Allahabad High Court
Gulab Chand And Ors. vs D.D.C. And Others on 30 April, 2019
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Reserved Court No. - 47 A.F.R. Case :- WRIT - B No. - 21884 of 1988 Petitioner :- Gulab Chand And Ors. Respondent :- D.D.C. And Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Avadhesh Singh, Mahendra Pratap, O.P. Rai, Rahul Mishra Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.,Ajai Kumar,Anuj.Kumar,Chandra Kumar Rai, K.K. Misra, K.P.Pathak, Prem Narayan Rai, R.K. Pandey, R.M. Singh, Rajeev Kumar Rai, T.D. Singh, V.K.Mishra Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J.
1. This writ petition arises from objections under Section 20 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, and hereinafter referred to as the ''Act', in relation to the allotment of plot no.55 of Village Teklampur Jagannath Sarai, Pargana Nizamabad, District Azamgarh. The dispute is between petitioners nos.1 and 2, who are chak holders no.98, claiming in the same right through their father and petitioner no.3, chak holder no.128, on one hand, and respondents nos.2, 3 & 4, chak holders nos.126, 122 and 123 respectively, on the other. There are other private respondents also who have, at one stage or the other of these chak allotment proceedings, been affected and are impleaded here as respondents nos.5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 & 12, but it appears that they have not contested proceedings, at least before this Court. All the writ petitioners are now dead, and are represented by their heirs and legal representatives, and so are respondents nos.2, 3 & 4. They are also represented by their respective heirs and legal representatives.
2. This petition is directed against a judgment and order dated 25.08.1988 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation deciding five revisions under Section 48 of the Act by a common judgment, to wit, Revision no.1301, Ramker vs. Vibhuti and others; Revision no.1296, Ram Badan vs. Ramdhari and others; Revision no.1278, Ramsurat vs. Dashrath and others; Revision no.1295, Sripati vs. Ramashraya and others; and, Revision no.1362, Bechan vs. Lautu and others. The petitioners have challenged the order dated 25.08.1988, relative to each of the Revisions disposed of thereby, but limited to the extent that it has removed from the petitioners' respective chaks, plot no.55 or some sub-division of it, as mentioned in the adjustment chart, that is part of the revisional order dated 25.08.1988, and hereinafter referred to as the ''impugned order'.
3. The petitioners have come up seeking restoration to their respective chaks, allotment of land comprising plot no.55 aforesaid, made by the Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation vide his order dated 05.01.1987. The case of the petitioners, and to this extent common ground between parties is that plot no.55 of Village Teklampur Jagannath Sarai, Pargana Nizamabad, District Azamgarh was recorded in the name of the Gaon Sabha in the Basic Year. It is the petitioners' case that there is a title dispute between the late Bechan, the father of petitioners nos.1 & 2, and the late Lautu, the third petitioner's father on one hand, and Gaon Sabha Teklampur about plot no.55, on the other. It is the petitioners' case that their fathers during their lifetime had erected a boundary-wall surrounding plot no.55 and carried on agricultural operations there. The petitioners inherited the rights of the late Bechan and the late Lautu aforesaid. In course of time, apart from the boundary-wall erected by the petitioners' father, further improvements were made over plot no.55 by the petitioners, who sunk a tubewell there, establishing their private source of irrigation. Plot no.55 on the commencement of consolidation operation was valued, and the Assistant Consolidation Officer, proposed a chak for the petitioners over the said plot. It has been pleaded in paragraph 4 of the Writ Petition that no objection was filed to the ACO's proposal, and, therefore, the proposal in favour of the petitioners became final. It is pointed out in paragraph 5 of the Writ Petition that one Shubh Karan, respondent no.5 here, filed an objection against other tenure holders, claiming rights to allotment over plots nos.52 and 134. To this objection, petitioner no.3 is claimed to have been made a party. The said objections under Section 20 of the Act were filed on 31.05.1983, and registered before the Court of the Chakbandi Officer-III, Palhani, Azamgarh as Case no.1040. Here, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that another set of objections were filed by respondent no.2 to the ACO's proposal, also dated 31.05.1983, annexed as Annexure CA-1 to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no.2. These objections were filed against respondent no.4, Ramker son of Kishore and one Pherai son of Samman, and another Komal son of Jagdev, non-parties here. These objections were registered as Case no.1027 on the file of the Chakbandi Officer. In these objections, a specific grievance was raised with regard to plot no.55 with a case that respondent no.2 be allotted a chak on his original holding comprising plots nos.78 and 83, and in case out of the part of the aforesaid plots the chak carved out is short in area, the deficiency be made good from plot no.55.
4. The Consolidation Officer while deciding the aforesaid case, modified the ACO's proposal, allowing the objections filed by respondents nos.2 & 5, vide order dated 17.10.1985. The petitioners were not allotted land in plot no.55. Respondent no.2, Ramsurat, who had filed objections to the ACO's proposal as above detailed, was also dissatisfied with the Consolidation Officer's determination dated 18.11.1985 as his demand was not fulfilled. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed an appeal under Section 21(2) of the Act. Respondent no.2 also appealed as did respondent no.4, Ramker, chak holder no.126. All the appeals, numbering three, came up before the Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation, Azamgarh numbered as Appeals nos.969, 959 and 958. The Appeal of the petitioners was allowed, and they were given a chak including the entire area of plot no.55. Thus, by the determination of the Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation in Appeal, the petitioners, who were chak holders nos.98 and 128, were granted as their respective chaks, that between them included the entire area of plot no.55. Respondents nos.2 and 4 also had their Appeals allowed with an equitable adjustment of their chaks, but no land was given to them over plot no.55.
5. Revision no.1278 was filed by respondent no.2 arraying one Dashrath, chak holder no.39 and the petitioners, chak holders nos.98 and 128 as opposite parties. Another revision bearing Revision no.1301 appears to have been filed by Ramker, respondent no.4, and Revision no.1296 by respondent no.3, Ram Badan son of Charittar. Thus, three Revisions along with Revision no.1295, Sripati vs. Ramashraya and others and Revision no.1362, Bechan vs. Lautu and others, were all consolidated, heard together and decided by a common judgment and order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Azamgarh. By means of the impugned order, that includes with it an adjustment chart at the foot of the order, the Revisions filed by the respondents were allowed, and the petitioners were deprived of plot no.55, that was excluded from their chaks, entering substantial area of it in the chak of respondent no.2. Accordingly, the petitioners, who are chak holders nos.98 and 128, have come up challenging the impugned order.
6. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the order passed by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation attained finality, and, therefore, it was not liable to be disturbed in Revision by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who is, after all, a court of Revision. The impugned order is assailed further by the learned counsel for the petitioners with a submission that plot no.55 has been taken out of their chak as it has been found to be Gaon Sabha land of high value, being roadside land, that cannot be allotted to the petitioners, as they do not have their original holding on the said plot number. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has allotted plot no.55, or at least some part of it in favour of respondent no.2, who also has no original holding on the said plot. The allotment order has, therefore, been assailed as a product of the practice of double standards and discrimination. In the final limb of his submission, the learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the Deputy Director of Consolidation in passing the impugned order has not returned any finding about possession and improvements to the land, made by the petitioners in plot no.55, and has, thus, completely ignored the mandatory provisions of Section 19(1)(f) read with Section 19-A(2) of the Act.
7. Learned counsel for respondent no.2 has submitted that plot no.55 belongs to Gaon Sabha, but its valuation was fixed and it was available to be allotted during consolidation. The chak allotted to respondent no.2 was so placed between it and the road, that some portion of plot no.55 fell in between. Moreover, it is the adjoining plot. The largest original holding of respondent no.2 are plot nos.78/1, 78 and 83, situate adjoining the road. Plot no.55 besides falling between his chak and the roadside, is also a contiguous plot. It is submitted that the Deputy Director of Consolidation made a local inspection and after hearing parties decided the Revision, excluding plot no.55 from the petitioners' holdings.
8. Learned counsel for the second respondent submits that so far as the petitioners are concerned, allotment of chak to them over plot no.55, including the whole of it, is allotment of a udan chak as plot no.55 is not a part of the petitioners' original holding at all. The original holding of the petitioners is located in an altogether different sector, as a perusal of CH Form-23 as well as the map drawn up after consolidation proceedings would show, that are annexed to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no.2 as Annexure CA-3 and Annexure CA-5.
9. It has been pointedly argued by the learned counsel for the second respondent that allotment of an udan chak over plot no.55, which is a valuable land adjoining the road, not part of the petitioners' original holding, has been rightly undone by the Revisional Authority. It is pointed out that the fact that plot no.55 is not part of the petitioners' original holding is not disputed. It is further contended that so far as plot no.55 is concerned, it is an adjoining plot to the second respondent's plots nos.78 and 83, which are original holdings of the said respondent, and are situate also adjoining the road. Therefore, for the purpose of adjustment of the said respondent's chak, some modification giving the second respondent some area out of plot no.55, has been lawfully and justly done by the Revisional Authority.
10. It is urged with much emphasis that plot no.55 is not surrounded by a boundary wall, as claimed by the petitioners. It is said that the case relating to the existence of a boundary-wall has been made for the first time before this Court in this writ petition, about which there is neither any material or evidence on record. It is further urged that the petitioners have not asserted about the existence of a tubewell or other source of irrigation before any of the Authorities below, and that plea too has been urged for the first time before this Court. The Revisional Authority has passed the order impugned, as already noted, after making a spot inspection and he has not come across any boundary-wall as alleged, or a private source of irrigation. It is also argued that the title dispute between the petitioners and the Gaon Sabha asserted in the Writ Petition is not at all there, inasmuch as, there are no particulars of proceedings pending before any court of law, mentioned. The pendency of proceedings as to title has been denied by respondent no.2 in paragraph 12 of the counter affidavit filed by him, regarding which there is no further pleading.
11. It is emphasized by the learned counsel for the second respondent that there is no violation of the provisions of Section 19(1)(f) of the Act as the petitioners have not mentioned the facts relating to the existence of a private source of irrigation etc., as already said, before the Authorities below. Making his own case more vivid, learned counsel for the second respondent points out that plot no.78 which is part of the second respondent's original holding with an area of 1.623 hectares is situated by the roadside of the Azamgarh - Jaunpur Highway and plot no.55, is an adjoining plot. It is pointed out that a small portion of plot no.55, is all that has been allotted to the second respondent, to make his chak more symmetrical and viable.
12. Adding to the resistance to the petitioners' case, learned counsel appearing for respondents nos.3/1, 4/1, 4/2 and 4/3, Sri C.K. Rai, points out that apart from the fact that plot no.55 is not the original holding of the petitioners, to which they cannot lay claim, the Revisional Authority has allotted a plot to them in plot no.104, in place of plot no.55. It has been emphasized by Sri C.K. Rai that though in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of these respondents, the existence of a boundary-wall put up by the petitioners in plot no.55 has been denied, in the rejoinder affidavit filed in the year 2017, in reply to the counter affidavit on behalf of respondent no.4, no document indicating the existence of a boundary-wall or any other kind of improvement made to plot no.55 has been annexed. There is no document relating to the alleged title dispute, brought on record by the petitioners. It is further submitted that plot no.55 is adjacent to plot no.56, that are the original holding of respondent no.3, Ram Badan son of Charittar. It is bearing that in mind that some area out of plot no.55 has been included in the land of respondent no.3, being a contiguous land holder.
13. Sri Rai has also emphasized that right from the year 1988 till the last rejoinder was filed in the year 2017, no document relating to the source of irrigation, about which much has been made by the petitioners, has been brought on record. He further submits that for the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director of Consolidation as a Revisional Authority under Section 48 of the Act to interfere with a finding of fact recorded by the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, Explanation (3) appended to Section 48, is very relevant, which has been inserted by U.P. Act no.3 of 2002 with retrospective effect, that is to say, w.e.f. 10.11.1980. The said explanation says that the power under Section 48 to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order, includes the power to examine any finding, whether of fact or law, recorded by any Subordinate Authority, and also includes the power to re-appreciate any oral or documentary evidence.
14. This Court has given a thoughtful consideration to rival submissions advanced on both sides. It is true, no doubt, that powers of the Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of the Act have always been regarded as wide, though inhibited in some regard, being a Court of Revision. The import of the powers of the Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of the Act as they have been always understood has been succinctly laid down by the Supreme Court in Sheo Nand and others vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and others, (2000) 3 SCC 103, where in paragraphs 20 & 21 of the report, it has been held:
"20. The section gives very wide powers to the Deputy Director. It enables him either suo motu on his own motion or on the application of any person to consider the propriety, legality, regularity and correctness of all the proceedings held under the Act and to pass appropriate orders. These powers have been conferred on the Deputy Director in the widest terms so that the claims of the parties under the Act may be effectively adjudicated upon and determined so as to confer finality to the rights of the parties and the revenue records may be prepared accordingly.
21. Normally, the Deputy Director, in exercise of his powers, is not expected to disturb the findings of fact recorded concurrently by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), but where the findings are perverse, in the sense that they are not supported by the evidence brought on record by the parties or that they are against the weight of evidence, it would be the duty of the Deputy Director to scrutinise the whole case again so as to determine the correctness, legality or propriety of the orders passed by the authorities subordinate to him. In a case, like the present, where the entries in the revenue records are fictitious or forged or they were recorded in contravention of the statutory provisions contained in the U.P. Land Records Manual or other allied statutory provisions, the Deputy Director would have full power under Section 48 to reappraise or re-evaluate the evidence-on-record so as to finally determine the rights of the parties by excluding forged and fictitious revenue entries or entries not made in accordance with law."
15. A look at the aforesaid decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court would make it clear that while the powers of the Deputy Director to go into the validity of findings of fact recorded by Authorities below was firmly acknowledged, but inhibited by the nature of the jurisdiction that is after all revisional, the exercise of power was held open on ground of finding being perverse; and once findings of the Authorities below were determined to be perverse, there was no trammel to the Authority of the Deputy Director, as their Lordships of the Supreme Court said in Sheo Nand and others (supra), "it would be the duty of the Deputy Director to scrutinise the whole case so as to determine the correctness, legality or propriety of the orders passed by the authorities subordinate to him." Thus, findings being found perverse or vitiated by something like fraud or forgery, it was always conceded to be the province of the Deputy Director to determine all questions of fact and law. It was, perhaps, bearing in mind some inhibition flowing from the nature of Deputy Director's revisional jurisdiction, that was variously construed in different decisions, to be sometimes wide enough to be as open as an appeal on facts and law, and sometimes held confined to the well-recognized limitations on the powers of the Revision, at least upto the extent that the findings of the Authorities below were not found perverse, that explanation (3) was added to Section 48 of the Act by U.P. Act no.3 of 2002, retrospectively w.e.f. 10.11.1980. The amended provisions of Section 48 of the Act read as under:
"48. Revision and reference.-(1) The Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings; or as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any order [other than an interlocutory order] passed by such authority in the case or proceedings, may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit.
(2) Powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under sub-section (3).
(3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1).
Explanation.- (1) For the purposes of this section, Settlement Officers, Consolidation, Consolidation Officers, Assistant Consolidation Officers, Consolidator and Consolidation Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation.
Explanation.- (2) For the purposes of this section the expression ''interlocutory order' in relation to a case or proceeding, means such order deciding any matter arising in such case or proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect to finally disposing of such case or proceeding.
Explanation.- (3) The power under this section to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order includes the power to examine any finding, whether of fact or law, recorded by any subordinate authority, and also includes the power to reappreciate any oral or documentary evidence."
16. The explanation added by the Amendment has dispelled all doubts about the wide import of the revisional power under Section 48 of the Act, which by the terms of the Act, appears to be wider than the power of a revision or supervision under other statutes. An explanation of the present kind falls precisely in that category, that has been referred to about the function of an explanation, in the reputed treatise on interpretation of statutes, ''Principles of Statutory Interpretation' by Justice G.P. Singh (12th Edition), wherein Chapter 3, Synopsis 10 at page 214, it has been summarized by the learned Author as follows:-
"....... It is also possible that an Explanation may have been added in a declaratory form to retrospectively clarify a doubtful point in law and to serve as a proviso to the main section or ex abundanti cautela to allay groundless apprehensions."
The aforesaid summary of the principles given by the learned Author is based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pushpa Devi Saraf and another vs. Jai Narain Parasrampuria and others, (1992) SCC 676 and the decision of the Privy Council in Abdul Latif Khan vs. Abadi Begum (Mrs.), AIR 1934 PC 188.
17. The aforesaid position of the law regarding the wide scope of the revisional powers of the Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of the Act has been endorsed by this Court in Ram Jeet & others vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur and others, Writ - B No.42465 of 1999, decided on 31.05.2013, where it has been held thus:
"17. ........... Supreme Court in Ram Dular Vs. DDC and others, 1994 (Supplement) (2) SCC 198, Preetam Singh Vs. DDC and others, (1996) 2 SCC 270, Sheo Nand Vs. DDC and others, (2000) 3 SCC 103, Gulzar Singh Vs. DDC and others, (2009) 12 SCC 590 has consistently held that Deputy Director of Consolidation has very wide power to decide issue relating to fact and law both under Section 48 of the Act after re-appreciating the evidence on record. Apart from it Explanation III has been added in Section 48 of the Act with retrospective effect from 10.11.1980 which provides that the power under this Section to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any order includes the power to examine any finding, whether of fact or law, recorded by any subordinate authority and also includes the power to re-appreciate any oral or documentary evidence. The case law relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner does not hold a good law and contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court."
18. There can, thus, be no doubt that the powers of the Revisional Authority, that is the Deputy Director of Consolidation, under Section 48 of the Act are uncharacteristically wide. A perusal of the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation shows that he has assigned reasons for his conclusions, that could be valid or not, dependent on what evidence the parties have placed before the Revisional Authority, and the two other Authorities of fact, below.
19. Sri C.K. Rai, leaned counsel appearing for the second respondent has said that the case about a boundary-wall not being raised over plot no.55 pleaded in the counter affidavit, has not been denied in the rejoinder. It has further been said that there is no document relating to the alleged title dispute brought on record by the petitioners. It has also been urged on behalf of the second respondent that the case about a private source of irrigation, established by the petitioners in plot no.55, has not been pleaded before the Authorities below. The respondents have emphasized also that the Deputy Director has made a spot inspection and has not found a boundary wall, or a private source of irrigation, so as to entitle the petitioners to the benefit of Section 19(1)(f) of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondents have also emphasized the fact that along with the written arguments before this Court some certified copies of CH Form-2A and CH Form-41 have been brought on record, that purport to show the petitioners private source of irrigation in plot no.55, but these papers, according to the respondents, were not placed before the Consolidation Authorities.
20. About the last argument that documents like CH Form-2A and CH Form-41, the certified copies of which have been shown to this court at the stage of argument, were not led in evidence by the petitioners, and, therefore, the private source of irrigation discernible from these Consolidation Forms, particularly, CH Form-2A cannot be relied upon by the petitioners at this stage, appears to be a submission, that cannot be accepted. CH Form-2A is Khasra Chakbandi that is drawn up at the earliest stage of commencement of consolidation operations in accordance with Section 8 of the Act, read with Rule 21 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules, 1954. It is caused to be drawn up by the Deputy Director of Consolidation based on a Revision of the Field Book of the Unit, after a field to field partal, and the Current Annual Register, after its test and verification. Section 8(1)(ii)(a) mandates that the Deputy Director upon revision of Village Map shall cause to be determined, in consultation with the Consolidation Committee, the valuation of each plot after taking into consideration its productivity, location and availability of irrigation facilities, if any. Further, by virtue of Section 8(1)(ii)(b), the Deputy Director is mandated to determine all trees, wells and other improvements, existing in the plots for the purpose of calculating compensation therefor. A perusal of CH Form-2A shows that columns nos.10, 11, 12, 19 & 24, would certainly carry mention about the source of irrigation. What is of prime importance is that whether the petitioner leads evidence about the existence of a source of irrigation or improvement or not, if the existence of such a source or other improvements made on a plot are recorded in CH Form-2A, the Consolidation Authorities are bound to take these into account as all these entries are based on their own partal. A perusal of the CH Form-2A, that has been produced before this Court at the time of hearing, does show that Khasra no.55 and its various sub-divisions are recorded in the name of Gram Samaj, and a certain sub-division in the name of one Dubar son of Ram Pher, but in columns nos.7, 8 & 9, possession of Bechan son of Ramm Baran, and Lautu son of Gajadhar, predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners has been recorded. In column no.19 of the CH Form-2A, tubewell is recorded. Likewise, in the certified copy of the CH Form-41 in Khasra no.55, the new numbers of which appears to be 118, 119 and 120, in column no.7, source of irrigation shown is ''tubewell'. In each of the certified copies of the documents, tubewell is described in vernacular as Nalkoop. Unless these documents are forged, it is difficult to fathom how the Deputy Director of Consolidation recorded his conclusions, without a reference or atleast a remark about this private source of irrigation.
21. There is another aspect of the matter, which is far reaching import about the manner in which the Deputy Director of Consolidation has written his judgment. A judgment is the result of a decision by a Court or quasi-judicial authority, invested with jurisdiction by the law to decide a lis. The words of the judgment indicate, amongst others, whether jurisdiction within the parameters of the power that the Court or Authority as exercised, has been appropriately exercised. A judgment of an original Court, an Appellate Court and a Revisional Court, would not read or be worded and framed in the same manner.
22. This Court is rather disconcerted to find that a reading of the judgment of the Consolidation Officer, the Assistant Settlement Officer, and particularly, the impugned order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in Revision, read like three original judgments, all written in exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction. The judgment of a Revisional Court cannot proceed to address the issues laid before it by parties, deal with them and decide, for that is to be done by the Court or Authority of first instance. The judgment of a Revisional Court has to open, go through and end like a judgment of reappraisal of what the two Courts or Authorities below have done. The approach of reappraisal has to be supervisory, and not open appellate. May be, in the case of a revision under Section 48 of the Act, the standard of reappraisal is wider than that traditionally associated with exercise of Revisional jurisdiction. But, all the same, a Revisional Court cannot decide and write its judgment as if it were a Court of first instance, without referring to and affirming or reversing the findings of the two Authorities below, in the context of the present Act. In the present case, the impugned judgment has precisely done that. It reads like an original judgment written in the third instance. It does not give any reason to disagree with what the Appellate Court has said, though it may have given its own reasons. In the context of dealing with criminal appeals and revisions, concerned about the trappings of an Appellate or Revisional Court's judgment or order, and how it should read and proceed, their Lordships of the Supreme Court In Re: To issue certain guidelines regarding inadequacies and deficiencies in criminal trials (Suo Motu Writ (Crl.) No.1 of 2017 vide order dated 30.03.2017, issued the following guidelines regarding the manner in which Appellate and Revisional Courts in criminal matters ought to write judgments, and what are the essentials to be adhered to while writing an Appellate or Revisional judgment. The said guidelines hold equally good in case of exercise of any Appellate or Revisional Authority by a Court or other Authority in any other jurisdiction. Guideline no.7 in Suo Motu Writ (Crl.) No.1 of 2017 (supra) reads thus:
"7. Repetition of pleadings, evidence, and arguments in the judgments and orders of the Trial Court, Appellate and Revisional Courts be avoided. Repetition of facts, evidence, and contentions before lower Courts make the judgments cumbersome, and takes away the precious time of the Court unnecessarily. The Appellate/ Revisional Court judgment/order is the continuation of the lower court judgment and must ideally start with " in this appeal/revision, the impugned judgment is assailed on the following grounds" or "the points that arise for consideration in this appeal/revision are". This does not of course, take away the option/jurisdiction of the Appellate/Revisional Courts to re-narrate facts and contentions if they be inadequately or insufficiently narrated in the judgment. Mechanical re narration to be avoided at any rate."
23. Particularly, relating to the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director of Consolidation under Section 48 of the Act, the aforesaid issue though in the context of a title matter was considered by this Court in Haridas and others vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and another, 2005 SCC OnLine All 2263: 2005(98) RD 593, where dealing with the obligations of a Revisional court while writing its opinion, it was held thus:
"8. It is well settled that, while setting aside the judgment of inferior Court or Tribunal a Revisional Court or higher Tribunal has to deal with the findings given by the inferior Court or Tribunal and is required to consider the entire evidence on record. Thus while recording the contrary findings the Deputy Director of Consolidation was under obligation to consider entire evidence on record and also to record reasons of differing with the findings of Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer Consolidation. ....."
24. In the conspectus of the above facts and the law, this Court is of firm opinion that the impugned judgment passed by the Revisional Court suffers from a manifest error of law in ignoring from consideration material evidence, that is part of its own record, in particular, CH Form-2A and CH Form-41, and also in exercising its jurisdiction, where it has proceeded to decide a revision so much like a Court of original jurisdiction that it has lost its character of a Revisional order. On both these counts, the impugned order is found to be flawed and vitiated and, thus, liable to be quashed with a remit of the matter to the Deputy Director of Consolidation to hear parties afresh, consider relevant evidence on record with opportunity to parties to place such evidence on record as may be relevant and to decide the revision afresh, all to be done within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
25. This writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 25.08.1988 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in Revision no.1301, Ramker vs. Vibhuti and others; Revision no.1296, Ram Badan vs. Ramdhari and others; Revision no.1278, Ramsurat vs. Dashrath and others; Revision no.1295, Sripati vs. Ramashraya and others; and, Revision no.1362, Bechan vs. Lautu and others, is hereby quashed with a remit of the matter to the Deputy Director of Consolidation to decide afresh within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, after hearing all parties concerned, in accordance with what has been said in this judgment.
Order Date :- 30.4.2019 Anoop