Gujarat High Court
Hotel Surya Palace vs Jindal Hotel Limited on 11 September, 2014
Author: S.G.Shah
Bench: S.G.Shah
C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 12621 of 2013
In APPEAL FROM ORDER-STAMP NUMBER NO. 435 of 2013
With
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 12620 of 2013
In
APPEAL FROM ORDER-STAMP NUMBER NO. 433 of 2013
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.G.SHAH Sd/-
=================================================
1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the No judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? No 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? No 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the No interpretation of the Constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ?
5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? No ================================================= HOTEL SURYA PALACE....Applicant(s) Versus JINDAL HOTEL LIMITED....Respondent(s) ================================================= Appearance:
M/S THAKKAR ASSOC., ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1 DR RAJESH H ACHARYA, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 1 ================================================= CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.G.SHAH Date :11/09/2014 CAV COMMON JUDGMENT
1. Rule. Learned advocate Mr.Kamal Upadhyay for learned advocate Dr.Rajesh H.Acharya waives service of rule for the opponent.Page 1 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT
2. Heard learned advocate Mrs.Sangeeta N.Pahwa appearing for M/s.Thakkar Associates for the applicant and learned advocate Dr.Rajesh H.Acharya for the opponent.
3. Perused the record. The applicant is original appellant-
defendant whereas opponent is original respondent-plaintiff before the City Civil Court of Ahmedabad in Civil Suit No.331 of 2012; for declaration, permanent and perpetual injunction for infringement and passing off action of Trademark; wherein by judgment and order dated 11.06.2013 passed below application Exh.7 of the plaintiff for interim relief is allowed by the Civil Court thereby, present applicant i.e. original defendant is restrained from continuing its business in the name and style of "Surya Palace" or having an identical and/or confusingly and/or deceptively similar Trademark and is further restrained from committing the act of infringement of such Trademark "Surya Palace" and "passing off" the services under such name. Applicant has challenged such interim relief against them by filing an Appeal From Order being Appeal From Order-Stamp Number 435 of 2013 on 30.11.2013, thereby, delay of 24 days in filing such appeal for which Civil Application No.12621/2013 is filed.
4. Whereas Civil Application No.12620 of 2013 in Appeal from Order-Stamp Number No.433 of 2013 is preferred to condone the delay of 92 days in filing an appeal against order below application Exh.9 whereby application of the defendant-appellant regarding Page 2 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been dismissed by order dated 24.04.2013. Since both the Civil Applications are arising, though against different orders but between the same parties and from the same suit and since the grounds for delay are inter connected inasmuch as the main ground is to the effect that for challenging the order below application Exh.7 and to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial Court to pass such an order below application Exh.9 is also required to be challenged, therefore, present Civil Applications are taken up together and decided by this common judgment and order.
5. On perusal of record, it transpires that there was some misunderstanding between the litigant and its advocate in challenging such order as well as order dated 24.04.2013 below Exh.9 regarding maintainability of the suit and, therefore, there was delay in filing such appeal in time. It is also contended that since some time was taken for getting certified copy, the applicant could not file an appeal in time and after getting certified copy, he could approach the advocate in High Court. Therefore, there is no intentional delay or any other reason for such delay.
6. The opponent-respondent has objected to condonation of such delay by filing detailed affidavit-in-reply on 16.12.2013, wherein it is contended that the application for condonation of delay is not bona fide and it is filed only with a view to delay the proceedings when the suit is listed for framing issues pursuant to suggested issues given by Page 3 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT plaintiff. It is further contended that statements made in the application for condonation of delay are false. Detailed history of the application has been explained in such affidavit-in-reply contending that in fact applicant-defendant has changed the name of business from "Surya Palace" to "Atithi Restaurant" and thereby, it can be confirmed that applicant has knowledge of impugned order. It is also contended that when respondent has filed a caveat application, the appellant was aware about the limitation and their was necessity to file appeal but in spite of that, it is filed beyond the period of limitation and therefore, such delay cannot be condoned. Respondent is also relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.K.Ramachandran vs. State of kerala reported in AIR (SC) 1998 page 2276 wherein the Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. Respondent has also relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Salil Dutta vs. T.M.and M.C.Private limited reported in 1993-1 CCC(SC) 635, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the issue regarding inaction on the part of agent or advocate and held that for his negligence, litigant should not get benefit.
7. Applicant has filed further affidavit on 28.04.2014 clarifying certain facts, more particularly, contention regarding "Atithi Page 4 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT Restaurant" contending that it is altogether different identity and produced relevant documents in support of such contention in its reply affidavit, which is filed by the respondent on 09.05.2014, placing their stand on record that "Atithi Restaurant" is in the same premises and, practically, the applicant has converted the business in the name of the "Atithi Restaurant". Therefore, now, there is no substance in the present appeal and the application for condoning the delay.
8. I have perused the entire record. Prima facie, it cannot be said that there is no sufficient cause in filing the appeal in prescribed period of limitation, more particularly, when there is delay of 24 and 92 days respectively though each day of delay has to be explained. It cannot be said that the reasons submitted by the applicant to condone such delay cannot be said to be sufficient cause for condoning such delay.
9. It is certain that there are two orders, which are required to be challenged viz; one below Exh.7 and another below Exh.9 and when such clarity has been confirmed during the consultation with an advocate of the High Court for filing such appeal and, thereafter, when some more time has passed in getting relevant certified copies of both the orders, I do not see any substance in the objections taken by the respondent. Though respondent has tried to explain that applicant was aware about the orders and, therefore, appeal should Page 5 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT have been filed in time but, when the case of the applicant is not with reference to lack of knowledge of order in time but with reference to legal necessity to challenge both the orders in appeal and time lapsed thereafter for getting certified copies, there is no reason to deny the applicant the right to agitate their issue in accordance with law. It is also evident that there is no defense like lack of bona fide or some ulterior motive in filing such appeal except an allegation that it is only a delaying tactic. However, it cannot be ignored that the suit is of the year 2013 only and even if all the suits are to be decided at the earliest, it is different to plead that filing of such appeal will delay the trial of the suit. In any case, there is no stay against the further proceeding of the suit and even there is no such prayer in the present application. Therefore, trial Court may certainly proceed in accordance with law, though such relief may be prayed in main appea,l which is yet not registered and taken up for hearing.
10. To decide the application for condonation of delay, the Court has to consider whether there is sufficient and reasonable cause for condonation of delay in filing any litigation beyond the prescribed period of limitation.
11. There are catena of judgments, more particularly when 'sufficient cause' and reasonable ground' are not defined under the law, that in general, the dispute shall be resolved on its own merits rather than technicalities and that, therefore, 'sufficient cause' and Page 6 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT 'reasonable ground' for condonation of delay cannot be defined in any narrow manner and thereby there cannot be straitjacket formula that what is 'sufficient cause' and what is 'reasonable ground' for condonation of delay, it goes without saying that 'sufficient cause' and 'reasonable ground' may be different from case to case and though particular cause or ground may not sufficient and reasonable to condone the delay in a particular case, similar ground or cause may be sufficient and reasonable enough to condone the delay in any other given case, if on judicial scrutiny of matter, it is so found by the competent Court to condone such delay.
12. Before determining the issue relating to sufficient cause finally, it is necessary to deal with several decisions:
12.1 (2010)2 SCC 114 - Dalipsingh Vs.State of UP & Ors. - wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with practice and procedure with reference to abuse of process stating that new creed of dishonest litigants noticed, which is to be deprecated strongly with denial of any relief to such persons. The Apex Court has held that costs should be imposed if party approaching the Court is guilty of suppressing facts and misleading the Court. It is further held that such litigant is not entitled to be heard on merits and cannot invoke the extraordinary/discretionary jurisdiction under Constitution.
Such principle can be invoked based upon the facts and circumstances of particular case and, therefore, unless there is a clear determination to that extent, such judgment does not help the opponent in present application for consideration of cause of delay.
Page 7 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT 12.2 (2012)8 SCC 524 - Cicily Kallarackal Vs. Vehicle Factory - wherein the Apex Court has held that if there is no sufficient cause, inordinate delay would amount to substituting the period of limitation prescribed by statute. Therefore, outcome of such judgment is simple that for condonation of delay there must be sufficient cause, thus it cannot be said that delay cannot be condoned even if there is sufficient cause.
12.3 (2012)5 SCC 157 - Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai - wherien the Apex Court has dealt with Section 5 of the Limitation Act and more particularly expression 'sufficient cause'. It is clarified and discussed with reference to object of Limitation Act and extent of leniency to be shown in public interest in condonation of delay by State machinery. Though High Court's order to condone the delay was set-aside by the Apex Court, it was held that expression 'sufficient cause' should be construed liberally on facts without any hard and fast rules. It is further stated that substantive right of parties should not be ignored because of delay, but a distinction must be made between the delay of few days and inordinate delay causing prejudice to the other side and that no premium can be given to total lethargy or utter negligence. It is further stated that condonation of delay cannot be held as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of limitation will cause injury to public interest. In this reported case, there was delay of seven years and, therefore, the Apex Court has observed as such and refused to condone the delay, more particularly when explanation for such delay was prima-facie found as concocted and causing prejudice to private appellant when the issue was Page 8 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT pertaining to demolition. It is further observed that explanation regarding advocate's transfer has no bearing on the issue and that explanation offered was silent about the events and persons involved and credible causes for such delay. Therefore also, though in this reported judgment, delay has not been condoned, it cannot be the rule of law that delay cannot be condoned even if sufficient cause is shown, because in the present case, condonation of delay was practically refused because of the particular facts on record - delay of seven years with absence of proper explanation and concocted explanation for condonation of delay. Therefore, unless there is such reason in the case on hand, such decision cannot be applied to every cases blindly without verifying that whether cause for delay is sufficient or not.
12.4 (2012)3 SCC 563 - Post Master General & Ors.
Vs.Living Media India Ltd. & Ors. - wherein also the Apex Court has dealt with 'sufficient cause' with reference to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Apex Court has held that if there is non-explanation of sufficient cause, and if there is absence of diligence by Department in prosecuting matter, inspite of another opportunity of filing 'better affidavit' being granted, it was held that condonation of delay is exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. Therefore, again this decision is based upon the particular facts and circumstances on record before the Apex Court wherein the Apex Court has found that there is negligence on the part of the Government and there is non- explanation of sufficient cause. Therefore, only because of such judgment, it cannot be said that delay cannot be condoned in all cases even if sufficient cause is proved.
Page 9 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT 12.5 (2010)8 SCC 685 - Balwant Singh (Dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Others - wherein the Apex Court has again dealt with express 'sufficient cause'. But, it is categorically stated that 'sufficient cause' implies presence of legal and adequate reasons and there cannot be straitjacket formula uniformly applicable to all cases without reference to the particular facts and circumstances of a given case. Therefore, it is to be decided by the Court whether or not a cause is sufficient and whether it could have been avoided by the party by exercise of due care and attention. Therefore, only because of denial of condonation of delay in few cases would not amount to a straitjacket principle of law that delay cannot be condoned irrespective of sufficient case shown. 12.6 (2010)5 SCC 459 - Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation & Anr. - wherein though the Supreme Court has directed probe to be conducted against defaulting officials of respondent Corporation for fixing accountability while denying to condone the delay, the fact remains that in the given case before the Apex Court, there was false statement made to explain the delay and when litigant did not approached the Court with clean hands, the Apex Court had no option, but to take serious view of the matter. However, while defining the term 'sufficient cause', the Apex Court has categorically observed and held that Courts bestowed with power to condone delay, if sufficient cause is shown and that term 'sufficient cause' elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a manner which subserves ends of justice and that there cannot be hard and fast rule laid down for condonation of delay and that liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration with stricter approach in case of inordinate delay is required. It Page 10 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT is further stated that certain amount of latitude not impermissible with regard to the State because State represents collective cause of the community and decisions are taken by the Officers/agencies i.e. more than one person. Therefore, even in the case cited by the opponent, the Apex Court has categorically stated in paragraph 15 that no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the application for condonation of delay.
12.7 (2008)17 SCC 448 - Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) Vs.Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project & Anr. - the Apex Court has refused to condone the delay mainly because of the reason that the Court was of the opinion that there was fraud on Court by public authority when false plea was taken with incorrect statement made in application seeking condonation of delay itself and, therefore, it was held that it is sufficient to reject such application without any further inquiry as to whether the averments made in the application reveal sufficient cause to condone the delay or not. Therefore, unless there is a proof or pleading regarding fraud committed with the Court proceeding only because of such judgment, it cannot be held that delay cannot be condoned in any case.
12.8 (1997)7 SCC 556 - P.K. Ramachandran Vs.State of Kerala & Anr. - wherein the Apex Court has refused to condone the delay because there was no explanation much less reasonable or satisfactory explanation offered by the State for condonation of delay in application for the purpose. Though it was seriously opposed, the same was allowed by the High Court without taking into consideration of all the aspects touching to such subject. However, only for such citation, it cannot be held that delay cannot be condoned even Page 11 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT if there is sufficient cause.
12.9 2012(7) SCALE 230 - B.Madhuri Goud Vs.B.Damodar Reddy - the Apex Court has refused to condone the delay of almost four years to set-aside the ex- parte decree since the ground pleaded for condoning delay was that the documents were misplaced by the office of the advocate and inadvertently tagged with the record of another appeal, but the affidavit of concerned advocate was not filed on record. Therefore, in such case, when cause was not supported by affidavit, Apex Court has decided not to condone the delay. Hence, in absence of such proof, it cannot be said that delay cannot be condoned even if sufficient cause is pleaded and proved on record.
13. The sum and substance of all above decisions cited by the opponent makes it clear that there cannot be a straitjacket formula or rule either for condonation of delay or to reject the condonation and that every case is to be decided considering the facts and circumstances of that case only. The only requirement for condonation of delay is that whether there is 'sufficient cause' for the litigant not to initiate the litigation in prescribed time of limitation. In all the cases cited above, there is either inordinate delay, which was never explained or there was misrepresentation or fraud and, therefore, the Apex Court has held that in such cases, delay cannot be condoned. However, it cannot be ignored that in almost all such judgments, the Apex Court has categorically observed and held that if sufficient cause is shown, delay can be condoned and that term Page 12 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT 'sufficient cause' elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a manner which subserves ends of justice and that there cannot be hard and fast rule laid down for condonation of delay.
14. As against that, if we look into the judgments cited by the applicant, it becomes clear that generally Courts should be reluctant to shut out a consideration of the case on merits on the grounds of limitation or any other similar technicality (AIR 2012 SC 640 - Abdul Gafoor Vs. State of Bihar); if there is delay in filing petition, due to opinion of the advocate on record and the Solicitor General etc., such delay deserves to be condoned (AIR 2011 SC 428 - Delhi Development Authority Vs.Bhola Nath Sharma); there is a strong arguable case on behalf of the appellant and, therefore, the Court should decide the matter on merit by giving the expression 'sufficient cause' a pragmatic justice-oriented approach (AIR 2011 SC 977 - Union of India Vs.Giani); the meaning of the word 'sufficient' is 'adequate' or 'enough', inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended and, therefore, word 'sufficient' embraces no more than that which provides a platitude which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose. Sufficient cause is a question of fact and the Court has to exercise its discretion in the varied and special circumstances in the case at hand. There cannot be a straitjacket formula of universal application (AIR 2011 SC 1150
- Parimal Vs.Veena); if case file has to be routed from various departments before decision to file appeal, it is sufficient cause for Page 13 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT condonation of delay (AIR 2010 SC 1445 - State of J & K Vs.Mohmad Maqbool Sofi); while deciding application for condonation of delay, Court cannot go into the merits of the case, if averments made in the application is sufficient to condone the delay, there is no hesitation to condone such delay (AIR 2009 SC 1927 - State of Jharkhand Vs.Ashok Kumar Chokhani); the expression 'sufficient cause' must receive liberal construction to advance substantial justice even condoning delay of more than 6500 when question of law involved (AIR 2009 SC 2577 - State of Karnataka Vs.Y.Moideen Kunhi); and what counts is not length of delay, but sufficiency of cause and that what constitutes 'sufficient cause' cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules [AIR 2009 SC (Supp.) 695 - State (NCT of Delhi) Vs.Ahmed Jaan]; delay of more than six years can also be condoned to avoid miscarriage of justice (AIR 1984 SC 1744 - O.P. Kathpalia Vs. Lakhmir Singh (Dead) - by 3 Judges bench of Apex Court).
15. Moreover, atleast in AIR 2008 SC 1688 - Sinik Security Vs.Sheel Bai, AIR 2009 SC 2170 - D.D. Vaishnav Vs.State of M.P. and AIR 2009 SC (Supp.) 195 - Commissioner, Nagar Parishad, Bhilwara Vs.Labour Court, Bhilwara, the Apex Court has condoned inordinate delay (769 days, 589 days and 178 days respectively) even by imposing some costs upon the applicant.
16. In AIR 1987 SC 1353 - Collector, Land Acquisition, Page 14 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst.Katiji & Ors., the Apex Court has held as under -
"The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-
[1 "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period."]
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferre for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The Page 15 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause".
So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits"
17. If we scrutinize all above referred citations, it becomes clear that in the citations referred by the applicant and discussed in above paragraphs, the delay was not condoned mainly for the reason that either there is forged statement by the applicant or the cause for delay was shown as loss of paper by the advocate or the main dispute is falling under Special Legislature like Rent Control or Arbitration or Consumer Dispute. Though in some cases, dispute falls within General Law, the second aspect for non-condoning the delay is actual delay in number of days, which is more than 1000 days in 5 cases, out of total 8 cases referred by the opponent and discussed in above paragraphs. Unless there is a similar situation i.e. unless the case in hand falls within a special enactment or there is inordinate delay beyond couple of years, none of such referred and cited judgment confirms that delay cannot be condoned even if sufficient cause is shown, more particularly because of the reason that all such Page 16 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT judgments are by the Division Bench only and in none of such judgments, any of the citations, which are relied upon and cited by the applicant and prior to the above referred judgments, were ever overruled or distinguished or even referred and not followed in any of the case, which is referred by the opponent. As against that, if we scrutinize the judgments cited by the applicant and referred in paragraphs 14 to 16, it becomes clear that atleast those judgments are referred amongst different judgments within them so as to decide that the delay can be condoned if sufficient cause is shown. Whereas atleast decision in O.P.Kathpalia Vs.Lakhmir Singh (Dead) & Ors. (supra) is by the three Judges bench of the Apex Court wherein delay of more than 6 years was condoned observing that otherwise it would result into miscarriage of justice. Therefore, when there is a judgment by the bench of three Judges of the Apex Court that to avoid miscarriage of justice, delay of even 6 years can be condoned and when the judgments referred and cited in paragraphs 14 to 16 are yet not overruled or distinguished in any of the later judgment by the Bench of three Judges', only because the Apex Court has not condoned the delay in some of the cited cases, it cannot be said that delay cannot be condoned in all cases after such judgments even if there is sufficient cause to condone the delay. Thus, in general, if there is sufficient reason to condoned the delay, irrespective of the cited cases, delay can be condoned.
18. Thus, in my view, the statement in the application for Page 17 of 18 C/CA/12621/2013 CAV JUDGMENT condonation of delay does constitute sufficient cause to condone the delay.
19. In view of such facts and circumstances, when there is nothing on record to show that there is no sufficient cause for filing such appeals in prescribed period of limitation, there is no reason to deny the condonation of delay of 24 days and 92 days, as prayed for.
20. For the foregoing reasons, both applications deserve to be allowed, as prayed for and thereby, the delay of 24 days in filing Civil Application No.12621 of 2013, whereas delay of 92 days in filing Civil Application No.12620 of 2013 are condoned, as prayed for.
21. Rule is made absolute.
Sd/-
(S.G.SHAH, J.) dharmendra Further Order Learned advocate appearing for Dr.Rajesh H.Acharya, learned advocate for the respondent is requesting to stay the operation of this order. Considering the facts and circumstances, there is no need to stay such order at this stage, hence, request is rejected.
Sd/-
(S.G.SHAH, J.) dharmendra Page 18 of 18