Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand & Ors vs Mahuwa Minz ... ... Opposite Party on 7 February, 2025
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Civil Review No. 37 of 2024
The State of Jharkhand & Ors. ... ... Petitioners
Versus
Mahuwa Minz ... ... Opposite Party
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
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For the Petitioners : Mr. Sachin Kumar, AAG-II Mr. Ravi Prakash Mishra, AC to AAG-II For the Opposite Party : Mr. Binod Singh, Advocate
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Order No. 15 Dated: 07.02.2025 The present Civil Review has been filed for reviewing the order dated 19.10.2022 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 3425 of 2022 claiming that there is certain apparent error in the said order.
2. Learned counsel for the review petitioner submits that the respondent namely, Mahuwa Minz had filed a writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 3425 of 2022 for the following reliefs:
(i) For quashing/setting aside the entire result of election pertaining to North Western G.E.L. Church, Ranchi held on 21.11.2021 and published vide letter no. XIII/1-Election-629 dated 04.12.2021 whereby the respondent no. 7 has been elected as Arch Bishop and the respondent nos. 8 and 9 have been elected as Bishops.
(ii) For quashing/setting aside the office order no.
02/2022 issued vide memo no. VII/5-
Ministerial/27 dated 31.01.2022, whereby
several "Purohits" have been transferred and posted from one place to another place.
(iii) For quashing/setting aside the minutes of proceeding as contained in letter/memo no.
XVII/7-Admin./101 dated 17.05.2022, whereby several "Purohits"/candidates have been transferred from one "Parish"/department to another "Parish"/department.
(iv) For quashing/setting aside the notification no.
XIII/1-Election/08 dated 16.06.2022, whereby the "Kalisya" Election 2022 (Session 2022-26) of North Western G.E.L. Church has been declared to be held on different dates by the respondent no. 4 in contrary to the constitution of the NWGEL Church Society as well as the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of the NWGEL Church Society.
3. It is further submitted that the said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 19.10.2022 in following terms:
"4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and keeping in view the provisions of Rule 12 of the Act, 1965, without entering into the merit of the case, the petitioner is given liberty to prefer a representation before the respondent no. 2 on the present issue. On receipt of the said representation, the respondent no. 2 shall take up the same and after issuing notices to the concerned parties as well as on providing due opportunity of hearing to them, shall take an appropriate informed decision within three months from the date of receipt of the representation.
5. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of with aforesaid liberty and direction."
4. Learned counsel for the review petitioner submits that the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and the Bihar (now Jharkhand) Societies Registration Rules, 1965 do not empower the Inspector General of Registration to adjudicate the dispute relating to a society or dispute among members of a society. The writ petitioner had challenged the election of North Western G.E.L. Church, Ranchi held on 21.11.2021 and published vide letter no. XIII/1- 2 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024 Election-629 dated 04.12.2021 whereas as per the Rules, 1965, the Inspector General of Registration is not empowered to enquire into the election matters of a society. In case of dispute arising among the governing body and the members of a society, the same can only be adjudicated in a civil suit.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his submission, puts reliance on the following judgments:
(i) Sri Ram Krishna Seva Sangh Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. [W.P.(C) No. 1151 of 2020] reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Jhar 1302;
(ii) Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. The Registrar of Societies & Ors. [W.P.(C) No. 3260 of 2010] reported in 2012 SCC OnLine Del 6415.
6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record.
7. Before coming to the merit of the review petition, it would be appropriate to refer few judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered with respect to the scope of entertaining a review petition.
8. In the case of "Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Vs. Aibam Pishak Sharma & Ors.", reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"3. ......... It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the 3 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024 review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."
(emphasis supplied)
9. In the case of "Parsion Devi & Ors. Vs. Sumitri Devi & Ors." reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment rendered in the case of "Haryana State Industrial Development Corpn.
Ltd. Vs. Mawasi & Ors.", reported in (2012) 7 SCC 200, has held as under:
"27. The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in several cases. We shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, this Court referred to the judgments in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai and Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing and observed:
"19. Review literally and even judicially means re- examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of decision 4 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024 legally and properly made. Exceptions both statutorily and judicially have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court observed that even though no rules had been framed permitting the highest court to review its order yet it was available on the limited and narrow ground developed by the Privy Council and the House of Lords. The Court approved the principle laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing that an order made by the Court was final and could not be altered: (Rajunder Narain Rae case, MIA p. 216) '... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the judgments, errors have been introduced, these courts possess, by common law, the same power which the courts of record and statute have of rectifying the mistakes which have crept in. ... The House of Lords exercises a similar power of rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own judgments, and this Court must possess the same authority. The Lords have, however, gone a step further, and have corrected mistakes introduced through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or have supplied manifest defects, in order to enable the decrees to be enforced, or have added explanatory matter, or have reconciled inconsistencies.' Basis for exercise of the power was stated in the same decision as under:
'It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence extended in such cases is mainly owing to the natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable injustice being done by a court of last resort, where by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been inadvertently made as if the party had been heard.' Rectification of an order thus stems from the fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing finality. When the Constitution was framed the substantive power to rectify or recall the order passed by this Court was specifically provided by Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred the substantive power to review any judgment or order by Article 137 of the 5 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024 Constitution. And clause (c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules as to the conditions subject to which any judgment or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power Order 40 had been framed empowering this Court to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The expression, 'for any other sufficient reason' in the clause has been given an expanded meaning and a decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the power. Apart from Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court. The court is thus not precluded from recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice."
28. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, the three-Judge Bench referred to the provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which was similar to Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and observed:
"32. ... It is needless to emphasise that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein.
It may allow a review on three specified grounds, namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. It has been held by the Judicial Committee that the words 'any other sufficient reason' must mean 'a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule'. (See Chhajju Ram v. Neki.) This conclusion was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath and was adopted by our Federal Court in Hari Sankar Pal v. Anath Nath Mitter, FC at pp. 110-11. The learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits that his case comes within the ground of 'mistake or error apparent on the face of the record' or some ground analogous thereto."6 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024
29. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., another three-Judge Bench reiterated that the power of review is not analogous to the appellate power and observed:
"11. ... A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out."
30. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the High Court can review an order passed under Article 226 of the Constitution and proceeded to observe:
"3. ... But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate powers which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court."
32. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, the Court observed:
"9. ... An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC ... A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'."
33. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, R.P. Sethi, J., who concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J., summarised the scope of the power of review in the following words: 7 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024
"56. ... Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised."
34. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, the Court observed:
"13. ... The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing 'on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason'. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict."
35. In State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, the Court considered the question whether a Tribunal established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can review its decision, referred to Section 22(3) of that Act, some of the judicial precedents and observed:
"21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier.
22. The term 'mistake or error apparent' by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and 8 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024 detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision."
11. It has consistently been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments that a review petition cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise". The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, even after exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the person seeking review or could not be produced by him at the time when the original order was made. It may only be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found or on any such analogous ground.
12. Reverting back to the present case, on bare perusal of the impugned order dated 19.10.2022, it appears that during the course of argument, the counsel appearing on behalf of the State had submitted that under rule 12 of the Rules, 1965, the Inspector General of Registration had ample power to look into the functioning and administration of the societies registered under the Act, 1860 and as such, the petitioner might represent the Inspector General, Registration, Government of Jharkhand ventilating his grievance.
13. On the said submission made by the counsel for the State, this Court without entering into the merit of the case, had 9 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024 given liberty to the petitioner to prefer a representation before the Inspector General, Registration, Government of Jharkhand on the issue involved in the writ petition. On receipt of the representation, the said authority was directed to take up the matter and after issuing notices to the concerned parties as well as providing due opportunity of hearing to them, to take informed decision within three months from the date of receipt of the representation.
14. The thrust of argument of learned counsel for the review petitioner is that the matter involved in the writ petition i.e. W.P.(C) No. 3425 of 2022 was an election dispute and the Inspector General, Registration was not empowered to decide the same.
15. I have perused the content of the said writ petition wherein the writ petitioner (the respondent herein) apart from challenging the election of Arch Bishop and Bishops, had also alleged against Chajras Minz - the Chief Secretary of the North Western Gossner Evangelical Lutheran Church Society and other office bearers of the said society that they were misusing their power and were also involved in misappropriation of funds of the society. It was further alleged against Navin Kumar Lakra (the respondent no. 5 of the said writ petition) that he, despite being Deputy Superintendent of Police, Government of Jharkhand, was holding the posts in Church Court and Legal Committee of the Society as well as holding the post of Secretary in Central Diocese Construction Committee of the society. The writ petitioner by making allegations against the said office bearers of the Society 10 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024 had demanded enquiry.
16. Here, it would be appropriate to refer Section 23 of the Act, 1860 as applicable in the State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) which reads as under:
23. Cancellation of registration in certain cases -
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act the Inspector General of Registration may, by order in writing cancel the registration of any society registered under this Act whose office has ceased to be in the State of Bihar by reason of the reorganisation of States or change of the office from the State of Bihar by reason of the reorganisation of States or change of the office from the State of Bihar to another State, or whose activities are subversive to the objects of the Society:
Provided that the Inspector General of Registration shall, before passing an order, make such inquiry as he considers necessary:
Provided further that no order or cancellation of registration of Society on the ground of activities of the society being subversive to the objects of the society shall be passed until the society has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against action proposed to be taken in regard to it.
(2) An appeal against an order made under sub-section (1) may be preferred in such manner, within such time and to such authority as may be prescribed and such authority shall consider and dispose of such appeals in the prescribed manner.
(3) The decision of the appellate authority under sub-
section (2) shall be final.
17. The aforesaid provision empowers the Inspector General, Registration to cancel the registration of any society registered under the Act, 1860 after making due inquiry on the ground that its office has ceased to be in the State of Bihar by reason of the reorganisation of States or change of the office from the State of Bihar by reason of the reorganisation of States or change of the office from the State of Bihar to another State, or 11 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024 whose activities are subversive to the objects of the Society.
18. Rule 12 of the Rules, 1965 reads as under:
12. The Inspector-General of Registration may in his discretion institute such inquiries or investigations in respect of any matter as may in his opinion be necessary for the proper working of the society and administration of the Act specially when there is a suspicion that the society is engaging itself in activities which are subversive to the objects of the society or the office of any registered society has ceased to be in the State of Bihar. Any original documents or other papers called for from the registered society shall be produced before the Inspector-General of Registration or any officer authorised by the Inspector-General of Registration to enable him to examine the affairs of the society or to enquire into any complaint received against any society.
19. Thus, rule 12 of the Rules, 1965 gives discretion to the Inspector General, Registration to make inquiries or investigations in respect of any matter which in his opinion is necessary for proper working of the society especially when there is a suspicion that the society is engaging itself in activities which are subversive to its objects or the office of any registered society has ceased to be in the State of Bihar.
20. On perusal of the averments made in the writ petition, it would be evident that the issue was raised not only with respect to the election dispute pertaining to North Western G.E.L. Church Society, Ranchi, but also regarding misappropriation of fund by the Chief Secretary of the Society. It has already been discussed hereinabove that Section 23 of the Act, 1860 read with rule 12 of the Rules, 1965 explicitly speaks about making an inquiry or investigation to see as to whether the society is engaged in the activity which is subversive to its objects. Hence, I do not find any 12 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024 error in the impugned order whereby on the submission of the State counsel, the Inspector General, Registration, Government of Jharkhand was directed to take an appropriate informed decision on the representation of the writ petitioner after giving due opportunity of hearing to the parties.
21. Learned counsel for the review petitioner has put reliance on the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of "Sri Ram Krishan Seva Sangh" (supra), wherein while looking to the provisions of Section 4, 4-A and Section 13 of the Act, 1860, it has been held that any dispute between the executive committee or the members of the society is not to be adjudicated by the Inspector General of Registration, rather the same is required to be referred to the Principal Court of original civil jurisdiction.
22. In the case of "Supreme Court Bar Association"
(supra), the Delhi High Court looking to the provision of Section 13 of the Act, 1860, has observed that a dispute with regard to the membership and the right of a particular member to vote at the elections is a dispute which arises between a society and its members.
23. To appreciate the contention of learned counsel for the review petitioner, I have also perused Section 13 of the Act, 1860 which reads as under:
"13. Provision for dissolution of societies and adjustment of their affairs--
Any number not less than three-fifths of the members of any society may determine that it shall be dissolved, and thereupon it shall be dissolved forthwith, or at the time 13 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024 then agreed upon, and all necessary steps shall be taken for the disposal and settlement of the property of the society, its claims and liabilities, according to the rules of the said society applicable thereto, if any, and, if not, then as the governing body shall find expedient.
Provided that, in the event of any dispute arising among the said governing body or the members of the society, the adjustment of its affairs shall be referred to the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction of the district in which the chief building of the society is situate; and the Court shall make such order in the matter as it shall deem requisite.
Provided that no society shall be dissolved unless three-fifths of the members shall have expressed a wish for such dissolution by their votes delivered in person, or by proxy, at a general meeting convened for the purpose.
Provided that whenever any Government is a member of, or a contributor to, or otherwise interested in any society registered under this Act, such society shall not be dissolved without the consent of the Government of the State of registration."
24. The aforesaid provision explicitly provides that if at least three-fifth members of the society by convening a general meeting determine that the society shall be dissolved, then it shall be dissolved forthwith, or at the time then agreed upon. Thereafter, all necessary steps shall be taken for disposal and settlement of the property of the society, its claims and liabilities, according to the rules of the said society applicable thereto, if any, and, if not, then as the governing body shall find expedient. However, in the event of any dispute arising among the said governing body or the members of the society, the same shall be referred to the Principal Court of Original Civil Jurisdiction of the district in which the chief building of the society is situated and the Court shall make such order in the matter as it shall deem requisite.
14 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024
25. There can be no gainsaying that in view of Section 13 of the Act, 1860, the Inspector General of Registration, Government of Jharkhand, has no power to adjudicate the dispute arising among the governing body or the members of the Society which shall be referred to the Principal Court of original civil jurisdiction of the concerned district, however, as per Section 23 of the Act, 1860 and rule 12 of the Rules, 1965, the Inspector General of Registration has the power to make enquiries or investigations to see as to whether the Society has engaged itself in the activities which are subversive of the objects of the Society.
26. This Court is of the view that when an application/representation is received by the Inspector General of Registration against any Society, it has to prima facie satisfy itself by making an inquiry to see as to whether the nature of allegation is such that the same can be determined by it or the same involves a dispute which can only be adjudicated by a civil court. If the Inspector General of Registration finds that there is a dispute which is required to be decided by a civil court, the same has to be referred to a concerned civil court by making an order in writing.
27. Thus, I do not find any error in the order dated 19.10.2022 so as to review the same. It is, however, important to note that the present review petition was filed after more than a year and four months from the order dated 19.10.2022. Moreover, a contempt petition being Contempt Case (Civil) No. 124 of 2023 was already filed by writ petitioner (the respondent herein) against Inspector General of Registration, Government of Jharkhand 15 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024 alleging wilful and deliberate violation of the order dated 19.10.2022 passed in W.P.(C) No. 3425 of 2022 and while hearing the said contempt case, the Inspector General of Registration had sought apology to the Court for violating the order dated 19.10.2022 annexing the order as contained in memo no. 278 dated 04.09.2023 as well as the revised order as contained in memo no. 334 dated 17.11.2023 which was passed in purported compliance of the order dated 19.10.2022 observing as under:
"5. Since the relief claimed by the petitioner cannot be granted by the Inspector-General of Registration any way. Considering the matter in holistic manner Inspector-General of Registration has instructed an enquiry to be conducted to ensure that the society in question is being managed according to the provisions of law in force, however such enquiry cannot go beyond the jurisdiction of Inspector General of Registration that is in the arena of election dispute. In such circumstances continuation of the present proceeding as far as grievance of the petitioner is concerned is a futile exercise. In such circumstance the present proceeding with respect to the abovementioned representation is disposed of without going into the merit of the election dispute."
28. Thus, on the one hand, the Inspector General of Registration, Government of Jharkhand, in purported compliance of the order dated 19.10.2022 passed by this Court, has issued order dated 04.09.2023 revised vide subsequent order dated 17.11.2023, however on the other hand, the instant review petition has been filed seeking review of the order dated 19.10.2022. The conduct of the review petitioner shows that the present Civil Review has been filed merely to save the Inspector General of Registration, Government of Jharkhand from any order as may be passed in the contempt case. Such conduct of the 16 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024 review petitioner is highly deprecated.
29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any ground to review the order dated 19.10.2022 passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 3425/2022.
30. The review petition is accordingly dismissed.
31. I.A. No. 13145 of 2024 filed on behalf of the writ petitioner (the respondent herein) is disposed of accordingly.
(Rajesh Shankar, J.) Manish/AFR 17 Civil Review No. 37 of 2024