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[Cites 13, Cited by 1]

Orissa High Court

Lakshmi Narayan Das vs State Of Orissa on 7 August, 2018

Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2018 ORI 265

Author: S. K. Sahoo

Bench: S.K. Sahoo

                             IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK

                                          CRLMC No. 2097 of 2010

        An application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal
        Procedure, 1973 in connection with G.R. Case No.156 of 2008
        pending on the file of J.M.F.C., Aska.
                                 -----------------------------

                Lakshmi Narayan Das                            .........                              Petitioner

                                                           -Versus-

                State of Orissa
                & Others                                      .........                               Opposite parties


                      For Petitioner:                              -           Mr. Sidharth Prasad Das


                      For Opp. Party No.1:                         -           Mr. Prem Kumar Patnaik
                                                                               Addl. Govt. Advocate

                      For Informants:              -         Mr. Pravash Chandra Jena
                                    -----------------------------

        P R E S E N T:

                             THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO
        -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Date of Hearing: 23.07.2018                                    Date of Judgment: 07.08.2018
        -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

S. K. SAHOO, J.              "Caste          has        killed         public       sprit.        Caste         has
                             destroyed the sense of public charity. Caste has
                             made          public        opinion impossible. Virtue                             has
                             become caste-ridden and morality has become
                             caste-bound. Caste is a state of mind. It is a
                             disease of mind. The teachings of the Hindu
                             religion are the root cause of this disease. We
                                      2


            practice casteism and we observe untouchability
            because we are enjoined to do so by the Hindu
            religion. A bitter thing cannot be made sweet.
            The taste of anything can be changed. But
            poison cannot be changed into nectar."

                   -Bharat Ratna Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar

            The petitioner Lakshmi Narayan Das is the retired

District Inspector of Schools, Aska and he has knocked at the

portals of this Court in challenging the order dated 16.01.2010 of

the learned J.M.F.C., Aska passed in G.R. Case No.156 of 2008 in

taking cognizance of offences under section 294 of the Indian

Penal Code and section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereafter

'1989 Act') and issuance of process against him. The said case

arises out of Aska P.S. Case No.109 of 2008.

2.          On 30.04.2008 Smt. Ahalya Patra and others lodged

the first information report before the Inspector in charge of

Aska police station alleging therein that on that day at about

11.00 a.m. while they along with other Sikshya Sahayaks met

the petitioner in his office and asked him as to whether he had

been   to   meet    the   Director       of   Odisha   Primary   Education

Programme Authority (hereafter 'OPEPA'), the petitioner all on a

sudden got frowned and abused the informants and their
                                3


companions in filthy language such as, "you are low caste

people, Hadi, Pana, Dhoba and one would not get food if he

looks at you. We are Brahmin by caste and we have to change

our sacred thread if we touch you". So saying, the petitioner

spitted for two to three times and further told "you and your

husband Maghia, Sala. You are doing politics and your future

would be ruined. Nobody including no police station, Court and

even the Education Department can do anything and your lives

would be finished with the help of goondas". It is further stated

in the first information report that on many occasions, the

informants and others had met the petitioner who told them to

meet him alone separately in his house and after he would be

satisfied financially as well as physically, he would do the

needful. The petitioner demanded Rs.1,500/- from each of the

Sikshya Sahayaks even though they appealed before him that

they are poor persons and would not be in a position to arrange

money and requested him to complete the formalities. The

petitioner did not pay any heed to the request of the informants

rather made false allegation against them and threatened them

to see that they would not be able to undergo training. The

petitioner told that since the informants did not fulfill his

demand, he would not do any of their works so long as he was
                                4


holding the post of District Inspector of Schools and that he has

got connection with political leaders and he would see who would

help them. The petitioner further told the informants that he

would institute false criminal cases and the informants would be

sent to jail and no Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe leader

would save them and if contingency arises, he would make their

service files go 'missing'.

            On the basis of such first information report, Aska

P.S. Case No.109 of 2008 was registered under sections 294,

506 of the Indian Penal Code and section 3(1)(x) of 1989 Act.

After registration of the case by the Inspector in charge of Aska

police station, Sub-Inspector of Police P.K. Sahu was entrusted

with investigation of the case. He examined the informants,

visited the spot which was the office of D.I. of Schools situated

at Niranjan Nagar, Aska. On 15.05.2008 Sri B.P. Dehury, Deputy

Superintendent of police, Aska took up investigation of the case

as per the official order of the Superintendent of Police, Ganjam.

After verification of the case records received from the previous

investigating officer, the D.S.P. re-examined all the witnesses

and recorded their separate statements. He also visited the spot

and the case was supervised by Sri J. Mohapatra, S.D.P.O.,

Bhanjanagar. On 25.03.2009 the charge of investigation was
                                 5


taken over by Sri B.K. Kamila, S.D.P.O., Aska who sent

requisition to the Tahasildar, Aska for obtaining caste particulars

of the petitioner as well as the informant party members and

received the reports. On completion of investigation, since prima

facie case was made out against the petitioner for commission of

offences under section 294 of the Indian Penal Code and section

3(1)(x) of 1989 Act, charge sheet was placed.

3.          Mr. Sidharth Prasad Das, learned counsel appearing

for the petitioner emphatically contended that the criminal

proceeding has been instituted against the petitioner with

malafide intention. He placed reliance in a recent decision of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Dr. Subash Kasinath

Mahajan -Vrs.- The State of Maharashtra reported in

(2018) 70 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC) 566, wherein it is

held that in respect of offences under the Atrocities Act, to avoid

false implication, before F.I.R. is registered, preliminary inquiry

may be conducted by the D.S.P. to find out whether the

allegations make out a case under the Atrocities Act and that the

allegations are not frivolous or motivated. It is the contention of

the learned counsel that since no preliminary inquiry has been

conducted by the Designated Officer before the registration of

the first information report, the institution of the case is bad and
                                  6


defective which goes to the root of the matter. Learned counsel

further pleaded that while the petitioner was working as Dist.

Inspector of Schools, Aska in the district of Ganjam in the year

2008, one Sikshya Sahayak namely Biswanath Sethy was the

President of Sikshya Sahayak Association of Aska Education

District. As per the notification of the Department of Schools and

Mass Education, Govt. of Odisha, there was restriction to transfer

the Sikshya Sahayaks from one centre to another but in

deviation to the same, the predecessor of the petitioner had

made some illegal transfers of Sikshya Sahayaks including the

said Biswanath Sethy in violation of Government guidelines. The

petitioner in his official capacity as D.I. of Schools, Aska reported

the illegal transfers to his departmental higher authority despite

protest and repeated threatening by some Sikshya Sahayaks

under the leadership of Biswanath Sethy. On 30.04.2008 at the

behest and leadership of Biswanath Sethy, some Sikshya

Sahayaks forcibly entered into the official chamber of the

petitioner and threatened him with dire consequences and to file

false case against him which was informed to the police by the

petitioner and consequently Aska P.S. Case No.110 of 2008 was

registered under sections 294, 506 read with section 34 of the

Indian Penal Code. It is contended that only to harass and
                                   7


humiliate the petitioner, the false case has been foisted and the

police without investigating the case in a fair manner and

ignoring the material facts and particulars proceeded against the

petitioner and submitted charge sheet. It is argued that the

petitioner was not examined by any police officer in connection

with the alleged incident which reveals unfairness on the part of

the investigating agency and its indifference to arrive at the

truth. It is contended that since the petitioner was discharging

his duty as a public servant at the relevant point of time and the

alleged incident having been taken during the official hour in the

office   of   the   petitioner,   without   obtaining   sanction   for

prosecution of the petitioner from the competent authority as

required under section 197 of Cr.P.C., the impugned order of

taking cognizance and issuance of process is not sustainable in

the eye of law. It is further contended that even though Rule 7 of

the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Rules, 1995 (hereafter '1995 Rules') stipulates that an

offence under 1989 Act shall be investigated by a police officer

not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police but in

this case, Sri P.K. Sahu, S.I. of Police of Aska police station was

entrusted with the investigation of the case by the Inspector in

charge since the date of lodging of F.I.R. i.e. on 30.04.2008 and
                                 8


he continued with the investigation till 15.05.2008 whereafter

the case was taken over for investigation by Sri B.P. Dehury,

Deputy Superintendent of Police, Aska and therefore, in view of

the defective investigation contrary to the mandates provided

under 1995 Rules, the criminal proceeding against the petitioner

is liable to be quashed. He placed reliance in the case of In Re:

Sessions Judge -cum- Special Judge, Cuttack reported in

(2002) 22 Orissa Criminal Reports 92. It is further argued

that the official chamber of the petitioner was not within the

public view and the contents of the first information report so

also the materials collected during course of investigation are

silent that any member of the public was present at the time of

commission of the alleged offence except the informants who

belonged to the SC and ST community and therefore, one of the

basic ingredients of the offence under section 294 of the Indian

Penal Code that the occurrence should happen in any public

place and also as per section 3(1)(x) of the 1989 Act, the offence

should take place within public view is conspicuously absent. It is

further contended that the basic ingredients of the offence under

section 3(1)(x) of the 1989 Act being absent in the F.I.R., this

Court should invoke its inherent power under section 482 of

Cr.P.C. to quash the proceeding. He relied upon the decision of
                                 9


the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Gorige Pentaiah -Vrs.-

State of A.P. reported in (2008) 41 Orissa Criminal

Reports (SC) 614. It is further contended that some of the

signatories of the first information report were of Koli Caste and

one of them is Bauri and the first information report did not

disclose that the petitioner ever uttered such caste name and

there was never any occasion for the petitioner to know the

individual or collective caste of the informants particularly when

thousands   of   Sikshya   Sahayaks    were   working   under   the

Education Department. It is further submitted that the official

documents of Director, Elementary Education, Odisha would

indicate that the petitioner had submitted the application forms/

biodatas of the informants earlier to the date of occurrence i.e.

on 12.02.2008 and 19.02.2008 and therefore, the genesis of the

offence is also a doubtful feature. It is further submitted that the

opposite party no.7 has filed Misc. Case No.497 of 2017 for

passing appropriate order in exonerating her to proceed further

in Aska P.S. Case No.109 of 2008 which shows that a malicious

prosecution has been instituted against the petitioner and

therefore, in view of the ratio laid down in case of State of

Haryana -Vrs.- Ch. Bhajan Lal reported in A.I.R. 1992 S.C.

604, the proceeding should be quashed. It is submitted that the
                                  10


petitioner is now seventy years of age and he is suffering from

many ailments and since the criminal proceeding is vexatious

and it is a product of malice, if it is allowed to continue, it would

be an abuse of process of the Court.

            Mr. Prem Kumar Patnaik, learned Addl. Government

Advocate on the other hand contended that the plea taken by

the petitioner relating to his false implication cannot be taken

into account at this stage which can be taken care of by the

learned trial Court at the appropriate stage. He contended that

even though at the initial stage, the S.I. of police was

investigating the case and he recorded the statements of the

witnesses but after the designated police officer as per Rule 7 of

1995 Rules took over charge of investigation, he re-examined all

the witnesses and ultimately charge sheet was submitted by the

competent police officer and therefore, there is no violation of

the provisions of 1995 Rules. It is further contended that the use

of obscene language and derogatory remarks are not the part

and parcel of official duty and therefore, no sanction for

prosecuting the petitioner is necessary. He argued that the

contents of the F.I.R. are corroborated by the statements of the

witnesses recorded during investigation which make out the

basic ingredients of the offences and there was no illegality in
                                 11


passing the impugned order and therefore, the application filed

by the petitioner should be dismissed.

           Mr. Pravash Chandra Jena, learned counsel appearing

for the informants submitted that the caste certificates obtained

by the investigating agency show that the informants are the

members    of   Scheduled   Castes/Scheduled    Tribes   and   the

petitioner is a member of General Caste. It is contended that the

manner in which the petitioner had used the obscene language

and passed derogatory remarks against the informants clearly

reveal his intention to humiliate them and since the public had

access to the office of the petitioner and the occurrence had also

taken within public view, there was every justification for the

investigating officer to submit charge sheet.

4.         The Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered judgment in

the case of Dr. Subash Kasinath Mahajan (supra) on

20.03.2018. The occurrence in the present case took place on

30.04.2008.

           It is the settled principle that when a law is declared

by the Supreme Court, it is the law as it always was and it does

not become law only from the date it was so declared. It is also

clear from the decision in Golak Nath & others -Vrs.- State of

Punjab reported in A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643, that it is only
                                     12


within the competence of the Supreme Court to declare the law

declared   by    it   to   be   prospective   and    that   too   only   on

constitutional   questions.      (Ref:-   Regional    Director,     E.S.I.

Corporation -Vrs.- P.B. Gupta reported in 2002 (I) Orissa

Law Reviews 250).

            Since in Dr. Subash Kasinath Mahajan (supra),

while giving directions in the concluding paragraph, it was

observed that the directions are prospective, the contentions

raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since no

preliminary inquiry has been conducted by the designated police

officer before the registration of the first information report, the

institution of the case is defective, cannot be accepted.

5.          The plea taken by the petitioner relating to the

reason for institution of the criminal proceeding is his reporting

to the departmental higher authority about the illegal transfers

of some of the Sikshya Sahayaks including one Biswanath Sethy,

President of Sikshya Sahayak Association of Aska Education

District was not taken in the petition under section 482 of Cr.P.C.

when it was filed on 05.08.2018. No document in that connection

was also annexed with the petition. Such plea was taken for the

first time by way of an additional affidavit filed on 28.07.2017.

Some xerox copies of the documents have been annexed to the
                                  13


additional affidavit in that connection. Now the question falls for

consideration as to whether the belated plea taken almost after

seven years of the presentation of the case and the xerox copies

of the documents filed with the additional affidavit are to be

taken into consideration at this stage.

            In case of State of Orissa -Vrs.- Debendra Nath

Padhi reported in (2005) 30 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC)

177, it is held that at the time of framing charge or taking

cognizance, the accused has no right to produce any material.

            In case of Chiranjib Biswal -Vrs.- Bishnu Charan

Das reported in (2016) 63 Orissa Criminal Reports 1131, it

is held as follows:-

            "8. Law is well settled that while making a
            prayer for quashing an order taking cognizance
            or quashing the entire criminal proceeding, an
            accused cannot be permitted to use the material
            which would be available to him only as his
            defence. The trial Court should be left to
            consider and weigh materials brought on record
            by the parties for the purpose of marshalling and
            appreciating   the   evidence.   While   invoking
            inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. to
            quash a criminal proceeding, the High Court
            cannot look into any document relied on by the
            accused which would require proof in accordance
            with law and may be subjected to rebuttal
                                 14


            evidence. The Court has to strictly confine itself
            to the allegation made in the first information
            report   and   charge    sheet   or   the   complaint
            petition and the statements collected under
            sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. A mini trial at that
            stage is impermissible. The acceptance of the
            documents filed by the defence or consideration
            of defence plea by the High Court under section
            482 Cr.P.C. at the stage of cognizance would
            certainly open flood gate for mini trial and
            should be discouraged as it is not neither proper
            nor legal."

            In case of Sampelly -Vrs.- Indian Renewable

Energy reported in (2016) 65 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC)

583, it is held that it is well settled that while dealing with a

quashing petition, the Court has ordinarily to proceed on the

basis of averments in the complaint. The defence of the accused

cannot be considered at the stage. The Court considering the

prayer for quashing does not adjudicate upon a disputed

question of fact.

            In case of R. Kalyani -Vrs.- Janak C. Mehta

reported in (2009) 42 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC) 162, it

is held that while exercising its inherent jurisdiction to quash a

criminal proceeding, save and except in very exceptional
                                   15


circumstances, the Court should not look into any documents

relied upon by the defence.

            In case of HMT Watches -Vrs.- M.A. Abida

reported in 2015 (I) Orissa Law Reviews (SC) 1012, it was

held that the High Court committed grave error of law in

quashing the criminal complaints filed by the appellant in respect

of offence punishable under section 138 of the N.I. Act in

exercise of powers under section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure by accepting factual defences of the accused which

were disputed ones. Such defences, if taken before trial Court,

after recording of the evidence, can be better appreciated.

            In case of Harshendra Kumar D. -Vrs.- Rebatilata

Koley reported in (2011) 48 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC)

861, it is held as follows:-

            "21. In our judgment, the above observations
            cannot be read to mean that in a criminal case
            where trial is yet to take place and the matter is
            at the stage of issuance of summons or taking
            cognizance,     materials   relied   upon    by    the
            accused which are in the nature of public
            documents or the materials which are beyond
            suspicion or doubt, in no circumstance, can be
            looked into by the High Court in exercise of its
            jurisdiction under Section 482 or for that matter
            in   exercise   of   revisional   jurisdiction   under
                                16


           Section 397 of the Code. It is fairly settled now
           that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under
           Section 482 or revisional jurisdiction under
           Section 397 of the Code in a case where
           complaint is sought to be quashed, it is not
           proper for the High Court to consider the
           defence of the accused or embark upon an
           enquiry in respect of merits of the accusations.
           However, in an appropriate case, if on the face
           of the documents - which are beyond suspicion
           or doubt - placed by accused, the accusations
           against him cannot stand, it would be travesty of
           justice if accused is relegated to trial and he is
           asked to prove his defence before the trial court.
           In such a matter, for promotion of justice or to
           prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High
           Court may look into the materials which have
           significant bearing on the matter at prima facie
           stage."

           In view of the settled position of law, accepting the

defence plea and the documents in support of such plea taken at

a belated stage would not be proper and justified. There is

nothing on record that the informants acted at the behest of

Biswanath Sethy. It is needless to say that the petitioner would

get enough opportunity during course of trial to take such plea

and adduce evidence in that respect which would be adjudicated

by the learned trial Court in accordance with law.
                                 17


6.          Adverting to the contention raised by the learned

counsel for the petitioner relating to the absence of sanction

from the competent authority as required under section 197 of

Cr.P.C., even though it is not disputed that the petitioner was a

public servant and he was discharging his duty as a public

servant at the relevant point of time and the incident in question

took place during the official working hours in the office of the

petitioner but the vital question is whether the abusive words

allegedly hurled at the informants and threat given to them by

the petitioner has got any connection whatsoever with official

duty.

            In case of Abani Chandra Biswal -Vrs.- State of

Orissa reported in Vol.64 (1987) Cuttack Law Times 659, a

Division Bench of this Court held that the public servant cannot

claim blanket privilege for all the acts and uncalled for over doing

while discharging any public duty. In that case judging the

accusation against the petitioner who was the officer in charge,

Komna Police Station in the district of Kalahandi that he had

hurled abusive language at the complainant while he was already

in the police lock-up, it was held that the action cannot by any

stretch of imagination, be said to have been committed in course
                                     18


of discharge of official duty as it had no connection whatsoever

therewith much less, reasonable.

               Abusing or threatening is no part of the official duty

of a government servant when general public approaches him in

connection with an official work which has been assigned to him.

A government servant is there to serve the people, look into

their genuine grievances and to act diligently with all patience

and he is paid for that. He has to set an example for others. It is

incumbent on a public servant to maintain decency and decorum

of the institution/post which he is serving. Public servant is

accountable and responsible for what he is advocating. It cannot

be lost sight of the fact that the petitioner was serving in the

Education Department and he was holding the post of District

Inspector of Schools. The languages which are allegedly used are

certainly not expected from an educated person. When the act

alleged and the official duty are so inter-related that one could

postulate      reasonably   that   it    was   done   by   the   accused

government servant in the performance of the official duty

though possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the

situation, sanction under section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure

is required.
                                   19


            In case of Devinder Singh and Ors. -Vrs.- State

of Punjab reported in (2016) 64 Orissa Criminal Reports

(SC) 380, it is held as follows:-

            "37. The principles emerging from the aforesaid
            decisions are summarized hereunder:
            I. Protection of sanction is an assurance to an
            honest and sincere officer to perform his duty
            honestly and to the best of his ability to further
            public   duty.   However,     authority          cannot   be
            camouflaged to commit crime.
            II. Once act or omission has been found to have
            been committed by public servant in discharging
            his duty, it must be given liberal and wide
            construction     so   far   its   official       nature   is
            concerned. Public servant is not entitled to
            indulge in criminal activities. To that extent
            Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure has to
            be   construed    narrowly    and    in      a    restricted
            manner.
            III. Even in facts of a case when public servant
            has exceeded in his duty, if there is reasonable
            connection, it will not deprive him of protection
            under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure.
            There cannot be a universal rule to determine
            whether there is reasonable nexus between the
            act done and official duty nor it is possible to lay
            down such rule.
            IV. In case the assault made is intrinsically
            connected with or related to performance of
                         20


official duties, sanction would be necessary
under Section 197 Code of Criminal Procedure,
but   such   relation    to   duty   should   not   be
pretended or fanciful claim. The offence must be
directly and reasonably connected with official
duty to require sanction. It is no part of official
duty to commit offence. In case offence was
incomplete without proving, the official act,
ordinarily the provisions of Section 197 Code of
Criminal Procedure would apply.
V. In case sanction is necessary, it has to be
decided by competent authority and sanction
has to be issued on the basis of sound objective
assessment. The Court is not to be a sanctioning
authority.
VI. Ordinarily, question of sanction should be
dealt with at the stage of taking cognizance, but
if the cognizance is taken erroneously and the
same comes to the notice of Court at a later
stage, finding to that effect is permissible and
such a plea can be taken first time before
Appellate Court. It may arise at inception itself.
There is no requirement that accused must wait
till charges are framed.
VII. Question of sanction can be raised at the
time of framing of charge and it can be decided
prima facie on the basis of accusation. It is open
to decide it afresh in light of evidence adduced
after conclusion of trial or at other appropriate
stage.
                                21


           VIII. Question of sanction may arise at any
           stage of proceedings on a police or judicial
           inquiry or in course of evidence during trial.
           Whether sanction is necessary or not may have
           to be determined from stage to stage and
           material brought on record depending upon facts
           of each case. Question of sanction can be
           considered at any stage of the proceedings.
           Necessity for sanction may reveal itself in the
           course of the progress of the case and it would
           be open to accused to place material during the
           course of trial for showing what his duty was.
           Accused has the right to lead evidence in
           support of his case on merits.
           IX. In some case it may not be possible to
           decide   the   question   effectively   and   finally
           without giving opportunity to the defence to
           adduce evidence. Question of good faith or bad
           faith may be decided on conclusion of trial."


           The petitioner has presented an F.I.R. relating to the

occurrence in question, on the basis of which Aska P.S. Case

No.110 of 2008 was registered under sections 294, 506 read

with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In the instant case, the

allegation as per the prosecution case is that when the

informants who are Sikshya Sahayaks met the petitioner in his

office and asked him as to whether he had been to meet the

Director of OPEPA, the petitioner all on a sudden got frowned
                                 22


and abused them in filthy language and threatened them

whereas the defence of the petitioner is that it was a case of

discharge of official duty and at the behest and leadership of one

Biswanath Sethy, some Sikshya Sahayaks forcibly entered into

his official chamber on the date of occurrence and threatened

him with dire consequences and to file false case against him. It

is not permissible for this Court at this stage to decide which

version is correct. Similarly, it is difficult to arrive at a prima

facie conclusion that the overt act allegedly committed by the

petitioner has got any connection with the discharge of official

duty much less, reasonable. It would be open to both the sides

to adduce their evidence at the stage of trial and the trial Court

shall decide the question whether there was any reasonable

nexus of the incident with the discharge of official duty by the

petitioner.

7.            Coming to the next contention raised by the learned

counsel for the petitioner relating to infraction of Rule 7 of the

1995 Rules, it appears that even though at the initial stage, the

investigation was conducted by the Sub-Inspector of Police P.K.

Sahu but on 15.05.2008 Sri B.P. Dehury, Deputy Superintendent

of police, Aska took up investigation of the case as per the

official order of the Superintendent of Police, Ganjam and after
                                 23


verification of the case records received from the previous

investigating officer, he re-examined all the witnesses and

recorded their separate statements. The case was supervised by

Sri J. Mohapatra, S.D.P.O., Bhanjanagar. On 25.03.2009 the

charge of investigation was taken over by Sri B.K. Kamila,

S.D.P.O., Aska who ultimately on completion of investigation

submitted charge sheet for commission of offences under section

294 of the Indian Penal Code and section 3(1)(x) of 1989 Act.

            Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance in

the case of In Re: Sessions Judge (supra), wherein it is held

that any investigation made by a police officer below the rank of

the officer so provided in the statute is vitiated and a criminal

proceeding would be vitiated because of non-compliance with the

statutory provision.

            In the instant case, after initial investigation by the

S.I. of police, the re-investigation has been done by the

competent designated police officers as per Rule 7 of 1995 Rules

and charge sheet was also submitted by the designated officer.

Therefore, it cannot be said that there is either any defect or

illegality in investigation or the criminal proceeding is vitiated

merely because at the initial stages, the investigation was

conducted not by a designated police officer. In case of H.M.
                                 24


Rishbud -Vrs.- State of Delhi reported in A.I.R. 1955 S.C.

196, it was held that a defect or illegality in investigation,

however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the

procedure relating to cognizance or trial.

            In view of the above discussions, the contention

raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner relating to

infraction of Rule 7 of the 1995 Rules is devoid of any merit and

deserves to be dismissed.

8.          In order to make out an offence under section 294 of

the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution has to prove that (i) the

offender has done any obscene act in any public place or has

sung, recited or uttered any obscene song, ballad or words in or

near any public place and (ii) thereby has caused annoyance to

others. If the act complained of is not obscene or is not done in

any public place or the song sung, ballad recited or words

uttered is not obscene or not so sung, recited or uttered in or

near any public place or that it causes no annoyance to others,

the offence is not committed.

            The meaning of the word 'obscene' in Black's Law

Dictionary, Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, Collins Cobuild

English Dictionary etc. would leave no doubt that the word

'obscene' is connected with sex and extremely offensive under
                                 25


contemporary community standards of morality and decency

grossly repugnant to generally accepted notions of what is

appropriate. The concept of 'obscenity' would differ from Country

to Country, State to State and even from region to region

depending on the standards of morals and contemporary society.

            The word 'Maghia' stated to have been used by the

petitioner is no doubt an obscene word which means 'mother

fucker'.

            'Public place' is one to which members of public have

free access without any hindrance or interference. Such place is

open to the use by public or they are accustomed to resort which

includes public offices also. The place to which the public have a

legal right of access and they habitually go and there is no

restricted entry to it would come within the purview of 'public

place'. If the entry is regulated by permission or is otherwise

restricted, it is not a 'public place'. However if the access of

public to a place is conditional upon payment and subject to

reasonable restriction or in other words there is no unlimited

right still then the same would come within 'public place'.

            As regards the obscene act, the term 'public place' is

used in section 294(a) of the Indian Penal Code whereas for

obscene song, ballad or words, the term 'in or near public place'
                                 26


is used in section 294(b) of the Indian Penal Code. The term 'in

or near public place' is much wider in its sweep than the term

'public place' as it encompasses even those areas which are in

the vicinity of public place meaning thereby that if the obscene

words uttered in a 'public place' is heard by someone who is in

the vicinity of the public place then offence under section 294 of

Indian Penal Code can be made out. The term 'in or near public

place' contained in section 294 (b) of the Indian Penal Code does

not literally mean that the abusive words should be uttered

necessarily in a place which is frequented by members of public.

If such utterances though made in private place but are audible

in a public place because of being in close vicinity to the private

place then in that eventuality also the offence under section 294

of the Indian Penal Code would be attracted. The said offence is

not only made out when an obscene act is committed to the

annoyance of others in any public place but also when the

accused utters words to the annoyance of others in or near any

public place.

            In case of Ashok Kumar Mishra -Vrs.- State of

Orissa reported in (2013) 54 Orissa Criminal Reports 162,

it is held as follows:-

             "5. A 'public place' must be held to be a place
            which is open to the members of the public
                                 27


           though in some cases access to it by members
           of   the   public   may   be   on   fulfilling   certain
           conditions but the right of access to such place
           must not be limited to any determinate section
           of public and the person in charge of the place
           should have no right or discretion to deny access
           to any member of the public as long as such
           member is ready to fulfill the conditions attached
           for access."

           There cannot be any dispute that the office of the

D.I. of Schools, Aska is a public place. The contention of the

learned counsel for the petitioner that the spot was the official

chamber of the petitioner and no public was present at the

relevant time and therefore, it cannot be said that the place was

within public view, is not acceptable. There is nothing on record

that the occurrence took place in the official chamber of the

petitioner where there is any restricted entry. In fact, the

materials on records indicate as per the statements of the

informants that all the nine of them had been to meet the

petitioner in the office of the D.I. of Schools, Aska to ventilate

their grievances, during course of which the occurrence took

place. Therefore, I am of the humble view that prima facie case

under section 294 of the Indian Penal Code is made out.
                                 28


           So far as the offence under section 3(1)(x) of 1989

Act is concerned, it requires intentional insult or intimidation by

an offender who is not a member of Scheduled Caste or

Scheduled Tribe to a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled

Tribe with intent to humiliate him in any place within public view.

The F.I.R. indicates the presence of nine persons and even if one

is excluded in view of the filing of Misc. Case No.497 of 2017, it

makes no difference. Judicial notice can be taken regarding the

presence of the staff of the D.I. of Schools during the official

hour. The statements of the witnesses recorded during course of

investigation corroborate to the facts narrated in the first

information report. All the witnesses have stated regarding the

intentional insult and intimidation to them and they are the

members of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes. The non-use of

names of specific caste of some of the informants like 'Koli Caste'

and 'Bauri' by the petitioner makes a little difference. The tenure

and the context in which the language is stated to have been

used prima facie show the intention of the user to humiliate the

informants. Even if one makes remarks or utterances with a view

to humiliate a member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled

Tribe inside the building, he would be liable to be prosecuted
                                 29


provided such remarks or utterances are either visible or audible

to the public.

            In case of Swaran Singh -Vrs.- State reported in

(2008) 41 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC) 414, it is held as

follows:-

            "28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod
            Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by
            appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a `Chamar')
            when he stood near the car which was parked at
            the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this
            was certainly a place within public view, since
            the gate of a house is certainly a place within
            public view. It could have been a different
            matter had the alleged offence been committed
            inside a building, and also was not in the public
            view. However, if the offence is committed
            outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a
            house, and the lawn can be seen by someone
            from the road or lane outside the boundary wall,
            the lawn would certainly be a place within the
            public view. Also, even if the remark is made
            inside a building, but some members of the
            public are there (not merely relatives or friends)
            then also it would be an offence since it is in the
            public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the
            expression `place within public view' with the
            expression `public place'. A place can be a
            private place but yet within the public view. On
                                    30


            the other hand, a public place would ordinarily
            mean a place which is owned or leased by the
            Government or the municipality (or other local
            body) or gaonsabha or an instrumentality of the
            State, and not by private persons or private
            bodies.

            Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that

basic ingredients of the offence under section 3(1)(x) of the

1989 Act being absent in the F.I.R., this Court should quash the

proceeding. He relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in case of Gorige Pentaiah -Vrs.- State of A.P.

reported in (2008) 41 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC) 614

wherein it is held as follows:-

            "7.   In   the   instant    case,   the   allegation   of
            respondent No. 3 in the entire complaint is that
            on 27.5.2004, the appellant abused them with
            the name of their caste. According to the basic
            ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the
            complainant ought to have alleged that the
            accused-appellant was not a member of the
            Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he
            (respondent No. 3) was intentionally insulted or
            intimidated      by   the   accused   with   intent    to
            humiliate in a place within public view. In the
            entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that
            the accused-appellant was not a member of the
            Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he
                                31


           intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent
           to humiliate respondent No. 3 in a place within
           public view. When the basic ingredients of the
           offence are missing in the complaint, then
           permitting such a complaint to continue and to
           compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the
           criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading
           to abuse of process of law."


           The citation placed by the learned counsel for the

petitioner is no way helpful to him in the facts and circumstances

of the case. First of all, the instant case arises out of a first

information report and not a complaint petition. In case of Lalita

Kumari -Vrs.- Govt. of U.P. reported in (2014) 57 Orissa

Criminal Reports (SC) 1, it is held that registration of F.I.R. is

mandatory under section 154 of the Code, if the information

discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary

inquiry is permissible in such a situation. If the information

received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the

necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted

only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not.

If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence,

the F.I.R. must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry

ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure

must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later
                                     32


than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the

complaint and not proceeding further. The police officer cannot

avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence is

disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers who do

not register the F.I.R. if information received by him discloses a

cognizable offence. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to

verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but

only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable

offence.

             In the instant case, the first information report

discloses commission of a cognizable offence. During course of

investigation, the Addl. Tahasildar, Aska submitted his report

dated 08.12.2009 which indicates that one of the informants

namely,     Baruna       Kumar   Barua    is    'Dhoba'   by    caste.     The

Tahasildar, Aska submitted his report dated 09.12.2009 which

indicates that the informants namely, Ahalya Patra, Abanikant

Behera and Bhabani sankar Patra are 'Koli' by caste, informant

Prakash Chandra Das is 'Bauri' by caste and the petitioner is

'Brahmin' by caste.

             List        of   Scheduled        Castes     notified       (after

addition/deletion) as per the Constitution (Scheduled Castes)

Order,     1950,    as    amended   vide       Modification    Order     1956,
                                33


Amendment Act, 1976 and the Constitution (Scheduled Castes)

Order (Amendment) Act 2002 No. 25 dated 27.5.2002 of

Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, read with The

Constitution (SCs) Order (Second Amendment) Act, 2002 No. 61

of 2002 dated 18.12.2002 of Ministry         of Law   & Justice

republished vide Notification No. 7797-I- Legis-5/2002-L dated

7.6.2003 of Law Deptt, Govt. of Orissa and, vide Gazette of India

No.381dt.30.8.2007, Gazette of India No.40 dt.18.12.2014,

Gazette of India No.7 dt.23.03.2015, Gazette of India No 27 dt

9.05.2016 & Gazette of India No 17 dated 01.05.2017 indicates

that 'Bauri' and 'Dhoba' are Scheduled Castes.

           Similarly, list of Scheduled Tribes notified (after

addition/deletion) as per the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes Order, 1950 as amended by Modification Order, 1956,

Amendment Act, 1976 and The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes Order (Amendment) Act 2002 No. 10 dated 8.1.2003 of

Ministry of Law & Justice republished by the Notification No.

7799/ L dated 7.6.2003 of Law Department, Govt. of Orissa

indicates that 'Koli' is Scheduled Tribe. The petitioner is not a

member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.

           First information report is not the encyclopedia or be

all and end all of the prosecution case. It is not a verbatim
                                34


summary of the prosecution case. The principal object to the first

information report is to set the criminal law into motion. Non-

mentioning of some facts or details or meticulous particulars is

not a ground to reject the prosecution case. The informant who

is a member of either Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe while

presenting the first information report might not be aware to

mention his caste as well as the caste of the accused while

narrating the incident. Whether it would be proper and justified

not to register the case under section 3 of 1989 Act even though

cognizable offence and particularly, the ingredients of such

offence are prima facie made out, merely because of the non-

mention of the caste details of the accused as well as the

informant? The answer is emphatically 'No'. In the format of

formal F.I.R., in Column No.6, it is to be mentioned whether the

informant is S.C./S.T. It is the duty of the concerned police

officer while registering the F.I.R. to elicit from the informant

about his caste particulars. In the instant case, the same has not

been done and that part has remained blank. Even if the

informant/victim indicates in the F.I.R. that he/she is a member

of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and the accused is not a

member of such caste or tribe, nonetheless it is the duty of the

investigating officer to ascertain the caste particulars of the
                                     35


informant/victim so also that of the accused from the competent

authority. Where the first information report is registered, inter

alia, for commission of offence under section 3 of 1989 Act, the

non-ascertainment      of     the        caste   particulars      of     the

informant/victim as well as the accused during course of

investigation would result in causing grave prejudice to the

parties.

           Therefore, I am of the humble view that the prima

facie ingredients of offence under section 294 of the Indian Penal

Code and in view of the caste particulars collected during course

of investigation, the ingredients of offence under section 3(1)(x)

of 1989 Act are attracted.

9.         The submission of the learned counsel for the

petitioner that the petitioner had submitted the application

forms/biodatas   of   the    informants      earlier   to   the   date    of

occurrence i.e. on 12.02.2008 and 19.02.2008 and therefore,

the genesis of the offence is also a doubtful feature, cannot be

adjudicated at this stage. In spite of submission of application

forms/biodatas, why the informants had grievances for which

they approached the petitioner on the date of occurrence is not

within the scope of purview of this application under section 482

of Cr.P.C. to be decided.
                                    36


10.           The submission of the learned counsel for the

petitioner that the petitioner was not examined by any police

officer in connection with the alleged incident which reveals

unfairness on the part of the investigating agency is not correct.

When the S.I. of police was investigating the case, the

whereabouts of the petitioner could not be ascertained which is

noted   in    the   case   diary. When   the   S.D.P.O.,   Aska    was

investigating the matter, the statement of the petitioner was

recorded on 09.07.2009 in which he highlighted about the filing

of Aska P.S. Case No. 110 of 2008.

11.           There is nothing on record to show that a malicious

prosecution has been instituted against the petitioner or the

criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide or it has

been instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance

on the petitioner and with a view to spite him due to private and

personal grudge and therefore, the ratio laid down in case of Ch.

Bhajan Lal (supra) is not applicable.

12.           The submission of the learned counsel for the

petitioner that petitioner is now seventy years of age and he is

suffering from many ailments, cannot be a ground to quash the

criminal     proceeding.   These   aspects   may   be   relevant   for

determination of the quantum of sentence at the end of trial.
                                              37


13.             In view of the foregoing discussions, I am of the

considered opinion that the impugned order does not suffer from

any illegality and therefore, it would not be proper to interfere

with the same invoking the inherent powers under section 482 of

Cr.P.C. which is to be used sparingly and with circumspection

                In the result, the CRLMC application being devoid of

merit, stands dismissed. Lower Court Record be sent back

immediately.

14.             Before parting with the case, I must record my deep

sense of appreciation for the able assistance rendered by Mr.

Sidharth Prasad Das, learned counsel for the petitioner. He had

prepared       the    case      minutely      and   presented   it   nicely   and

discharged his duty as an officer of the Court to the best of his

ability.

                                                          ..............................
                                                            S. K. Sahoo, J.

Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 7th August 2018/Pravakar/Sisir/Sukanta