Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
K.Makkaji And Others vs Govt. A.P. And Another on 14 June, 1994
Equivalent citations: AIR1994AP306, 1994(2)ALT373, AIR 1994 ANDHRA PRADESH 306, (1994) 2 ANDH LT 373, (1995) 1 CURCC 661, (1994) 2 LS 17
ORDER
1. This writ petition arises under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The prayer sought for is to extend the benefit of G.O.Ms. No. 733, Revenue (UC-II) Department, dated 31-10-1988 to the lands of the petitioners. The lands of the petitioners are situated within the limits of Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, while the above G.O.Ms. No. 733, dated 31-10-1988 confers benefits of exemption only for the lands situated outside the areas of Hyderabad Municipal Corporation. The above G.O.Ms. No. 733 also excludes the agglomerated areas which are specified under the Act, But, that is a question apart in this writ petition.
2. This Court's intervention is sought for under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India only on one ground viz., unreasonableness of the distinction made between the lands situated within the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and outside the same and this argument is based on the touch stone of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. What is argued by Mr. K. Pratap Reddy, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the basis for exemption under G.O.Ms. No. 733, dated 31-10-1988 being the hardship caused to the holders of the lands in excess of the ceiling limit prescribed under the Act, there is no rationale in depriving the holders of the lands situated in Municipal Corporation limits while conferring such benefits only on the holders of the lands in peripheral areas. According to the learned counsel there is no intelligible differentia for making such a distinction.
3. The learned Govt. Pleader argues otherwise and submits that as the agricultural lands situated in peripheral areas outside the limits of Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad were not within the ambit of the Act and they were brought within the purview of the Act only by a subsequent Master Plan prepared on 29th September, 1980, to alleviate the grievances and hardship caused to the agriculturists and also keeping in view the necessity for making constructions to cater to the needs of the needy, G.O.Ms. No. 733 was issued and that the same is rational and the distinction drawn between the lands situated within the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and those beyond it, is reasonable and not arbitrary.
4. The Act was brought into force in order to avoid unjust enrichment and inequality in holdings of urban vacant lands with a prime object of providing accommodation to the needy. There is population explosion in India by geometric progression as propounded by the famous Economist Dr. T. Malthus and consequent requirement for more housing accommodation necessitating a legislation like the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976. It is true that the Act aims at limiting the holding of urban vacant land within the urban agglomeration and peripheral areas and not agricultural lands; but agricultural lands which were earmarked in the Master Plan prepared before the commencement of the Act, for the purpose of other than agriculture are treated to be vacant lands by legal fiction. The validity of the Act was challenged in Bhim Singhji's case, , but unsuccessfully. In so far as the Master Plan prepared after commencement of the Act, it is held by the Supreme Court in Atia Mohammadi Begum v. State of U.P., , that the Master Plan existing as on the date of the commencement of the Act alone is the criteria and not the Master Plan/s prepared after the commencement of the Act.
5. Even though all agricultural lands, be it within agglomeration or peripheral, have been exempted from the purview of the Act, there is a marked distinction in construing the same as such. While for the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad the Master Plan was already prepared during the year 1975, i.e., before the commencement of the Act and the agricultural lands were earmarked for residential, industrial or commercial use, as the case may be, there was no such Master Plan prepared for the non-Municipal Corporation areas. For non-Municipal Corporation areas, the Master Plan came into being only with effect from 29th of September, 1980, i.e., 4 years and 8 months after the cut-off date mentioned in the Act. What was not covered by the Act was sought to be brought within the purview of the Act only by a subsequent Master Plan. Lots of agricultural lands comprised in several villages around the limits of Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and Secunderabad were indicated for use other than agriculture and it was for this reason G.O.Ms. No. 733 was issued to alleviate the grievances of the said farmers either to keep Acs. 5.00 cts., of land to continue their agricultural operations or to sell the same by making into plots entitling them for sale consideration for a clear area of Acs. 5.00 cts., after making provision for roads, etc. This distinction is very vital for the determination of the question involved in the instant case. The lands of the petitioners had been within the limits of Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad and a Master Plan was prepared during the year 1975 for the said lands even before the advent of the Act and in the said Master Plan the lands of the petitioners were earmarked for residential use and as such by legal fiction, they were vacant lands as on the date of the commencement of the Act, while the lands under G.O.Ms. No. 733 were purely agricultural lands and were not covered by the Act and this vital distinction forms an intelligible differentia for treating the agricultural lands situated within the Municipal Corporation limits, which were already attracted by the provisions of the Act by legal fiction, as vacant lands. As such, I cannot countenance an argument that G.O.Ms. No. 733, dated 31-10-1988 makes any discrimination in limiting the benefit only to the lands in peripheral areas.
6. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed; but without costs.
7. Petition dismissed