Delhi High Court
Ranjan Gupta vs A.F. Ferguson & Company on 25 May, 1990
Equivalent citations: 42(1990)DLT66
JUDGMENT N.N. Goswamy, J.
(1) This revision petition by the owner-landlord is directed against the order dated 9.2.1989 passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, whereby his petition under Section 14(l)(e) read with Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act was dismissed.
(2) Though the petition has not been formally admitted but I have looked into the entire record and I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length at the admission stage itself. The petitioner is the owner landlord of premises No. 56-B; Friends Colony, New Delhi. First floor of the premises was let out to the respondent company. Originally the petition was filed on the ground that the ground floor of the premises which was in occupation of the petitioner was occupied by his mother and his sister and her daughter. It was alleged that the sister had been deserted by her husband and therefore was dependants on the petitioner for residence. It was pleaded that the petitioner was enjoying a very high status and in addition to his business at Ludhiana lie was having a business at Delhi and wanted to shift to Delhi. It was further pleaded that he being of a very high status could not live on the ground floor where his mother and sister and her daughter are living and therefore his requirement for the first floor was bona fide. It is not necessary to go into the details regarding the requirements pleaded in the petition because there has been a substantial change during the pendency of the petition - itself. By now admittedly the sister of the petitioner has got re-married -and is happily settled with her husband. The petitioner who himself was unmarried at the time when he had instituted the eviction petition has got married and is having two minor-children. Thus, at present the requirement is of the petitioner, his wife, two minor children and the mother of the petitioner.
(3) The arguments were addressed at length on the question as to whether the petitioner had shifted to Delhi or not. It is true that at the time when the petition was filed or till 1988 it was only a desire of the petitioner to shift to Delhi. According to the petitioner he has in fact shifted prior to 1988 though from the evidence of his sister and even from his own statement it cannot be spelt out that he had shifted to Delhi prior to 1988. In any case I am of the view that actual shifting is not necessary as long as the desire to shift is bona fide. The petitioner admittedly has his business at Delhi also. His children are now admitted in a school at Delhi and, therefore, it cannot be said that the desire of the petitioner to shift is not bona fide. Thus, I have proceeded on the assumption that the petitioner has shifted to Delhi.
(4) There is no dispute regarding the ownership and the letting purpose. It is established that the petitioner is the owner and the letting purpose was residential. As such the arguments were addressed only on the question of sufficiency of accommodation as far as the petitioner is concerned. A plan of the premises is available on record and is not in dispute. The ground floor which is admittedly in possession of the petitioner consists of drawing room dinning room, four bed rooms, a family lounge, a lobby and a glazed verandah. All the rooms are of fairly big size including the lobby and the verandah. The lobby itself is of 12'X14' and none of the bed rooms is less than 12'X15'. The bed rooms are attached with toilets and dressing rooms. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that one bed room is required for the petitioner and his wife, one bed room for the mother. one bed room for the sister of the petitioner whenever she visits and as such there is no accommodation for the guests and the study. It was also contended that the mother of the petitioner requires a puja room. In addition it was also submitted that the mother of the petitioner needs a separate kitchen also since her relations with her daughter-in-law are not very cordial. At the outset it has to be seen that the relation of the mother-in-law and daughter- in-law were not pleaded and the requirement of Puja room was also not pleaded. In any case I find that one bed room can be used by the petitioner and his wife, one bed room can be used by the children of the petitioner and one bed room can be used by the mother of the petitioner. All the bed rooms are of fairly big size and as such there can be no hindrance of the mother performing puja also in her bed room. Thus, we are left with one additional bed room and a lobby. The additional bed room can be used for the guests and the lobby can be used for the study. The glazed verandah can be used for any other purpose that the petitioner may desire.
(5) It is true that ordinarily owner-landlord is the judge of his requirements, but all the same it is not possible for a owner to pitch his claim too high on the ground that he is very affluent and wants to live in a fabulous style. It is the duty of the Court to see that the owner has sufficient accommodation for his living, at best comfortably living, but the extent of accommodation cannot be left to the mere desire or whims of the owner. In "Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain". , Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. as His Lordship then was speaking for the Court observed :- "Rent restriction laws are both beneficial and restrictive, beneficial for those who want protection from eviction and rack-renting but restrictive so far as the landlord's right or claim for eviction is concerned. Rent restriction laws would provide a habitat for the landlord or landlady if need be, but not to seek comforts other than habitat-that right the landlord must seek else where."
(6) Following the aforesaid decision of their Lordship of the Supreme Court I am clearly of the view that the accommodation available with the petitioner landlord is more than sufficient for his comfortable living and as such he is not entitled to any further accommodation and his need for the first floor is therefore, not bona fide.
(7) For the reasons recorded above I do not find any merit in this petition and dismiss the same. There will be no order as to costs.