Patna High Court
Kailash Pati Singh vs The State Of Bihar And Ors. on 11 February, 1976
Equivalent citations: AIR1976PAT248, 1977(25)BLJR44, AIR 1976 PATNA 248, ILR (1976) 55 PAT 350, 1976 BBCJ 101, 1976 PATLJR 207
Author: Nagender Prasad Singh
Bench: Nagendra Prasad Singh
JUDGMENT Nagender Prasad Singh, J.
1. This writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed on behalf of the petitioner for quashing a notice, dated the 30th September, 1975, issued to the petitioner by the respondent Deputy Collector Incharge Land Reforms, Dinapur (hereinafter referred to as the 'D.C.LR.'), in purported exercise of powers conferred on him under Section 12 of the Bihar Money-Lenders Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), read with Rule 10 (3) of the Bihar Money-Lenders Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules') directing the petitioner to show cause by the 6th October, 1975, as to why respondent No. 3 should not be put in possession of the lands which had been mortgaged in favour of the petitioner. A copy of the said notice is Annexure '2' to the writ application.
2. On the 29th October, 1975, a rule was issued by this Court to the respondents to show cause and it was ordered that, during the pendency of the writ application, further proceedings before the respondent D.C.L.R, shall remain stayed.
3. According to the petitioner, the father of respondent No. 3 required money as loan from the petitioner, who is a registered money-lender, and the petitioner advanced a loan of Rs. 2,000 and the father of respondent No. 3 executed a usufructuary mortgage bond in favour of the petitioner and put the petitioner in possession of the mortgaged lands, fully described in the deed of mortgage, dated the 27th June, 1967. Under the terms of the mortgage, the petitioner was entitled to appropriate the usufruct of the lands mortgaged, in lieu of interest on the amount advanced. In accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the petitioner was entitled to remain in possession of the said lands till the mortgage was redeemed by payment of the principal amount of the loan advanced, and, in case the mortgagor failed to redeem the mortgage within the period of thirty years, as prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, the right of redemption was to stand extinguished. However, the Bihar Money-Lenders Act was enacted in the year 1974, and Section 12 of this Act has made a provision that a usufructuary mortgage relating to any agricultural land, whether executed be-
fore or after the commencement of this Act, shell be deemed to have been fully satisfied and the mortgage shall be deemed to have been wholly redeemed on expiry of a period of seven years from the date of the execution of the mortgage bond and thereafter the mortgagor shall be entitled to recover possession of the mortgaged land in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Rules, On an application made by respondent No. 3, the respondent D.C.L.R. has issued the impugned notice, which, according to the petitioner, is without any authority in law, inasmuch as Section 12 of the Act is ultra vires and the rules framed under the Act are of no effect, because the procedure prescribed under Sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Act regarding framing of the rules has not been complied with.
4. The object of the Act, as mentioned therein, is to consolidate and amend the law relating to regulation of money-lending transactions and to grant relief to debtors in the State of Bihar. Section 4 of the Act makes provision regarding registration of a money-lender. Section 7 imposes a duty on such registered money-lender to maintain accounts in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein. Section 9 prescribes the maximum rate of interest which can be charged on the loan. Section 11 fixes the maximum amount which a money-lender may realise from a debtor on account of principal and interest. Section 12, which is the relevant section for the present case, reads as under:--
"12. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or anything having the force of law or in any agreement, the principal amount and all dues in respect of a usufructuary mortgage relating to any agricultural land, whether executed before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to have been fully satisfied and the mortgage shall be deemed to have been wholly redeemed on expiry of a period of seven years from the date of the execution of the mortgage bond in respect of such land and the mortgagor shall be entitled to recover possession of the mortgaged land in the manner prescribed under the Rules:
Provided that if the mortgage bond had been executed before the commencement of this Act nothing in this section shall entitle the mortgagor to claim any accounts or profits from the mortgagee by the reason of the benefit of redemption of the mortgage under this provision.
Explanation.-- Nothing in this section shall be construed to confer a right of effecting usufructuary mortgage of land on persons who do not possess transferable rights in such land."
This section prescribes a special law of limitation and procedure for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage, and that is perhaps, the reason why this section has a non obstante clause saying that, 'notwithstanding anything to the contrary, contained in any law or anything having the force of law or any agreement', the said provision is to prevail. Section 47 deals with the rule-making power. Subsection (3) of Section 47 is as follows:--
"47 (3) Every rule made under this section shall be laid as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of the State Legislature, while it is in session for a total period of fourteen days which may be comprised in one session or in two successive sessions, and, if, before the expiry of the session in which it is so laid or the session immediately following, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule or both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be, so, however, that any such modification or amendment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule."
Rules 9 and 10 prescribe the procedure for taking possession of the mortgaged land by the mortgagor from the mortgagee and require in the first instance, a notice to be sent in the form prescribed by the mortgagor calling upon the mortgagee to deliver possession of the mortgaged property within twenty days from the date of the notice. On expiry of the said period, if the mortgagee fails or refuses to deliver possession, the mortgagor can file an application before the Collector for ejecting the mortgagee and the Collector shall issue a notice in the prescribed form to the mortgagee to show cause by a date fixed as to why the mortgagor should not be put in possession; on cause being shown, the Collector has to pass an order to eject the mortgagee from the mortgaged land and to put the mortgagor in possession.
5. Mr. Kailash Roy, appearing for the petitioner, has challenged the legality of the notice (Annexure '2') on several grounds, including the one that Section 12 of the Act itself is ultra vires and the Rules are of no effect due to non-compli-
ance with the aforesaid provision of Subsection (3) of Section 47 of the Act. Learned counsel has submitted that an usufructuary mortgagee has an interest in the subject-matter of the mortgage and any interference with his right of possession to such property must be under some legal authority. In that connection, he has placed reliance on the cases of Paresh N.ath Singha v. Nabogopal Chattopadhya, (1902) ILR 29 Gal 1 (FB), Sohan Lal v. Mohan Lal (AIR 1928 All 726) (FB) and Prahlad Dalsukhrai v. Maganlal Muljibfaai Tewar (AIR 1952 Bom 454). There cannot be a dispute that the interest of a mortgagee of a usufructuary mortgage is a tangible property and it can be extinguished only in accordance with Law; If it is held, .as is being suggested on behalf of the petitioner, that Section 12 of the Act cannot extinguish the said right, then the proceedings initiated for ejectment of the petitioner have to be held to be null and void. But the question is as to whether the said Section 12 and the procedure prescribed in the Rules for recovery of possession are ultra vires on one ground or the other.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the legality of Section 12 of the Act on several-grounds, including the one that it is violative of Article 19 of the Constitution end amounts to an arbitrary invasion over petitioner's right to property. He has further submitted that, in view of the Presidential Order, dated the 8th January, 1976, issued under Article 359 (1) of the Constitution, suspending the right to move any Court for the enforcement of such rights under Article 19, the present writ application has to remain pending in this Court during the period the said order remains in force. According to learned counsel, however, in spite of the fact that the proceedings have to remain suspended, the order of stay passed by this Court at the time of admission of the writ application on the 29th October, 1975, staying further proceedings before the respondent D.C.L.R. shall remain in force. He submits that the order of stay of further proceedings in the case in question had been passed by this Court before the issuance of the Presidential Order and its effect cannot be destroyed by any such Order issued later. In my opinion, it is difficult to accept this contention of the learned counsel, because in that case the word 'suspended' used in Article 359 (1) will have to be interpreted to mean only staying the pro-
ceedings in question. There is difference between the effect of an order suspending a proceeding and the effect of en order Of merely staying the proceeding. In Article 359 (1), instead of the word 'suspended', if the word 'stayed' had been used, then any such proceeding where such right is enforced had to be stayed and only in that case there was no difficulty in accepting the argument of the learned counsel. In my view, however, if the pro ceeding pending 'before this Court, where such right is enforced, is to remain sus pended due to the . Presidential Order, then even the order of stay which is only ad interim in nature and is to continue during the pendency of the proceeding will also be deemed to be suspended. The matter may be different if some final judicial order had been passed. It is well known that any order of stay which is to continue during the pendency of a pro ceeding before this Court cannot be con sidered to be a final order.
7. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider what is the effect of such Presidential Order, in the case of Makhan Singh Taraikka v. State of Punjab (AIR 1964 SC 381), where it was observed by Gajendr-agadkar, J. (as he then was) as follows:--
"13. Since the object of Article 359 (1) is to suspend the rights of the citizens to move any court, the consequence of the Presidential Order may be that any proceeding which may be pending at the date of the Order remains suspended during the time that the Order is in operation and may be revived when the said Order ceases to be operative;..... In other words, Article 359 (1) end the Presidential Order issued under it may constitute a sort of moratorium or a blanket ban against the institution or continuance of any legal action subject to two important conditions. The first condition relates to the character of the legal action and requires that the said action must seek to obtain a relief on the ground that the claimant's fundamental rights specified in the Presidential Order have been contravened and the second condition relates to the period during which this ban is to operate."
In the said judgment it was clearly said that the Presidential Order constitutes a sort of moratorium or a blanket ban against the continuance of any legal action and any such right revives when the said Order ceases to be operative. If the proceeding pending before this Court is to remain in moratorium or under a blanket ban, then how the interim order passed in the same proceeding which is to continue during the pendency of the proceeding can remain in force? Learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a Single Judge decision of the Calcutta High Court in Jagadish Chandra Agarwal v. Union of India (AIR 1976 Cal 17). A Bench of this Court in M/s. Radha Krishna Agrawal v. State of Bihar (C. W. J.C. Nos. 1053 and 1054 of 1975, disposed of on the 8th Jan., 1976 (Pat)) has considered this aspect of the matter and has held that in such a situation even the order of stay passed, which is to continue during the pendency of such writ applications, shall also become ineffective. When it was indicated by the Court that, if the petitioner chose to enforce his right under Article 19 of the Constitution in this writ application will have to remain suspended, including the order of interim stay passed in this case, the learned counsel for the petitioner said that he would not press the application on the ground of violation of the right of the petitioner under Article 19 of the Constitution, but he shall press the application on other grounds. In my opinion, the petitioner is entitled to do the same.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner thereafter submitted that the Act will not be deemed to be in force because the Bill in question did not receive the assent of the Governor, as required by Article 200 of the Constitution; it has simply received the assent of the President. This assent by the President, according to learned counsel, will not amount to an assent, as required by Article 200, but it is only an assent in accordance with Article 254 (2) of the Constitution. According to learned counsel, the Bill which was passed by the Bihar Legislature dealt with matters which are covered by the entries in the State List (List II) and certain matters which are enumerated in the Concurrent List (List III). However, Parliament had already made law on the matters covered by the Concurrent List, meaning thereby the Transfer of Property Act and the Indian Limitation Act. The assent of the President was essential in accordance with the requirements of Article 254 (2) of the Constitution so that the provisions of the Act may prevail so far as the State of Bihar is concerned, although being repugnant to and inconsistent with the provisions of the Central Acts. According to learned counsel, the assent of the President relates to only those provisions. In my opinion, there is no merit in this submission of the learned counsel. In view of Article 200 of the Constitution, any Bill which has been passed by the Legislature of the State has to be presented to the Governor and the Governor "shall declare either that he assents to the Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President". The third alternative in which the Governor reserves the Bill for consideration of the President is to be assented by the President in accordance with Article 201 of the Constitution. The power to reserve the Bill for consideration of the President need not be exercised only in cases where the Bill contains a provision repugnant to the provisions of some Central Act. It all depends on the discretion of the Governor as to what Bill he shall reserve for consideration of the President. Once the President assents in accordance with Article 201 of the Constitution, then that Bill need not be presented again before the Governor for his assent merely because it deals with items which are within the legislative competence of the State Legislature. I am supported in my view by the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Sir Kameshwar Singh (AIR 1952 SC 252), where, at page 265, paragraph 17, Patanjali Sastri, C. J., while construing the scope of the proviso to Article 200 of the Constitution, observed as follows:--
"It is significant that the article does not contemplate the Governor giving his assent and thereafter, when the Bill has become a full-fledged law, reserving it for the consideration of the President. Indeed, the Governor is prohibited from giving his assent where such reservation by him is made compulsory. The constitution would thus seem to contemplate only 'bills' passed by the House or Houses of Legislature being reserved for the consideration of the President and not 'laws' to which the Governor has already given his assent......... If it was intended that such a law should have the assent of both the Governor and the President, one would expect to find not only a more clear or explicit provision to that, effect, but also some reference in Article 200 to the Governor's power to reserve a measure for the consideration of the President after himself assenting to it. On the other hand, as we have seen, where reservation by the Governor is made obligatory, he is prohibited from giving his assent."
In the same judgment, S. R. Das, J. (as he then was), at page 304, paragraph 178, observed :
"Therefore, it is urged that, after a Bill is passed by the State Assembly, the Governor must assent to it so that the Bill becomes a law and then that law, to have effect, must be reserved for the consideration of the President. This, admittedly, not having been done, the provisions of Article 31 (3) cannot be said to have been complied with and, therefore, the Act cannot, have any effect at all. I am unable to accept, this line of reasoning."
9. A Bench of the Assam High Court in Benudhar Saikia v. S. K. Bhatta-charya (AIR 1961 Assam 16) has also held that, when the Governor has reserved a Bill for consideration of the president under Article 200 .and the President gives assent, the Act is valid and cannot be challenged on the ground that it did not receive the assent of the Governor, A Full Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Gan-patrao Pande v. State (ILR (1953) Nag 1) took the same view. The President having given his assent the Bill must be deemed to have been passed into law. In my opinion, it cannot be urged that the Bill which was passed by the Bihar Legislature never became law in absence of the essent by the Governor of Bihar.
10. Learned counsel then submitted that, in view of Article 254 (1) of the Constitution, the provisions of Section 12 of the Act shall be void and of no effect. According to learned counsel, when Section 12 prescribes a special period of limitation and procedure for redemption, it is repugnant to and inconsistent with the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act and the Transfer of Property Act, which are Central Acts, and, as such, it is void In my opinion there is no inconsistency with the provisions of the Limitation Act The Limitation Act prescribes a time-limit after which the equity of redemption is extinguished by lapse of time, whereas Section 12 prescribed a period after which it will be deemed that the principal amount and all dues in respect of the mortgage in question have been fully satisfied. Limitation is a matter which is in the Concurrent List; both the State Legislature and Parliament can legislate in respect of the same. The Act will also not be void merely because the procedure of redemption of a usufructuary mortgage relating to agricultural lands under the Act is different from the procedure prescribed under the Transfer of Property Act. The question of repugnancy could have arisen if both the Acts, that is, the T. P. Act and the Act, had dealt with matters under the Concurrent List. The Act, in pith and substance, is for granting relief to agriculturists against indebtedness, which is covered by Entry No. 30 in the State List and for achieving that object, it was perfectly within the competence of the State Legislature to enact the law in question. It is well settled that in such a situation, merely because certain provisions of the Act incidentally deal with matters enumerated either in the Concurrent List or in the Union List, the Act will not be void, if the Act, in pith and substance, is in respect of any matter enumerated in any of the entries of the State List (List II), Reference in this connection may be made to the cases of A. S, Krishna v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 297) and Prafulla Kumar Mu-kherjee v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna (AIR 1947 PC 60).
11. It was then submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that Section 12 of the Act simply declares that, after the expiry of the period of seven years from the date of execution of the mortgage, the principal amount and all the dues in respect of the mortgage shall be deemed to have been fully satisfied end the mortgage shall be deemed to have been wholly redeemed; but it does not prescribe the procedure for recovery of possession of the mortgaged land--it simply says that that will be done in the manner prescribed by the Rules. He also submitted that in the eye of law no such Rules have been framed. According to learned counsel, the Rules are of no effect due to non-compliance with the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Act, which requires that every rule made under the section has to be laid as soon as may be after it is made before each House of the State Legislature "while it is in session for a total period of fourteen days." According to the petitioner, the Rules were never laid before any House of the State Legislature, much less for fourteen days. In support of this argument, reliance has been placed on the observations of a Bench of this Court in Managing Committee of T. K. Ghosh Academy v. State of Bihar (1974 BLJR 96 (97)), where a question had been raised as to whether an appeal filed by a discharged Head Master of a non-Government Secondary School could be heard according to the then existing rules. The appeal had been heard and disposed of according to the then existing rules which were to remain in force till new rules were framed in accordance with Section 8 (3) of the Bihar School (Control and Regulation of Administration) Act, 1960. In that connection an objection was taken on behalf of respondent No. 2 to the effect that the new rules had been framed. That argument was repelled saying that the new rules had not even been placed before the two Houses of the State Legislature and as such they were not effective. From, the following observation in paragraph. 6 of the judgment it appears that this question was not directly" in issue:--
"6. Since facts concerning the new rules were not placed before us on any affidavit, we are not sure as to whether the rules are effective or not and whether they have been. laid before each House of the Bihar Legislature in accordance with Section 8 (3) of the Act. If they have not been so laid, then it is plain that the rules have not got the statutory force yet, because they may be rejected by the Legislature; they may be modified by the Legislature."
However, in the present case, from the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State it appears that it had been so laid. In the counter-affidavit it has been stated that the Rules in question had been published on the 29th July, 1975 in an issue of the Bihar Gazette and were laid before the different Houses of the State Legislature on the 9th August, 1975. They remain so laid in the next session of the State Legislature which commenced on the 9th December, 1975 and continued till the 22nd December, 1975. It has been stated that neither of the Houses has suggested any modification of the Rules. The impugned notice was issued on the 30th September, 1975. As such, by that time it had been laid before the two Houses of the Slate Legislature. Apart from that, the last part of Sub-section (3) of Section 47 of the Act says in explicit terms that "any such modification or amendment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule." As such, even if the two Houses of the State Legislature had suggested any modification or amendment, which they have not, that would not have invalidated any action taken. The petitioner cannot, therefore, urge that the notice issued on the 30th September, 1975, after the Rule had been laid before the two Houses of the Legislature, will be invalid, merely be-
cause by that time they had not remained so Laid for a total period of fourteen days. Sub-section (3) of Section 47 presupposes that action might have been taken on the basis of the Rules even before the period of fourteen days had expired, and such action will be deemed to be valid even in case the Legislature later decided that the Rules should be modified or amended.
12. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider a similar provision in the case of Jan Mohammad Noor Mohammad Regben v. State of Gujarat [(1966) 1 SCR 505 = (AIR 1966 SC 385)]. The Bombay Agricultural Produce Markets Act (22 of 1939), by Section 26 (1), authorised the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act. It was provided by Sub-section (5) that the Rules made under Section 26 shall be laid before each House of the Provincial Legislature at the session thereof next following and shall be liable to be modified or rescinded by a resolution in which both Houses agreed and such rules shall, after notification in the Official Gazette, be deemed to have been modified or rescinded accordingly. Jt was urged on behalf of the petitioner in that case that the Rules, having not been placed before the two Houses of the Provincial Legislature at the first session, had no legal validity. This argument was repelled by the Supreme Court in the following words:--
"Section 26 (5) of Bombay Act 22 of 1939 does not prescribe that the rules acquired validity only from the date on which they were placed before the Houses of Legislature. The rules are valid from the date on which they are made under Section 26 (1). It is true that the Legislature has prescribed that the rules shall be placed before the Houses of Legislature, but failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature does not affect the validity of the rules, merely because they have not been placed before the Houses of the Legislature. Granting that the provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 26 by reason of the failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature were violated, we are of the view that Sub-section (5) of Setcion 26 having regard to the purposes for which it is made, and in the context in which it occurs, cannot be regarded as mandatory,"
13. It was lastly submitted on behalf of the petitioner that respondent No. 3 has not paid requisite court-fee on his application filed before the D.C.L.R. If that be so, the respondent D.C.L.R. shall call upon respondent No. 3 to pay the requisite court-fee, as required by Rule 10 (2) of the Rules.
14. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
Shambhu Prasad Singh, J.
15. I agree and would like to add a few observations of my own on the question whether Section 12 of the Bihar Money-Lenders Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is a bad law on account of repugnancy with some of the provisions of the Central Acts, such as, the Indian Limitation Act, the Transfer of Property Act and the Indian Contract Act. The article of the Constitution relevant for consideration of this question is 254, but before referring to the provisions of that article. I would like to examine whether there is any repugnancy with provisions of any of those Acts. So far as the Limitation Act is concerned, it has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that while Article 61 of the Limitation Act of 1963 prescribes a period of 30 years for redemption or recovery of possession of immovable property mortgaged and Section 27 of the said Act Lays down that at the determination of the period limited under the said Act to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property his right to such property shall be extinguished. Section 12 of the Act extinguishes the right of the mortgagee on the expiry of seven years. According to me, there is no repugnancy between the two provisions, for, while the Limitation Act extinguishes the right of the mortgagor to redeem and recover possession after expiry of 30 years from the date when the right to redeem or recover possession accrues, Section 12 of the Act extinguishes the right of the mortgagee to remain in possession after expiry of seven years. Section 12 of the Act confers upon the mortgagor a right to recover possession on the expiry of seven years from the date of the execution of the mortgage and in case he does not recover possession within 30 years from that date, his right shall be extinguished under the provisions of the Limitation Act. A question was also posed before us as to what will happen in cases where the right of the mortgagor to redeem and recover possession has already been extinguished on account of the provisions of the Limitation Act. Can he in such cases avail of the right conferred upon him under Section 12 of the Act?
This question need not be considered and answered in this case as the right of the mortgagor to redeem and recover possession of the mortgaged property has not been extinguished under the provisions of the Limitation Act in the present case.
16. In my opinion, there is also no repugnancy between the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 12 of the Act. Undoubtedly, the Transfer of Property Act confers a right upon the mortgagor to redeem and on the mortgagee to remain in possession in cases where he is put In possession so long the mortgage is not redeemed. Section 12 of the Act takes away neither of these rights. The mortgagor retains his right to redeem, if he so likes, within seven years of the execution of the mortgage and the mortgagee to remain in possession of the property mortgaged for seven years until the mortgage stands redeemed by force of law.
17. The definition of "usufructuary mortgage" in Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act itself visualises that there may be such mortgages where the usufruct of the property is to be appropriated partly in lieu of interest or partly in payment of the mortgage-money end the mortgage is extinguished when the mortgage money stands repaid from the usufruct of the property. Section 12 of the Act merely provides that in all cases of usufructuary mortgage of agricultural land in Bihar, the mortgage-money shall be deemed to have been paid from the usufruct of the mortgaged property on the expiry of a period of seven years from the date of the execution of the mortgage. Mortgages known as Bhughtbandha are also prevalent in Bihar in which the mortgage stands redeemed on expiry of the period fixed for the purpose by the par ties to the deed. Laws like Section 46 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act have also put restrictions that such Bhughtbandha mortgages cannot be for a period exceeding seven years except in certain cases.
18. Section 12 of the Act, no doubt, puts a restriction on the freedom to enter into contracts relating to mortgage of lands. Parties to a mortgage are restricted by law to execute usufructuary mortgages in respect of agricultural lands for a period of more than seven years end irrespective of their agreement the mortgage is extinguished on the expiry of seven years. But it is open always tc the Legislature to put restrictions on the freedom of entering into contracts. The Con-
tract Act itself puts many such restrictions.
19. Article 254 (1) of the Constitution lays down that if any provision of law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of any existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list, then, subject to the provisions of Clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. In so far as the Limitation Act, 1063 is concerned, it is a law made by Parliament and undoubtedly limitation being a matter in the concurrent list (item No. 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule), the Parliament was competent to en-act it. The Transfer of Property Act and the Contract Act are existing laws, as defined in Article 366 (10) of the Constitution, but transfer of property of agricultural lands and contracts relating to agricultural lands are not in the concurrent list. Item No. 6 of List III of the Seventh Schedule is as follows:--
"Transfer of property other than agricultural land; registration of deeds and documents."
Item No. 7 of the said List reads-
"Contracts, including partnership, agency contracts of carriage, and other special forms of contracts, but not including contracts relating to agricultural land."
Transfer of agricultural lands and contract relating to agricultural lands being not in the concurrent list, but being in the State list, any law made by the State Legislature relating to these cannot be declared to be void on the ground of repugnancy with an existing law of the Central Government. Section 12 of the Act cannot, therefore, be declared to be bad on the ground of repugnancy with any provision of the Transfer of Property Act or the Indian Contract Act, even if really there is any repugnancy between Section 12 of the Act and some of the provisions of those Acts. Section 12 of the Act cannot be declared to be bad law or void on account of repugnancy, if any, with the provisions of Indian Limitation Act of 1963, for, the Bihar Money-Lenders Bill which has now ripened into the Bihar Money-Lenders Act, 1974, was reserved for the consideration of the President and received his assent, Therefore, as provided in Article 254 (2) of the Constitution, the provisions of the Act will prevail in the State of Bihar in preference to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.