Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
M/S. Emco General Plastic Industries ... vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 1 July, 2015
Author: Tapen Sen
Bench: Tapen Sen
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Civil Revisional Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present :
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tapen Sen
and
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashis Kumar Chakraborty
F.M.A. 2160 of 2013
M/s. Emco General Plastic Industries (P) Ltd.
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the Appellant : Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta, Sr. Advocate
Mr. Lakshman Chandra Halder, Advocate
Mr. Rananeesh Guha Thakurata, Advocate
Mr. S. Das Chowdhury, Advocate
For the Respondent No. 3 : Mr. Jayanta Dasgupta, Advocate
Mr. Balaram Patra, Advocate
Mr. Saibal Mukherjee, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Narayan Chandra Bhattacharya, Advocate
Mr. S. Mosihar Rahaman, Advocate
Heard on : March 12, 18, April 01, 30 & June 19, 2015.
Judgment on : July 01, 2015
Ashis Kumar Chakraborty, J.
In this appeal, the point urged by the parties involves the scope of Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The instant appeal is at the instance of the employer writ petitioner in W.P. 15774(W) of 2004 and it is preferred against an order dated December 21, 2012 passed by an Hon'ble Single Judge allowing the application filed by five workmen under Section 17-B of the Act.
In the writ petition, the appellant-employer has challenged an award dated July 30, 2004 passed by the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal directing them to reinstate five workmen in service and to pay their back wages at the rate of 50% for the strike period from March 16, 1999 to July 09, 1999 and full back wages with consequential benefits during the period of closure. The Tribunal further directed the appellant employer to compute the bonus taking into account the amount paid to the workmen in column "others" shown in the respective wage slips within thirty days from the date of publication of the award. The appellant employer was directed to pay the said workmen's wages last drawn by them for the month of December, 2012, by January 07, 2013 and to go on making such payment for each month by the seventh of the month next following. The arrears from the date of filing of the writ petition till November, 2012 was directed to be liquidated by the employer by twenty equal monthly instalments from February, 2013. It has been recorded in the impugned order that the counsel representing the writ petitioner employer has not disputed the factum that the applicants workers remained unemployed during the pendency of the proceeding. In the instant appeal, the appellant employer filed a stay application. By an order dated April 23, 2013, another Division Bench of this Court disposed of the said stay application by directing stay of operation of the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. In the said order, the Division Bench upheld the contention of the appellant employer that the expression "award" used in Section 17-B of the Act has to be construed to mean a valid award on the face of it. The Division Bench further held that the award was passed by the Tribunal by ignoring the definition of "closure", as defined in Section 2(cc) of the Act and the same is patently illegal, and as such no order could be passed in the application filed by the workmen under Section 17-B of the Act. Of course, the Division Bench clarified that the views expressed in the said order were prima facie in nature.
The writ petition filed by the appellant employer challenging the validity of the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal is still pending disposal before the learned Single Judge. In the meantime, the above appeal filed against the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, allowing the application under Section 17-B of the Act came up for final hearing before this Division Bench.
Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellant employer submitted that the appellant is a company engaged in manufacturing various types of polythene pipes and for the purpose of such manufacture, it established two units one at Rampur and the other at Tangra, both in the State of West Bengal. The said two separate units were set up for manufacturing different types of pipes. Since the workers of the Rampur Unit refused to produce a new type of plastic pipe and went on strike, the appellant employer was compelled to close down the said Rampur Unit. However, the other unit at Tangra is still functioning. From the award of the Tribunal it appears the issues that were adjudicated by the Tribunal were, inter alia, as follows:
1. Whether the strike at Rampur unit w.e.f. 16.8.98 as resorted to by the union over the calculation of Bonus is justified and bona fide?
2. Whether declaration of closure of Rampur Unit following strike is real?
Apart from the above issues, some other issues were also framed by the Tribunal.
Mr. Sengupta drew our attention to the following finding of the Tribunal appearing at internal page 25 of the award:-
"In view of the aforesaid decision cited by the parties and materials on record I hold that the factory at Rampur cannot be said closed down permanently, when other factory at Tangra was continuing their production as usual. In case of closure the employer does not merely close down the place of business but he closes the business itself finally and irrecoverably".
According to Mr. Sengupta, when the definition of "closure" as provided in Section 2(cc) of the Act lays down that closure means permanent closing down of a place of employment or a part thereof, the finding of the Tribunal in the impugned award that the factory of the appellant at Rampur cannot be said to be closed down permanently when the other factory at Tangra was continuing production as usual, is patently illegal, void and nullity. According to him, since the award passed by the learned Tribunal is patently illegal and void, the learned Single Judge ought to have rejected the application filed by the workmen under Section 17-B of the Act. He strenuously urged that when an award passed by the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal directing reinstatement of a workman is patently illegal or perverse or nullity and the same has been challenged before the High Court, no order should be passed by the High Court in an application under Section 17-B of the Act filed by the workman/trade union for directing the employer to pay such workman, full wages last drawn by him. Mr. Sengupta further contended that the language of Section 17-B of the Act cannot be interpreted to the effect that even in a case when the award directing reinstatement of a workman passed by the Industrial Tribunal is patently illegal or nullity or avoid the employer, having challenged the said award before a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is bound to make payment to the workman as the same would result in unjust enrichment in favour of the workman. He asserted that the findings of the other Division Bench of this Court in the said order dated April 23, 2013 are all good grounds in law and we should accept such findings and set aside the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge.
On the other hand, Mr. Jayanta Dasgupta, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent no. 3 workers' union contended that the language of section 17-B of the Act is clear and unambiguous and there is no scope for interpreting the said section to confer any discretion on the High Court to reject an application filed by a workman under Section 17-B of the Act when the workman has not been gainfully employed in any establishment. According to Mr. Dasgupta, Section 17-B of the Act is a beneficial provision in favour of the workmen and the object of such provision is to provide the retrenched workman, directed to be reinstated by the Labour Court/ Tribunal with the subsistence allowance during the pendency of the proceeding filed by the employer, before the High Court and the Supreme Court, challenging the award of the Labour Court/ Tribunal and the same is not refundable even if the award is set aside by the Court. Mr. Dasgupta strenuously contended that the obligation of an employer under Section 17-B of the Act to the workman his last drawn wages during the pendency of the proceeding challenging the award for reinstatement before the High Court and the Supreme Court, when the said workman has not been gainfully employed in any establishment is mandatory. In support of such contention, Mr. Dasgupta relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Dena Bank vs. Kirtikumar T. Patel reported in 1999 SCC (L & S) 466 = (1999) 2 SCC 106 and Ch. Saraiah vs. Executive Engineer Panchayat Raj Department and Anr. reported in 1999 SCC (L & S) 1158 = (1999) 9 SCC 229. He submitted that after considering the provisions contained in Section 17-B of the Act and the objects of incorporation of the section in the Act with effect from August 24, 1984, in both the said cases the Supreme Court held that the duty/obligation of an employer to pay wages last drawn to the workman whose retrenchment/termination of service has been declared by the Labour Court to be illegal and has been directed to be reinstated, is mandatory, provided the workman has not been gainfully employed in any establishment receiving adequate remuneration during the pendency of the challenge to the award. He further cited the Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Commandant, Defence Security Corporate Centre vs. Secy., N.C.C. Group URC Employees Association, Calicut reported in 2001 Lab I.C. 2002, the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Suresh Mahato vs. G.E. Industrial Pvt. Ltd. reported in 2009(1) CHN 473 and the Division Bench decision of the Jharkhand High Court in the case of State of Jharkhand and Anr. vs. Sanjay Kumar and Ors. reported in [2013 (137) FLR 14], where after following said decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of Dena Bank (supra) and Ch. Saraiah (supra), the Kerala High Court, Jharkhand High Court and this Court have already held that once an award is passed by the Labour Court/Tribunal holding the termination of the service of the workman to be illegal and directing his reinstatement, the employer is bound to pay the wages last drawn to the workman, not being gainfully employed in any establishment, under Section 17-B of the Act during pendency of the challenge to the award by the employer in the High Court or the Supreme Court.
Thus, according Mr. Dasgupta, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the said cases of Dena Bank and Ch. Saraiah and the aforesaid Division Bench decisions of this Court, Kerala High Court and Jharkhand High Court, the findings of the other Division Bench of this Court in the said order dated April 23, 2013 cannot be accepted as good law. He contended that it is the settled law that an application under Section 17-B has to be disposed before the main writ petition of the employer challenging the award of reinstatement of the workman and it should be disposed of expeditiously. In support of such contention, Mr. Dasgupta cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Workmen of HVOC Ltd. vs. Hisdustan Veg. Oils Corpn. Ltd. reported in 2001 Lab IC 2118= (2000) 2 LLJ 792(SC).
Mr. Dasgupta further submitted from the issues framed before the learned Tribunal as quoted above and the impugned award passed by the learned Tribunal it is evident that the decision of the learned Tribunal is not based only on the findings as pointed out by Mr. Sengupta.
In reply, Mr. Sengupta appearing for the appellant submitted that all the aforesaid decisions of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, Jharkhand High Court and this Court, cited by Mr. Dasgupta, have been delivered by following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dena Bank (supra). He drew our attention to paragraph 2 of the decision in the case of Dena Bank (supra) and submitted that the question that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, in that case was whether the expression "full wages last drawn"
in Section 17-B of the Act means wages drawn by a workman at the time of his termination of his employment or wages which he would have drawn on the date of the award. Thus, according to him, the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dena Bank (supra) cannot be held to be a binding precedent for deciding the question whether the High Court can reject an application under Section 17-B of the Act filed by the trade union or a workman, on the ground that the award of the Labour Court/Tribunal under challenge is patently illegal or perverse, void or nullity.
Mr. Sengupta strenuously urged that it is the well settled principle of law that a decision is an authority for what it actually decides; what is the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. In support of such contention, he cited the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Rajpur Ruda Meha and Ors. vs. State of Gujrat reported in AIR 1980 SC 1707 (para 6), State of Orissa and Ors. vs. Md. Illiyas reported in AIR 2006 SC 258 (para 13), Rajendra Singh vs. State of U.P. and Anr. reported in (2007) 7 SCC 378 (paras 18 and 19). Relying upon the said decisions, Mr. Sengupta urged that when the question that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, in the case of Dena Bank (supra) was the interpretation of the "full wages last drawn" in Section 17-B of the Act, any observation of the Supreme Court in the said case cannot be the binding precedent for deciding the question raised in this appeal, that is, if the award of the Labour Court directing reinstatement of a workman is patently illegal or perverse or a nullity and such award has been challenged by the employer, does this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution have the discretion to refuse to direct the employer to make payment to the workman under Section 17-B of the Act. He also cited a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Girdhari Lal and Sons. Vs. Balvirnath Mathur reported in (1986) 2 SCC 237 (para 16) where the Supreme Court held that ascertaining of legislative intent is a basic rule of statutory construction and that a rule of construction should be preferred which advances the purpose and object of a legislation and that though a construction, according to plain language, should ordinarily be adopted, such a construction should not be adopted where it leads to anomalies, injustices or absurdities. He submitted that if the said five workmen of the said Rampur Unit of the appellant is required to be paid their last drawn under Section 17-B of the Act for the period from September, 2004, that is the date of filing of the writ petition before this Court, the same shall have a severe impact on the finance of the appellant employer which may result in closure of the Tangra Unit.
Mr. Sengupta further cited a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. vs. Pradip Kumar Mukherjee reported in 2001(2) CHN 79, where the Division Bench of this Court set aside the decision of a learned Single Judge allowing an application under Section 17-B of the Act directing the employer to make payment even to a worker who had crossed the age of superannuation.
Relying on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of J.K. Industries Ltd. vs. Upendra Chowdhary and Ors. reported in [(2012) 4 Cal LT (H.C.) 97], Mr. Sengupta lastly contended that since the supplementary affidavit was filed by the said five workmen respectively before the learned Single Judge in 2007, 2008 and 2012 stating that they are not gainfully employed, the learned Single Judge erred in passing the impugned order without any subsequent affidavit being filed by the said five workmen, immediately before the application under Section 17-B was taken up for hearing.
We have considered the submissions made by both Mr. Sengupta and Mr. Dasgupta, appearing for the appellant and the respondent no. 3 trade union, respectively. Since the question that falls for consideration is the scope of Section 17-B of the Act, before proceeding to analyse their respective contentions, we may extract the said section which is as follows :
"17-B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceeding in higher courts. - Where in any case, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such Court:
Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme Court that such workman has been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this section for such period or part, as the case may be."
The objects and reasons in Section 17-B of the Act are as follows:
"................ When Labour Courts pass awards of reinstatement, these are often contested by an employer in the Supreme Court and High Courts. It was felt that the delay in the implementation of the award causes hardship to the workman concerned. It was, therefore, proposed to provide the payment of wages last drawn by the workmen concerned, under certain conditions, from the date of the award till the case is finally decided in the Supreme Court or High Courts."
Though what is stated in the objects and reasons is the provision for payment of wages last drawn by the workman concerned from the date of the award till the case is finally decided in the Supreme Court or High Court, what is actually provided under Section 17-B is only payment of wages to be drawn during the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court.
On a reading of Section 17-B of the Act it is evident that the language of the section is clear and unambiguous; the said provision can be invoked by an workman on satisfying the following conditions.
(i) there must be an award by the Labour Court or the Tribunal directing reinstatement of the workman.
(ii) the challenge against the award should be pending before the High Court the Supreme Court.
(iii) the workman had not been gainfully employed in any establishment during the pendency of the challenge in the High Court or the Supreme Court, and
(iv) there is an affidavit by the workman that he is not employed in any establishment receiving adequate remuneration during the pendency of the challenge in the High Court or the Supreme Court.
Thus, once the above conditions are satisfied, a workman can file an application under Section 17-B of the Act, claiming his last drawn wages during pendency of the proceeding challenging the award before the High Court or the Supreme Court.
The very object of Section 17-B is to grant the workman an allowance in the nature of subsistence allowance during the pendency of the proceeding filed by the employer challenging the award of the Labour Court/Tribunal before the High Court and Supreme Court. Such wages is not refundable by the workman even if the award is set aside by the High Court or Supreme Court. Further, payment of wages under Section 17-B of the Act is not a condition precedent for suspension or stay of implementation of the award passed by the Labour Court/Tribunal directing reinstatement of the workman. From the language of the section it is further apparent that the obligation of the employer to pay basic wages to the workman has no connection with the prayer of an employer before High Court or Supreme Court for obtaining stay of operation of the award of the Labour Court/Tribunal. For all these reasons, as has been held in the said decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vegetable Oil Corporation (supra) cited by Mr. Dasgupta, it is the settled law that an application under Section 17- B of the Act should be disposed of expeditiously before deciding that merit of the award of the Labour Court/Tribunal.
From the language used in Section 17-B of the Act it is clear that once the workman fulfils the conditions of the said section, the High Court does not have any discretion to refuse the workman's claims for payment of wages last drawn by him during the pendency of any challenge to the award of the Labour Court/Tribunal. For all the aforesaid reasons, we do not find that our interpretation of Section 17-B of the Act leads to any anomaly or injustice or absurdity. The right of a workman under Section 17-B has no connection with the merit of the award of the Labour Court/Tribunal. Accordingly, we are of view that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Girdhari Lal and Sons. (supra) cited by Mr. Sengupta has no application in this case. If we are to accept the contention of Mr. Sengupta that in a case where the award passed by the Labour Court/Tribunal directing reinstatement of the workman is contended by the employer, to be patently illegal or perverse or a nullity, the workman is not entitled to receive "full wages last drawn by him"
under Section 17-B of the Act, then we will be rewriting, recasting and reframing Section 17-B of the Act, which would be contrary to the settled principle of law that while interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. The court has to proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said and even if there is any defect in the phraseology, etc., it is for others than the court to remedy that defect. The statute requires to be interpreted without doing any violence to the language used therein. In this regard, reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Union of India vs. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 323, Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy vs. State of A.P. reported in (2006) 2 SCC 670 and Hardeep Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (2014) 3 SCC 92. In the case of Elpro International Ltd. vs. K.B. Joshi and Ors. reported in 1987 Lab I.C. 1468 = (1987) 2 Lab L.J. 210 vires of Section 17-B of the Act was challenged before the Bombay High Court. It was contended by the employer, before the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, that the said Section effectively interferes with the discretion of the High Court and the Supreme Court to grant unconditional stay of an award directing reinstatement and as such the provision contained of the said section is void. It was further contended that in the face of the said section, however, grossly erroneous, perverse and illegal the award may be, the High Court and the Supreme Court would be rendered powerless to grant any interim relief to the employer and, therefore, the said section is wholly violative of Articles 226, 227, 32 and 136 of the Constitution. After considering the said Section 17-B of the Act, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court upheld the validity of the said section. The Division of the Bombay High Court held that the said section is reasonable and cannot be held to be either vague or arbitrary. However, in paragraph 8 of the said decision, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that Section 17-B of the Act nowhere lays down that in extreme cases where it is demonstrated that the award passed is either without jurisdiction or is otherwise a nullity, or grossly erroneous or perverse, the High Court or the Supreme Court is debarred from exercising its powers under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution. It is true that in the case of Dena Bank (supra) the question that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the expression "full wages last drawn" in Section 17-B of the Act means wages drawn by a workman at the time of termination of his employment or wages which he would have drawn on the date of the award. However, from the decision of the Supreme Court in the said case it is also evident that for the purpose of answering the said question, the Supreme Court was required to construe the entire Section 17-B of the Act and the objects and reasons for enacting the said provision. In paragraph 16 of the said decision, the Supreme Court considered the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Elpro International Ltd. (supra). The Supreme Court held that the words "full wages last drawn" must be given their plain and material meaning and they cannot be given any extended meaning. In paragraph 23 of the said decision the Supreme Court, however, overruled the decision of the Bombay High Court in the said case of Elpro International Ltd. (supra) that in exercising of power under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution, an order can be passed denying the workman, the benefit granted under Section 17-B of the Act. The Supreme Court specifically held that the confirment of such a right under Section 17-B to the workman cannot be regarded as a restriction on the powers of the High Court or the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution. In view of the said finding of the Supreme Court in paragraph 23 of the decision in the said case of Dena Bank (supra) overruling the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Elpro International Ltd. (supra) to the extent that in exercising of power under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution, an order can be passed denying the workman the benefit granted under Section 17-B, where the award of the Labour Court/Tribunal appears to be perverse or a nullity, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sengupta that the said decision of the Supreme Court cannot be held to be a binding precedent for deciding the question that has fallen for consideration in this case. Accordingly, none of the decisions of the Supreme Court cited by Mr. Sengupta in the cases of Rajpur Ruda Meha (supra) or Mohd. Illiyas (supra) or Rajendra Singh (supra) has any application in this case. In any event, apart from the said case of Dena Bank (supra) in another decision of Ch. Saraiah (supra) cited by Mr. Dasgupta, the Supreme Court has held that the High Court has no jurisdiction to direct non-compliance with the provisions contained in Section 17-B of the Act when the condition precedent for passing an order in terms of the said section is satisfied.
So far as the contention raised by Mr. Sengupta that if the appellant is required to make payment to the said five workmen the wages last drawn by them respectively under Section 17-B of the said Act, the appellant employer shall face severe financial hardship which may result in closure of the said Rampur unit we are afraid, we cannot accept such contention. It is trite law that where the legislature clearly declares its intent in the section of the statute, it is the duty of the court to give full effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent with such express intent of the legislature. Hardship or inconvenience cannot alter the meaning employed by the legislature if such meaning is clear on the face of the statute. If the statutory provisions do not go far enough to relieve the hardship of a party, the remedy lies with the legislature and not in the hands of the court. The authority for such view can be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shanker Raju vs. Union of India reported in (2011)2 SCC 132 (para 35).
With regard to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation (supra) cited by Mr. Sengupta, we find that the said decision is an authority for the proposition that a workman who has attained the age of superannuation is not entitled to the benefit of Section 17-B of the Act as he has ceased to be a workman. In this case, it is not the case of the appellant employer that any of the said five workmen has attained the age of superannuation. Thus, the said decision has no application in this case. So far as the other contention of Mr. Sengupta that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is vitiated by an error on the ground that the affidavits were filed by the said five workmen respectively a few years before passing the impugned order and there was no proof before the learned Single Judge that as on the date of the order, the said five workmen were not gainfully employed, we do not find any merit, for the following reasons. Firstly, the applicant workmen filed the necessary affidavits stating that they remain unemployed. In the impugned order dated December 21, 2012 it has been recorded that the counsel representing the employer writ petitioner had not disputed the factum that the applicants workmen remained unemployed during the pendency of the proceeding. Secondly, in the Memorandum of appeal the appellant has raised no ground raising such contention. In any event, it has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Narendra Kumar and Ors. vs. Management of Taj Services Ltd. and anr. reported in 2001-II LLJ 417 that the provisions of Section 17-B does not postulate that the employee at every point of time would be required to file an affidavit that he is not gainfully employed in some other establishment and the employee concerned would be entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 17-B until the employer by positive assertions files an affidavit and establishes that the employee who had been given the benefit of Section 17-B of the Act is employed somewhere else and as such disentitled himself/herself would benefit of question. For all these reasons, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (supra) cited by Mr. Sengupta cannot be made applicable to this case.
So far as the contention of Mr. Dasgupta that the decision of the learned Tribunal, in the award directing the reinstatement of the said five workmen is not based on, the only finding as pointed out by Mr. Sengupta, we think, that such contention is to be decided by the learned Single Judge at the time of disposal of the main Writ Petition.
For all the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in the above appeal and the same, accordingly, stands rejected.
The appellant is directed pay the said five workmen's wages last drawn by them for the month of June, 2015 by July 15, 2015 and to go on making such payment for each month by the seventh of the month next following. So far as the arrears of wages, from the date of filing of Writ Petition till May, 2015 the same shall be paid by the appellant to the said five workmen by twenty equal monthly instalments from August, 2015.
However, there shall be no Order as to costs.
Urgent Certified Copy to be issued upon appropriate application(s) being made in that regard.
I Agree,
(Tapen Sen, J.) (Ashis Kumar Cha kraborty, J.)