State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Mahindra Lifespace Developers Ltd. vs Umesh Chand Goel on 4 December, 2025
IN THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
RESERVED ON : 17.11.2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 04.12.2025
SECOND APPEAL NO. 739 of 2025
(Against the order dated 22.09.2025 in First Appeal No. 265/2022 of the
State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Delhi)
M'ahindra Lifespace Developers Ltd.
Mahindra Towers,
5th Floor, Road Number 13,
Worli, Mumbai
Maharashtra-400018
Through
Smarika Singh, Advocate
Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas & Co.
Amarchand Towers, 216,
Okhla Industrial Estate Phase III,
New Delhi-0110020, India .Appellant(s)
Versus
Umesh Chand Goyal
S/of Late Shri Gian Chand Goyal
House No. 897, Sector 28,
Faridabad-121008 Respondent(s)
BEFORE:
HON'BLE DR. INDER JIT SINGH, PRESIDING MEMBER
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE SUDHIR KUMAR JAIN, MEMBER
For the Appellant(s) Mr. Sudhir K. Makkar, Sr. Advocate &
Mr. Saifur Rahman Faridi, Advocate &
Ms. Soumya Gupta, Advocate &
Mr. Arjun Singh Rana, Advocate &
Mr. Ishaan Saraswat, Advocate &
Ms. Sanya, Advocate
For the Respondent(s) Mr. Umesh Chand Goyal, In Person
ORDER
DR. INDER JIT SINGH, PRESIDING MEMBER
1. This Second Appeal has been preferred by the Appellant against the impugned order dated 22.09.2025 passed by the State Commission in SA 739 of 2025 Page 1 of 15 FA/265/2022. The State Commission allowed the Appeal and remanded the matter to the District Commission for fresh adjudication on merits.
2. The Appellant herein (hereafter referred to as Opposite Party) was Respondent before the State Commission and Opposite Party before the District Commission. The Respondent herein (hereinafter referred to as Complainant) was Appellant before the State Commission and Complainant before the District Commission.
3. The main question for consideration in the present case is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Complaint was time barred or not. Brief facts of the case as recorded in paras 6 & 7 of District Commission's order are reproduced below:
"6. Briefly stated, the complainant booked a flat in the OP project on 12.09.2010. He paid the instalments towards his booked fiat as per demand raised by the OP from time to time, paying a total sum of Rs.53,53,628/- as on 27.09.2014. On 20.05.2015, he received an email wherein the complainant was offered possession of the flat vide final call letter bearing No. Ref.2757 dated 16.05.2015, along with the further demand. The complainant requested the OP for clarification vide his letter dated21.05.2015.
7. Despite repeated follow-ups towards his queries, the complainant, who took possession of the fiat in question after executing the conveyance deed on 09.06.2015, remained dissatisfied with the OP's silence and lack of clarity on his queries. It was only on 15.03.2018 when the complainant wrote to the Director of the OP Company that he received an email dated
04.07.2018 from the executive of the OP company that-
"We regret, our stance on the concerns raised by you remain the same as communicated earlier", as per his complaint."
4. Vide order dated 11.11.2022, District Commission allowed the application filed by the Opposite Party seeking dismissal of the complaint on account of it being time barred. In this regard extract of relevant paras of order of District Commission is reproduced below:
"8. A bare perusal of the complaint shows that the complainant on page no. 19 of his complaint under Clause XV. Limitation himself states SA 739 of 2025 Page 2 of 15 that the cause of action arose on 20.03.2015 when he received a letter from the OP dated 20.03.2015 offering possession of the apartment. He has further accepted that the conveyance deed was executed on 09.06.2015, and it was only on 14.04.2016 that he raised his demand for payment of Rs. 7 Lacs and some additional amount due towards him by the OP for the first time. Perusal of correspondence reveals that the demand was rejected by OP vide letter dated 03.08.2016 and it is final stand which were also referred in its subsequent email dated 18.01.2018 to complainant. Thereafter limitation expired in between August, 2018 to January, 2020 but the complaint has been filed in July, 2020 and without any application for condonation delay U/s 69 of Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
9. Though the complainant alleges that the cause of action is continuous and recurring, we are of the opinion and agree that the cause of action arose when he raised a demand vide his tetter dated 20.03.2015. Pursuant to this letter, both parties kept exchanging communication via email, letters, and telephonic conversation. However, they were unable to reach a resolution. Nevertheless, that does not extend the limitation period to file the present complaint, as the complainant had already taken possession of the flat in question. Continuous cause of action in terms of Limitation has been settled as per a catena of landmark judgments of the Hon'bie Supreme Court and Hon'ble NCDRC.
10. The OP, vide email dated 03.08.2016, have clarified their stance, giving point-wise answers to all the complainant's queries. The complainant has annexed this email dated 03.08.2016 as Annexure-13 with his complaint, where the OP referred to his letters dated 21.05.2015, 14.04.2016 and 20.05.2016. In our view, after the aforementioned email, when the complainant was given a dear and concise clarification of his queries, the cause of action arose as he was not satisfied with their explanation. The Limitation, for filing this complaint, therefore, elapsed in August 2018.
11. Hence allowing the application, we dismiss the complaint in toto and leave the parties to bear their own cost."
5. Aggrieved with said order, the Complainant filed an Appeal (FA/265/2022) before the State Commission, which was allowed vide order dated 22.09.2025 and matter was remanded back to the District Commission for fresh adjudication on merits.
6. It was the case of the Complainant that limitation in the present case has to be calculated only from 27.09.2018 or 25.10.2018 i.e. the date when SA 739 of 2025 Page 3 of 15 the OPs rejected the dispute through e-mail leading to cause of action to file the complaint. According to the Complainant, the very first rejection of the dispute was vide e-mail dated 25.10.2018 and there has not been any prior communication for rejection of dispute raised by the Complainant from 21.05.2015 till date. On the other hand, OP's case was that offer of possession was issued vide letter dated 16.05.2015, which was received by the Complainant on 20.05.2015. Final letter was issued on 29.05.2015, after which the Complainant took possession and thereafter the conveyance deed was registered on 09.06.2015. The OP's case is that Complaint ought to have been filed within two years of cause of action having arisen i.e. 2 years from 20.03.2015 i.e. by 20.03.2017. But the Complaint filed on 24.07.2020 is much beyond the limitation.
7. The State Commission considered the rival contentions of parties and came to a conclusion that cause of action last arose on 25.10.2018, as such the Complaint filed on 24.07.2020 falls within the period of limitation. Extract of relevant paras of order of State Commission is reproduced below:
"9. A perusal of the aforesaid email dated 03.08.2016 makes it dear that the Respondent did not reject the dispute and did not provide the information sought by the Appellant, rather invited the Appellant to its office, as evident from the aforesaid email. Therefore, it is dear that the District Commission erred in observing that the aforesaid email is not in the nature of a dosure/rejection but rather it is a follow-up to the already existing dispute, entailing an invitation to the Appellant for discussion of specific queries to be explained by the architect/ respective department heads of the MEP.
10. Thus, it is dear from the above discussion that the observation recorded in the impugned order by the District Commission on rejection of demand is erroneous and factually incorred as there is no such rejedion in the said tetter dated 03.08.2016.
11. Albeit, a perusal of the contents of tetter dated 25.10.2018 (A.21 at pg-96- 97 of complaint & Annexure-5 page 18-19 of Written Submissions of the Appellant) shows the Rejedion of dispute/compiaint by Respondent was vide email dated 25.10.2018, citing reasons that the Respondent is engaged in the dispute since 2015 and therefore is inclined to put the concerns of the Appellant to rest through this email. No other SA 739 of 2025 Page 4 of 15 communication reflecting the rejection of disputes by the Respondent is found on record.
12. Therefore, it is dear that the cause of action last arose on 25.10.2018 as detailed aforesaid, and as such, the Complaint filed by the Appellant/Complainant on 24.07.2020 falls squarely within the period of limitation to file the Complaint.
13. Consequently, the present Appeal stands allowed and the matter is remanded to the District Commission for fresh adjudication on merits, after giving due opportunity to the parties of being heard."
8. Appellant has challenged the orders of the State Commission mainly on following grounds:
The State Commission failed to appreciate that the complaint was ex- facie barred by limitation and erred in appreciating the mandatory bar under Section 69(1) of the Act, which prescribes a 2 year limitation period from the date of accrual of cause of action. For the purpose of computing limitation under the Act, the cause of action must be reckoned from the date of unequivocal rejection of a demand by the Opposite Party. Once such rejection is communicated, any subsequent exchanges or correspondence between the parties cannot, in law, revive, extend, or restart the limitation period.
ii) The District Commission held that the cause of action last arose on 03.08.2016, when the claims were rejected. The complaint was filed on 24.07.2020, almost 2 years after August 2018, which is clearly time-barred.
The Respondent neither filed application for condonation of delay nor showed sufficient cause to justify the extraordinary delay of about five years. The State Commission erred in holding that the Appellant's letter dated 03.08.2016 was not a final rejection. The said letter provided a detailed reply, which conveyed the Appellant's final position. Inviting the Respondent to visit the office for clarification was merely an operational courtesy, not an open- ended promise or reconsideration of liability. This misreading of the record led to a perverse finding that limitation continued beyond 2016.
SA 739 of 2025 Page 5 of 15iii) The State Commission erred in treating correspondence of 2018 as constituting a fresh or continuing cause of action.
iv) There was no continuing or recurring cause of action once possession and conveyance were complete, and that repeated correspondence cannot extend limitation once the cause of action has arisen. The State Commission failed to appreciate that possession was handed over on 29.05.2015, conveyance deed was executed on 09.06.2015, conclusively transferring ownership. Once all the contractual obligations stood discharged and there was no continuing or recurring cause of action thereafter.
v) The impugned judgment has set a precedent by treating belated and repetitive correspondence as grounds to revive limitation, which undermines the finality of concluded transactions.
vi) The District Commission's order dated 11.11.2022 was based on a careful analysis of the pleadings, evidence and admissions on record, which relied on the Respondent's own pleading that the cause of action arose on 20.03.2015 and relied on settled principle which caution that entertaining highly belated complaints would defeat the Act's objective of expeditious consumer redressal.
9. We have carefully considered the orders of the State Commission, District Commission, other relevant records in the light of various judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Commission, relevant extract of some of which are given in the succeeding paras.
9.1. In Kandimalla Raghavaiah and Company v. National Insurance Company and Anr. (2009) 7 SCC 768, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:
"17. Section 24-A of the Act bars any fora set up under the Act, from admitting a complaint, unless the complaint is filed within two years from the date on which the cause of action has arisen. The provision expressly casts a duty on the Commission, admitting a complaint, to dismiss a complaint unless the complainant satisfies the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may SA 739 of 2025 Page 6 of 15 I be, that the complainant had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the period of two years from the date on which the cause of action had arisen. Recently, in SBI v. B.S. Agriculture Industries (I) [(2009) 5 SCC121 : JT 2009 (4) SC 191] this Court, while dealing with the same provision, has held: (SCC p. 125, paras 11-12) "11. ...It would be seen from the aforesaid provision that it is peremptory in nature and requires the consumer forum to see before it admits the complaint that it has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action. The consumer forum, however, for the reasons to be recorded in writing may condone the delay in filing the complaint if sufficient cause is shown. The expression, 'shall not admit a complaint' occurring in Section 24-A is sort of a legislative command to the consumer forum to examine on its own whether the complaint has been filed within the limitation period prescribed thereunder.
12. As a matter of law, the consumer forum must deal with the complaint on merits only if the complaint has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action and if beyond the said period, the sufficient cause has been shown and delay condoned for the reasons recorded in writing. In other words, it is the duty of the consumer forum to take notice of Section 24-A and give effect to it. If the complaint is barred by time and yet, the consumer forum decides the complaint on merits, the forum would be committing an illegality and, therefore, the aggrieved party would be entitled to have such order set aside."
(emphasis supplied)
18. The term "cause of action" is neither defined in the Act nor in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but is of wide import. It has different meanings in different contexts, that is when used in the context of territorial jurisdiction or limitation or the accrual of right to sue. Generally, it is described as "bundle of facts", which if proved or admitted entitle the plaintiff to the reliefprayed for. Pithily stated, "cause of action"means the cause of action for which the suit is brought. "Cause of action"
is cause of action which gives occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit. (See Sidramappa v. Rajashetty [(1970) 1 SCC 186]). "
9.2. In Sesh Nath Singh and Another v. Baidyabati Sheer Aphuli Co- Operative Bank (2021) 7 SCC 313, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:
"61. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not speak of any application. The section enables the court to admit an application or appeal if the applicant or the appellant, as the case may be, satisfies the SA 739 of 2025 Page 7 of 15 court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application and/or preferring the appeal, within the time prescribed. Although, it is the general practice to make a formal application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in order to enable the court or tribunal to weigh the sufficiency of the cause for the inability of the appellant applicant to approach the court/tribunai within the time prescribed by limitation, there is no bar to exercise by the court/tribunai of its discretion to condone delay, in the absence of a forma! application.
62. A plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act makes it amply dear that, it is not mandatory to file an application in writing before relief can be granted under the said section. Had such an application been mandatory, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would have expressly provided so. Section 5 would then have read that the court might condone delay beyond the time prescribed by limitation for filing an application or appeal, if on consideration of the application of the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, for condonation of delay, the court is satisfied that the appellant applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Alternatively, a proviso or an Explanation would have been added to Section 5, requiring the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, to make an application for condonation of delay. However, the court can always insist that an application or an affidavit showing cause for the delay be filed. No applicant or appellant can claim condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as of right, without making an application.
xxxx
100. In any case, Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act are not mutually exclusive. Even in a case where Section 14 does not strictly apply, the principles of Section 14 can be invoked to grant relief to an applicant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by purposively construing "sufficient cause". It is well settled that omission to refer to the correct section of a statute does not vitiate an order. At the cost of repetition it is reiterated that delay can be condoned irrespective of whether there is any formal application, if there are sufficient materials on record disclosing sufficient cause for the delay."
9.3. In Samruddhi Cooperative Housing Society Limited v. Mumbai Mahalaxmi Construction Private Limited (2022) 4 SCC 103, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:
"12. Section 24-A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986provides for the period of limitation period for lodging a complaint. A complaint to a consumer forum has to be filed within two years of the date on which the cause of action has arisen. In the instant case, the appellant has submitted that since the cause of action is founded on a continuing wrong, the complaint is within limitation.SA 739 of 2025 Page 8 of 15
13. Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963provides for the computation of limitation in the case of a continuing breach of contract or tort. It provides that in case of a continuing breach of contract, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of time during which the breach continues. This Court in Baiakrishna Savairam Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan [Baiakrishna Savairam Pujari Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, 1959 Supp (2) SCR 476: AIR 1959 SC 798] elaborated on when a continuous cause of action arises.
14. Speaking for the three-Judge Bench, P.B. Gajendragadkar, J. (as the teamed ChiefJustice then was) observed that: (Baiakrishna case, AIR p. 807, para 31) "31. ... Does the conduct of the trustees amount to a continuing wrong under Section 23? That is the question which this contention raises for our decision. In other words, did the cause of action arise de die in diem as claimed by the appellants? In dealing with this argument it is necessary to bear in mind that Section 23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is ofsuch a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterised as continuing wrongs that Section 23 can be invoked."
(emphasis supplied) The Court held that the act of the trustees to deny the rights ofGuravs as hereditary worshippers and dispossessing them through a decree of the court was not a continuing wrong. Although the continued dispossession caused damage to the appellants, the injury to their rights was complete when they were evicted.
15. In CWT v. Suresh Seth [CWT v. Suresh Seth, (1981) 2 SCC 790 :
1981 SCC (Tax) 168], a two-Judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question of whether a default in filing a return under the Wealth Tax Act amounted to a continuing wrong. E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the learned ChiefJustice then was) observed that: (SCC pp. 798-99, para 11) "11.... The distinctive nature of a continuing wrong is that the law that is violated makes the wrongdoer continuously liable for penalty. A SA 739 of 2025 Page 9 of 15 wrong or default which is complete but whose effect may continue to be felt even after its completion is, however, not a continuing wrong or default. It is reasonable to take the view that the court should not be eager to hold that an act or omission is a continuing wrong or default unless there are words in the statute concerned which make out that such was the intention of the legislature. In the instant case whenever the question of levying penalty arises what has to be first considered is whether the assessee has failed without reasonable cause to file the return as required by law and if it is held that he has failed to do so then penalty has to be levied in accordance with the measure provided in the Act. When the default is the filing of delayed return the penalty may be correlated to the time lag between the last day for filing it without penalty and the day on which it is filed and the quantum of tax or wealth involved in the case for purposes of determining the quantum of penalty but the default however is only one which takes place on the expiry of the last day for filing the return without penalty and not a continuing one. The default in question does not, however, give rise to a fresh cause of action every day. Explaining the expression "a continuing cause of action" Lord Lindley in Hole v. Chard Union [Hole v. Chard Union, (1894) 1 Ch 293: 63 LJ Ch 469: 70 LT52 (CA)] observed: (Ch pp. 295-96) What is a continuing cause of action? Speaking accurately, there is no such thing; but what is called a continuing cause of action is a cause of action which arises from the repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind as that for which the action was brought.'"
(emphasis supplied)
16. The Court further provided illustrations of continuous wrongs :
(Suresh Seth case [CWT v. Suresh Seth, (1981) 2 SCC 790 : 1981 SCC (Tax) 168], SCCp. 800, para 17)
"17. The true principle appears to be that where the wrong complained of is the omission to perform a positive duty requiring a person to do a certain act the test to determine whether such a wrong is a continuing one is whether the duty in question is one which requires him to continue to do that act. Breach of a covenant to keep the premises in good repair, breach of a continuing guarantee, obstruction to a right of way, obstruction to the right of a person to the unobstructed flow of water, refusal by a man to maintain his wife and children whom he is bound to maintain under law and the carrying on of mining operations or the running of a factory without complying with the measures intended for the safety and well-being of workmen may be illustrations of continuing breaches or wrongs giving rise to civil or criminal liability, as the case may be, de die in diem."
SA 739 of 2025 Page 10 of 1517. In M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) v. Suresh Das [M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple-5 J.) z Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1] , a Constitution Bench of this Court [of which one of us (D. Y. Chandrachud, J.) was a part] examined the precedents with regard to a continuing wrong. The Court observed that: (SCC p. 369, para 343) "343. The submission of Nirmohi Akhara is based on the principle of continuing wrong as a defence to a piea of limitation. In assessing the submission, a distinction must be made between the source of a legal injury and the effect of the injury. The source of a legal injury is founded in a breach of an obligation. A continuing wrong arises where there is an obligation imposed by law, agreement or otherwise to continue to act or to desist from acting in a particular manner. The breach of such an obligation extends beyond a single completed act or omission. The breach is of a continuing nature, giving rise to a legal injury which assumes the nature of a continuing wrong. For a continuing wrong to arise, there must in the first place be a wrong which is actionable because in the absence of a wrong, there can be no continuing wrong. It is when there is a wrong that a further line of enquiry of whether there is a continuing wrong would arise. Without a wrong there cannot be a continuing wrong. A wrong postulates a breach of an obligation imposed on an individual, whether positive or negative, to act or desist from acting in a particular manner. The obligation on one individual finds a corresponding reflection of a right which inheres in another. A continuing wrong postulates a breach of a continuing duty or a breach of an obligation which is of a continuing nature.... Hence, in evaluating whether there is a continuing wrong within the meaning of Section 23, the mere fact that the effect of the injury caused has continued, is not sufficient to constitute it as a continuing wrong. For instance, when the wrong is complete as a result of the act or omission which is complained of, no continuing wrong arises even though the effect or damage that is sustained may enure in the future. What makes a wrong, a wrong of a continuing nature is the breach of a duty which has not ceased but which continues to subsist. The breach of such a duty creates a continuing wrong and hence a defence to a piea of limitation."
(emphasis supplied)
18. A continuing wrong occurs when a party continuously breaches an obligation imposed by law or agreement. Section 3 of the MOFA imposes certain genera! obligations on a promoter. These obligations inter alia include making disclosures on the nature of title to the land, encumbrances on the land, fixtures, fittings and amenities to be provided, and to not grant possession of a fiat until a completion certificate is given by the local authority. The responsibility to obtain the occupancy SA 739 of 2025 Page 11 of 15 certificate from the local authority has also been imposed under the agreement to sell between the members of the appellant and the respondent on the tatter."
9.4 In B AND T AG v. Ministry of Defence (2024) 5 SCC 358, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed:
"38. Three principles of taw are discernible from the aforesaid decision in Inder Singh Rekhi [Inder Singh Rekhi v. DDA, (1988) 2 SCC 338] of this Court. First, ordinarily on the completion of the work, the right to receive the payment begins. Secondly, a dispute arises when there is a claim on one side and its deniai/repudiation by the other and thirdly, a person cannot postpone the accrual of cause of action by repeatedly writing letters or sending reminders. In other words, "bilateral discussions" for an indefinite period of time would not save the situation so far as the accrual of cause of action and the right to apply for appointment of arbitrator is concerned.
xxxx
44. In Geo Miller [Geo Miller & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd., (2020) 14 SCC 643], this Court observed in paras 28 and 29 as under: (SCC p. 652) "28. Having perused through the relevant precedents, we agree that on a certain set of facts and circumstances, the period during which the parties were bona fide negotiating towards an amicable settlement may be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for reference to arbitration under the 1996 Act. However, in such cases the entire negotiation history between the parties must be specifically pleaded and placed on the record. The Court upon careful consideration of such history must find out what was the "breaking point" at which any reasonable party would have abandoned efforts at arriving at a settlement and contemplated referral of the dispute for arbitration. This "breaking point" would then be treated as the date on which the cause of action arises, for the purpose of limitation. The threshold for determining when such a point arises will be lower in the case of commercial disputes, where the party's primary interest is in securing the payment due to them, than in family disputes where it may be said that the parties have a greater stake in settling the dispute amicably, and therefore delaying formal adjudication of the claim.
xxxx
45. The aforesaid observations make it very dear that what is important for the Court is to find out what was the "Breaking Point" at which any reasonable party would have abandoned efforts at arriving at a settlement and contemplated referral of the dispute for arbitration.SA 739 of 2025 Page 12 of 15
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64. "Cause of action" means the whole bundle of material facts, which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to succeed in the suit. In delivering the judgment of the Board in Chand Kour v. Partab Singh [Chand Kour v. Partab Singh, 1888 SCC Online PC 14: ILR (1889) 16 Cal 98], Lord Watson observed: (SCC Online PC) "... Now the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the [Ed.: The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] media [Ed.: The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in original.] upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour."
(emphasis supplied) xxxx
68. Whether any particular facts constitute a cause of action has to be determined with reference to the facts of each case and with reference to, the substance, rather than the form of the action. If an infringement of a right happens at a particular time, the whole cause of action will be said to have arisen then and there. In such a case, it is not open to a party to sit tight and not to file an application for settlement of dispute of his right, which had been infringed, within the time provided by the Limitation Act, and, allow his right to be extinguished by lapse of time, and thereafter, to wait for another cause of action and then file an application under Section 11 of the 1996Act for establishment of his right which was not then alive, and, which had been long extinguished because, in such a case, such an application would mean an application for revival of a right, which had long been extinguished under the 1963 Act and is, therefore, dead for all purposes. Such proceedings would not be maintainable and would obviously be met by the plea of limitation under Article 137 of the 1963Act.
xxxx
73. Negotiations may continue even for a period of ten years or twenty years after the cause of action had arisen. Mere negotiations will not postpone the "cause of action" for the purpose of limitation. The Legislature has prescribed a limit of three years for the enforcement of a claim and this statutory time period cannot be defeated on the ground that the parties were negotiating."
9.5. In Chetanbhai Pravinchandra Shah versus Hotel Shyam Lodge and Others (2023) SCC Online NCDRC 713, it was observed that:
SA 739 of 2025 Page 13 of 15"18. xxxxx As per Section 24A of the Act, a complaint under the Act is required to be filed within a period of two years from the date of cause of action. In the present case, the cause of action has occurred in favour of the Complainant only on 12.03.2012 when the lift incident has taken place, however, the Complaint was filed before the State Commission by the Complainant only on 09.03.2015 i.e. beyond the limitation period of two years. As such, the Complaint was barred by limitation. A bare perusal of the afore-extracted Orders passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court would reveal that issuance of any legal notice or sending of any letter/communication does not extend the period of limitation as specifically prescribed under the Act. Moreover, no application seeking condonation of delay of one year along with Complaint has been filed by the Complainant explaining and justifying the reasons for the delay. Hence, the Complaint filed by the Complainant on 09.03.2015 was hopelessly time barred and in view of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case ofSingai Udyog's (Supra), State Commission was not justified in enquiring the matter on its merit. However, the Impugned Order passed by the State Commission does not suffer from illegality."
10. After careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are in agreement with the observations and findings of the State Commission that the rejection of disputes/Complaint by the Respondent (Complainant) was by e-mail dated 25.10.2018, hence, the cause of action arose on 25.10.2018. The said communication dated 25.10.2018 is reproduced below:
"Dear Mr. Umesh, I am in receipt of your letter dated 15th Oct to our Chairman where you have highlighted pending concerns being unresolved. We have been engaged on this matter since 2015 & it would be fair to dose this. I have personally gone through the facts of the points raised by you, with Sangeeta (our MD & CEO). It is post this deliberation & discussion, that I reply to address the key concerns:
a. Compensation that was paid out to you - There was a restraint that was put on us by the authorities, delaying our ability to deliver by 3 months. We have uniformly applied this period (3 months) across all customers where compensation was payable, in our computation of the compensation payable.
b. Square feet variation of 65 sq ft. I have personally through our face to face meeting on the subject, explained the logic & reasons why. The agreement signed by you has formed the basis & guidance for action on this subject. The same logic has been equitably applied to all customers.SA 739 of 2025 Page 14 of 15
'4 I do took forward to putting your concerns to rest through this e-mail. Warm Regards, Sangeeta"
11. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Complaint filed on 24.07.2020 is within the prescribed the limitation period of two years, and is not time barred as contended by the Appellant herein. The findings of District Commission that the cause of action last arose on 03.08.2016 are not sustainable. As there was no delay, filing of the condonation of delay application was not required. We are in agreement of the observation of the State Commission that the Appellant's letter dated 03.08.2016 was not a final rejection. The State Commission has passed a well-reasoned order. We find no reason to interfere with its findings. There is no illegality or material irregularity in the order of the State Commission, hence, the same is upheld. Accordingly, SA No. 739 of 2025 is dismissed.
12. Pending IAs in the case, if any, also stand disposed off.
Sd/-
( DR. INDER JIT SINGH ) PRESIDING MEMBER Sd/-
( DR. SUDHIR KUMAR JAIN, J.)
jr/Court-S/AB/ MEMBER
SA 739 of 2025 Page 15 of 15