim that the 2 nd Plaintiff regularly 9 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 paid rent to the 1st Defendant. The 1st Defendant stopped accepting rent from June 2007 onwards, and the 2nd Plaintiff couldn't pay rent. However, DW.1 admitted that the 1st Plaintiff took possession of the property in 2001 and had been running a business there since then. He also acknowledged that the 1st Plaintiff started paying rent through cheques in 2005.
15. Despite the Defendants disputing the lease deed in favour of the 2nd Defendant, DW.1 did not challenge the execution of the lease deed dated 05.11.2004. The trial Court rejected the Defendants' contention, reasoning that if there was no lease in favour of the 2nd Defendant, the 1st Plaintiff wouldn't possess the property, and the 2nd Plaintiff wouldn't pay rent by cheque. DW.1's testimony, as rightly observed by the trial Court, indicated that the Defendants took steps to prevent the Plaintiffs from enjoying the property. DW.2 (L.A.Govinda Rao), Assistant Director, Drugs Control Administration, confirmed through his evidence that the licence for the 2nd Plaintiff was in the name of the 1st Plaintiff as the leaseholder in 2001 and was renewed in January 2003 in the name of A. Subba Reddy for five years. The parties have produced the documents in proof of lease. DW.2 stated that Ex.B.1 (copy of affidavit dated 20.07.2002) was sent to their office; based on Ex.B.1, the licence was altered in the name of Subba Reddy; the lease period is up to 31.12.2007. In the cross-examination, DW.2 relied on Ex.X.1, the Xerox copy of the notice received by them dt.25.06.2008 and Ex.X.2, the letter addressed by Ch.Gopi Babu (2nd 10 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 Defendant) to the Director General of Drugs. The Defendants' objection to licence renewal was evident from documents (Ex.X.1 and Ex.X.2), where the 2nd Defendant requested not to renew any licence in the name of the 2nd Plaintiff without his consent, citing his ownership of half the property.
16. DW.2's inspection on 23.11.2007 affirmed that PW.1 was running the firm on that day, supporting the Plaintiffs' claim to deal with business in the schedule premises. DW.3, Bathula Sreenivasarao, Assistant Commissioner of Registrations, Sathenapalli, testified that the 2nd Plaintiff obtained a licence on 08.11.2004, filed a lease deed executed by the 1st Defendant in favour of the 2nd Defendant, and the licence, which showed turnover till November 2007, ended in September 2008. It was further mentioned that a letter from Managing Partner K.V.Ranga Rao resulted in the licence being issued in the name of the 1st Plaintiff on 19.09.2008. DW.3's cross-examination revealed that the licence was granted in PW.1's name, with a fresh renewal application made in the 2nd Plaintiff's name, represented by the 1st Plaintiff. No objections to this licence were received. The trial Court rightly concluded that the Defendants were attempting to interfere with the 2nd Plaintiff's operations, substantiated by the evidence of DWs.2 and 3.
17. The evidence presented by the Defendants failed to establish their claim that Subba Reddy continued the business on the premises. The trial Court did not address disputes over the rent quantum payable by the 2nd Plaintiff firm, as it was not the primary focus of the dispute. This Court 11 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 deems the Defendants' contentions on the rent payable by K.V.Ranga Rao, entrusted with the firm's affairs and business by C.Subba Reddy, as irrelevant to the core matter in dispute. The record establishes the Plaintiffs' possession of the property, the 2nd Plaintiff's rent payments, and interference from the Defendants.
18. The Appellants/Defendants' counsel argues that the Plaintiffs, while claiming specific performance, did not file a suit to cancel the gift deed or declare their pre-emptive right over the schedule property. The Respondents/Plaintiffs' counsel relies on the Hon'ble Apex Court's decision in P.Ramasubbamma V. V.Vijayalakshmi and Ors.,1 to support the claim that the 1st Defendant's gift deed to his brother (2nd Defendant), contrary to the sale deed terms, justified the trial Court's decree in favour of the Plaintiffs.
19. Plaintiffs assert that the 1st Defendant is not entitled to sell the 'B' schedule property without offering it to them, expressing readiness to purchase the remaining half of the 'A' schedule property. However, the Defendants contend in their written statement that the 1st Defendant was unaware of any recital in the sale deed (Ex.A.1) on June 15, 2005, and signed it based on trust. DW.1's testimony contradicts this claim, as he acknowledged selling his half to the 1st Plaintiff under Ex.A.1, stating he carefully reviewed the contents, including the recital requiring him to offer it first to the 1st Plaintiff. DW.1's admission undermines the written 1 AIR 2022 SC 1793 12 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 statement's plea. DW.1 also admitted lacking documents proving he informed the 1st Plaintiff about gifting the property to the 2nd Defendant. The recitals in Ex.A.1 explicitly mention the condition regarding offering the property to the 1st Plaintiff before third parties. It is mentioned explicitly on page No.3 of Ex.A.1 as follows:
"Now the vendor witnesses the vendee herewith this sale deed that he should not alienate his half share of an undivided and unspecified right in the site and building remaining with him to others without the consent of the vendee.
The vendor also witnesses the vendee with this sale deed; if he wants to alienate his half share of an undivided and unspecified right in the site and building remaining with him, he shall give priority to the vendee and next priority to others.
20. DW.1's testimony, along with the contents of Ex.A.1, unequivocally indicates that the 1st Defendant agreed to alienate his half share of the undivided and unspecified right in the site and building, giving precedence to the 1st Plaintiff. However, no evidence on record suggests that such priority was granted to the 1st Plaintiff. The 1st Defendant violated the terms and conditions of the sale deed dated 15.06.2006 and gifted the property to his brother, the 2nd Defendant. Considering the recitals in the sale deed, the trial Court granted the relief of specific performance.
21. The Defendants contend that the specific performance decree was granted mechanically without considering their version. The contention that the execution of the gift deed by the 1st Defendant in favour of the 2nd Defendant cannot be challenged under the guise of Ex.A.1 is supported by 13 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 the fact that, after the execution of Ex.A.2 by the 1st Defendant, the 1st Plaintiff obtained a lease under Ex.B.3 from the 2nd Defendant. PW.1 denied offering the 2nd half share of the property to purchase, citing a lack of funds. PW.1 admitted in cross-examination that the 1st Defendant executed a gift deed in favour of the 2nd Defendant, who then leased it in the name of the 1st Plaintiff. Ex.B.3, the lease agreement, shows the agreement between the 2nd Defendant and the 1st Plaintiff, effective from 01.10.2008 to 30.09.2014, with a rent of Rs.7,500/-. The agreement acknowledges the 2nd Defendant as the owner, joint undivided and unspecified share, and specifies that the 2nd Defendant is offering his share on lease to the 1st Plaintiff. The agreement establishes the 2nd Defendant's ownership, and by agreeing, the Plaintiffs cannot now question the 2nd Defendant's rights over the property. Having entered into the agreement with the 2nd Defendant by the Plaintiffs during the pendency of the suit, now it is not open to the Plaintiffs to question the right of the 2nd Defendant over the schedule property.
22. This Court views that a party cannot probate or reprobate, having filed the suit against the Defendants questioning the execution of the Ex.A.2 gift deed claiming a right of pre-emption and entered into an Ex.B.3 registered lease deed admitting the ownership of the 1st Defendant, during the pendency of the suit. It is pertinent to note that the Plaintiffs have not entered into a registered lease deed subject to the outcome of this suit. The Plaintiffs accepted the 2nd Defendant's right over the 14 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 schedule property during the suit and are precluded from questioning such a right before this Court. The execution of the Ex.B.3 registered lease deed is undisputed. Despite its marking and DW.1's admission, the trial Court failed to consider this evidence, providing no reasons for doing so.
23. It is settled law that the relief of Specific Performance is discretionary but not arbitrary, and discretion must be exercised by sound and reasonable judicial principles. Before granting a decree of specific performance, the trial Court was supposed to have given reasons for not considering the impact of Ex.B.3, which was executed between the parties during the pendency of the suit proceedings.
24. It is, of course, a settled proposition of law that primary relief of specific performance need not be granted as the same is lawful to do. At the same time, it is also a settled and well-established principle of law that the said relief cannot be granted arbitrarily, unreasonably and inequitably. No doubt, there was a particular contract between the parties, which was binding on them and could be enforced against the transferees within the sale deed, but not otherwise. The parties to the sale deed are still alive, and it is pretty clear that the contract bound the 1 st Defendant.
25. Before proceeding further, it is crucial to clarify the distinction between 'acquiescence' and 'delay and laches'. The doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine that applies when a party with a right stands by and sees another dealing inconsistently with such right 15 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 while the act is in progress and after the violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain.2
26. In a literal sense, it means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, and acceptance, which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of the party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention.
27. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party from complaining of violating the right afterwards.
28. For a valid waiver of a legally enforceable right, it must be clear, unequivocal, and made with full knowledge of the consequences. For establishing waiver, it will have to be established that a party expressly or by its conduct acted in a manner inconsistent with its rights. Waiver can indeed not always and in every case be inferred merely from the failure of the party to take the objection. The waiver can only be inferred if and after it is shown that the party knew the relevant facts and was aware of his right to take the objection in question.
29. As such, to apply the principle of waiver, it will have to be established that though a party was aware of the relevant facts and the right to object, he has neglected to take such an objection. Thus,
2 Para 39, Chairman, S.B.I. & Anr. v. M.J. James, 2021 S.C.C. OnLine SC 1061. 16
T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 constituting acquiescence or waiver must be established that though a party knows the material facts and is conscious of his legal rights in a given matter but fails to assert its rights at the earliest possible opportunity, it creates an effective bar of waiver against him.
30. In Krishna Bahadur v. Purna Theatre3, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that:
"9. The principle of waiver, although, is akin to the principle of estoppel; the difference between the two, however, is that whereas estoppel is not a cause of action; it is a rule of evidence; waiver is contractual and may constitute a cause of action; it is an agreement between the parties and a party fully knowing of its rights has agreed not to assert a right for consideration.
31. In Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines (P) Ltd. 4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
'26. Acquiescence is sitting by when another is invading the rights.... It is a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim.... It implies positive acts, not merely silence or inaction, such as is involved in laches. ... The acquiescence must be such as to lead to the inference of a licence sufficient to create a new right in the Defendant....'
32. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs initiated the suit asserting pre-emptive rights against Defendants 1 and 2. However, during the ongoing legal proceedings, the Plaintiffs entered into a registered lease deed, acknowledging the 2nd Defendant's ownership of the schedule property.
33. Undoubtedly, a waiver under duress, coercion or undue influence would be considered invalid. It is not the Plaintiffs' case. They have not explained any reason to enter the registered lease deed (Ex.B.3) 3 (2004) 8 SCC 229 4 (1994) 2 SCC 448 17 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 transaction during the pendency of the suit. Even if it is assumed that there was interference from the Defendants to enjoy the leasehold property, the Plaintiffs should have approached the trial Court to work out their remedies following the law. Without any explanation from the Plaintiffs, this Court has no hesitation in holding that entering into a registered lease deed with the 2nd Defendant, admitting his title over the property, is to be considered a waiver of any rights that may have had, if any. No doubt, as the 1st Defendant had repudiated the contract and failed to perform part of it, it was open to the Plaintiffs to sue for its enforcement.
34. In Santokh Singh and another V. Sohan Singh Dosanjh and others5, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh held that:
Pre-emptory right is only given where there is a sale deed, but the instant case is a case of a gift deed. The donor and the donee had not come forward to challenge the gift deed; therefore, the plaintiffs have no locus standi to challenge the gift deed. Thus, ratio decidendi culled out in Nihal Kaur V. Dhan Kaur [2003 (3) R.C.R. (Civil) 527]
35. In Raj Narayan Rai and Ors. vs. The State of Bihar and Ors. 6, the High Court of Patna held that:
Pre-emption is a weak right, and the purchaser can defeat the right of the pre-emptor by any legitimate means provided under the law.
36. In Bishan Singh vs. Khazan Singh 7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
5 2016 S.C.C. OnLine P&H 14642 6 MANU/BH/0948/2014 7 MANU/SC/0119/1958 : 1959 SCR 878 18 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 "The right being a very weak right, it can be defeated by all legitimate methods, such as the vendee allowing the claimant of a superior or equal right being substituted in his place."
37. The evidence on record suggests that the 1st Plaintiff consciously relinquished her rights and benefits acquired under Ex.A.1. In light of the presented facts, the contention raised by the Defendants, asserting the 1st Plaintiff's intention to waive her right, is difficult to reject.
38. Given the execution of the Ex.B3 registered lease deed between the parties, this Court finds that it can be considered a waiver as it is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of rights.
39. It is evident from the record that the 1st Defendant executed a gift deed in favour of his brother, the 2nd Defendant, disclosing the property's market value. The Plaintiffs sought specific performance, considering the property's value as indicated in the gift deed. The terms of the gift deed suggest that it was executed without consideration, and the valuation presented is for stamp duty purposes. Common knowledge dictates that this valuation may not accurately represent the property's market value. The Plaintiffs' request for specific performance, offering to pay the mentioned consideration amount of Rs.15,82,650/-, is not justified, especially considering the absence of consideration in the gift deed. The valuation in the gift deed is solely for stamp duty payment.
40. After thoroughly examining the entire material, pleadings, evidence presented, and the impugned Judgment and decree, it is clear that the trial Court has not appropriately exercised its discretion in granting the 19 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 relief of specific performance. However, it is justified to grant the relief of permanent injunction. The trial court's findings are well-founded while granting relief of Permanent Injunction, and there is no need for interference with the said findings. Consequently, the points raised in the Appeal are addressed accordingly.
41. As a result,
(a) The Appeal suit is allowed in part by setting aside the Decree and Judgment dated 20.01.2010 passed in O.S. No.204 of 2007 by the learned I Additional District Judge, Guntur, regarding the granting of the relief of specific performance.
(b) The Decree and Judgment passed by the trial Court is confirmed concerning the relief of Permanent Injunction as granted.
(c) Both parties are directed to bear their costs in the suit and the Ap- peal in the facts and circumstances.
Pending applications, if any, in this Appeal, shall stand closed.
___________________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 27.02.2024 SAK 20 T.M.R., J A.S. No.325 of 2010 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE T.MALLIKARJUNA RAO APPEAL SUIT NO.325 OF 2010 Date: 27.02.2024 SAK