Gujarat High Court
Hiteshkumar Jashwantsinh Taparia ... vs Municipal Commissioner on 26 June, 2015
Author: J.B.Pardiwala
Bench: J.B.Pardiwala
C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 9185 of 2015
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
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1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowedYes
to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? No
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy ofNo
the judgment ?
4 Whether this case involves a substantial question ofNo
law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of
India or any order made thereunder ?
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HITESHKUMAR JASHWANTSINH TAPARIA (CHIEF FIRE OFFICER ,
VADODARA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION)....Petitioner(s)
Versus
MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER....Respondent(s)
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Appearance:
MR KB PUJARA, ADVOCATE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR MAULIK G NANAVATI, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA
Date : 26/06/2015
CAV JUDGMENT
1. By this writapplication under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner a Page 1 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT suspended Chief Fire Officer, Vadodara Municipal Corporation has prayed for the following reliefs: "(a) to quash and set aside the impugned order of suspension dtd. 30052015 passed by the respondent as per AnnexureM;
(b) PENDING THE HEARING AND FINAL DISPOSAL OF THIS PETITIN, BE PLEASED to say the further operation of the impugned order of suspension dtd. 30052015 passed by the respondent as per Annexure - M, and to allow the petitioner to discharge duties and to draw salaries as he was doing prior to the passing of the said order;
(c) PENDING THE HEARING AND FINAL DISPOSAL OF THIS PETITIN, BE PLEASED to direct the respondent to revoke the impugned order of suspension dtd. 3005 2015 passed by him as per AnnexureM;
(d) to grant any other appropriate and just relief/s."
2. The facts giving rise to this application may be summarized as under:
3. The petitioner was appointed as a Station Officer in the Fire Brigade Department of the Vadodara Municipal Corporation on 4.01.1986. He was promoted as the Deputy Chief Fire Officer in the year 2004 and further promoted as the Chief Fire Officer on 1.05.2007.
4. It is the case of the petitioner that a disgruntled union leader namely one Shri Manoj Panday, made an application to the Vigilance Commission, Gujarat State levelling allegations of assets disproportionate to the known sources Page 2 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT of the income of the petitioner. A First Information Report in that regard came to be registered against the petitioner at the Vadodara City ACB Police Station for the offence punishable under Sections 13(1)(e) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, vide I C.R. No.1 of 2014.
5. The petitioner apprehending arrest by the ACB Prayed for anticipatory bail before the Sessions Court. However, the prayer for the anticipatory bail was declined by the Special Court. The petitioner came before this Court by way of a Criminal Misc. Application No.4469 of 2014 and prayed for the anticipatory bail. This Court vide order dated 28th April, 2014 allowed the application and ordered the release of the petitioner on anticipatory bail.
6. The Corporation in the meantime passed the order dated 5th February, 2014 asking the petitioner to proceed on leave with effect from 6th February, 2014.
7. The Corporation also issued a show cause notice dated 5th February, 2014 to the petitioner calling upon him to show cause why the disciplinary action should not be taken agaist him under Section 56(2) of the Gujarat Provincial Page 3 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 for the alleged breach of Rule 3(1)(III) and Rule 19 of the Gujarat Service(conduct) Rules 1971. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply dated 10th February, 2014 to the show cause notice.
8. After the grant of the anticipatory bail by this Court, the petitioner requested the corporation to allow him to resume his duty. The Corporation reconsidered the matter and permitted the petitioner to resume his duties vide order dated 9th July, 2014.
9. On 26th May, 2015, the Investigating Officer summoned the petitioner and completed the procedure of his arrest and release on bail, according to the order of this Court granting anticipatory bail.
10. The petitioner informed the corporation that he was formally arrested by the Investigating Officer of the ACB Police Station and pursuant to order of the High Court was released on bail.
11. The Corporation thereafter passed an order of suspension dated 30th May, 2015.
12. The petitioner has come up with this writ application being aggrieved by the order of Page 4 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT suspension.
13. Mr. K.B.Pujara, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner vehemently submitted that the impugned order of suspension is totally unjustified and uncalled for in the facts and circumstances of the case.
14. Mr. Pujara submitted that according to the Rule5 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1971 the power of suspension can be exercised (a) where a disciplinary proceeding against the employee is contemplated or is pending or (b) where a case against him in respect of criminal offence involving moral turpitude is under investigation, inquiry or trial.
15. Mr. Pujara sumbitted that the impugned order of suspension has not been passed on the ground of the criminal offence being under investigation, inquiry or trial, but it is purported to have been passed on the ground of pending disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, no disciplinary proceedings are pending against the petitioner in as much as the respondent has not held even any preliminary inquiry against the petitioner nor any charge sheet has been issued to the petitioner.
Page 5 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENTTherefore no disciplinary inquiry is pending against the petitioner as wrongly stated in the impugned order.
16. Mr. Pujara further submitted that for holding a regular disciplinary inquiry as provided in Rule9 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1971, the Disciplinary Authority has to form an opinion that there are grounds for inquiry into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehavior or of any culpable act or omission against the employee. No such opinion has been formed by the respondent so far and therefore there is no question of holding any disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner.
17. Mr. Pujara submitted that the prosecution against his client is accuated with the sole intention to settle personal scores. Mr. Pujara submitted that his client is suffering because of a disgruntled employee who is a union leader and is not getting alone well with his client. Mr. Pujara submitted that initially for a period of 15 months after the registration of the FIR, the Corporation did not deem fit to pass any order of suspension but thereafter all of a sudden placed the petitioner under suspension.
18. Mr. Pujara therefore prays that there being merit in this writapplication the same be Page 6 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT allowed and the impugned order of suspension be quashed.
19. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Maulik G. Nanavati, the learned advocate appearing for the Vadodara Municipal Corporation. He submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by his client in passing the order of suspension. Mr. Nanavati submitted that there is ample material on record to prima facie substantiate the allegations against the petitioner of possessing assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. Mr. Nanavati submitted that the allegations levelled by the petitioner regarding mala fide exercise of power in order to punish the petitioner is baseless.
20. Mr. Nanavati pointed out that the case of the petitioner was considered by the Standing Committee of the Corporation. The Standing Committee took the decision of placing the petitioner under suspension having regard to the criminal prosecution instituted against the petitioner for the alleged offence referred to above. The order of suspension was passed by the Municipal Commissioner as the Standing Committee accorded sanctioned for the same.
Page 7 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT21. Mr. Nanavati therefore prays that there being no merit in this application, the same be rejected.
22. In the course of the hearing of this matter I requested Mr. Nanavati to make available the original files of the Corporation as I wanted to look into the decision making process. Mr. Nanavati made available the original file which was perused by me. The perusal of the file revealed that the entire matter was looked into very closely and in details. I also found that the Investigating Officer has prayed for the necessary sanction from the Corporation to prosecute the petitioner under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. I perused the entire report of the Investigating Officer praying for sanction under Section 19 of the Act, 1988 and such report is quite exhaustive. It appears that the Investigation is almost completed and the Investigating Officer wants to now go ahead with filing of the chargesheet. However, such chargesheet cannot be filed in the absence of a valid sanction under Section 19 of the Act, 1988.
23. I do not want to discuss anything on merit as regards the allegations of assets Page 8 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT disproportionate as the chargesheet would make the picture clear.
24. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the respondent was justified in passing the order of suspension.
25. In service jurisprudence suspension is a device to keep a Government servant out of touch from his service duties due to several reasons including maintaining faith of the public at large in service, to remove any eventuality of causing any injury to the adverse material available again the delinquent Government servant/employee that may be used in establishing his delinquency. The device is of an interim nature and that does not break the relationship of master and servant, but precludes the employee from discharging his official duties. Suspension is neither stigmatic, nor a punishment, but certainly it is an extraordinary eventuality, thus, should be exercised very cautiously and by proper application of mind.
26. In the instant case the petitioner, who is a Chief Fire Officer is alleged to have amassed huge wealth in the form of movable and immovable Page 9 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT properties. Corruption in any form is not only a serious misconduct, but a crime too. In the event of serious and well founded allegations of corruption, the suspension from service is highly desirable unless the person suspended is able to make out more than a prima facie case of mala fides or bias on the part of the suspending authority.
27. Suspension in service jurisprudence is of different kinds, viz as punishment if provided under the service rules, inherent power of the employer to suspend and thirdly, rules providing for suspension during pending enquiry or contemplation of inquiry.
28. In V.P. Gidroniya v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr., 1970 1 SCC 362, the hon'ble Apex Court held at para Nos.6, 7 and 8 as below: "6. Three kinds of suspension are know to law. A public servant may be suspended as a mode of punishment or he may be suspended during the pendency of an enquiry against him if the order appointing him or statutory provisions governing his service provide for such suspension. Lastly, he may merely be forbidden from discharging his duties during the pendency of an enquiry against him which act is also called suspension The right to suspend as a measure of punishment as well as the right to suspend the contract of service during the pendency of an enquiry are both regulated by the contract of employment or the provisions regulating the conditions of service. But the last category of suspension referred to earlier is the right of the master to forbid his servant from doing the work Page 10 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT which he had to do under the terms of the contract of service or the provisions governing his conditions of service at the same time keeping in force the master's obligations under the contract. In other words the master may ask his servant to refrain from rending his services but he must fulfill his part of the contract.
7. The legal position as regards a master's right to place his servants under suspension is now well settled by the Decisions of this Court. In the Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi and Ors. V. Hotel Workers Union, 1960 1 SCR 476, the question whether a master could suspend his servant during the pendency of an euquiry came up for consideration by this Court. Therein, this Court observed that it was well settled that under the ordinary law of master and servant the power to suspend the servant without pay could not be implied as a term in an ordinary contract of service between the master and the servant but must arise either from an express term in the contract itself or a statutory provision governing such contract. It was furthr observed therein that ordinarily in the absence of such a power either in express terms in the contract or under the rules framed under some such statute would mean that the master would have no power to suspend a workman and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work he will have to pay the wages during the socalled period of suspension. Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and the servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay.
8. The same view was reiterated by this Court in T. Cajee v. U. Formanik Stem and Anr., 1961 1 SCR 750. The rule laid down in the above decisions was followed by this Court in R.P. Kapur V. Union of India, 1964 5 SCR 431. The law on the subject was exhaustively reviewed in Balvantray Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharashtra, 1968 2 SCR 577. Therein the legal position was stated, thus: The general principle is that an employer can suspend an employee of his pending an enquiry into his misconduct and the only question that can arise in such a suspension will relate to the payment of his wages during the period of such suspension. It is now well settled that the power to suspend, in the sense of a right to forbid an employee to work, is not an implied terms in an ordinary contract between Page 11 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT master and servant, and that such a power can only be the creature either of a statute governing the contract, or of an express term in the contract itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such a power either as an express term in the contract or in the rules framed under some statute would mean that an employer would have no power to suspend an employee of his and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work, he will have to pay the employee's wages during the period of suspension. Where, however there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the order of suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. It is equally well settled that an order of interim suspension can be passed against the employee while an enquiry is pending into his conduct even though there is no such term in the contract of employment or in the rules, but in such a case the employee would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of suspension if there is no statute or rule under which, it would be withheld. The distinction between suspending the contract of a service of a servant and suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting is important. The suspension in the latter case is always an implied term in every contract of service. When an employee is suspended in this sense, it means that the employer merely issues a direction to him that he would not do the service required of him during a particular period. In other words, the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey."
29. In L.K. Verma V. HMT Ltd. and another, 2006 2 SCC 269, the Supreme Court held as follows: "17. Suspension is of three kinds. An order of suspension may be passed by way of punishment in terms of the conduct rules. An order of suspension can also be passed by the employer in exercise of its inherent power in the sense that it may not take any work from the delinquent officer but in that event, the entire salary is required to be paid. On order of suspension can also be passed, if such a provision exists in the rule laying down that in place of the full salary, the delinquent officer Page 12 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT shall be paid only the subsistence allowance specified therein."
[Refer: Management of Hotel Imperial V. Hotel Workers Union, 1960 1 SCR 476, T.Caje Versus U. Uormanik Siem and another, 1961 AIR (SC) 276 AND R.P. Kapoor Versus Union of India and another, 1964 AIR (SC) 787,]
30. Suspension as punishment can be imposed after holding departmental enquiry. The Supreme Court in Balvantray Ratilal Patel Versus State of Maharashtra, 1968 AIR (SC) 800, observed as follows"= "......On general principles therefore the government like any other employer, would have a right to suspend a public servant in one of two ways. It may suspend any public servant pending departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceedings; this may be called interim suspension. The Government may also proceed to hold a departmental enquiry and after his being found guilty order suspension as a punishment if the rules so permit. This will be suspension as a penalty."
31. The Apex Court in the case of R.P. Kapur v. Union of India and another, 1964 AIR (SC) 787, has held that the employer would have a right to suspend a public servant in one or two ways. It may suspend any public servant pending departmental enquiry or pending criminal proceedings or the Government may also proceed to hold departmental enquiry and after his being found guilty, order of suspension as a punishment can be passed if the rules so permit. In other words, the authority which appoints a public servant would be entitled to suspend him pending Page 13 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT a departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal proceeding, which may eventually result in a departmental enquiry against him. Article 311 and 314 pf the Constitution of India have been enumerated to hold that the employer would have a right to suspend an employee in any of the two ways mentioned hereinabove.
32. The Apex Court in the case of Nasirkhan Nivaskhan Pathan v. District Development Officer, Bharuch and others, 2002 AIR (Guj) 143, has examined dictionary meaning of 'suspension' and has held that the suspension is temporary deprivation of office and its privileges and by reasons of suspension, the person suspended does not lose his office nor his status or position. It has referred to Oxford Dictionary, which defines the word "suspension" as "action of privilege; temporary deprivation of one's office or position, or again, state of being temporary kept from doing or deprived of something.
33. In the case of Bank of India v. Rattan Singh, 2000 10 SCC 396, the respondent Bank suspended the clerkcumcashier in view of an act of gross misconduct on his part. The departmental inquiry as well as criminal prosecution both were under contemplation. However, in view of the criminal Page 14 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT prosecution, the departmental inquiry was not initiated. The Apex Court held that when a criminal prosecution on serious charges was pending, the bank was entitled to suspend him.
34. In the case of U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandli Parishad v. Sanjiv Ranjan, reported in 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 483, the respondent was employed at the relevant point of time as a cashier of the Agricultural Produce Market Committee and the allegations against the respondent was to the effect that during his tenure as a cashier, lakhs of rupees credited in the account of the Market Committee were not credited in its account. This misfeasance led the suspension of the respondent from service. His challenge to the suspension on the ground that some other officers were allowed to join service, the Court quashed such order of suspension. When challenged before the Apex Court by the employer, the Apex Court held that Ordinarily, when there is an accusationofdefalcation of the monies, the delinquent employees have to be kept away from the establishment till the charges are finally disposed of. Whether the charges are baseless, malicious or vindictive and are framed only to keep the individual concerned out of the employment is a different matter. But even in such a case, no conclusion can be arrived at without examining the entire record in questionand hence it is always advisable to allow the disciplinary proceedings to continue unhindered.
Page 15 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENTThe Apex Court also held that the Court should not Ordinarily interfere with the orders of suspension unless they are passed mala fide and without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employees with the misconduct in question. The Court also further held that prolongation of suspension due to delay in filing the charge sheet also would not justify revocation of suspension order. At the most the Court can direct the authorities to complete the inquiry within the stipulated period and can further direct the enhancement in subsistence adequately.
35. The Apex Court in the case of Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola, reported in 1997 (4) SCC 1, was dealing with the case where the respondent was a bank employee. The Central Bureau of Investigation conducted an investigation and registered a case and the charge sheet reflected that the respondent participated in false issuance of cheque books and withdrawn money by depositing cheques issued from those cheque books. When the High Cour had set aside the order of suspension, the Banks appeal was allowed by the Apex Court by holding that What is an offence involving "moral turpitude" must depend upon the facts of each case. But whatever may be the meaning which may be given to the term "moral turpitude" it appears to us that one of the most serious offences involving "moral turpitude" would be where a person employed in a banking company dealing with money of the general Page 16 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT public commits forgery and wrongfully withdraws money which he is not entitled to withdraw.
The Court held that the very fact that the investigation was conducted by the CBI, which resulted in the filing of a charge sheet, alleging various offences would be sufficient for the employer to conclude that pending prosecution the employee should be suspended. Such suspension pending the criminal trial in the case before the Apex Court continued for a long period of 10 years. The Court yet held that mere expiry of long period of 10 years would not be a proper ground for his reinstatement.
36. Chapter II of the Gujarat Civil Services (Design and Appeal) Rule 1971 provides for suspension.
"5. Suspension: (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered by Government in that behalf may place a Government servant under suspension:
(a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending, or
(b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence involving moral turpitude is under investigation, inquiry or trial :
Provided that where the order of suspension is made by an authority subordinate or lower in rank than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the appointing authority the circumstances in which the order was made.
(2) A Government servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by an order of appointing authority Page 17 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT
(a) with effect from the date of his detention, if he is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding fortyeight hours.
(b) with effect from the date of his conviction if, in the event of conviction for an offence, he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding forty eight hours and is not forthwith dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired consquent upon such conviction.
Explanation: The period of fortyeight hours referred to in clause (b) of this subrule shall be computed for the commencement of the imprisonment after the conviction and for this purpose, intermittent periods of imprisonment, if any, shall be taken into account.
Sub Rule (2)(A) inserted by GAD Notedated 4072007 Reperiodical Renew of suspension from time to time.
(3) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government Servant under suspension is set aside in appeal or on review under these rules and the case is remitted for further enquiry or action or with any other directions, the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force with effect on and from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall remain in force until further orders.
229. The Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) (First Amendment) Rules, 2007Rule5(2A) to the principal Rules, 1971Inserted. In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution of India the Governor of Gujarat hereby makes the following rules further to amend the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971, namely:
1.(1) These rules may be called the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) (First Amendment) Rules, 2007.
(2) They shall come into force on the expiry of ninety days from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette.
2. in the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971, in Rule5, after subrule(2), the following subrule shall be inserted, namely: "(2A) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the authority competent to modify or revoke the suspension, before expiry of ninety days from the Page 18 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT date of order of suspension. After such review, the competent authority may pass an order either extending or revoking the suspension. The subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. The extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days, at a time.
Notwithstanding any thing contained in this rule, an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under subrule(1) or (2) of this rule, shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days."
[Noti. No. GS/2007/19/CVO1220051077Inq. Cell. dt. 4.07.2007--Guj.Govt.Gaz., Pt. IVA, dt. 12.07.2007, p.191.] = 2007 GSCS/II/P.441/H.229."
37. What is discernible from the various decisions referred to above is that the employer has a right to suspend the employee and any appointing authority would be entitled to suspend the employee pending the departmental inquiry into his conduct or pending the criminal proceeding.
38. Having regard to the nature of the allegations and the criminal proceedings instituted against the petitioner, it could not be said that the exercise of the powers of suspension was unjustified or arbitrary. The paramount consideration in this type of cases should be the public interest. Where the person is suspended from the office, there is a direction by the employer that unless and until the departmental proceedings/criminal proceedings are not concluded against him so long as he holds Page 19 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT the office, he shall not perform any function in discharge of his duties.
39. Mr. Pujara, the learned counsel laid much stress on the fact that in the impugned order of suspension, it has been stated that the petitioner is placed under suspension pending disciplinary proceedings. According to Mr. Pujara it reflects total non application of mind on the part of the Municipal Commissioner because on the day and date of the passing of the suspension order there was no departmental proceedings pending against the petitioner. Well, it appears that instead of making a reference of the criminal prosecution instituted against the petitioner there is a reference of disciplinary proceedings. Mr. Pujara in his own way may be right in submitting so but the submission is too technical to be excepted.
40. The Rules provide that an employee can be placed under suspension pending both departmental proceedings or criminal proceedings. In such circumstances, I am not impressed by such submission canvassed on behalf of the petitioner.
41. Mr. Pujara also tried his best to persuade me to look into the matter from the view point of mala fides as alleged against the union leader.
Page 20 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENTAgain here I may say that the union leader may be having some axe to grind against the petitioner but the information provided by him or the material collect during the course of the investigation as regards the assets disproportionate to the known sources of income should also not be ignored as mala fides by itself will no render such material at this stage unreliable or baseless.
42. I may at the cost of repetition state that the reading of the application filed by the prosecuting agency seeking sanction to prosecute the petitioner under Section 19 of the Act speaks for itself.
43. I do not say for a minute that the same is sufficient to accord the necessary sanction. It is ultimately for the corporation to take an appropriate decision in that regard in accordance with law and I express no opinion in that regard.
44. In the over all view of the matter I am convinced that no case is made out for interfering with the impugned order of suspension.
45. In the result, this application fails and is Page 21 of 22 C/SCA/9185/2015 CAV JUDGMENT hereby rejected. Notice is discharged.
46. I may only say that the petitioner is receiving subsistence allowance without discharging duties. It is also not in dispute that the criminal case lodged against him will take a long time before its disposal. Keeping a government servant under suspension as such for an indefinite period would ruin his efficacy as well as that shall be an unnecessary burden on the state Exchequer. In such circumstances, when the investigation is completed with the filing of the chargesheet and if it is found that there are no chances of tampering with the evidence available, the authority concerned may review the same in accordance with law.
47. The Rule 1971 itself provides for periodical review of the order of suspension within 90 days. The eventuality of causing injury to the public faith in service may be checked by adopting the precautionary measures.
(J.B.PARDIWALA, J.) Manoj Page 22 of 22