Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Devi Kishan vs Madan Lal Verma on 29 May, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000CRILJ3619, 2000(3)WLC245, 2000(3)WLN426
Author: B.S. Chauhan
Bench: B.S. Chauhan
ORDER Chauhan, J.
1. The instant contempt petition has been filed complaining that the order, passed by this Court on 5.7.1993 in Writ Petition No. 2211/1993, has not been complied with by the respondents.
(2). The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that the petitioner had filed a writ petition for issuing direction to the respondents claiming promotion to the post of Lower Division Clerk from Class IV Employee on the basis that he possessed the requisite qualification for the post (Prathma from Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Allahabad in 1981) and there was a quota for departmental promotion from Class IV Employee to Lower Division Clerk. This Court disposed of the said writ petition vide judgment and order dated 5.7.93 directing the respondents to consider his representation for promotion within two months of the presentation of the certified copy of the order. As the matter has not been considered, petitioner has filed the instant petition.
(3). There is an inordinate delay of about six years on the part of the petitioner to move the contempt petition as he filed this petition on 30.7.99.
(4). Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short, "the Act") reads as under:-
"Limitation for action for Contempt. - No Court shall initiate any proceeding for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."
(5). Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid provisions of Sec. 20 that the Act provides for initiation of proceedings and not for institution of proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Baradakanta Mishra vs. Justice Gatlkrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court (1), has held that the terminus ad quen for the period of limitation in Sec. 20 of the Act is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiate by the Court. Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act deals with filing of a suit, appeal or application within the prescribed period and it certainly does not deal with the taking of cognizance of a mailer by the Courts. As it does not deal with the initiation of the proceedings, it cannot be said that the Limitation Act or any provision thereof applies to the contempt proceedings and in view of this, the bar of limitation prescribed by Section 20 of the Act is absolute. Sec. 4 to 24 (both inclusive) of the Limitation Act via Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act are not applicable to contempt proceedings.
(6). The issue of application of the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act was considered by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in Dinesh Bhai Pareek vs. Kripala Co-operative Housing Society, Ahmedabad & Ors. (2), wherein the Court held that the Schedule to the Limitation Act does not prescribe any limitation for initiating the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. Sec. 20 of the Act fills up the lacuna and prescribes a period of limitation. The Court observed as under:-
".... Sec. 20 as such does not contemplate the institution of a petition or an application by a private individual for taking action under the Act. It merely contemplates initiation of proceedings by a Court on its own motion or otherwise. The fellers which Sec. 20 places on the jurisdiction of the Court is that the Court shall not initiate any proceeding for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of the period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. Since there is no application or petition before the Court in such proceeding, the question of condoning the delay does not arise. Delay can be condoned in a case where a person who has a right to institute action has approached the Court after the expiry of the period of limitation. Sec. 20 does not contemplate such situation. When the Court initiates contempt proceedings on its own motion, the question of condoning the delay does not arise."
(7). Since Sec. 20 of the Act provides for a condition precedent for exercising the jurisdiction of a Court, thus, it becomes mandatory that before the Court exercises its jurisdiction, the said condition precedent should be fulfilled and if the Court is satisfied that the condition precedent has been fulfilled, only then it can initiate the contempt proceedings, otherwise not. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation as it would otherwise defeat the provision of law. (Vide State of Kerala vs. P.K. Ramchandranan (3). The natural corollary of this would be that after the period, as prescribed by Sec. 20 of the Act, lapses, the jurisdiction of the Court automatically evaporates and Court loses jurisdiction under the said Act.
(8). A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court, in Gulab Singh & Ors. vs. Principal Ramjilal (4), has held that the period within which the proceedings for contempt are to be initiated, is prescribed by the Contempt Act and not by Limitation Act, therefore, the question of applying the provisions of Limitation Act does not arise. The statute cannot be interpreted as to make a statutory provision nugatory.
(9). A Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court, in Manjit Singh vs. Darshan Singh (5), has held that within the said period of limitation, not only that the petition should be presented before the Court but the Court should take cognizance of it, as the terminus ad quen in contempt would necessarily vary and be related to the modes of taking cognizance in contempt cases.
(10). There may be a case where the contempt may be in respect of a continuous wrong. But in that case, the continued non-compliance of the order may save the limitation as the offence continues unless its requirement is carried out and it is complied with (Vide State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi (6). The same view has been taken by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kishan Singh vs. T. Anjaiya, Chief Minister & Ors (7); Advocate General, Andhra Pradesh vs. A.C. Koteswara Rao (8); Purshottam Das Goyal vs. Hon'ble Justice B.S. Dhillon (9); Sukhdeo Singh vs. Teja Singh (10); and R.L. Kapoor vs. State of Tamil Nadu (11).
(11). Initiation of contempt proceedings has a different connotation and cannot be equated with mere presentation of the petition, and initiation means when the Court applies its mind and forms an opinion that a prima facie case for initiating the proceeding for contempt is made out and the respondents or the alleged contemnors should be called upon to show cause why they should not be punished.
(12). Therefore, it is an out-come of the conscious application of mind by the Court to the facts and material before it and the limitation provided by Sec. 20 of the Act is different as the limitation is understood under the provisions of the Limitation Act. Even Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act has no application in the case and the Court loses its jurisdiction after expiry of the limitation, rather jurisdiction evaporates automatically after expiry of period provided u/S 20 of the Act. In T. Deendayal vs. High Court of Andhra Pradesh (12), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that proceedings may be initiated within one year and it is not necessary that it should be concluded within that stipulated period.
(13). In Firm Ganpatram Rajkumar vs. Kalu Ram & Ors. (13), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that Sec. 20 of the Act does not apply in the case of continuing wrong.
(14). In the instant case, as the respondents were directed to decide the claim of the petitioner within a prescribed period and it was not done within the said period, the wrong committed by the respondents cannot be of a continuous nature and the petitioner failed to get the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the Act within the prescribed limitation and as observed above, the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act are not attracted in contempt proceedings.
(15). The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Om Prakash Jaiswal vs. D.K. Mittal & Ors (14), has elaborately dealt with this issue and placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Baradakanta Mishra vs. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court (supra), wherein the Apex Court has held that it is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates proceedings for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of proceedings for contempt. That is why, the terminus a qua for a period of limitation provided u/s. 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court.
(16). As the petition has been presented after expiry of the statutory limitation, the Court cannot entertain the same.
(17). Mr. Purohit, at this juncture, has submitted that this Court may convert this petition under Article 215 of the Constitution though the petition has been filed under the provisions of Sec. 11 and 12 read with Sec. 2(b) of the Act. This Court, in Anwar Khan vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (15), has considered the issue elaborately and placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pritam Pal vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh (16), held that the power of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, being the Courts of Record, as embodied under Art. 129 and 215 respectively, cannot be restricted by any ordinary legislation including the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. Their inherent power is elastic, unfattered and not subject to any limit. Such power is an inherent power and the jurisdiction vested is a set one not derived from any other statute and such constitutionally vested right cannot be either abridged by any legislation or abrogated or cut down.
(18). Undoubtedly, a party cannot be rendered remediless (Vide Rameshwar Lal vs. Municipal Council, Tonk & Ors. (17) but the Court must be satisfied that party has a right to enforce and he has endeavoured to enforce it and in order to do that he has persued the case deligently and bonafide. The rights claimed by the petitioner are doubtful and it is further fortified from the fact that the petitioner himself has approached this Court after a lapse of six years and it appears that he had not been persuing the remedy deligently and effectively and there is no justification for resorting to the provision under Article 215 of the Constitution at such a belated stage.
(19). Petitioner has not disclosed the entire facts. However, if he was seeking promotion on the vacancy occurred after 27.5.1985, he was not entitled to be considered for promotion in view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Shanker Lal Verma vs. R.S.E.B. & Ors. (18), as the said Certificate stood de-recognised on 27.5.1985.
(20). Thus, the petition stands dismissed.