Telangana High Court
M/S. Sri Jagadeeswara Cotton Et Silk ... vs The Bank Of Baroda on 1 July, 2022
* THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.VENKATESHWARA REDDY
+ W.P.Nos.29918, 29928, 31871 and 32730 of 2021
And
W.P.Nos.1980, 3396, 3415, 3451, 7516 and 8115 of 2022
% Date: 01-07-2022
# M/s.Maruthi Ginning and Pressing Factory and others
... Petitioners
v.
$ The Recovery Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Hyderabad
and others
... Respondents
! Counsel for the Petitioners : Mr. V.V.Ramana, Mr. T.Vijay Kumar Mr. P.Nagendra Reddy, Mr.D.Raghavulu, Ms.P.Hamsa Durga, Ms.Mohana, Mr.Venkatesh and Mr.G.K.Desh Pande ^ Counsel for respondents : Mr. B.S.Prasad Learned Advocate General < GIST:
HEAD NOTE:
? CASES REFERRED:
1. (2007) 1 SCC 97
2. (2012) 2 SCC 315
3. (2014) 9 SCC 329
4. (2015) 10 SCC 161
5. AIR 1961 SC 532
6. (2004) 6 SCC 254
7. 2006 SCC OnLine AP 843
8. 2011 (124) DRJ 633
9. (2017) 3 GLR 234
10. (1997) 3 SCC 261
11. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 16
12. (2012) 9 SCC 552
13. AIR 1955 SC 233
14. (1994) 4 SCC 711
15. (2006) 6 SCC 207
2
THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.VENKATESHWARA REDDY
W.P.Nos.29918, 29928, 31871 and 32730 of 2021
And
W.P.Nos.1980, 3396, 3415, 3451, 7516 and 8115 of 2022 COMMON JUDGMENT AND ORDER:
(Per Hon'ble Sri Justice Ujjal Bhuyan) We have heard Mr. V.V.Ramana, Mr.T.Vijay Kumar, Mr.P.Nagendra Reddy, Mr.D.Raghavulu, Ms. P.Hamsa Durga, Ms.Mohana, Mr.Venkatesh and Mr.G.K.Desh pande, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr.Ch.Srinivas, Mr.K.Viswanadham, Mr.A.Krishnam Raju and Mr. Maruti Jadav, learned counsel for the respondents.
2. On our request, Mr.B.S.Prasad, learned Advocate General for the State of Telangana had appeared and assisted us in the hearing.
3. The core issue which has arisen for consideration in this batch of writ petitions was summed up by this Court in the order dated 03.12.2021 passed in Writ Petition No.31871 of 2021. Therefore, relevant portion of the order dated 03.12.2021 is extracted hereunder:
"Learned counsel for the petitioners to examine as to whether this court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
We may mention that the loan transaction had taken place at Dharmavaram in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The borrowers and the bankers are also at Dharmavaram, so also the guarantors. For 3 administrative exigency, disputes arising under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 from Rayalaseema region of the State of Andhra Pradesh are being taken up by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Hyderabad.
Question for consideration is whether any order or proceeding of the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Hyderabad pertaining to issues arising from the State of Andhra Pradesh would confer jurisdiction on the High Court for the State of Telangana to adjudicate.
We would like to request the learned Advocate General for the State of Telangana to assist us in the matter.
Let a copy of this order be served in the office of learned Advocate General for the State of Telangana. Since we are examining this issue, we expect that no coercive steps shall be taken by the respondent/Bank till we decide this issue".
4. Thus, the issue arising in all the writ petitions is that whether a subject matter taken up by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Hyderabad or any order passed by the said Tribunal on a dispute arising out of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (briefly, 'the SARFAESI Act' hereinafter) when both the parties to the dispute as well as the cause of action had arisen in the State of Andhra Pradesh?
5. In view of the issue under consideration, it may not be necessary for us to narrate the facts of each individual case.
6. Before proceeding further, we may mention that there are two Debts Recovery Tribunals in Hyderabad i.e. Debts Recovery Tribunal - I, Hyderabad and Debts Recovery Tribunal - II, Hyderabad. Both the 4 Tribunals have territorial jurisdiction over the State of Telangana. For a short while, both the Tribunals did not have presiding officers after superannuation of the incumbent presiding officers. As a result, a number of writ petitions came to be filed. Subsequently, new presiding officer has joined in the Debts Recovery Tribunal - I at Hyderabad, but Debts Recovery Tribunal - II, Hyderabad is still without any presiding officer.
7. Government of India in the Ministry of Finance issued Notification SO 254 (E) dated 25.01.2017. The notification states that vide earlier notification of Government of India in the Ministry of Finance dated 21.09.1999 Central Government had established one Debts Recovery Tribunal at Hyderabad for the then composite State of Andhra Pradesh. Thereafter, vide the notification dated 26.02.2002 Central Government established another Debts Recovery Tribunal at Visakhapatnam in the composite State of Andhra Pradesh. After bifurcation of the unified State of Andhra Pradesh into the States of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, Central Government considered it necessary to establish one more Debts Recovery Tribunal at Hyderabad in the State of Telangana. While the earlier Debts Recovery Tribunal at Hyderabad came to be known as Debts Recovery Tribunal
- I, Hyderabad, Telangana, the newly established Debts Recovery 5 Tribunal was referred to as Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Hyderabad, Telangana. The existing Debts Recovery Tribunal at Visakhapatnam came to be known as Debts Recovery Tribunal, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh. By the aforesaid Notification dated 25.01.2017, the areas of jurisdiction of the three Debts Recovery Tribunals were specified. While the area of jurisdiction of Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Hyderabad covered entirely places within the State of Telangana, the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Visakhapatnam covered areas which are entirely in the State of Andhra Pradesh. It is only in respect of Debts Recovery Tribunal - II at Hyderabad that the area of jurisdiction comprised of places both in the State of Telangana and in the State of Andhra Pradesh.
8. Area of jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Hyderabad in terms of the Notification dated 25.01.2017 is as under:
Sl.No. Name of Location Area of jurisdiction
Debts
Recovery
Tribunal
2. Debts First Floor, Ameerpet, Begumpet, Khairtabad,
Recovery Triveni Secunderabad, Shaikpet and
Tribunal-2, Complex, Tirumulgherry in Hyderabad district in
Hyderabad Abids, the State of Telangana, Rangareddy,
Hyderabad - Medchal and Vikarabad districts in the
500001 State of Telangana and Anantapur,
Chittoor, Cuddapah and Kurnool
districts in the State of Andhra
Pradesh
6
8.1. From the above, we find that in addition to Ameerpet, Begumpet, Khairtabad, Secunderabad, Shaikpet and Trimalgherry in Hyderabad district, Ranga Reddy, Medchal, and Vikarabad districts in the State of Telangana, four districts of the State of Andhra Pradesh i.e. Anantapur, Chittoor, Cuddapah and Kurnool are under the jurisdiction of Debts Recovery Tribunal - II, Hyderabad. It appears that these four districts from the Rayalseema region of the State of Andhra Pradesh have been brought under the jurisdiction of Debts Recovery Tribunal - II, Hyderabad for dealing with disputes under the SARFAESI Act for administrative convenience.
9. Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act provides for application against measures to recover secured debts. As per Sub-Section (1), any person, including a borrower, aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in Sub-Section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor or by his authorized officer, may make an application along with the prescribed fee to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within a period of 45 days from the date of taking of such measures. Which Debts Recovery Tribunal would have the jurisdiction is dealt with in Sub-Section (1A) of Section 17. Sub- Section (1A) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act reads as under:
(1-A) An application under sub-section (1) shall be filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction-7
(a) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises;
(b) where the secured asset is located; or
(c) the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being.
9.1 From a reading of the above, it is seen that only that Debts Recovery Tribunal would have the jurisdiction to entertain an application filed under Sub-Section (1) of Section 17 within whose local limits the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises; where the secured asset is located; or the branch or any other office of a bank or financial institution where the debt claimed is outstanding. In other words, only that Debts Recovery Tribunal will have the jurisdiction where the cause of action arises within its local limits or the secured asset is located within its local limits or the secured creditor is located. Therefore, if the loan transaction had taken place within the above four districts of Andhra Pradesh; if the secured asset is located within the said districts; and if the secured creditor is located therein, then ordinarily the jurisdictional Debts Recovery Tribunal should have been located in the State of Andhra Pradesh.
10. We may also refer to Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (briefly, 'the 1993 Act' hereinafter) which provides for filing of application by a bank or financial institution to the jurisdictional Debts Recovery Tribunal for recovery of debt from 8 any person. Sub-Section (1) of Section 19 of the 1993 Act says that where a bank or a financial institution has to recover any debt from any person, it may make an application to the Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction -
a) the branch or any other office of the bank or financial institution is maintaining an account in which debt claimed is outstanding for the time being; or
b) the defendant or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of making the application actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; or
c) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of making the application actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; or
d) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
10.1. Thus, the application referred to in Section 19 of the 1993 Act can be filed by a bank or financial institution, before that Debts Recovery Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the branch or other office of the secured creditor is maintaining the loan account or the defendant or each of the defendants (when there are more than one defendant) at the time of making the application actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; or any of the defendants where there are more than one defendant, at the time of making the application actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain or the cause of action, wholly or in part arises.
9
11. Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) may also have some relevance. Section 20 CPC says that subject to the limitations mentioned in Sections 16 to 19 of CPC every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendants reside or cause of action arises. It says that every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction -
a. the defendant or each of the defendants where there are more than one at the time of commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or b. any of the defendants, where there are more than one at the time of commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given or the defendants who do not reside or carry on business or personally work for gain acquiesce in such institution, or c. the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
11.1. Thus, what Section 20 CPC says is that ordinarily a suit is to be instituted in a Court within the local limits or within whose jurisdiction the defendant resides or carries on business or works for gain and the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
12. Article 226 of the Constitution of India deals with the power of the High Courts to issue certain writs. As per Clause (1), notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have 10 power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority including in appropriate cases, any Government within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution of India i.e. fundamental rights and for any other purpose. Clause (2) says by way of clarification that the power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Therefore, even if the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of any person is not within the territorial limits of the High Court, yet such a High Court may exercise jurisdiction if a cause of action, wholly or in part arises within the territorial limits of such High Court.
13. The common thread running through the three provisions of law which we have discussed above is cause of action. Therefore, it would 11 be apposite to briefly analyse what is cause of action before we proceed ahead.
14. The expression cause of action has been defined by Mulla in his treatise "Code of Civil Procedure" in the following manner:
Cause of action means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court.
15. Supreme Court in State Bank of India Vs. Ranjan Chemicals Limited1 delineated the elements of a cause of action as follows:
Firstly, the breach of duty owing by one person to another; and secondly, the damage resulting to the other from the breach or the fact or combination of facts which gives rise to a right to sue.
16. In AVM Sales Corporation Vs. Anuradha Chemicals Private Limited2 Supreme Court defined cause of action as comprising a bundle of facts which are relevant for determination of the lis between the parties. Explaining the above expression in Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India3 Supreme Court has held that cause of action is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. 1 (2007) 1 SCC 97 2 (2012) 2 SCC 315 3 (2014) 9 SCC 329 12
17. Again in the case of Indian Performing Rights Society Limited Vs. Sanjay Dalia4 Supreme Court has held that cause of action is a bundle of facts which is required to be proved to grant relief to the plaintiff. Cause of action not only refers to the infringement but also the material facts on which the right (alleged to be infringed) is founded. It has to be decided in each case whether the cause of action wholly or in part arises at a particular place.
18. Mr. B.S.Prasad, learned Advocate General for the State of Telangana, has submitted a list of citations and submits therefrom that the answer to the question posed by this Court would have to be in the negative. According to him, going by the definition of cause of action and the various judicial pronouncements it cannot be said that merely because a securitization application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal - II, Hyderabad or if any order is passed thereon by the said Tribunal, a writ petition relatable to such adjudication or pendency would be maintainable before this High Court. According to him, this High Court would have no territorial jurisdiction to entertain such dispute which would, in any event, be beyond the territorial limits of this High Court 4 (2015) 10 SCC 161 13 being within the State of Andhra Pradesh. Mr. Prasad has relied upon the following decisions:
Lt. CoL. Khajoor Singh Vs. Union of India5, Kusum Ingots & Alloys Limited Vs. Union of India6, P.S.R.Krishna Vs. Union of India7, Sterling Agro Industries Limited Vs. Union of India8, Nawal Kishore Sharma (3 supra), and Sri Balaji Water and Power Engineer Private Limited Vs. State Bank of Sikkim9.
19. Mr. Venkatesh, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners has submitted a memo of judgments and has placed reliance on paragraph Nos.90 and 91 of the Supreme Court decision in L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India10, as well as on paragraph Nos.19 and 20 of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Alapan Bandyopadhyay11 . He has also placed reliance on a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Bharat Aluminium Company Vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.,12 more particularly on paragraph No.96 thereof to contend that both the High Court's i.e., High Court of Andhra Pradesh
5 AIR 1961 SC 532 6 (2004) 6 SCC 254 7 2006 SCC OnLine AP 843 8 2011 (124) DRJ 633 9 (2017) 3 GLR 234 10 (1997) 3 SCC 261 11 2022 SCC OnLine SC 16 12 (2012) 9 SCC 552 14 and High Court for the State of Telangana would have jurisdiction. According to him, the High Court for the State of Telangana which has supervisory jurisdiction over the Debts Recovery Tribunal - II, Hyderabad as well as the Andhra Pradesh High Court within whose territorial limits the cause of action had arisen or the secured creditor is situate, would have the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petitions.
20. Supporting such submission, Mr. G.K.Deshpande, learned counsel has placed reliance on a seven judges' decision of the Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque13.
21. On the other hand, Mr. Ch.Srinivas, learned counsel appearing for Bank of Baroda, in his submissions has tried to make a distinction between two categories of cases. According to him, the first category pertains to those cases where securitization application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act has been filed and the Debts Recovery Tribunal - II, Hyderabad passes an order thereon. This category will also include pending securitization applications as there is no presiding officer in the said Tribunal. The second category would comprise of such cases where no securitization application has been filed. In the case of the former, perhaps, this Court may have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition filed under Article 13 AIR 1955 SC 233 15 226 of the Constitution of India. But in respect of the second category, since no part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of this Court, this Court would not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain such writ petition.
22. Such submission of Mr. Ch.Srinivas has been adopted by Mr.A.Krishnam Raju, learned counsel appearing for State Bank of India, as well as by Mr. Maruti Jadav, learned counsel also appearing for State Bank of India, who in addition has referred to and relied upon provisions of Section 17 (1A) of the SARFAESI Act, Section 19 of the 1993 Act and Section 20 (c) of CPC.
23. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties as well as by Mr. B.S. Prasad, learned Advocate General for the State of Telangana have been duly considered.
24. Originally, Article 226 of the Constitution of India was as under:
"226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.---
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.16
(2) The power conferred on a High Court by clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32."
25. Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra) is a seven judges bench decision of the Supreme Court where one of the questions which arose for consideration was whether High Courts had jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue writs against decisions of Election Tribunals. After analyzing the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution of India as it then existed Supreme Court held that scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is firstly that it confers on the High Courts power to issue writs and directions, and secondly, it defines the limits of that power. The limitation is that such a power could be exercised over any person or authority within the territories in relation to which the High Court so exercised its jurisdiction. The emphasis was on the words "within the territory" and their significance was that the jurisdiction to issue writ was co-extensive with the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. The reference was not to the nature and composition of the Court or Tribunal but to the area within which the power could be exercised. Supreme Court further opined that Election Tribunals are subject to the superintendence of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, such superintendence being both judicial and administrative. 17
26. It was on that basis that contention has been advanced that since Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Hyderabad is subject to the superintendence of this High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, a writ petition arising out of a securitization application either decided or pending pertaining to the above four districts of Andhra Pradesh or against an order passed therein would be maintainable.
27. In Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra), a seven judges bench of the Supreme Court examined the concept of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the light of the question as to whether the Government of India can be said to be located at one place, namely, New Delhi. Article 226 of the Constitution of India as it stood then conferred upon the High Court the power to issue a writ against a person or authority or Government which are situated within the territorial limits of such High Court. It was in that context that the seven judges bench took the view that Article 226 as it stood did not refer to accrual of cause of action and to the jurisdiction of the High Court depending on the place where the cause of action accrued being within its territorial jurisdiction. The seven judges bench opined that there was no place for introduction of the concept of the place where the impugned order had effect or of the concept of functioning of a 18 Government apart from the location of its office concerned or even of the concept of cause of action. The bench opined that unless there are clear and compelling reasons which cannot be denied, writ Court cannot exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution beyond its territorial limits. Therefore, the concept of cause of action could not be introduced in Article 226.
28. The above interpretation caused undue hardship and inconvenience to the litigants to invoke writ jurisdiction. As a result, Article 226 of the Constitution of India was amended by the Constitution (15th Amendment) Act, 1963 whereby Clause (1A) was inserted in Article 226 thereby introducing the concept of cause of action, wholly or in part, in Article 226. The statement of objects and reasons appended to this amendment mentioned that under the existing (unamended) Article 226 of the Constitution, the only High Court which had jurisdiction with respect to the Central Government was the then Punjab High Court. This caused considerable hardship to litigants from distant places. It was, therefore, proposed to amend Article 226 of the Constitution so that when any relief was sought against any Government, authority or person for any action taken, the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arose, may 19 also have the jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions or orders or writs.
29. Clause (1A) so inserted was subsequently re-numbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution (42nd Amendment Act) 1976. Amended Clause (2) of Article 226 now reads as under:
"226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.---
(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose.
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
(3)-(4) * * *"
30. Thus by way of the amendment, the basis of the earlier pronouncements of the Supreme Court was removed and the concept of cause of action was introduced.
31. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Limited (supra), Supreme Court explained as to what is meant by the expression cause of action and observed that it implies a right to sue. Though not defined in any statute, it has, however, been judicially interpreted to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in 20 order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. For every action, there has to be a cause of action. If there is no cause of action, the plaint or the writ petition would be rejected summarily. Thereafter Supreme Court referred to Section 20 (c) CPC and observed that though provisions of CPC would not apply to writ proceedings in view of Section 141 CPC, the phraseology used in Section 20 (c) CPC and Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India being in pari materia, the decisions rendered on interpretation of Section 20 (c) CPC would apply to writ proceedings as well. Reference was made to the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu14 where it was held that the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of averments made in the writ petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial.
Mere fact that the Oil and Natural Gas Commission had sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action; all necessary facts must form an integral part of the cause of action. Finally, Supreme Court held that the facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be 14 (1994) 4 SCC 711 21 said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the Court.
32. In paragraph No.27 of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Limited (supra) on which much emphasis has been placed by Mr. Venkatesh, learned counsel for some of the petitioners, it has been held that when an order is passed by a Court or Tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action arises at that place. Further clarifying, it has been held that when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another place, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situated having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set-aside, as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority.
33. Referring to the decision in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra) it has been held that in view of the insertion of Clause (2) in Article 226 of the Constitution of India the position which now prevails is that if a part of cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction of the High Court it would still have the jurisdiction to issue a writ, thus the decision in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh (supra) now has no application. 22
34. However, in the concluding portion Supreme Court cautioned that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases the High Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens.
35. P.S.R.Krishna (supra) is a division bench decision of the then High Court of Andhra Pradesh. In that case a decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench at New Delhi was questioned by filing writ petitions. After observing that question of jurisdiction was required to be decided as a preliminary issue since it went to the very root of the matter, it was held that until a clear finding is recorded that the High Court has territorial jurisdiction no injunction should be granted and the writ petition should be dismissed as not maintainable. This Court referred to Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and observed that location of the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal at New Delhi outside the territorial limits of the then Andhra Pradesh High Court notwithstanding, even if a part of the cause of action arises within its territorial limits, jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and its power to issue a writ of certiorari 23 to quash the impugned order of the Tribunal, would not be ousted. It was held that the test to determine territorial jurisdiction of a High Court is not the location of the authority or the Tribunal or the residence of the person to whom the writ is to be issued or even the seat of the Government but, whether the cause of action, either wholly or in part, has arisen within its territorial limits. Referring to the amendment of Article 226 of the Constitution of India by which Clause (IA) was inserted which subsequently became Clause (2), it was held that the concept of cause of action was thereby introduced in Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Consequent thereto, even in cases where the relief sought for was against an authority located outside its territorial limits, the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs against such an authority was not ousted provided that the cause of action, even if it be in part, arose within its territorial limits. It was held that the test to determine territorial jurisdiction of a High Court is not the location of the authority or the Tribunal but the situs of the cause of action whether wholly or in part.
36. Sterling Agro Industries Limited (supra), is a case decided by a full bench of five judges of the Delhi High Court. Delhi High Court was of the view that all necessary facts must form an integral part of the cause of action. The fact which is neither material nor essential nor 24 integral would not constitute a part of cause of action within the meaning of Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Clarifying further it was held that the entire bundle of facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of action as what is necessary to be proved before the petitioner can obtain a decree is material facts, which expression is also known as integral facts. Therefore, in the context of Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India undisputably even if a small fraction of the cause of action accrues within the territorial limits of the High Court, the High Court will have jurisdiction in the matter though the doctrine of forum conveniens may also have be considered. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned. Delhi High Court thereafter analyzed the concept of forum conveniens. After referring to the definition of forum conveniens in Black's Law Dictionary which denies forum conveniens as the Court in which an action is most appropriately brought, considering the best interests and convenience of the parties and witnesses, Delhi High Court held as follows:-
31. The concept of forum conveniens fundamentally means that it is obligatory on the part of the Court to see the convenience of all the parties before it. The convenience in its ambit and sweep would include the existence of more appropriate forum, expenses involved, the law relating to the lis, verification of certain facts which are necessitous for just adjudication of the controversy and such other ancillary aspects. The balance of convenience is also to be taken note of. Be it noted, the Apex Court has clearly stated in the cases of Kusum Ingots, Mosaraf 25 Hossain Khan and Ambica Industries about the applicability of the doctrine of forum conveniens while opining that arising of a part of cause of action would entitle the High Court to entertain the writ petition as maintainable.
32. The principle of forum conveniens in its ambit and sweep encapsulates the concept that a cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court would not itself constitute to be the determining factor compelling the Court to entertain the matter. While exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the Court cannot be totally oblivious of the concept of forum conveniens. The Full Bench in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. has not kept in view the concept of forum conveniens and has expressed the view that if the appellate authority who has passed the order is situated in Delhi, then the Delhi High Court should be treated as the forum conveniens. We are unable to subscribe to the said view".
37. Thereafter Delhi High Court recorded its conclusions as under:-
"33. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are inclined to modify the findings and conclusions of the Full Bench in New India Assurance Company Limited (supra) and proceed to state our conclusions in seriatim as follows:
(a) The finding recorded by the Full Bench that the sole cause of action emerges at the place or location where the tribunal/appellate authority/revisional authority is situate and the said High Court (i.e., Delhi High Court) cannot decline to entertain the writ petition as that would amount to failure of the duty of the Court cannot be accepted inasmuch as such a finding is totally based on the situs of the tribunal/appellate authority/revisional authority totally ignoring the concept of forum conveniens.
(b) Even if a miniscule part of cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of this Court, a writ petition would be maintainable before this Court, however, the cause of action has to be understood as per the ratio laid down in the case of Alchemist Ltd. (supra).
(c) An order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action to make the writ petition maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction the appellate authority is situated. Yet, the same may not be the singular factor to compel the High Court to decide the matter on merits. The High Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens.
(d) The conclusion that where the appellate or revisional authority is located constitutes the place of forum conveniens as stated in absolute terms by the Full Bench is not correct as it will vary from case to case and depend upon the lis in question.26
(e) The finding that the court may refuse to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 if only the jurisdiction is invoked in a mala fide manner is too restricted/constricted as the exercise of power restricted to the ground of mala fide alone.
(f) While entertaining a writ petition, the doctrine of forum conveniens and the nature of cause of action are required to be scrutinized by the High Court depending upon the factual matrix of each case in view of what has been stated in Ambica Industries (supra) and Adani Exports Ltd. (supra).
(g) The conclusion of the earlier decision of the Full Bench in New India Assurance Company Limited (supra) "that since the original order merges into the appellate order, the place where the appellate authority is located is also forum conveniens" is not correct.
(h) Any decision of this Court contrary to the conclusions enumerated hereinabove stands overruled".
38. Thus, according to the Delhi High Court place or location of the Tribunal/Appellate Authority/Revisional Authority cannot be the sole basis for conferring jurisdiction on the High Court to entertain the writ petition. Of course, even if a miniscule part of the cause of action arises within the territorial limits of the High Court, a writ petition would be maintainable before that High Court. That apart, while entertaining a writ petition, the doctrine of forum conveniens and the nature of cause of action are required to be scrutinized by the High Court.
39 In Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra) Supreme Court analyzed the expression cause of action as appearing in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and held that cause of action is a bundle of facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he 27 can succeed. Reference was made to its earlier decisions in Utpal Kumar Basu (supra), Kusum Ingots & Alloys Limited (supra) and in Om Prakash Srivastava Vs. Union of India15 and held that the question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limits of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In order to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him is prima facie either been infringed or is threatened to be infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of the Court's jurisdiction. It was thus asserted that in order to maintain a writ petition the petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents within the territorial limits of the Court's jurisdiction and such infringement may take place by causing him actual injury or threat thereof. Paragraph No.7 in Om Prakash Srivastava (supra) which has been quoted in paragraph No.14 of this judgment being relevant is extracted as under:
"7. The question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limits of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, a writ petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has prima facie either been infringed or is threatened to be 15 (2006) 6 SCC 207 28 infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of the Court's jurisdiction and such infringement may take place by causing him actual injury or threat thereof".
40. Similar issue cropped up before the Gauhati High Court in Shree Balaji Water and Power Engineer (Pvt.) Limited (supra). In that case both the borrower and secured creditor were from the State of Sikkim. The cause of action in the form of loan transaction had taken place in the State of Sikkim. However, the Debts Recovery Tribunal competent to deal with the securitization application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act was located in Guwahati in the State of Assam. Against the decision passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Guwahati, the related writ petition was filed before the Gauhati High Court. After referring to various case laws a single bench of the Gauhati High Court held as follows:
"15. In the present case, the proceeding have originated from the issuance of the loan by the State Bank of Sikkim to the loanee, who are both residents of Sikkim. The authority whose orders and decisions are being adjudicated is a resident of Sikkim. As such, the High Court, within whose jurisdiction the proceeding has originated from would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
16. In view of the fact that no cause of action exists in the State of Assam and as the cause of action arose in the jurisdiction of the Sikkim High Court and keeping in view the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ambica Industries (supra) and Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra), this court holds that this court is not the proper Court to decide the issue at hand. Accordingly, the present writ petition, being not maintainable, the same is dismissed. The petitioner is at liberty to approach the Sikkim High Court, if so advised, as the Sikkim High Court is the proper forum to entertain a writ petition keeping in mind the facts of the case and the judgments of the hon'ble Supreme Court".
41. The view of the Gauhati High Court is that the proceedings having originated from the issue of loan by the State Bank of Sikkim 29 to the loanee who are both residents of Sikkim and the authority whose decision was being adjudicated upon was a resident of Sikkim, therefore the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the proceeding had originated would have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the matter. Thus, it was held that as no cause of action arose in the State of Assam and as the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Sikkim High Court, the Gauhati High Court was not the proper Court to adjudicate the matter, Sikkim High Court being the proper Court to entertain the writ petition. Implicit in what was being held is that merely because adjudication by the Debts Recovery Tribunal was at Guwahati would not by itself confer territorial jurisdiction on the Gauhati High Court to entertain the related writ petition relating to the SARFAESI Act.
42. As already noticed above, learned counsel for the petitioners, more particularly Mr. Venkatesh, had placed heavy reliance on paragraph No.96 of Bharath Aluminium Company (supra). That was a case arising out of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. One of the issues which came up for consideration before the constitution bench was which High Court would have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain challenge to arbitration proceedings. This was in context of Section 2 (i) (e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which 30 defines 'Court' and Section 20 of the said Act which provides for 'place of arbitration'. It was in that context Supreme Court held as follows:
"96. Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 reads as under:
2. Definitions.---(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires -
(a)-(d) * * * *
(e) "Court" means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;"
We are of the opinion, the term "subject-matter of the arbitration" cannot be confused with "subject-matter of the suit". The term "subject-matter" in Section 2(1)(e) is confined to Part I. It has a reference and connection with the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify the courts having supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings. Hence, it refers to a court which would essentially be a court of the seat of the arbitration process. In our opinion, the provision in Section 2(1)(e) has to be construed keeping in view the provisions in Section 20 which give recognition to party autonomy. Accepting the narrow construction as projected by the learned counsel for the appellants would, in fact, render Section 20 nugatory. In our view, the legislature has intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the court which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is located and the courts where the arbitration takes place. This was necessary as on many occasions the agreement may provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral to both the parties. Therefore, the courts where the arbitration takes place would be required to exercise supervisory control over the arbitral process. For example, if the arbitration is held in Delhi, where neither of the parties are from Delhi, (Delhi having been chosen as a neutral place as between a party from Mumbai and the other from Kolkata) and the tribunal sitting in Delhi passes an interim order under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the appeal against such an interim order under Section 37 must lie to the courts of Delhi being the courts having supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and the tribunal. This would be irrespective of the fact that the obligations to be performed under the contract were to be performed either at Mumbai or at Kolkata, and only arbitration is to take place in Delhi. In such circumstances, both the courts would have jurisdiction, i.e., the court within whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the suit is situated and the courts within the jurisdiction of which the dispute resolution, i.e., arbitration is located". 31
43. Thus, what the Supreme Court said in the above case is that in such circumstances both the Courts would have the jurisdiction to adjudicate i.e., the Court within whose jurisdiction subject matter of the suit is situated and the Courts within the jurisdiction of which arbitration is located. While coming to the above conclusion, Supreme Court gave an example of arbitration being held at Delhi though neither of the parties were from Delhi. The arbitral tribunal sitting at Delhi passes certain orders. Against such orders appeal would lie to the Courts in Delhi being the Courts having supervisory jurisdiction. This would be irrespective of the fact that the obligations to be performed under the contract giving rise to arbitration were to be performed in some other place and only arbitration takes place in Delhi. It was in that context Supreme Court held that both the Courts would have the jurisdiction. We are afraid the above decision would not be of much assistance to the petitioners, both contextually and factually.
44. In L. Chandra Kumar (supra) the challenge before the seven judge bench of the Supreme Court was the ouster of jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India in respect of orders passed by Central Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Clarifying 32 that power of judicial review is a basic feature of the Constitution of India, Supreme Court held that all decisions of Tribunals whether created pursuant to Article 323-A or Article 323-B of the Constitution would be subject to the High Courts writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before a division bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal is situated. It was held thus:
"90. We may first address the issue of exclusion of the power of judicial review of the High Courts. We have already held that in respect of the power of judicial review, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226/227 cannot wholly be excluded. It has been contended before us that the Tribunals should not be allowed to adjudicate upon matters where the vires of legislations is questioned, and that they should restrict themselves to handling matters where constitutional issues are not raised. We cannot bring ourselves to agree to this proposition as that may result in splitting up proceedings and may cause avoidable delay. If such a view were to be adopted, it would be open for litigants to raise constitutional issues, many of which may be quite frivolous, to directly approach the High Courts and thus subvert the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. Moreover, even in these special branches of law, some areas do involve the consideration of constitutional questions on a regular basis; for instance, in service law matters, a large majority of cases involve an interpretation of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. To hold that the Tribunals have no power to handle matters involving constitutional issues would not serve the purpose for which they were constituted. On the other hand, to hold that all such decisions will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls will serve two purposes. While saving the power of judicial review of legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, it will ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunal. The High Court will also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which will be of use to it in finally deciding the matter.
91. It has also been contended before us that even in dealing with cases which are properly before the Tribunals, the manner in which justice is dispensed by them leaves much to be desired. Moreover, the remedy provided in the parent statutes, by way of an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, is too costly and inaccessible for it to 33 be real and effective. Furthermore, the result of providing such a remedy is that the docket of the Supreme Court is crowded with decisions of Tribunals that are challenged on relatively trivial grounds and it is forced to perform the role of a first appellate court. We have already emphasised the necessity for ensuring that the High Courts are able to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of Tribunals under Article 227 of the Constitution. In R.K. Jain's case, after taking note of these facts, it was suggested that the possibility of an appeal from the Tribunal on questions of law to a Division Bench of a High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal falls, be pursued. It appears that no follow-up action has been taken pursuant to the suggestion. Such a measure would have improved matters considerably. Having regard to both the afore-stated contentions, we hold that all decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323A or Article 323B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls".
45. Here also the decision of the Supreme Court would have to be understood in the context in which it was rendered. Initially, under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal was made directly appealable to the Supreme Court excluding jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. It was in such circumstances, while interfering with the enactment in so far exclusion of jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India was concerned, Supreme Court provided that challenge to a decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India would be before a division bench of the High Court, within whose territorial jurisdiction that particular Tribunal falls. As has been explained by this Court in P.S.R.Krishna (supra) the scope of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution of India and what 34 constitutes territorial jurisdiction thereunder was not an issue before the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar (supra). Issue before the Supreme Court was exclusion of jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution vis-à-vis orders and decisions of the Central Administrative Tribunals constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. In that context, Supreme Court held that power of judicial review of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and such a power cannot be taken away by a statute. Accordingly, Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was struck down. Therefore, the finding recorded in paragraph No.91 in L.Chandra Kumar (supra) that all decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India before a division bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls cannot be stretched and applied to analyze cause of action vis-à-vis territorial jurisdiction of the High Court in a case arising out of the SARFAESI Act. In our view L. Chandra Kumar (supra) does not lay down the proposition that the High Court under whose jurisdiction the Debts Recovery Tribunal is situated would be the proper High Court to entertain a writ petition de-hors the cause of action in the context of the SARFAESI Act.
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46. Similar is the position in respect of Alapan Bandyopadhyay (supra) which also relied heavily on L.Chandra Kumar (supra). Paragraph No.20 of Alapan Bandyopadhyay (supra) on which much reliance was placed by learned counsel for the petitioners reads as under:
"20. When once a Constitution Bench of this court declared the law that "all decisions of Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution will be subject to the scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls", it is impermissible to make any further construction on the said issue. The expression "all decisions of these Tribunals" used by the Constitution Bench will cover and take within its sweep orders passed on applications or otherwise in the matter of transfer of Original Applications from one Bench of the Tribunal to another Bench of the Tribunal in exercise of the power under Section 25 of the Act. In other words, any decision of such a Tribunal, including the one passed under Section 25 of the Act could be subjected to scrutiny only before a Division Bench of a High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. This unambiguous exposition of law has to be followed scrupulously while deciding the jurisdictional High Court for the purpose of bringing in challenge against an order of transfer of an Original Application from one bench of Tribunal to another bench in the invocation of Section 25 of the Act. The law thus declared by the Constitution Bench cannot be revisited by a Bench of lesser quorum or for that matter by the High Courts by looking into the bundle of facts to ascertain whether they would confer territorial jurisdiction to the High Court within the ambit of Article 226 (2) of the Constitution. We are of the considered view that taking another view would undoubtedly result in indefiniteness and multiplicity in the matter of jurisdiction in situations when a decision passed under Section 25 of the Act is to be called in question especially in cases involving multiple parties residing within the jurisdiction of different High Courts albeit aggrieved by one common order passed by the Chairman at the Principal Bench at New Delhi".
47. Explaining L. Chandra Kumar (supra), Supreme Court in Alapan Bandyopadhyay (supra) held that the Tribunal would mean that Tribunal which is under the jurisdiction of the High court and all decisions of the Tribunal would mean orders passed on applications 36 or otherwise in the matter of transfer of original application from one bench of the Tribunal to another bench of the Tribunal in exercise of power under Section 25 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. In other words, any decision of such a Tribunal including the one passed under Section 25 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 could be subjected to scrutiny only before the Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls, in this case the Tribunal at New Delhi. In that case, writ petition was filed in the Calcutta High Court challenging the order passed by the Chairman of the Principal Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal at New Delhi under Section 25 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 transferring the original application filed before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Calcutta Bench to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench at New Delhi. Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court in Alapan Bandyopadhyay (supra) would have to be understood in the context of what was the issue before the Supreme Court in that case. We are afraid decision of the Supreme Court in Alapan Bandyopadhyay (supra) rendered in the above context cannot also be of much assistance to the petitioners.
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48. That being the position and having regard to Section 17 (1) (A) of the SARFAESI Act, we are of the un-hesitant view that since the cause of action arises in the four districts of Andhra Pradesh viz. Ananthapur, Chitoor, Cuddapah and Kurnool where the borrowers, secured assets, and the secured creditors are located as well as the loan transaction had taken place, it is the High Court for the State of Andhra Pradesh which will have the jurisdiction in matters arising out of the SARFAESI Act in respect of the above four districts. In the event no securitization application is filed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, the position becomes very simple. The parties being within the State of Andhra Pradesh and the cause of action also arising within that State, High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad would have no territorial jurisdiction to entertain any writ petition relating thereto. Even if a securitization application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is filed before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Hyderabad or any order is passed by the said Tribunal on such application, then also the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad would not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain any writ petition relating to such proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Hyderabad though the said Tribunal is within the jurisdiction of this Court. This is because filing of securitization application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Hyderabad or 38 passing of any order by the said Tribunal on such securitization application would not give rise to any additional cause of action to the cause of action already accrued. As was held by the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Srivastava (supra) and re-stated by the Supreme Court in Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra) in order to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has prima facie to establish that a legal right claimed by him has either been infringed or is threatened to be infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of the High Court's jurisdiction. Such legal right or the infringement thereof has taken place within the State of Andhra Pradesh. By filing securitization application or passing of order(s) there on by the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Hyderabad no legal right of the petitioner can be said to have been infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of this High Court.
49. In view of the above, we answer the question framed by us in the Order dated 03.12.2021 in the negative. Consequently, we hold that any order or proceeding of the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Hyderabad pertaining to issues arising from the State of Andhra Pradesh including the above four districts would not confer jurisdiction on the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad to adjudicate. 39
50. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are dismissed as being not maintainable before this Court. However, petitioners are at liberty to approach the appropriate forum for redressal of grievance. Interim orders passed by this Court would continue to hold the field for a period of 30 days from today to enable the petitioners to approach the appropriate forum. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
51. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in all these writ petitions shall also stand dismissed.
____________________ UJJAL BHUYAN, CJ ________________________________ A.VENKATESHWARA REDDY, J DATE:01-07-2022 KVSN/VRKS Note: Lr copy be marked (By order) pln 40 THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE UJJAL BHUYAN AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.VENKATESHWARA REDDY W.P.Nos.29918, 29928, 31871 and 32730 of 2021 And W.P.Nos.1980, 3396, 3415, 3451, 7516 and 811 of 2022 COMMON JUDGMENT AND ORDER:
(Per Hon'ble the Chief Justice Ujjal Bhuyan) Date: 01.07.2022 KVSN/VRKS