Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Assistant Collector And Land ... vs Pandu Rangaiah And Ors. on 10 April, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1997(4)ALT144, 1997 A I H C 2741
JUDGMENT D. Reddeppa Reddi, J.
1. These appeals by the Assistant Collector & Land Acquisition Officer (Revenue Divisional Officer), Gadwal Under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the Act) and the cross-objections therein by the claimants-landholders are directed against the common judgment dated 20-3-1995 in O.P. Nos. 120,121,122 and 125 of 1988 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Gadwal. They relate to acquisition of lands bearing S. Nos. 841,842,844, and 848 measuring Ac.34-35 guntas, situated in Gadwal Town for the purpose of extending the existing Agricultural Market Yard at Gadwal.
2. The acquisition proceedings commenced with publication of the draft notification Under Section4(1) of the Act in the A.P. Gazette dated 23-9-85. After due enquiry the Land Acquisition Officer, having divided the lands to be acquired into two categories-The land abutting the existing Market Yard measuring Ac.12-30 guntas as Category-I and the remaining extent of Ac.22.05 guntas as Category-II, passed the award on 21-1-1987 fixing the compensation for Categories I and II at the rate of Rs. 50,000/-and Rs. 45,000/-per acre respectively. Not satisfied with the award the claimants sought reference Under Section 18 of the Act to a Civil Court. Accordingly, the matters were referred to the Subordinate Judge, Gadwal for determination of compensation.
3. Before the reference Court, the claimants in O.P. Nos.120,121 and 122 of 1988 claimed compensation for the acquired lands on sq.yard basis. The claimants in O.P. No. 125/88 claimed compensation at the rate of Rs. 500/-per sq.yard. Their claim was resisted by the referring officer by filing separate written statements. All the petitions were clubbed and tried together. Evidence was recorded in O.P. No. 125 of 1988. On behalf of the claimants, P.Ws.1 to 6 were examined and Exs. A-1 to A-24 were marked. P.W.1, is claimant No. 3 in O.P. No. 125/88, Exs. A-1 to A-15 have been marked through him. Exs. A-1 to A-13 are the documents to show that permission has been accorded by all the concerned authorities for establishing an industry over an extent of Ac.4-12 guntas out of Ac. 5.52 guntas in S.No. 848. Ex.A-14 is the proceedings dated 3-1-85 of the Commissioner, Gadwal Municipality stating that Municipal Council, Gadwal had passed a resolution dated 29-12-84 approving the proposal to earmark the area behind the Agricultural Market yard for industrial purpose. Ex. A-15 is the certified copy of registration sale deed dated 30-12-1982, whereunder a plot measuring 277 sq. yards was sold and purchased for a consideration of Rs. 40,000/- i.e., at Rs. 148/-per sq.yard. P.W.2 is the purchaser under Ex.A-15, He was examined to proved the execution of the original of Ex.A-15. P.W.3 is the claimant in OP.No. 120/88. Exs. A-16 to A-18 have been marked through him. Ex.A-16 is the certified copy of Pahani for the year 1983-84. Ex.A-17 is the Ryot pass-book. Ex. A-18 is the certificate dated 31-12-85 issued by the Commissioner, Gadwal Municipality stating that the Council has fixed the market value of the land bearing S.Nos. 841, and 842 at Rs. 200/- per sq.metre. P.W.4 is the claimant No. 1 in OP.No. 122/88. Exs.A-19, A-20 and A-21 have been marked through him. Ex.A-19 is another certified copy of the registered sale deed dated 30-12-1982 which is already marked as Ex.A-15. Exs.A-20 and A-21 are the certified copies of the sale deeds dated 21-6-83 and 4-12-84 respectively. P.W.5 is the Revenue Inspector, Gadwal. He deposed that he issued Ex.A-22, a true copy of Resolution No. 15 dated 9-9-81 of Gadwal Municipal Council fixing the market value of the land in residential area, industrial area and commercial area at Rs. 150/-, Rs. 200/-, and 250/- per sq. metre respectively. P.W.6 is the claimant No. 3 O.P.No. 120/88. Ex. A-23 and A-24 have been marked through him. Ex.A-23 is the certificate dated 16-12-92 of the Commissioner, Gadwal Municipality to the effect that the acquired lands are within the limits of Gadwal Municipality. Ex.A-24 is the certified copy of Resolution dated 19-9-81 of Gadwal Municipality prescribing the rates as shown in Ex.A-22.
4. R.Ws.1 to 8 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-10 were marked on behalf of the respondents. R.W.I is the Sub-Collector, Gadwal. He spoke to acquisition of subject lands and passing of Award No. 1/87 dt. 22-1-1987, Ex.B-1, by his predecessor in office. Exs.B-2 to B-10 have also been marked through him. Exs. B-2 to B-8 are the certified copies of sale deeds dated 28-11-1984,14-9-83,29-9-84,7-1-93,10-6-76 and 16-4-1977 respectively. R.W.2 is the vendor of Ex.B-2 R.W.4 is the vendor under Exs.B-7 and B-8. R.W.5 is the vendor under Ex.B-4. R.W.6 is the scribe of original of Exs.B-4, R.W.7 is the Mandal Surveyor, Gadwal Municipality. He speaks to the preparation of Exs.B-9 and B-10, Ex.B-9 is the topographical sketch of the lands covered under Exs. B-2 to B-8 and the acquired land. Ex. B-10 is the Town Plan of Gadwal Municipality. R.W.8 is one of the vendors under Exs.B-5 and B-6. On consideration of the said oral and documentary evidence, the reference Court determined the compensation for categories 1 and 2 at the rate of Rs. 65/-and Rs. 60/- per sq.yard respectively. It also awarded statutory benefits such as additional amount, solatium and interest as provided under the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (for short 'the Amendment Act' ). Accordingly, it passed the impugned judgment and decrees. Hence, these appeals by the referring officer questioning the enhancement of compensation. On receipt of notices in the appeals the respondents filed cross-objections restricting their claim to Rs. 95/- per sq.yard for lands covered under category-I and Rs. 90/- per sq. yard for lands covered under Category-II.
5. Agricultural Market Yard, Godwal, the beneficiary of acquisition had no notice of the proceedings either before the Land Acquisition Officer or before the Reference Court. However, on receipt of the communication dated 21-6-96 from the Sub-Collector, Gadwal, asking it to make available the funds so asto comply the interim directions of this Court to deposit entire amount of compensation, it filed CMP. Nos. 11789/95, 11791/95, 11793/95 and 11795/95 in AS.Nos. 433/95, 434/95, 435/95 and 436/95 respectively to implead itself as second appellant in each appeal. Learned Counsel for respondents though raised, initially an objection that the beneficiary of acquisition could not be impleaded as a co-appellant, but could be impleaded only as a respondent, gave it up during the course of arguments, perhaps realising that it is only super technical in nature. Therefore, these petitions are being ordered now.
6. Sri A. Ramalingeswara rao, learned Counsel for the beneficiary of acquisition at the threshold of arguments, made it clear that he is prepared to make his submissions on the basis of evidence available on record and does not press for remand of the matters to the reference Court.
7. The respondents /cross-objectors filed C.M.P.No. 1. 424/97 in A.S.No. 435/95 to receive a certified copy of the judgment and decree dated 7-2-94 of this Court in A.S.No. 3487/92 and 1221/93 as additional evidence and mark the same as Ex.A-25. The said petition has been ordered by us as not opposed by order dt. 13-2-1997.
8. Before adverting to the arguments of the learned Counsel on either side, we shall, in brief, refer to the location and potentiality of the acquired lands. They classified as dry in revenue records, are situate within the limits of Gadwal Municipality. They are adjacent to the existing Agricultural Market Yard at Gadwal. Infact, they were acquired for extending the said existing Market Yard. They are also abutting the P.W.D. road connecting Railway Station at Gadwal and a place called Ieej. They are surrounded by industries, offices and residential houses. An extent measuring Ac.4-12 guntas out of Ac.5-32 guntas in S.No. 848 has been already converted for use as industrial purpose. Permission has been also accorded to construct a rice mill therein. There is abundant oral and documentary evidence in proof of these facts. Thus, there should be no hesitation to conclude that they possessed potentialities for use as house-sites or industrial purpose even as on the date of publication of Draft Notification Under Section 4(1) of the Act. Infact, the learned Advocate General and Sri A. Ramalingeswara Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for the beneficiary of acquisition, are fair enough to admit this fact.
9. Elaborate arguments have been advanced by the learned Advocate General and Sri A. Ramalingeswara Rao appearing for the appellants and by Sri E. Ella Reddy, Sri C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy and Sri C.B. Rammohan Reddy, appearing for the respondents/cross-objectors. They have also taken us through the entire evidence, oral and documentary and the judgment under appeal. However, finally, they confined their submissions only to Exs.A-15, A-20, A-21, A-25 and Ex.B-2. The learned Advocate General and Sri Ramalingeswara Rao contend that the transactions covered under Exs.A-15, A-20 and A-21, being in relation to small extents lying within within the existing Market Yard, cannot be taken as comparable sales and thus the value depicted thereunder cannot form basis for determination of compensation. They also point out that Exs.A-20 and A-21 have not been only proved. Regarding Ex.A-25, which has been received as additional evidence, it is their submission that though it is admissible in evidence, the rate of compensation awarded thereunder by this Court cannot be adopted in the present cases, for it was determined on the basis of evidence found there in. It is also their submission that the transaction covered under Ex.B-2 is close in proximity of time and situation and hence the value reflected thereunder can alone be taken as the basis for determination of compensation in the present cases. In opposition, it is contended by Sri. E. Ella Reddy, Sri C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy and Sri C.B. Ramamohan Reddy that though the value depicted under Ex.A-15 may not be directly adopted, yet there is no justification to discard it altogether. They maintain that reasonable deduction may be made from the value reflected thereunder to account for the factor pertaining to the largeness of the land under acquisition and the area required for formation of roads etc. According to them a maximum deduction of 50% would be just and reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the cases on hand.
10. Regarding Ex.A-25, their submission is that once it is admitted in evidence and when there is no dispute about the similarity or potentiality of the land covered thereunder and the acquired land, the rate of compensation awarded thereunder can form safe basis for determination of compensation. They try to get over the value reflected under Ex.B-2 on two grounds: First, it is a distress sale made in apprehension of the present acquisition. Second, even if it is found to be a genuine transaction, the claimants are entitled to claim compensation on the basis of Ex. A-25 in view of the settled principle that the highest value fetched by a similar land shall form basis for determination of compensation. On the above submissions, the points for our consideration may be formulated as under:
(1) Whether the transactions covered under Exs.A-15, A-20, A-21 can be accepted as comparable sales?
(2) Whether it is permissable to determine the compensation in the present cases on the basis of Ex. A-25 and if so whether the rate of compensation fixed thereunder by this Court shall be accepted in preference to the value reflected under Ex.B-2.
11. Point No. 1: The principles for determination of market value of large tracts of land with reference to price fetched by small plots have been succinctly enunciated by the Supreme Court in Administrator General of West Bengal v. Collector, Varanasi, . Therein Sri M.N. Venkatachalaiah, J as he then was, speaking for the Court observed:
"The determination of market value of a piece of land with potentialities for urban use is an intricate exercise which calls for collection and collation of diverse economic criteria. The market value of a piece of property, for purposes of Section 23 of the Act, is stated to be the price at which the property changes hands from a willing seller to a willing, but not too anxious a buyer, dealing at arms length. The determination of market value, as one author put it, is the prediction of an economic event, viz., the price outcome of a hypothetical sale, expressed in terms of probabilities. Prices fetched for similar lands with similar advantages and potentialities under bona fide transactions of sale at or about the time of the preliminary notification are the usual, and indeed the best, evidences of market value. Other method of valuation are resorted to if the evidence of sale of similar lands is not available.
"It is trite proposition that prices fetched for small plots cannot form safe basis for valuation of large tracts of land as the two are not comparable properties.....The principle that evidence of market value of sales of small, developed plots is not a safe guide in valuing large extents of land has to be understood in its proper perspective..." (para 6) In Chimanlal v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona, . the Supreme Court reiterated that:
"the Court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance which provides the index of market value."
12. In the light of the above principles, let us consider whether the acquired lands are similar in material aspects to the land covered by Exs.A-15, A-20 and A-21 and whether the transactions covered under Exs.A-15, A-20 and A-21 can be regarded as comparable, if not most comparable, instances of sale so as to form basis for determination of market value of the acquired land. The land covered under Ex. A-15, a certified copy of registered sale deed dated 30-12-1982, is plot No. 16 measuring 277 sq.yards, situate within the existing Agricultural Market Yard at Gadwal. P.W.2, the purchaser under the original of Ex. A-15 admits that he is doing commission business in plot No. 16. It is clearly recited in Ex. A-15 that as on the date of its execution, the area covered thereunder was included in the Market Yeard. It is, thus, evident that since the date of purchase, P.W. 2 has the benefit carrying on business in the said plot. It is necessary to mention here that by virtue of the provisions of Section7 of the And Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce & Live Stock) Markets Act, 1966, no person other than the one holding a licence granted by the Market Committee, can carry on any business in the notified market area. Thus, a person owning a plot inside the notified market area, which is referred to herein as Market Yard, will have a special advantage of carrying on business to the exclusion of others, of course, subject to the terms and conditions of licence. Indisputably, the land covered under Exs.A-20 and A-21 is also situate inside the existing Market Yard. Thus, the land covered under Exs.A-15, A-20, A-21, whose extent is very small, had high commercial value even as on the date of draft notification.
13. The acquired land is large in extent, measuring Ac.34-35 guntas. No doubt, it is contiguous to the existing Market Yard. May be, as already held by us, it possessed potentialities of industrial and residential use as on the date of Draft Declaration. We are also conscious of the fact that permission was accorded to start an industry over an extent of Ac.4-12 guntas in S.No. 848. But, that by itself does not, in our view, make any difference, for there is no evidence to show that any improvement has been made thereon. On earnest consideration, we are of the considered opinion that there is nothing common between the two. It is unimaginable to think of large tract of Ac.34-35 guntas being sold as plots for commercial use in a small town like Gadwal. Thus, there cannot be any comparison in terms of value between the plot of land already put to commercial use and the vast extent of undeveloped land, though useful for industrial as well as residential purpose. In this view of the matter, we are unable to persuade ourselves to treat acquired land as similar to the land covered under Exs.A-15, A-20 and A-21 and determine the market value of the same basing on the value reflected under Ex.A-15.
14. We are not impressed with the alternative submission of the learned Counsel for the respondents that there is no justification to discard Ex.A-15 altogether etc. The reasons are obvious. It has already been concluded by us that the transaction under Ex.A-15 cannot be accepted as a comparable instance of sale for the reason that the land covered thereunder possessed high commercial utility. We are of the considered view that the question of making reasonable deduction would arise only in cases where the small bits of land as well as large tracts possess similar advantages or protentialities. In other words, when they are not similar in nature, as in the present cases, such a course is not permissable.
15. In the light of the above, we have no hesitation to conclude that the transactions covered under Exs.A-15, A-20 and A-21 cannot be regarded as comparable instances of sale and thus the value reflected thereunder cannot form basis for determination of the market value of the acquired land. We, accordingly, answer this point in favour of the appellants and against the respondents-cross objectors.
16. Point No. 2: Ex.A-25 is a certified copy of judgment and decree dated 7-4-1994 of a Division bench of this Court made in A.S.Nos. 3487/92 and 1221/93 that arose out of O.P.No. 297/92 on the file of the Subordinate Judge at Gadwal. That case related to acquisition of land measuring Ac.9-00 in S.No. 649/A situated at Gadwal for the purpose of extension of the very same Agricultural Market Yard at Gadwal pursuant to Draft Notification published in the Gazette on 17-8-1979. The reference Court fixed the market value of the land at Rs. 15/- per sq.yard. But, on reapprisal of evidence, particularly, the certified copies of registered sale deeds marked as Exs.A-9, A-11, A-13 and A-15, whereunder small plots were sold at the rate ranging between Rs. 25/- and Rs. 32-37 paise per sq. yard, this Court determined the gross market value at Rs. 25 / - per sq.yard and net at Rs. 19 /- per sq. yard, making a deduction of 1/3rd of the market value towards developmental charges. It is stated across the bar that this judgment and decree has become final.
17. The question of admissibility of previous judgment not inter parties in a land acquisition case determining the value of land in the vicinity in a subsequent case is no longer res Integra. The view of Shelat, J, as he then was expressed in Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Lakhamsi, AIR 1960 Bombay 78.
"A judgment not inter partes in land acquisition reference and relating to land situate near the land in question is not admissible in evidence either as an instance or one from which the market value of the land in question cannot obviously fall under Secs.40 to 43 or Under Section11 or Section 13 of the Evidence Act."
But, this view was not approved by the Supreme Court in City Improvement Trust, Bangalore v. H. Narayanaiah, AIR 1776 SC 2404. M.H. Beg, J speaking for a Bench of three judges, on an exhaustive survey of law on the subject observed:
"...We do not think it necessary to take so restrictive a view of the provisions of Sections 11 and 13 of the Evidence Act as to exclude such judgments altogether from evidence even when good grounds are made out for their admission. In Khaja Fizuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh C.A.No. 176 of 1962, decided on 10-4-1963 (SC) a Bench of three Judges of this Court held such judgments to be relevant if they relate to similarly situated properties and contain determinations of value on dates fairly proximate to the relevant date in a case." (para 27) In Pal Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, the same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the following terms:
"No doubt, a judgment of a Court in a land acquisition case determining the market value of land in the vicinity of the acquired lands, even though not inter partes, could be admitted in evidence either as an instance or one from which the market value of the acquired land could be deduced or inferred as has been held by the Calcutta High Court in H.K. Mallick's case (supra) based on the authority of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Indian General Steam Navigation and Railway Co. (1909), ILR 36 Cal. 967, where the Judicial Committee did refuse to interfere with High Court Judgment in a land acquisition case based on previous awards, holding that no question of principle was involved in it. ... " (para 5)
18. In the light of the above, there could, possibly, be no objection and infact there has been no objection on behalf of the appellants to receive Ex. A-25 as additional evidence. The learned Advocate General and the learned Counsel for the beneficiary of acquisition have been fair enough to state before us that there was no difference whatsoever between the land dealt with under Ex. A-25 and the land under the present acquisition with regard to their location and potentiality as on the date of the respective draft notification. However, the learned Counsel for the beneficiary of the acquisition, objects to the determination of market value on the basis of compensation awarded under Ex.A-25 on two counts. Firstly, it was not duly proved by the respondents. Secondly, the rate of compensation determined thereunder on the basis of the evidence found therein cannot be taken into consideration. To sustain his submission, he has drawn our attention to the following observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Pal Singh, .
"....What cannot be overlooked is that for a judgment relating to value of land to be admitted in evidence either as an instance or as one from which the market value of the acquired land could be inferred or deduced, must have been a previous judgment of Court and as an instance, it must have been proved by the person relying upon such judgment by adducing evidence aliunde that due regard being given to all attendant facts and circumstances, it could furnish the basis for determining the market value of the acquired land". . . .( para 5) He has also placed reliance on the following observation made by Division Bench of this Court in Special Deputy Collector v. G. Narusubai, 1993 ALT Supp. (1) 62.
" Mere filing of the order in the O.P. passed by a competent Subordinate judge or Additional District Judge in a land acquisition case is not binding on the Court in another proceeding though the notification is one and the same. The land acquired under the same notification may not have similar potentialisties."
19. Having given our anxious consideration, we are unable to countenance the first objection in view of the express provisions in Section58 of the Evidence Act, 1872, that facts admitted need not be proved. As already noted, there was no objection by and on behalf of the appellants to receive the judgment and decree dated 7-2-1994 of this Court made in AS.Nos.3487/82 and 1221/93 as additional evidence and mark the same as Ex.A-25. It may be taken that it was market with their consent. Moreover, the specific averment made in the affidavit filed in support of petition in CMP.No. 1424/97 stating that the land dealt with under Ex.A-25 is in the same vicinity and at the time of its acquisition, it possessed potentialities similar to the acquired land is not denied. On the other hand, the said averment is admitted to be true and correct in the course of arguments.
20. The above quoted observation of the Supreme Court in Pal Singh's case (5 supra) has to be understood in the context it was made. That was a case where the claimants pleaded for enhancement of compensation before the Supreme Court on the basis of a subsequent judgment of the High Court, citing the same from a Law Report. The said plea was rejected mainly on two grounds. One, the judgment cited was not a previous judgment relating to the market value of land in the vicinity. Second, the claimants failed to adduce evidence to show that the said judgment could form basis for determining the market value of their acquired lands. To our mind, the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in this decision is that the party in a land acquisition case, who desires determination of market value of land on the basis of a previous judgment, not inter partes, shall produce the same and prove that the land dealt with thereunder is similar to the land in the case in which it is sought to be relied upon. We are equally clear in our mind that the same principle has been reiterated by a Division Bench of this Court in Narusubai's case (6 supra). In the case on hand, the previous judgment has been produced by the respondents / claimants and the appellants have consented for receiving the same as additional evidence. They have also admitted that the land dealt with thereunder was similar to the land in the present acquisition. In this view of the matter, we reject the first objection as absolutely untenable.
21. We find no substance in the second objection too. And we do feel that it is fallacious. The reason is obvious. When a previous judgment, not inter partes, has been admitted in evidence and on consideration of the same if the Court is satisfied that it could form basis for determination of the market value of the land in the case in which it has been admitted, it is, in our considered view, unnecessary and rather impermissable to go into the question on what basis or evidence the compensation has been determined therein. What is relevant of the previous judgment of the Court is its conclusion or finding, but not the evidence on which the such conclusion or finding has been arrived at. Undoubtedly, it is open to the party, who opposes determination of compensation on the basis of previous judgment, to say that the land dealt with thereunder is not similar to the land covered in the subsequent case. Once, there is no dispute about that fact, it is not open to him to ask for reapprisal or comparison of the evidence considered in the previous judgment with the evidence in the subsequent case. That is what exactly the learned Counsel for the beneficiary of acquisition requests us to do in the present case. We are sorry we cannot accede to such unreasonable request.
22. In the light of the above discussion and for the reasons already stated, we have no hesitation to conclude that Ex.A-25 could certainly form basis for determination of the market value of the land in the present case.
23. Now, we take up the next question whether the value reflected under Ex.B-2 represents the real value and if so whether it could be adopted for determining the market value of the acquired land in preference to the rate of compensation awarded by this Court under Ex.A-25. Ex.B-2 is certified copy of sale deed dt. 28-11-1984. No doubt, the land covered thereunder is close to the acquired land. R.W.3 deposed that he purchased an extent of 32 guntas under the original of Ex.B-2 for a consideration of Rs. 45,900/-, which works out to Rs. 55,000/- per acre. He also deposed that during that period, the value of the land purchased by him was only Rs. 55,000/- per acre. But it has been elicited from his cross-examination that there was a proposal to acquire the land covered under Ex.B-2 and therefore he had to move this Court for deletion of the same from acquisition. It has been stated across the bar that, inf act, it was deleted from acquisition pursuant to the order of this Court. Thus, it looks obvious that the vendor under Ex.B-2 sold the land covered thereunder at a lesser rate apprehending that the same would be acquired and he would not get proper compensation. In this view of the matter, we are convinced that the value reflected under Ex.B-2 does not reflect real value.
24. Even otherwise, the value reflected under Ex.B-2 cannot be adopted in view of the settled principle of law enunciated by the Supreme Court in Ranee of Vuyyur v. Collector of Madras, 1969 (1) An.W.R. 45. that the claimant is entitled to the highest value a similar land has fetched. Therein, speaking for the Court, , Mudholkar J, observed:
"..When the land is being compulsorily taken away from a person, he is entitled to say that he should be given the highest value which similar land in the locality is shown to have fetched in bonafide transaction entered into between a willing purchaser and a willing seller near about the time of the acquisition. . ."
However, the learned Counsel for the beneficiary of acquisition strenuously contends that compensation awarded by the Court under Ex.A-25 cannot be construed as a sale between willing purchaser and a willing seller and therefore the claimants cannot claim compensation on its basis. We are unable to agree. On careful analysis, what is deducible from the above decision is that the claimants shall be entitled to claim compensation the highest value fetched by a similar land. In our considered view, it makes no difference whatsoever whether it is by way of private sale or as per the judgment of a competent Court. We are unable to see any reason to accept the rate reflected under a sale deed in preference to the rate of compensation determined by a competent Court for a similarly situated land. On the other hand, we are of the firm view that the rate determined by a Court shall prevail over the rate mentioned in a sale deed. In this view of the matter, there should be no hesitation to hold that the rate of compensation fixed by this Court under Ex.A-25 shall be accepted in preference to the value reflected under Ex.B-2.
25.Thus, we proceed to determine the compensation on the basis of Ex.A-25. Under Ex.A-25, a Division Bench of this Court awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 19/- per sq.yard for the land similar in all aspects to the acquired land. It is borne out by Ex.A-25 that the land covered thereunder was acquired pursuant to Draft Notification dated 17-8-1979. It is also borne out by the same that the compensation was determined by this Court on the basis of the value reflected under various sale deeds in respect of the land in the vicinity. It has also come in the evidence of witnesses that there was alround development in the lands surrounding the acquired land. It is admitted before us that subsequent to the present acquisition, the nearby land was acquired for Jurala Priyadarshini Project Camp at Gadwal and for construction of Housing Complex by Gadwal Municipality under a Centrally Sponsored Scheme. There can, thus, be no doubt that the value of the acquired land would have gone up by the time of its acquisition. There was a time gap of nearly six years between the date of publication of Draft Notification pursuant to which the land under Ex.A-25 was acquired and the present acquisition. Generally the escalation is taken at 10 to 12 per cent per annum. Even if it is taken at 10% per annum, the escalation comes to Rs. 11-40 paise per sq.yard. On that basis, it works out to Rs. 30-40 paise per sq.yard which may be rounded off to Rs. 31/- per sq.yard.
26.For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the respondents/claimants are entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs. 31 /- per sq.yard for the entire extent together with all statutory benefits as provided under the Amendment Act. In addition, the respondent No. 3 in AS.No. 434/95 is entitled to a further sum of Rs. 9311/- which he paid towards conversion charges under Ex.A-13. The judgment and decrees shall stand accordingly modified. Consequently, the appeals are allowed to the extent mentioned above and the cross- objections are dismissed. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs both in the appeals as well as in the cross objections.