Bombay High Court
Mr. Rafique Barkatulla Khan vs Mr. Shahenshah Hussain Iqbal Munshi on 28 September, 2011
Author: R.M. Borde
Bench: R.M. Borde
This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION.
Appeal from Order No. 977 of 2011
WITH
Civil Application No. 1299 of 2011 in AO
Mr. Rafique Barkatulla Khan
Aged 37 years, Occ: Business
M/s. Market Enterprises,
Shop no.2, 'Barkat Manzil',
Barkat Street, Sonaji Nagar,
Mumbra, Dist. Thane 400 612. ....Appellant
v/s.
Mr. Shahenshah Hussain Iqbal Munshi
An adult Indian,
R/at: Room no. 301, 3rd floor,
Mansi Apartment, New Mill Road,
Kurla (W), Mumbai 400070.
2. Thane Municipal Corporation,
Having its headquarters at
Mahapalika Bhavan, Chandan Wadi,
Panchpakhadi, Thane (W) 400602.
3. Mr. Arif Nawas Iraqi
aged adult, Indian
r/at: flat no.4, 1st floor,
C/11, Shamshad Nagar,
Mumbra, Dist. Thane 400612. ....Respondents
Mr. Shriram S.Kulkarni i/b. Law One Associates for the appellant.
Mr. P.B.Shah i/b. R.Y. Thorve for respondent no.3.
CORAM: R.M. BORDE, J.
28th September, 2011
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ORAL JUDGMENT:
The original plaintiff-appellant is taking exception to the judgment and order passed below exhibit 56 in Special Civil Suit No. 82/2008 by the 6 th Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thane on 28th July, 2011. The plaintiff instituted Special Civil Suit No. 82/2008 claiming declaratory decree that the Development Agreement dated 20th April, 2006 as well as the power of attorney of the same date executed by defendant no.1-respondent no.1 herein in favour of the plaintiff pertaining to the development of the property as valid and subsisting. The plaintiff has also sought a declaration that the plaintiff is only and exclusively entitled to develop the said property and construct buildings thereon in pursuance of the agreement dated 20th April, 2006 as well as the General Power of Attorney executed on the same date and in furtherance thereof, the plaintiff is solely entitled to the exclusive,quiet, vacant and peaceful possession of the said property to the exclusion of any other person/s whatsoever. The plaintiff has also sought an direction to defendant no.2 Thane Municipal Corporation to demolish any such illegal constructions that the defendant no.1 may put up on the said property and/or may get the same constructed through his agents, servants or any persons claiming through the defendant no.1. The plaintiff has sought a declaration that defendant no.1 or 3 or any person claiming through them do not have any right of development on the suit property and further hold that the plaintiff has exclusive rights of ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 3 ao977-11 judgm..sxw development of the suit property in exclusion of any other person including defendants 1 and 3. Plaintiff has sought restraining orders by way of permanent injunction from doing any construction work on the said property or any part thereof so also for restraining them from disturbing the peaceful possession of plaintiff on the suit property by encroaching upon suit property or any part thereof. The plaintiff has sought restraining orders against defendant no.2 Thane Municipal Corporation by way of perpetual injunction from entertaining any application by defendant no.1 or 3 or any other person/s claiming through them including application for sanctioning of development plant and permanently cancel any sanction and permission granted to them or any other person/s except the plaintiff. Plaintiff has sought a declaration that the Development Agreement executed on and between defendant no.1 and defendant no. 3 registered in the year 2008 be declared as null and void.
2. According to the plaintiff the defendant no.1 had granted development rights in respect of suit property and accordingly executed the Development Agreement and general power of attorney on 20th April, 2006 in favour of the plaintiffs. There is a mention in the Development Agreement that the suit property is clear and marketable. The plaintiff has paid an amount of Rs.
1,50,000/- by way of refundable security deposit in consideration of award of development rights of the suit property. It is the contention of the plaintiff that after execution of the development agreement it was realized that the property ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 4 ao977-11 judgm..sxw is declared as a private forest and there is a revenue entry recorded to that effect. The plaintiff as such took serious efforts and because of the efforts made by the plaintiff, the entry has been deleted and an order to that effect came to be passed by the revenue officials on 30th May, 2006. There was also a problem relating to Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as ULC Act) which was also required to be resolved and plaintiff took serious efforts for resolving that problem and was also required to incur expenses for securing an appropriate clearance under ULC Act.
Ultimately, according to the plaintiff the problem was resolved and property was released on 4th August, 2007.
Plaintiff thereafter realized that owner is trying to alienate the property. Such realization occurred to the plaintiff on 23rd October, 2007. Thereafter, the defendant no.1 proceeded to terminate the Development Agreement and the general power of attorney executed in favour of the plaintiff and a notice-cum-intimation letter came to be issued to the plaintiff at the instance of defendant on 3rd December, 2007. The plaintiff tendered his reply and putforth his case. He also transmitted a notice on 8 th January, 2008 which was followed by a police complaint against defendant no.1 on 25th January, 2008. Ultimately the plaintiff instituted the suit and filed an application claiming interim orders on 29th January, 2008. The plaintiff also registered the suit as contemplated by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act on 1st February, 2010. After registration of lis-pendence the defendant no.
1 has created interest in favour of defendant no.3 and executed an agreement ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 5 ao977-11 judgm..sxw thereby transferring the development rights in favour of defendant no.3. There was a registered deed executed in favour of defendant no.3 on 10 th March, 2008 which necessitated the amendment in the plaint. The plaintiff as such amended the plaint and sought additional reliefs which are referred to in the above noted paragraph.
3. Initial applications tendered by the plaintiff seeking interim order was not considered favourably by the trial Court. The plaintiff tendered an application at exhibit 54 after seeking an amendment to the plaint and sought a restrained order against the defendant no.1 as well as defendant no.3. The plaintiff requested Court to issue a restrain order against defendants 1 and 3 and all the persons claiming through them from doing any construction work on the suit property or any part thereof and direct them to stop any construction activities on the suit property pending disposal of the suit. The plaintiff also seeks an order of temporary injunction against the defendants 1 and 3 and all the persons claiming through them from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff over the suit property by encroaching upon suit property or any part thereof. An order is also sought against defendant no.2 TMC to stay the construction permission and sanction plan granted to defendant no.1 and/or defendant no.3 or any other person claiming through them. An interim order is sought against defendants 1 and 3 and all persons claiming through them restraining them from selling, transferring or alienating or dealing with the suit property or any part thereof or ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 6 ao977-11 judgm..sxw until disposal of the suit.
4. The application tendered by the plaintiff has been opposed by the respondents by filing written-statement. The adverse allegations made have been refuted. It is the case of the defendants that the plaintiff did not comply with the assurance given while entring in the agreement and as such a legal notice was issued on 3rd December, 2007 for cancellation of Development Agreement. The defendant no.1 has alienated the property in favour of defendant no.3 on 10th March, 2008 for valuable consideration. The document executed in favour of defendant no.3 is registered one. It is the contention of the defendants that the plaintiff does not have a prima-facie case nor likely to succeed in the suit. The document on which reliance is placed by the plaintiff, apart from being ambiguous and inadmissible, cannot be a basis for grant of injunction.
5. Turning to the documents executed in favour of the plaintiff which is dated 20th April, 2006 the owner has declared that he is absolute owner of the property and is entitled to deal with the same as absolute owner. It is also stated by the owner that property and every part thereof is free from all encumbrances, charges, equities and demands and title of the owner to the said property and every part thereof is clear and marketable. The developer/plaintiff agreed to acquire and undertake development rights in ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 7 ao977-11 judgm..sxw respect of the property with a view to undertake construction of multistoried buildings on the said property in accordance with plans and specifications sanctioned by the Gram Panchayat and to sell the units of the proposed buildings to the proposed purchaser and to form a co-operative housing society of the purchasers of the unit of the proposed building together with the land below the same in favour of or in the name of such co-operative housing society. In paragraph 2 of the Development Agreement it is stated thus:
"That in consideration of the Owner granting and assigning the right of development in respect of the said property to the Developer herein, the Developer shall allot free of cost and on ownership basis ___ Sq. Ft. of the total F.S.I. ____ Sq. Ft granted by the Gram panchayat on the said property in respect of the said proposed building. The said F.S.I. Shall be in the shape of residential units in form of 'A' and 'B' Wings of the proposed buildings to be constructed on the property fully constructed together with standard amenities as usually granted, which amenities are specified in Schedule 'B' hereunder written. The Developer shall incurred ball and whatsoever expenses for the construction of the proposed building. That the developer shall alone be entitled to the balance ____ Sq. Ft. F.S.I. granted by the Gram panchayat to the Developer. It is specifically declared by the parties hereto that the Developer shall allot above said 22% F.S.I. In the shape of residential units, proportionately 22% on each floor of the said proposed building. That after sanction of plans and specifications by the Thane Municipal Corporation, the floor plan of the said proposed building will be attached to this agreement and will be shown in red colour boundary and which floor plan shall be attached and treated the part of this agreement."
6. In para-3 of the Development Agreement it is declared that in the event the developer is not able to allot exact 22% F.S.I. on one floor, the same may be adjusted on the last floor. The refundable security deposit is payable amounting to Rs. 1,50,000 as noted in paragraph 4 of the Development ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 8 ao977-11 judgm..sxw Agreement. Paragraph 6 of the Development Agreement refers to the sanction of development plans and specifications by the Gram Panchayat. In paragraph 9 of the Development Agreement the defendant has undertaken that if the construction work is held up or abandoned for the reason of non-availability of material in market, Act of nature, Civil War or any act, deed and matter beyond the capacity of the developer that particular period may not be counted in the construction work period cited herein before. In para 11(b) the defendant no.
1 has reiterated that the property and the part thereof is free from all encumbrances, charges, equities and demands and his title to the property is clear and marketable. In para-15 of the agreement, the agreement is reached between the parties that because of delay on the part of the owner or delay in removing any defects in the said property after commencement of development activities on the said property by the developer, for such delayed period, the owner shall be given relaxation for such period of completion of the said work.
Paragraph no. 19 relates to termination of agreement. It is as quoted below:-
" If any dispute arise between the parties about delay in the construction work notwithstanding anything herein mentioned, either party at liberty to terminate this agreement by giving advance notice to each party by one month and the security deposit shall be refunded to the Developer after due settlement mutually agreed by and between the parties."
7. Thus it is the contention of the plaintiff that the delay attributable for execution of the work is because of defects in the title of the defendant.
Although it is declared that property is clear from all encumbrances and is fully ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 9 ao977-11 judgm..sxw marketable, it was found that there was reservation in respect of private forest and there was also problems relating to securing saction as per provisions of ULC Act. The plaintiff had to take steps for getting the property cleared and for removing the entries in respect of private forest and for securing appropriate orders from ULC authorities. The entry in respect of the private forest was deleted only in the month of May 2006 whereas the corrections in the revenue record were recorded only in the year 2007. The problem relating to securing sanction undaer provisions of ULC Act is concerned, it was resolved only on 4th August, 2007. Therefore, the period required for securing the marketable title and for removing the defects ought to be excluded. It cannot be inferred that the plaintiff is instrumental in delaying the development work and the notice issued by the defendant no.1 terminating the Development Agreement is not only erroneous but is also against the express provisions contained in the agreement. It is contended that apart from taking steps for getting the property cleared and securing the entries in respect of private forest removed, the plaintiff has also taken steps for developing property and approached the Municipal Corporation with the applications for division of larger area and also have taken certain steps for development of the property.
8. It is urged that the creation of third party interest during the subsistence of the agreement and during the subsistence of litigation even after registration of lis-pendence is illegal. According to Counsel appearing for plaintiff-
::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 :::This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 10 ao977-11 judgm..sxw appellant the creation of third party interest in favour of the defendant no.3 by defendant no.1 after registration of lis-pendence is not only illegal but the said transaction ought to be branded as void. The defendant no.3, therefore, cannot get any right to enter into property and develop the property during the pendency and disposal of the litigation. The trial Judge has committed a serious error in refusing to grant protection as asked for during the pendency of the suit. The learned Counsel appearing for plaintiff has also canvassed that the plaintiff is successful in pointing out that there are serious triable issues involved in the matter. The plaintiff has fair chance of success in the suit. It is also contended that plaintiff has established the prima-facie case. Balance of convenience lies in favour of the plaintiff and if development is permitted to be continued during the pendency of the suit, irreparable injury is likely to be caused and whatever development would take place during the continuation of litigation cannot be reasonably and properly undone in the event of success of the suit. The plaintiff as such contends that the order passed by the trial Court suffers from serious errors and is liable to be quashed and set aside.
9. The learned Counsel appearing for respondent-original defendant contends that the agreement if read at its face value is not capable of being put to a proper interpretation. It is full of infirmities. There are blank spaces left in the agreement. The reference in the agreement in respect of securing permission or sanction from the Gram Panchayat authority is not only ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 11 ao977-11 judgm..sxw misleading but has an effect of rendering the whole agreement incapable of being put to execution. It is also contended that the possession is stated to have been delivered in the agreement. The agreement is not registered nor proper stamp duty is paid. The document is conveyance within meaning of Bombay Stamp Act which is required to be affixed with necessary stamps. In the absence of payment of adequate stamp duty, the document cannot be taken into consideration for any purpose as mandated by Section 34 of the Act. It is also contended by the defendant that the document executed in favour of the defendant no.3 is for valuable consideration of more than 20 lacs. The amount has been paid by defendant no.3 in favour of defendant no.1. The defendant no.3 has started construction activities over the property. The Thane Municipal Corporation has issued Commencement Certificate in the year 2010 itself and the development activities are in full swing. It is contended that the alleged agreement in favour of the plaintiff has been terminated by defendant no.1 on 3rd December, 2007. There is no challenge to the notice of termination in the plaint. There is no prayer made in the plaint for setting aside or quashment of notice/communication terminating the Development Agreement of the plaintiff.
In the absence of such a prayer, the plaintiff is not likely to succeed in the suit.
It is contended that the Development Agreement allegedly executed in favour of the plaintiff cannot be specifically enforced and the only remedy available in law for the plaintiff is to claim damages. The plaintiff has not quantified the damages nor has ascertained his monetary claim in the plaint. It is contended ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 12 ao977-11 judgm..sxw that effect of the transaction between the defendant no.1 and defendant no.3 after registration of lis is as stated in Section 52 of the Act. Creation of third party interest would be subject to limitations of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is contended that balance of convenience does not lie in favour of the plaintiff nor he has made out any prima-facie case and as such request is made for dismissal of the Appeal.
10. The first question that arise for consideration is as to what is the effect of the transaction taken place between defendant no.1 and defendant no.3 after registration of lis by the plaintiff. The provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act as is applicable to State of Maharashtra is as quoted below.
"52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto.- (1) During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir established beyond such limits by the Central Government, of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, if a notice of the pendency of such suit or proceeding is registered under section 18 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, the property after the notice is so registered cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose.
(2) Every notice of pendency of a suit or proceeding referred to in sub-section (1) shall contain the following particulars, namely:-
(a) the name and address of the owner of immovable property or other personw hose right tot he immovable property is in question;::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 :::
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(b) the description of the immovable property the right to which is in question;
(c) the Court in which the suit or proceeding is pending;
(d) the nature and title of the suit or proceeding; and
(e) the date of which the suit or proceeding was instituted.
[Explanation. -For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.]"
11. Simultaneously, Section 18 of the Registration Act was also amended to provide for registration of notice in pending suit. Principle of lis perdana is considered in the matter of Guruswamy Nad v/s. P. Lakshmi Ammal (dead) through Lrs & ors. (2008) 5 SCC page 796. In paragraph no. 10 onwards the Apex Court has observed as below:
"10. The principle of lis pendens is still settled principle of law. In this connection, the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Ram Peary (supra) has considered the scope of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Full Bench has referred to a decision in Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 44 ER 842 at p.843)wherein it was observed as under:
It is scarcely correct to speak of lis pendens as affecting a purchaser through the doctrine of notice, though undoubtedly the language of the Courts often so describes its operation. It affects him not because it amounts to notice, but because the law does not allow litigant parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute, so as to prejudice the opposite party.
Where a litigation is pending between a plaintiff and a ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order
14 ao977-11 judgm..sxw defendant as to the right to a particular estate, the necessities of mankind required that the decision of the Court in the suit shall be binding, not only on the litigant parties, but also on those who derive title under them by alienations made pending the suit, whether such alienees had or had not notice of the pending proceedings. If this wsere not so, there could be no certainty that the litigation would ever come to an end.
11. Similarly the Privy Council in Faiyaz Husain Khan v. Munshi Prag Narain where the Court lay stress on the necessity for final adjudication and observation that otherwise there would be no end to litigation and justice would be defeated.
12. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court further referred to the work of Story on Equity IIIrd Edition,(para 406) which expounded the doctrine of lis pendens in the terms as follows: (Ram Peary case AIR p319 para6) Ordinarily, it is true that the judgment of a court binds only the parties and their privies in representations or estate. But he who purchases during the pendency of an action, is held bound by the judgment that may be made against the person from whom he derives title. The litigating parties are exempted from taking any notice of the title so acquired; and such purchaser need not be made a party to the action. Where there is a real and fair purchase without any notice, the rule may operate very hardly. But it is a rule founded upon a great public policy; for otherwise, alienations made during an action might defeat its whole purpose, and there would be no end to litigation. And hence arises the maxim pendent elite, nihil innovetur; the effect of which is not to annul the conveyance but only to refer it subservient to the rights of the parties in the litigation. As to the rights of these parties, the conveyance is treated as if it never had any existence; and it does not vary them.
13. Normally, as a public policy once a suit has been filed pertaining to any subject matter of the property, in order to put an end to such kind of litigation, the principle of lis pendens has been evolved so that the litigation may finally terminate without intervention of a third party. This is because of public policy otherwise no litigation will come to an end. Therefore, in order to discourage that same subject matter of property being subjected to subsequent sale to a third person, this kind of transaction is to be checked. Otherwise, litigation will never come to an end.
14. Our attention was invited to a decision of this Court in R.K. Mohammed Ubaidullah and Ors. v. Hajee C. Abdul Wahab (D) by L.Rs. and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1658. In this case it was observed that a person who purchased the property should make necessary effort to find out with regard to that property, whether the title or interest of the person from whom he is making purchase was in actual possession of ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 15 ao977-11 judgm..sxw such property. In this case, the plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of contract and during the pendency of the suit, rest of the defendants brought subsequent transaction of sale by the defendant in their favour claiming the title to the suit property on the ground that they were the bona fide purchasers for value without notice of prior agreements in favour of plaintiff and they were also aware that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property as a tenant for last several years and that they did not make any inquiry if plaintiff had any further or other interest in the suit property on the date of execution of sale deed in their favour apart from that he was in possession of the property as a tenant. In that context their Lordships observed that subsequent purchaser cannot be said to be bona fide purchaser of the suit property for value without notice of suit agreement and plaintiff would be entitled to relief of specific performance. Their Lordships after considering the effect of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act as well as Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act held that subsequent purchaser has to be aware before he purchases the suit property."
12. Thus, it is clear that once a suit has been filed pertaining to the subject matter of the property in order to put an end to such kind of litigation, the principle of lis-pendence has been evolved so that the litigation may finally terminate without intervention of a third party. In order to discourage same subject matter of the property being subject to subsequent sale to a third party, this kind of transaction has to be checked. Otherwise, litigation will never come to an end. The effect of the principle of the lis-pendence would be that the third party shall not have entitlement of intervention in the pending suit and would be bound by the result of the suit. Sofar as the Maharashtra Amendment Act is concerned on registration of the lis it shall be presumed to be a notice to all in respect of the pending litigation and thus it would not be open for the purchaser pendant lit to contend that he is bonafide purchaser without notice.
Registration of lis-pendence with the registering Authority is notice to all including the purchaser who steps in during pendency of litigation. Thus, it ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 16 ao977-11 judgm..sxw would not be open for the third party to come forward and say that there is no notice of litigation and that he is bonafide purchaser for value. The effect of entering into any transaction after registration of lis would be the same as provided under Section 52 of the Act. Identical issue has been dealt with in Sanjay Varma's case reported in 2006(13) SCC page 608/ AIR 2007 SCC 1332. The Supreme Court was considering an appeal against the order passed by the High Court allowing impleadment of transferees pendente lite in suit for specific performance which was pending before the trial Court. In the suit a declaration was sought that defendant no.1 had no right to execute sale deeds in favour of defendant nos. 2 to 5. Permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with peaceful possession of the plaintiff was sought. During pendency of litigation one of the defendant transfered the property to one Shyam who in turn transferred it to Manik Roy and anr. These transferees applied for impleadment before the trial Court which rejected the prayer. Third party purchasers questioned the order before the High Court which allowed the petition and directed that they be added as parties. The plaintiffs questioned order of High Court before the Supreme Court contending that the effect of Section 52 of the TP Act had been totally lost sight of. While supporting the order, respondents placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in Bibi Zubaida Khatoon v/s. Nabi Hassan Saheb & anr. {2004(1) SCC page 191}. The Supreme Court held that the Judgment in Khatoon's case was infact against the respondents' stand claiming impleadment. In paras 10 and ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 17 ao977-11 judgm..sxw 11, the Court quoted with approval from previous judgments in Servinder Singh v/s. Dalip Singh & ors. reported in 1996 (5) SCC 539 and Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v/s. Jai Prakash University and others, reported in 2001 (6) SCC 534 to the following effect:
" It would, therefore, be clear that the defendants in the suit were prohibited by operation of Section 52 to deal with the property and could not transfer or otherwise deal with it in any way affecting the rights of the appellant except with the order or authority of the court. Admittedly, the authority or order of the court had not been obtained for alienation of those properties. Therefore, the alienation obviously would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens by operation of Section 52. Under these circumstances, the respondents cannot be considered to be either necessary or proper parties to the suit.
In Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University and ors.
(2001) (6) SCC 534 it was noted as follows: 2011 AIR SCW 2674.
Under Rule 10, Order 22 of the Code, when there has been a devolution of interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against persons upon whom such interest has devolved and this entitles, the person who has acquired an interest in the subject matter of the litigation by an assignment or creation or devolution of interest pendente lite or suitor or any other person interested, to apply to the Court for leave to continue the suit. But it does not follow that it is obligatory upon them to do so. If a party does not ask for leave, he takes the obvious risk that the suit may not be properly conducted by the Plaintiff on record, and yet, as pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Moti Lal v. Karab-ud-Din , he will be bound by the result of the litigation even though he is not represented at the hearing unless it is shown that the litigation was not properly conducted by the original party or he colluded wither the adversary. It is also plain that if the person who has acquired an interest by devolution, obtains leave to carry on the suit, the suit in his hands is not a new suit, for, as Lord Kingsdown of the Judicial Committee said in Prannath v. Rookea Begum , a cause of action is not prolonged by mere transfer of the title. It is the old suit carried on at his instance and he is bound by all proceedings up to the stage when he obtains leave to carry on the proceedings.
The Court then concluded in paras 12 and 13 as under:
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18 ao977-11 judgm..sxw "12. The principles specified in Section 52 of the T.P. Act are in accordance with equity, good conscience or justice because they rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be impossible to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if alienations are permitted to prevail. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit.
The principle of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the T.P. Act being a principle of public policy, no question of good faith or bona fide arises. The principle underlying Section 52 is that a litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subject- matter of the suit. The Section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the Court. "
13. In kachhi property v/s. Ganpatrao S. Kadam and ors. reported in 2010 (9) LJSOFT 10, it has been observed by the learned Single Judge in para 30 of the Judgment;
"30. To sum up:
(a) Section 52 of the TP Act provides adequate protection to the parties from transfers pendente lite and such transferees are neither required to be impleaded nor can claim impleadment. They cannot even resist execution proceedings.
(b) In Mumbai (as also elsewhere as and when amended
provisions are made applicable) plaintiffs could (or
rather ought to) have notices of their suits registered under Section 18 of the Indian Registration Act, in view of the amended provision of the TP Act and the Registration Act. They cannot seek to restrain adversary by an injunction by refusing to go in for registration of the lis.
(c) Rule 1 of Order XXXIX of the Civil Procedure Code enabling Court to grant temporary injunctions to restrain transfers pendente lite is only an enabling provision, recognizing the power in the Court to issue such injunction and does not imply that because there is ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 19 ao977-11 judgm..sxw power, it must be exercised. The provision could be invoked only if protection provided by Section 52 of the TP Act is shown to be inadequate.
(d) In the face of protection provided by Section 52 of the TP Act, Courts should be cautious in examining the claims by plaintiffs of irreparable loss if injunction to restrain alienations is refused.
(e) In suits for specific performance/right to develop
against the recorded/rightful owners, Courts may consider if
an injunction would cause greater inconvenience
to a rightful owner by being deprived the right to deal with his
property for the sake of a claim which is yet to mature into right and which metamorphosis rests in the discretion of the Court and is not certain.
(f) Courts may
conditions
consider necessity of imposing suitable
to protect plaintiffs' interests short of granting injunction - like seeking undertaking that no equities would be claimed, on account of sale/development of properties; effecting sales only after putting transferees to notice that their rights would be subject to suit etc. Interests of prospective purchasers would also be protected if plaintiffs in such cases register the lis, though it may be optional."
14. The learned Single Judge has expressed word of 'caution' in the matters where protection is provided under Section 52 of the TP Act. It has been observed that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property provides additional protection to the parties from transfers pendente lite and such transferees are neither required to be impleaded nor can claim impleadment. Thus the effect of operation of the provisions of Section 52 as applicable to the State of Maharashtra would be the same as has been enunciated by the learned Single Judge in Judgment as well as Judgment of the Apex Court cited supra.
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15. The Counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that the plaintiff has a prima-facie case and balance of convenience lies in his favour. He has invited my attention to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in relation to grant or refusal of injunction in the matter of M. Gurudas & ors. vs. Rasaranjan & ors. {(2006) 8 SCC 367}. My attention is invited to para 18-21 of the judgment which reads thus:-
"18. While considering an application for injunction, it is well-settled, the courts would pass an order thereupon having regard to:
(i) Prima facie
(ii) Balance of convenience
(iii) Irreparable injury.
19. A finding on 'prima facie case' would be a finding of fact.
However, while arriving at such finding of fact, the court not only must arrive at a conclusion that a case for trial has been made out but also other factors requisite for grant of injunction exist. There may be a debate as has been sought to be raised by Dr. Rajeev Dhawan that the decision of House of Lords in American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd. would have no application in a case of this nature as was opined by this Court in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. MANU/SC/0494/1999 : AIR1999SC3105 and S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd. MANU/SC/0407/2000 : 2000ECR1(SC) , but we are not persuaded to delve thereinto.
20. We may only notice that the decisions of this Court in Colgate Palmolive (supra) and S.M. Dyechem Ltd. (supra) relate to intellectual property rights. The question, however, has been taken into consideration by a Bench of this Court in Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. v. Lanco Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd. MANU/SC/2523/2005 : (2006)1SCC540 stating:
The Respondent, therefore, has raised triable issues. What would constitute triable issues has succinctly been dealt with by the House of Lords in its well-known decision in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. holding:::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 :::
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21 ao977-11 judgm..sxw Your Lordships should in my view take this opportunity of declaring that there is no such rule. The use of such expression as 'a probability', 'a prima facie case', or 'a strong prima facie case' in the context of the exercise of a discretionary power to grant an interlocutory injunction leads to confusion as to the object sought to be achieved by this form of temporary relief. The court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious; in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried.
It was further observed:
Where other factors appear to be evenly balanced it is a counsel of prudence to take such measures as are calculated to preserve the status quo. If the defendant is enjoined temporarily from doing something that he has not done before, the only effect of the interlocutory injunction in the event of his succeeding at the trial is to postpone the date at which he is able to embark on a course of action which he has not previously found it necessary to undertake; whereas to interrupt him in the conduct of an established enterprise would cause much greater inconvenience to him since he would have to start again to establish it in the event of his succeeding at the trial The factors which he took into consideration, and in my view properly, were that Ethicon's sutures XLG were not yet on the market; so that had no business which would be brought to a stop by the injunction; no factories would be closed and no workpeople would be thrown out of work. They held a dominant position in the United Kingdom market for absorbable surgical sutures and adopted an aggressive sales policy.
We are, however, not oblivious of the subsequent development of law both in England as well as in this jurisdiction. The Chancery Division in Series 5 Software v. Clarke opined:
In many cases before American Cyanamid the prospect of success was one of the important factors taken into account in assessing the balance of convenience. The courts would be less willing to subject the plaintiff to the risk of irrecoverable loss which would befall him if an interlocutory injunction was refused in those cases where it thought he was likely to win at the trial than in those cases where it thought he was likely to lose. The assessment of the prospects of success therefore was an important factor in deciding whether the court should exercise its discretion to grant interlocutory relief. It is this consideration which American Cyanamid is said to have prohibited in all but the most exceptional case. So it is necessary to consider with some care what was said in the House of Lords on this issue.::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 :::
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22 ao977-11 judgm..sxw In Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. MANU/SC/0494/1999 : AIR1999SC3105 , this Court observed that Laddie, J. in Series 5 Software (supra) had been able to resolve the issue without any departure from the true perspective of the judgment in American Cyanamid, In that case, however, this Court was considering a matter under Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969.
In S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd.
MANU/SC/0407/2000 : 2000ECR1(SC) , Jagannadha Rao, J. in a case arising under Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 reiterated the same principle stating that even the comparative strength and weaknesses of the parties may be a subject matter of consideration for the purpose of grant of injunction in trade mark matters stating:
21...Therefore, in trademark matters, it is now necessary to go into the question of "comparable strength" of the cases of either party, apart from balance of convenience. Point 4 is decided accordingly.
The said decisions were noticed yet again in a case involving infringement of trade mark in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. MANU/SC/0199/2001 : [2001]2SCR743 .
21. While considering the question of granting an order of injunction one way or the other, evidently, the court, apart from finding out a prima facie case, would consider the question in regard to the balance of convenience of the parties as also irreparable injury which might be suffered by the plaintiffs if the prayer for injunction is to be refused. The contention of the plaintiffs must be bona fide. The question sought to be tried must be a serious question and not only on a mere triable issue. [See Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden and Ors. MANU/SC/0161/1990 : [1990]1SCR332 , Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v. Prahlad Singh and Ors. MANU/SC/0715/1991 :
AIR1993SC276b , United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0003/1981 : [1981]3SCR300 , Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. Coca Cola Co. and Ors. MANU/SC/0472/1995 :
AIR1995SC2372 , Bina Murlidhar Hemdev and Ors. v. Kanhaiyalal Lokram Hemdev and Ors. MANU/SC/0386/1999 : [1999]3SCR677 and Transmission Corporation of A.P. Ltd. (supra)]"
16. The plaintiff has vehemently contended that agreement in his favour by the defendant no.1 is earlier in point of time. The termination of the agreement by issuing notice is an act not contemplated by the terms of the agreement itself ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 23 ao977-11 judgm..sxw and there is no necessity to apply for setting aside the notice and act itself is void. It is contended that the plaintiff is entitled to seek extension of time to perform obligation, for the reason that the defendant no.1 himself is responsible for making the false representation to the effect that property given under the agreement has a clear and marketable title, however, it was later on revealed that there were certain problems such as mutation entry about private forest and necessity of securing clearance from ULC authorities. The plaintiff had to take steps which consumed time for acquiring appropriate permissions from the various authorities.
The plaintiff has also taken steps in furtherance of Development Agreement and secured necessary permission from the Thane Municipal Corporation for developing property. The defendant no.1 was not justified in issuing the notice of termination and infact issuance of such notice has no fatel effect. Eventually, it was not open for the defendant no.1 to enter into transaction with the defendant no.3, and more so after plaintiff registered the plaint.
17. As I have stated above, the effect of registration of lis is akin to the effect of provisions of Section 52 of the T.P. Act. It also to be taken note of that the plaintiff has not sought the cancellation of the notice terminating his agreement. The plaintiff has sought merely declaratory relief and a restraining order against the defendants.
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18. The objection relating to the failure of plaintiff to register the development agreement also needs attention. It cannot be controverted that in para-2 of the agreement there are blank spaces left and omissions are material, as those relate to allotment of built up area on ownership basis free of costs.
There is also mention in several clauses of the agreement relating to securing permission from Gram Panchayat. As has been pointed out the property is situated within the area of Thane Municipal Corporation and the permissions that are required to be taken are from Thane Municipal Corporation. There is some substance in the contention of the defendants that the agreement as it stands is not capable of importing meaning and is ambiguous. Another aspect of the matter is that the agreement in question though it purports to transfer possession is not registered. The document is covenance within the meaning of Article 25 of Schedule I of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 and is required to be sufficiently stampped. Explanation I of Article 25 provides thus:-
Explanation 1 __ For the purposes of this article, where in the case of agreement to sell an immovable property, the possession of any immovable property is transferred (or agreed to be transferred) to the purchaser before the execution, or at the time of execution, or after the execution of, such agreement then such agreement to sell shall be deemed to be a conveyance and stamp duty thereon shall be leviable accordingly:
Provided that, the provisions of section 32A shall apply mutatis mutandis to such agreement which is deemed to be a conveyance as aforesaid, as they apply to a conveyance under that section:::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 :::
This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 25 ao977-11 judgm..sxw Section 34 of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 provides that instruments not duly stamped are not admissible in evidence. According to the relevant Section no instrument chargeable with the duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law consent of the party authority to receive evidence or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer unless such instrument is duly stamped. The embargo is not only applicable for admission of the document in evidence but for its being acted upon. Thus, the document which is unregistered instrument cannot be acted upon. Reliance is placed on the Judgment of the Single Judge in the matter of Sanjay s/o. Shrikishanji Somani & anr. vs. Vishnupant s/o Shankarrao Shahane reported in 2007 (6) ALL MR 863. It is contended that while considering injunction application, recording of evidence is not necessary and applications are required to be decided on the basis of facts stated in affidavit or otherwise. It is not necessary to consider the issues relating to admissibility of the documents. The application for grant of injunction to be decided as contemplated by Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of the Code and on the basis of the facts stated in the affidavit or otherwise. The stage of recording of evidence is a subsequent stage and the question of registration of the document and its admissibility in evidence shall have to be considered at the later stage.
In para-11 of the Judgment it is observed thus:
"11. Rule 1 opens with wording "where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise....", Court may grant or refuse temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff. The scope of consideration of ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 26 ao977-11 judgm..sxw prayer clause for injunction is, therefore, being governed by proof of facts by affidavit or otherwise. It is not obligatory on the part of the party, at this stage, to prove the documents in accordance with rules of Indian Evidence Act. The party to the suit may file various documents, for the consideration of prayer of temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of 1908. The Court, at the first instance, is required to consider such prayer in view of the provision laid down under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of 1908. If fact alleged by the plaintiff is supported by an affidavit or otherwise, meaning thereby some documents, Court has to record a prima facie opinion in respect of the existence of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss to the party concerned. It is not the stage at which Court can exercise power of impounding the document. Apart from Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of 1908, a look to provision under Section 34 of the Bombay Stamp Act would show that instrument not duly stamped are inadmissible in evidence. Instruments/documents are to be admitted in evidence, at the time of hearing of the suit, as noted in the foregoing paragraphs. Section 34 of the Bombay Stamps Act obligates the Court that no instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having bye law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence. Thus, prohibition put by Section 34 of the Bombay Stamp Act is in relation to receiving any document or admitting any document in evidence. This stage has to be in relation to the hearing of the suit itself and not an application for temporary injunction. Section 35 of the Bombay Stamps Act is in relation to admission of the instrument, except as provided in Section 58, be called in question at any stage. Section 35 thus reads:
35. Where an instrument has been admitted in evidence, such admission shall not, except as provided in Section 58, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped.
Bare reading of Section 35 makes it clear that it becomes applicable only after an instrument is admitted in evidence. The stage of consideration of the application for temporary injunction has to be considered distinctly to that of stage of hearing/recording of the evidence in the suit itself."
19. Although the learned Judge has referred to Section 34 of the Bombay Stamp Act, the court has considered the Section from the point of admissibility ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 27 ao977-11 judgm..sxw of document in evidence. But the embargo put up by section also is in respect of the document being acted upon. In view of the provisions of Section 34 of Bombay Stamp Act, I am doubtful as to whether the document i.e. Insufficiently stamped Agreement can be acted upon or can be considered even for the purpose for grant of an order of injunction. It would be relevant to refer to the Judgment of Apex Court in that regard in the matter of Suraj Lamp & Industries Private Limited v/s. State of Haryana & ors.,{(2009) 7 SCC 363}.
The Apex Court has observed that consequence to the transactions require the document to be sufficiently stampped if not stampped and no requisite stamp duty is paid the consequences of omission are disturbing and far-reaching, affect economy adversely. Where law requires document need to be registered, it must be registered otherwise consequences of such act not only affect others, but also affects economy and law and order. In para 20-24 of the Judgment the Apex Court has observed thus:-
"20. Whatever be the intention, the consequences are disturbing and far reaching, adversely affecting the economy, civil society and law and order. Firstly, it enables large scale evasion of income tax, wealth tax, stamp duty and registration fees thereby denying the benefit of such revenue to the government and the public. Secondly, such transactions enable persons with undisclosed wealth/income to invest their black money and also earn profit/income, thereby encouraging circulation of black money and corruption.
21. These kinds of transactions has disastrous collateral effects also. For example, when the market value increases, many vendors (who effected power of attorney sales without registration) are tempted to resell the property taking advantage of the fact that there is no registered instrument or record in any public office thereby cheating the purchaser. When the purchaser under such `power of attorney sales' comes to know about the vendors action, he ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order
28 ao977-11 judgm..sxw invariably tries to take the help of musclemen to `sort out' the issue and protect his rights. On the other hand, real estate mafia many a time purchase properties which are already subject to power of attorney sale and then threaten the previous `Power of Attorney Sale' purchasers from asserting their rights. Either way, such power of attorney sales indirectly lead to growth of real estate mafia and criminalization of real estate transactions.
22. Some states have made some efforts to control such `Power of Attorney Sales' by subjecting agreements of sale involving delivery of possession and irrevocable powers of attorney for consideration, to the same stamp duty as deeds of conveyance or by making such documents compulsorily registrable. But the steps taken are neither adequate nor properly implemented resulting in multiple transactions in regard to the same property by greedy and unscrupulous vendors and/or purchasers giving nightmares to bonafide purchasers intending to buy a property with certainty regarding title. It also makes it difficult for lawyers in tracing and certifying title.
23. Any process which interferes with regular transfers under deeds of conveyance properly stamped, registered and recorded in the registers of the Registration Department, is to be discouraged and deprecated. The present case is a typical example of the consequences of not obtaining a registered sale deed. There is apparently no reason as to why a company registered under the Companies Act should resort to such a transaction. Execution of a will by an individual bequeathing an immovable property to a company, is also incongruous and absurd.
24. If there was a bar and the process was adopted to overcome such bar regarding sale of lands, then courts should not go to their assistance, as that would amount to perpetuating illegalities. If there was no bar, then the questions that arise are: why should a company hold a property in a state of suspended animation from 1991? How can a company `verbally' agree to sell a property to someone? What is the reason for the delay in lodging the complaints? If petitioner had purchased the property under a registered sale deed, numerous disputes, litigations and criminal proceedings could have been avoided. The illegal and irregular process of `Power of Attorney Sales' spawns several disputes relating to possession and title, and also results in criminal complaints and cross complaints and extra- legal enforcement and forced settlements by land mafia. We are therefore of the view that the situation warrants special measures."
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20. The Apex Court has expressed a word of caution in respect of acting upon unregistered /unstampped documents which are compulsorily required to be registered/stampped. The observations of the Apex Court are self explanatory one and no further comments are required to be made. In my humble opinion, the learned trial Judge was justified in refusing to place reliance on the unregistered/insufficiently stampped document executed in favour of the plaintiff, even for the purpose of refusing to grant temporary injunction.
21. It is contended by the Counsel appearing for the respondent-defendant that the defendant in furtherance of the agreement has taken steps and started construction activity. He has also received Commencement Certificate from the Thane Municipal Corporation in 2010 itself and has commenced the work of construction. In Civil Application presented by the applicant, it has been in terms stated that defendant has started construction. Thus meaning thereby the defendant has been put in possession of the property. There can be little doubt as to defendant no.3 having possession of the property. It is contended that the matter relates to development of properly on the basis of development agreement and even if plaintiff succeeds in the litigation, he would be entitled to claim damages. The plaintiff has not quantified the damages nor there is reference thereto in the plaint. The Development Agreement recites that the ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 ::: This Order is modified/corrected by Speaking to Minutes Order 30 ao977-11 judgm..sxw plaintiff has paid a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-towards refundable deposit. While refusing to grant injunction, the defendant no.1 could have been put to terms, however, as the defendant has not put forth any claim in terms of damages, I do not wish to issue any direction. For the reasons recorded above, I am convinced that the Appeal from Order does not deserve favourable consideration.
22. The Appeal from Order is devoid of merits and therefore stand dismissed. In view of disposal of Appeal from Order, pending Civil Application do not survive and stand disposed of.
23. The Counsel appearing for the appellant states that there was a stay of the order of dismissal operating during intervening period and same be confirmed.
In law, there cannot be any stay to the order of rejection of application for injunction. The order of grant of stay in respect of rejection of application is inconsequential. The Counsel also requests for passing an order directing the parties to maintain status-quo so as to enable him to approach the Apex Court.
However, for the reasons recorded in the Judgment, I am convinced that no such order is warranted in the instant matter. The oral prayer made for grant of status-quo stand rejected.
(R.M.BORDE, J) ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 17:46:48 :::