Punjab-Haryana High Court
Swastika Woollens vs Presiding Officer, Employees ... on 10 January, 2002
Equivalent citations: (2003)ILLJ241P&H
Author: Bakshish Kaur
Bench: Bakshish Kaur
JUDGMENT G.S. Singhvi, J.
1. These petitions are directed against orders dated 11.6.1998, 12.4.1999 and 16.8.1999 (Annexures P14, P15 and PI7) passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Ludhiana (respondent No. 2) and Presiding Officer, Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (respondent No. 1), respectively.
2. For the sake of convenience, we may notice the detailed facts from Civil Writ Petition No. 4909 of 2000.
3. The petitioner is a small scale industrial unit. It commenced production on 27.4.1981. After four years, it applied for coverage under the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for short the Act). There was some controversy about the allotment of code to the petitioner and its sister concern, namely M/s Taneja Woollens Mills (petitioner in CWP No. 5895 of 2000) (both have a common proprietor namely M/s Swastika Wool Traders Private Limited). The dispute was finally resolved in 1991. Thereafter respondent No. 2 issued notice dated 19.4.1991 (Annexure P5) to the petitioner for determination of its liability under Section 7A of the Act. The petitioner contested the notice and pleaded that the amount due under the act had been deposited during the relevant years. It also prayed for the grant of opportunity to produce the relevant records. Vide order dated 21.10.1991 (Annexure P8) respondent No.2 determined liability of the petitioner at Rs. 98,696.65/- for the period from June 1981 to June 1984 and asked it to deposit the amount within 15 days. The petitioner challenged the order of assessment by filing a petition under Section 19A of the Act, which was allowed by the competent authority of the Central Government vide order dated 11.5.1993 (Annexure P9) and the case was remanded to respondent No.2 for passing fresh order.
4. In compliance of the direction given by the competent authority, respondent No.2 issued notice dated 29.6.1993 (Annexure P10). The petitioner submitted reply dated 20.12.1993 (Annexure P11) and prayed that the proceedings may be dropped because it had already deposited Rs. 10,026/- payable as employees share of Provident Fund Contribution, employees share of family Pension Fund Contribution, employer's contribution under the Employer's Deposited Linked Insurance Scheme, 1976 (for short, EDLI Scheme) and administrative charges. It appears that respondent No, 2 accepted the reply of the petitioner and therefore he did not pass fresh order under Section 7A. However, he issued notice dated 19.3.1996 (Annexure P12) to the petitioner to show cause against the proposed levy of damages under Section 14B of the Act. The petitioner submitted reply dated 21.5.1996 (Annexure P13) to contest the levy of damages. After hearing representatives of the petitioner and department respondent No.2 passed order dated 11.6.1998 (annexure P14) and imposed damages to the tune of Rs. 1,42,291/- by recording the following observations:
"That M/s Swastika Woollen Mills (hereinafter stated to estt.) was brought under the provision of the EPF & MP Act, 1952 (hereinafter stated to as the Act) w.e.f. 20.5.1981 including M/s Taneja Woollen Mills. Since estt. failed to report compliance as such dues were determined under section 7A of the Act vide order dated 21.10.91. However, consequent upon orders dated 11.5.1998 of the then Legal Adviser (LA) to the Ministry of Labour, the said Order was set aside with the directions to decide the issue of clubbing of both the estts. (as was pleaded by these estt. before the LA) and to pass reasoned order. However, vide an order dated 11.4.91 the then authority had allotted separate code No. 1 to both these estts. by allotting code No. PN/13064 to M/s Swastika Woollen Mills, w.e.f. 20.5.81 and PN/10813 to M/s Taneja Woollens Mills from the original date of coverage (which in this case was 20.5.81). Hence though no reasoned orders were passed but the proceedings initiated after remand back by LA were dropped on the recommendations of the then Enforcement Officer as is available vide proceedings dated 20.12.1993 in the file of M/s Swastika Woollen Mills.
Further before passing of orders by LA. Damages Under Section 14B for the period 7/84 to 9/84 and 11/84 to 4/89 amounting Rs.55,238.75 were levied vide orders dated 21.7.92 but subsequently due to setting aside of the 7A order the dues assessed earlier Under Section 7A were set aside. The notice Under Section 14B for the period 6/81 to 6/84 to/85 to 7/92, 11/93 to 3/95 and 5/95 was issued on 19.3.96 in r/o M/s Taneja Woollen Mills (PN/10813) and similar notice was issued on 19.3.96 for the period 7/84 to 9/84, 11/84 to 7/93, 11/93 to 3/95 and 7/95 in r/o M/s Swastika Woollen Mills (PN/13064) and the same is under consideration as present though initially separate proceedings were held but since matter was interlinked as such main proceedings were later on taken in the file of M/s Swastika Woollen Mills as Shri B.D. Arora, Advocate appeared on behalf of both the estt.
Shri Arora, advocate raised many issues in these cases, main being as that of dispute of clubbing, grant of infancy period, setting aside of earlier orders etc. beside other issues such as floods and fire etc. but could not produce any document relating to his contention about flood and fire incidence. The estt. namely M/s Swastika Woollen Mills raised various other issues also during the proceedings, the main being setting aside of earlier order by LA. non-allotment of separate code no. in time due to which dues could not be deposited in time.
I have gone through the submissions made by the estt. documents placed on records etc. it has been observed that at no place any infancy period was granted to the estt. Rather, the date of coverage was made specific in r/o both the estts. vide order dated 11.4.91 and no orders were passed after remand back from LA. Hence the estt. is liable for levy of damages on all the belated remittances for the period as was shown in the show cause notice issued Under Section 14-B of the Act and presently under consideration. Further because of non-production of proof relating to flood fire etc. the claim of the estt. for lenient view is also not acceptable as it is the duty of the employer to pay the dues in time without waiting for the allotment of code no. etc. from the Deptt.
After applying my mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. 1 A.K. Chandok, regional P.P. Commissioner. Ludhiana in exercise of the powers conferred upon me by virtue of Section 14B of the Act, accord sanction for the levy and recovery of Rs. 1,42,291/- for the delayed payment of Provident Fund Contributions. Family Pension/Employees Pension Fund Contributions. Administrative charges and Employees Deposit Linked Insurance Contributions and Admn. charges."
5. The appeal preferred by the petitioner against the levy of damages was dismissed by respondent No. 1 vide order dated 12.4.1999 (Annexure P 15). Paragraphs 4 and 5 of that order read as under.-
"The contention of the appellant is that when the 7A Authority itself did not issue a code number till the year 1991 how the appellants can be held liable for damages for the period 1984 to 1991. The second point is that without deciding the clubbability of 2 establishments how the 14B authority can hold that there was any delay for PF contribution for the period 1981 to 1984 because unless the legal liability is fixed no penalty can be imposed. The third contention is that the appellants should have been allowed exemption for pre-discovery period they should not have been asked to deposit employees share for that period. The fourth contention is that the learned RPS has wrongly rejected the plea of the appellants that the damages may be waived because of the fire incident and floods which ruined the economy of the establishment.
The Hon'ble Bombay High Court in a case under Section 14B of the act has said that if there is delay in deposit of the PF Contribution because of the delayed allotment of code number then the damages, if any, should be recovered from the authority concerned. However, after examining the Court attached to the assessment of damages, I find that upto the year 1981 the rate of damages is 10% p.a. and never exceeding 100% as fixed by Section I4B and after that period it has been assessed in accordance with para 32A of the Act. The chart shows that the appellants have started compliance with the provisions of the Act in the year 1984 itself and after some time discontinued. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that they stopped deducting PF contribution from their employees. May be that they have withheld the amount because they were not allotted a separate code number or any code number by the 7A authority. Because of section 7-Q inserted n the year 1988 now the employers are liable to pay interest @ 12% p.a. and without any limit whereas under Section 14B there is a limit of 100%. If this time factor and rate factor is taken into consideration then although on principle some item of delayed payment may be exempted but total effect of re-calculation will be more than what has been calculated in the impugned order. So far as financial difficulties because of flood and fire incident is concerned, may have a bearing but this power is vested in the Central Board of Trustees. The Appellants should have approached the Board of Trustees for that redress. The RPFC is not authorised to waive any portion of damages because of these financial difficulties. As I have already said that I have examined this chart and I see that no useful purpose will be served in remanding the case back for re- calculation, I, therefore am inclined to dismiss these appeals with the observations; given above. The learned counsel for the appellant stress that both the establishments, property in attached by creditors banks, they are in great difficulty. If the appellant deposit the entire penalty within 6 months in equal monthly instalments then it would be advisable that RPFC should not take any coercive measure but if the appellants fail to deposits consecutive instalments then he may proceed to recover the whole of it."
6. Review application filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by respondent No. 1 vide order dated 16.8.1999 (Annexure P17).
7. The facts of Civil Writ Petition No.5895 of 2000 are closely inter-linked with those of Civil writ Petition No.4909 of 2000. By an order dated 21.10.1991 (Annexure P-9), respondent No.2 held the sister concern of the petitioner namely M/s Swastika Woollen Mills liable to pay Rs. 98,695.65 for the period from June 1981 to June 1984. That order, as mentioned above was set aside by the Central Government. After remand, respondent No.2 is said to have dropped the proceedings under Section 7A but issued notice dated 9.3.1996 under Section 14B for levy of damages. The petitioner contested the notice by asserting that delay in deposit of dues was caused due to reasons beyond its control. Respondent No.2 did not accept the petitioners' plea and vide order dated 5.6.1998 (Annexure P-14), he imposed damages amounting to Rs.80,834/- on account of delayed payment for Employees Provident Fund Contributions, administrative charges, delayed payment of EPF/EPS Contributions, delayed payment of contribution under EDLI Scheme and delayed payment of administrative charges under that Scheme. Appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by respondent No. 1 vide order dated 12.4.1999 (Annexure P-15) and review filed against that order was dismissed by the said respondent vide order dated 16.8.1999 (Annexure P-17).
8. The petitioners have challenged the levy of damages on the grounds that delay in the deposit of dues under various schemes was occasioned due to late release of code number and also due to reasons beyond their control. They have referred to the averments contained in the replies filed to the notices issued by respondent No.2 for levy of damages under Section 14B of the act and have averred that the impugned orders may be declared illegal and quashed because there could be no justification to take action for imposition of damages after a period of more than 14 years.
9. Respondent No.2 has filed separate written statements in both the petitions but contents thereof are similar. It has averred that the petitioners are the units of M/s Swastika Wool Traders Private Limited, Ludhiana, which was set up in May 1978 at New Delhi, as a partnership concern and later on converted into a private limited company. Copy of the partnership deed has been placed on record as Annexure R-2. According to respondent No.2, the petitioners were duty-bound to deposit the dues of Provident Fund from May, 1981 after availing infancy benefits from May, 1978 to May, 1981 but, they failed to deposit the amount due under the Act and this necessitated initiation of proceedings under Sections 7A and 148 of the Act. Respondent No.2 has given the details of the delays in the deposit of dues and has averred that levy of damages is perfectly legal and justified.
10. The petitioners have filed replications reiterating their plea against the levy of damages.
11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
12. The Provident Funds Act, 1952 provides for the institution of compulsory provident funds for employees in factories and other establishments. It applies to every establishment which is a factory engaged in any industry specified in Schedule 1 and in which twenty or more persons are employed and to any other establishment employing twenty or more persons or class of such establishment which the Central Government may specify jn that behalf by notification in the Official Gazette. Under Section 4, the Central Government framed the Employees Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 which was notified vide SRO 1509 dated September 2, 1952. Section 6 of that Act enjoins upon every employer to make contribution to the Employee Provident Fund at the rate of 6/1/4% of the basic wages, deamess allowance, retaining allowance, if any for the time being payable to each of the employees and the employees contribution shall be equal to the contribution of the employer in respect of him. The employee at his option may, however, increase the contribution to the extent of 8-1/3%. The initial responsibility for making payment of the contribution of the employer as well as of the employees, lies on the employer. Para 30 of the EDLI Scheme makes it incumbent on the employer that he shall, in the first instance, pay both the contribution payable by himself and also on behalf of the member employed by him. Under that para, the employer is authorised, before paying the member employee his wage in respect of any period or part of period for which contributions are payable, to deduct the employee's contribution from his wages. It further provides that the deposit of such contribution shall be made by that employer within fifteen days of the close of every month, i.e., a contribution for a particular month has got to be deposited by the 15th day of the month following. A breach of any of these requirements is made a penal offence. Section 14 of the 1952 Act provides for penalties. Failure to comply with the requirement of section 6 is punishable with various terms of imprisonment which may extend to a period of six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand to two thousand rupees, under the provisions of Section 14, depending upon the nature of the breach, viz. failure to pay the contributions, or failure to submit the necessary returns, or failure to pay administrative charges. Section 14-A provides for offences by companies and other corporate bodies. Paragraph 16 of the EDLI Scheme provides for punishment for failure to pay contributions etc., and in particular by clause (d), every employer guilty of contravention or of non-compliance with the requirements of the EDLI Scheme shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months or with fine of Rs.1000/-.
13. The Parliament amended the Act by Act No.16 of 1971 and added Section 6-A to the Act for the establishment of the Family Pension Fund. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 6-A, the Central Government framed the Employees Family Pension Scheme, 1971 which was notified vide G.S.R. 315, dated March 4, 1971. Under para 4 of the said Scheme, even employee who is a member of the Employees Provident Fund is given the option to join the Family Pension Scheme. Para 9 created the Family Pension Fund and provides that from and out of the contributions payable by the employer and employee in each month under section 6 of the Act a part of the contribution, representing 1-1/6% if the employees pay along with an equivalent amount of 1-1/6% from out of the employer's contribution, shall be remitted by the employer to the Family Pension Fund. The operation of the provisions of the Act and the schemes presented various administrative difficulties. An employer could delay payment of Provident Fund dues without any additional financial liability. Parliament, accordingly, inserted section 14-B for recovery of damages on the amount of arrears. The reason for enacting Section 14-B is that employers may be deterred and thwarted from making defaults in carrying out statutory obligations to make payments to the Provident Fund. The object and purpose of the Section 2 is to authorise the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to impose exemplary or punitive damages and thereby to prevent employers from making defaults. Section 14-B, as originally enacted, provided for imposition of such damages, not exceeding 25% of the amount of arrears. This, however, did not prove to be sufficiently deterrent. The employers were still making defaults in making contributions to the Provident Fund; and in the meanwhile utilising both their own contribution as well as the employees contribution, in their business. The provision contained in Section 14-B for recovery of damages, therefore, proved to be illustory. Accordingly, by Act No. 40 of 1973, the words "twenty-five per cent of were omitted from Section 14-B and the words 'not exceeding the amount on arrears' were substituted.
14. Challenge to constitutional validity of Section 14-B of the Act was examined by the Supreme Court in Organo Chemical Industries and another v. Union of India and Ors., A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1803. Their lordships of the Supreme Court made reference to the provisions of the Act and the scheme as well as the statements of objects and reasons for the insertion of Section 14-B and upheld the validity of Section 14-B. Some of the observations made in that decision, which are relevant to the subject matters of these appeals and writ petitions are extracted below:-
"The traditional view of damages as meaning actual loss, does not take into account the social content of a provision like S.14-B contained in a socio-economic measure like the Act in question. The word damages has different shades of meaning. It must take its colour and content from its context, and it cannot be read in isolation nor can S.14-B be read out of context. The very object of the Legislation would be frustrated if the word damages appearing in S.14-B of the Act was not construed to mean penal damages. The imposition of damages under S.14-B serves a two-fold purpose. It results in damnification and also serves as a deterrent. The predominant object is to penalise, so that an employer may be thwarted or deterred from making any further defaults.
The expression damages occurring in S.14-B is, in substance, a penalty imposed on the employer for the breach of the statutory obligation. The object of imposition of penalty under S.14-B is not merely to provide compensation for the employees. We are clearly of the opinion that the imposition of damages under S.14-B serves both the purposes. It is meant to penalise defaulting employer as also to provide reparation for the amount of loss suffered by the employees. It is not only a warning to employers in general not to commit a breach of the statutory requirements of Section 6 but at the same time it is meant to provide compensation or redress to the beneficiaries i.e. to recompense the employees for the loss sustained by them. There is nothing in the section to show that the damages must bear relationship to the loss which is caused to the beneficiaries under the Scheme. The word, damages in Section 14-B is related to the word default. The words used in Section 14-B are default in the payment of contribution and, therefore, the word default must be construed in the light of Para 38 of the scheme which provides that the payment of contribution has got to be made by the 15th of the following month and therefore, the word default in S.14-B must mean failure in performance or failure to act. At the same time, the imposition of damages under S.14-B is to provide reparation for the amount of loss suffered by the employees."
15. In view of the above discussion we hold that the levy of damages under Section 14B of the Act cannot be declared illegal on the grounds set out in the writ petition.
16. The question as to whether delay in the initiation proceeding under Section 14-B of the Act is fatal to the ultimate order is no longer res-integra. In Hindustan Times Ltd. v. Union of India, J.T. 1998(1) S.C. 18, their Lordships of the Supreme Court reviewed various judicial precedents on the subject and laid down the following principles:-
1. The Act does not contain any provision prescribing a period of limitation for assessment or recovery of damages. The monies payable into the Fund are for the ultimate benefit of the employees but there is no provision by which the employees can directly recover these amounts The power of computation and recovery are both vested in the Regional Provident Commissioner or other officer as provided in Section 14-B.
2. It is not the legislative intention to prescribe any period of limitation for computing and recovering the arrears. As the amounts are due to the Trust Fund and the recovery is not by suit, the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. 1963 are not attracted.
3. The position under Section I4B of the Act of an employer is totally different. The employer who has defaulted in making over the contributions to the Trust Fund had, on the other hand, the use of monies which did not belong to him at all.
4. In cases under Section 14-B if the Regional Provident Commissioner has made computations earlier and sent demand immediately after the amount fell due, the defaulter would not have been able to use these monies for his own purposes or for his business. In our opinion, it dies not lie in the mouth of such a person to say that by reason of delay in the exercise of powers under Sections 14B, he has suffered loss.
5. There is no period of limitation prescribed by the legislature for initiating action for recovery of damages under Section 14-B. The fact that proceedings are initiated or demand for damages is made after several years cannot by itself be a ground for drawing an inference of waiver or that the employer was lulled into a belief that no proceedings under Section 14B would be taken; mere delay in initiating action under section 14B cannot amount to prejudice inasmuch as the delay on the part of the department, would have only allowed the employer to use the monies for his own purposes or for his business especially when there is no additional provision for charging interest. However, the employer can claim prejudice if there is proof that between the period of default and the date of initiation of action under-Section 14B, he has changed his position to his detriment to such an extent that if the recovery is made after a large number of years, the prejudice to him is of an irretrievable nature.
17. The same question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 891 of 1986 - M/s Elsons Cotton Mills v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Faridabad and other connected L.P.As. and writ petitions (decided on June 30, 1998). In those cases also, the levy of damages had been challenged on the ground of delay, violation of rules of natural justice and non-application of mind. While negating the challenge to the levy of damages, the Court observed as under: -
"Admittedly there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 14-B of the Act within which action for recovery of damages can be initiated against the defaulter. It is to be realised that the amounts of provident fund dues consist of deductions made from wages of the workers as well. If an employer deducts these contributions from wages of the employees and sits tight over them, he, as a trustee, is liable to account for the same at any time. It is no defence for him to say that he is ceased to be accountable after a fixed period. The Legislature has advisedly not prescribed any period of limitation for issuing show cause notice against such defaulting trustees-employers. It is also to be noted that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation meant for the welfare of weaker and disadvantaged section of the society, namely, the employees, who do not have any control over the acts and omissions of the authorities constituted under the Act. If any such authority on account of negligence or otherwise fails to take prompt action against the defaulting employer, there is no rhyme on reason why innocent beneficiary employee should suffer. This view of ours is supported by the following decisions:-
1. M/s Sham Glass Works v. State, A.I.R. 1979 Allahabad 19.
2. Divisional Engineer, A.P.S.E. Board v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Hyderabad, 1979 Lab. I.C. 187.
3. U.S.U.T. Bhandar Ltd. v. Union of India, 1981 Lab.I.C. 285.
4. S.H. Salve Kadam & Co. v. R.P.F. Commissioner, Bangalore, 1981 Lab.I.C. 568.
5. Marry George v. R.P.F. Commissioner, 1983 Lab.I.C. 133.
6. Gandhidham Spinning and Mfg. Co. Ltd., v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Anr., 1987 Lab.I.C. 659.
7. AS.Pvt. Ltd v. Union of India, 1993 (67) F.L.R. 1029.
8. Mathur Alloy and Steel Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India, 1993(2) L.L.J. 471."
18. The Court then referred to the judgment of M/s Hindustan Times Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) and held as under:-
"On the basis of the above, we hold that there is bar of limitation for initiation of proceedings under Section 14-B of the Act and the delay in initiation of such proceedings cannot be made a ground to quash the order passed by the competent authority imposing damages on the employer who is found to have defaulted in the compliance of the provision of the Act and the Schemes framed thereunder. We also hold that mere delay cannot lead to an inference that the employer has been prejudiced. Only in a case of positive proof of prejudice to the employer which is irretrievable in nature, the competent authority can take into consideration the factor of delay while imposing damages.
Before concluding this aspect of the matter, we deem it appropriate to mention that the intention of the Legislature not to prescribe any period of limitation for initiation of action under Section 14-B of the Act is clearly discernible from the fact that by the Employees State Insurance Amendment Act No.29 of 1989. Section 77(1)(b) of the Principal Act has been amended and five years have been prescribed as period of limitation for recovery of contributions (including interest and damages) by the Employees State Insurance Corporation, but no such amendment has been made in Section 14-B of the Act (19 of 1952) incorporating the period of limitation for recovery of damages. If at all the Legislature wanted to incorporate the period of limitation in Section 14-B, nothing prevented it from inserting appropriate provision to this effect by amending the Act (?? of 1952). Since that has not been done, it is reasonable to draw an inference that the Parliament had designedly refrained from prescribing the period of limitation for initiation of proceedings under Section 14-B."
19. In view of the proposition laid down in the afore-mentioned decisions we have no hesitation to reject the plea of the petitioners that the levy of damages should be quashed on the ground of delay, more-so because they have not adduced any evidence to prove that their defence was prejudiced on account of delayed initiation of proceedings under Section 14-B of the Act. Rather it appears that they are seeking to take advantage of the period spent in the initiation and finalisation of action taken under Section 7-A of the Act. However, in view of the law laid down in Hindustan Times Limited v. Union of India (supra) and Elsons Cotton Mills v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Faridabad (supra), it is not possible to accept their plea.
20. Before concluding, we may advert to the reason cited by the petitioners before respondent No.2 to avoid their liability under Section 14-B of the Act. In the reply filed on behalf of the petitioner M/s Swastika Woollens, the following factors were cited as the cause for delay :-
"i) that in the month of March, 1984, establishment imported a consignment of RAW Material, valuing Rs.3.60 lacs approximately. This consignment was destroyed at Port and could not be retrieved. This caused heavy loss to the establishment. On account of which there was delay in payment of dues.
ii) that change in constitution of the Partnership firm to Private Limited Company was effected on 1.4.1985. On account of which the present occupier could not operate Bank accounts, which consequently caused delay in deposit of dues in subsequent to that period.
iii) that on 30.9.88, Snap Floods not only damaged Plant and Machinery of the establishment but also caused loss to inventory/Stocks to the tune of Rs. 20,00 lacs. This fact hampered production of the subsequent period and added losses caused in payment of dues.
iv) that establishment is incurring losses from year to year."
23. In the case of Taneja Woollen Mills, the petitioner had set up the following defence:-
i) that there was change in constitution of the Partnership to Private Limited Company w.e.f. 30.9.88, on account of which the present occupier could not operate Bank Account for a long period, which consequently caused delay in deposit of dues.
ii) that on 30.9.88, Snap Floods damaged Plant and Machinery and as well caused huge losses to the Stocks. The losses tunes to Rs. 19.26 lacs approximately. This fact hampered production of the subsequent period and added further losses.
iii) that in the month of March, 1990, the establishment suffered fire loss tuning to Rs.2.69 lacs.
iv) that again in April, 1990 the establishment had to suffer 2nd fire loss tuning to Rs.15.00 lacs. Both these losses caused delay in deposit of dues.
v) that establishment is running in loss since 1987 and this factor too handicapped the unit from making payments in time.
22. Respondent Nos.2 and 1 have considered the afore-mentioned factors and then concluded that it was appropriate to levy of damages because the establishment had deliberately avoided compliance of the statutory provisions. We have carefully examined reasons assigned by the respondents and are in fully agreement with them.
23. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petitions are dismissed. However, we make it clear that this order will not preclude the petitioners from approaching the Central Board of Trustees for grant of relief in the matter of levy of damages.
Sd/- Bakshish Kaur, J.