National Green Tribunal
Vanashakti vs State Of Maharashtra on 26 August, 2025
Item No.11 (Pune Bench)
BEFORE THE NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL
WESTERN ZONE BENCH, PUNE
[THROUGH PHYSICAL HEARING (WITH HYBRID OPTION)]
ORIGINAL APPLICATION NO.235 OF 2024 (WZ)
I.A. No.292 OF 2025 (WZ), I.A. No.293 OF 2025 (WZ) &
I.A. No.429 OF 2025 (WZ)
Vanashakti & Anr.
.....Applicants
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors.
....Respondents
Date of hearing: 26.08.2025
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH KUMAR SINGH, JUDICIAL MEMBER
HON'BLE DR. VIJAY KULKARNI, EXPERT MEMBER
Applicants : Mr. Zaman Ali, Advocate
Respondents : Mr. Aniruddha Kulkarni, Advocate for R-1(b)/Envt. Deptt. &
for R-2/CCF
Ms. Manasi Joshi, Advocate along-with
Ms. Pooja Natu, Advocate for R-5/MPCB
Mr. Saurabh Kulkarni, Advocate along-with
Mr. Adwait Gokhale, Advocate for R-6/TMC
Mr. Shivshankar Swaminathan, Advocate, instructed by
M/s MZM Legal LLP for R-7 to R-11
ORDER
1. Today, learned counsel for the applicants has pressed for the Interim Application, i.e. I.A. No.292 of 2025, to be taken up first for consideration, which was moved by Respondent No.7- J. Kumar Infraprojects Ltd., in which prayer is made that the present Original Application may be dismissed being time barred under Section 14(3) of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010.
2. At this stage, we tried to know from learned counsel for the other parties, as to whether pleadings are complete in this case. So instead of Page 1 of 26 deciding the application seeking decision on the preliminary issues, it would be appropriate for us to decide the entire Original Application on merit. Parties have given their consent for the final hearing of this matter, as the pleadings are said to be complete.
3. At the very initial stage, learned counsel for Respondent Nos.7 to 11 has stated that the issue of the present Original Application being time barred may be taken first.
4. Thereafter, learned counsel for the applicants has drawn our attention to para no.28 of the present Original Application, in which it is recorded that the applicants did not receive responses to the e-mail representation dated 19.06.2024, email representation dated 20.07.2024 and Legal Notice dated 13.09.2024, which were addressed to the concerned Respondents. On 02.12.2024, it was informed by the ESZ Monitoring Committee that no permission has been granted to any person for the casting yard or related activities inside the ESZ of Sanjay Gandhi National Park (SGNP) and, therefore, the present cause of action is well within the limitation period of six months as provided under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010.
5. It is urged by learned counsel for Respondent Nos.7 to 11 that there is no specific date mentioned in the above paragraph as to on which particular date, the cause of action first arose to the applicants.
6. Learned counsel for Respondent Nos.7 to 11 has drawn our attention to the response with respect to limitation in their reply affidavit dated 24.07.2025, in which in para no.7, it is submitted that six months' period cannot be counted for the date referred by the Applicants in the case in hand, and hence the present Original Application may be dismissed out-rightly being time barred.
Page 2 of 26
7. Above argument is being vehemently opposed by learned counsel for the applicants and he has read the same paragraph i.e. para no.28 of the present Original Application stating that the date, on which the cause of action first arose, is mentioned therein to be 02.12.2024, when it was informed by the ESZ Monitoring Committee that no permission has been granted to any person for the casting yard or related activities. Therefore, within six months of that date the present Original Application was filed.
8. Learned counsel for the applicants has relied on the Judgment dated 07.05.2015 passed by the Principal Bench of this Tribunal in Original Application No.222 of 2014 (The Forward Foundation & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors.), in which in para nos.29 to 31, following are mentioned:-
"29. A cause of action which is complete in all respects gives the applicant a right to sue. An applicant has a right to bring an action upon a single cause of action while claiming different reliefs. Rule 14 of the National Green Tribunal (Practice and Procedure) Rules, 2011, shows the clear intent of the framers of the Rules that multiple reliefs can be claimed in an application provided they are consequential to one another and are based upon a single cause of action. Different causes of action, thus, may result in institution of different applications and therefore, there is exclusion of the concept of the 'joinder of causes of action' under the Rules of 2011. The multiple cause of action again would be of two kinds. One, which arise simultaneously and other, which arise at a different or successive point of time. In first kind, cause of action accrues at the time of completion of the wrong or injury. In latter, it may give rise to cause of action or if the statutes so provide when the 'cause of action first arose' even if the wrong was repeated. Where the injury or wrong is complete at different times and may be of similar and different nature, then every subsequent wrong depending upon the facts of the case may give rise to a fresh cause of action.Page 3 of 26
To this general rule, there could be exceptions. In particular such exceptions could be carved out by the legislature itself. In a statute, where framers of law use the phraseology like 'cause of action first arose' in contradistinction to 'cause of action' simplicitor. Accrual of right to sue means accrual of cause of action for suit. The expressions 'when right to sue first arose' or 'cause of action first arose' connotes date when right to sue first accrued, although cause of action may have arisen even on subsequent occasions. Such expressions are noticed in Articles 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963. We may illustrate this by giving an example with regard to the laws that we are dealing here. When an order granting or refusing Environmental Clearance is passed, right to bring an action accrues in favour of an aggrieved person. An aggrieved person may not challenge the order granting Environmental Clearance, however, if on subsequent event there is a breach or non-implementation of the terms and conditions of the Environmental Clearance order, it would give right to bring a fresh action and would be a complete and composite recurring cause of action providing a fresh period of limitation. It is also for the reason that the cause of action accruing from the breach of the conditions of the consent order is no way dependent upon the initial grant or refusal of the consent. Such an event would be a complete cause of action in itself giving rise to fresh right to sue. Thus, where the legislature specifically requires the action to be brought within the prescribed period of limitation computed from the date when the cause of action 'first arose', it would by necessary implication exclude the extension of limitation or fresh limitation being counted from every continuing wrong, so far, it relates to the same wrong or breach and necessarily not a recurring cause of action.
30. Now, we would deal with the concept of recurring cause of action. The word 'recurring' means, something happening again and again and not that which occurs only once. Such reoccurrence could be frequent or periodical. The recurring wrong could have new elements in addition to or in substitution of the first wrong or when 'cause of action first arose'. It could even Page 4 of 26 have the same features but its reoccurrence is complete and composite. The recurring cause of action would not stand excluded by the expression 'cause of action first arose'. In some situation, it could even be a complete, distinct cause of action hardly having nexus to the first breach or wrong, thus, not inviting the implicit consequences of the expression 'cause of action first arose'. The Supreme Court clarified the distinction between continuing and recurring cause of action with some finesse in the case of M. R. Gupta v. Union of India and others, (1995) 5 SCC 628, the Court held that:
"The appellant's grievance that his pay fixation was not in accordance with the rules, was the assertion of a continuing wrong against him which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was paid a salary which was not computed in accordance with the rules. So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is paid his monthly on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to rules. It is no doubt true that it the appellant's claim is found correct on merits. He would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale in the future and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant's claim, if any, for recovery of arrears calculated on the basis of difference in the pay which has become time barred would not be recoverable, but he would be entitled to proper fixation of his pay in accordance with rules and to cessation of a continuing wrong if on merits his claim is justified. Similarly, any other consequential relief claimed by him, such as, promotion etc. would also be subject to the defence of laches etc. to disentitle him to those reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. It is to this limited extent of proper pay fixation the application cannot be treated as time barred since it is based on a recurring cause of action.
The Tribunal misdirected itself when it treated the appellant's claim as 'one time action' meaning thereby that it was not a continuing wrong based on a recurring cause of action. The claim to be paid the correct salary computed on the basis of proper pay fixation, is a right which subsists during the entire tenure of service and can be exercised at the time of each payment of the Page 5 of 26 salary when the employee is entitled to salary computed correctly in accordance with the rules. This right of a Government servant to be paid the correct salary throughout his tenure according to computation made in accordance with rules, is akin to the right of redemption which is an incident of a subsisting mortgage and subsists so long as the mortgage itself subsists, unless the equity of redemption is extinguished. It is settled that the right of redemption is of this kind. (See Thota China Subba Rao and Ors. v. Mattapalli, Raju and Ors. [AIR (1950) F C1].
31. The Continuing cause of action would refer to the same act or transaction or series of such acts or transactions. The recurring cause of action would have an element of fresh cause which by itself would provide the applicant the right to sue. It may have even be de hors the first cause of action or the first wrong by which the right to sue accrues. Commission of breach or infringement may give recurring and fresh cause of action with each of such infringement like infringement of a trademark. Every rejection of a right in law could be termed as a recurring cause of action. [Ref: Ex. Sep. Roop Singh v. Union of India and Ors., 2006 (91) DRJ 324, M/s. Bengal Waterproof Limited v. M/s. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Company and Another, (1997) 1 SCC 99]."
9. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the applicants that above Judgment passed in Original Application No.222 of 2014 was assailed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by Respondent No.9 in the matter of Mantri Techzone Private Limited v/s Forward Foundation and Ors. [(2019) 18 SCC 494], in which following was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court: -
"54. In our view, the findings arrived at by the Tribunal are not only based on the documents that were available on record but also on the pleadings that were made by the parties buttressed by the Committee's report and the inspection note of the Expert Members. Therefore, the directions passed and the penalty imposed by the Tribunal on both project proponents are valid and sustainable and do not suffer from any perversity.Page 6 of 26
55. We are also of the view that it is impermissible for the appellants to seek a factual review through the methodology of re-appreciation of factual matrix by this Court under Section 22 of the NGT Act.
56. Shri R.Venkataramani, learned senior counsel has also raised a subsidiary issue relating to res judicata. According to him, respondent Nos. 12 and 13 filed Writ Petition Nos.3656- 57/2013 seeking similar reliefs in a representative capacity. The issues raised therein are same as those canvassed in the application before the Tribunal. The reliefs sought for are essentially the same. Hence, the applications are barred by the principle of res judicata.
57. The Tribunal has answered this issue in paragraphs 47 to 51 of the order. There was no dispute in so far as filing of the writ petitions is concerned. However, the parties are not common nor the issues in application and the writ petitions are directly and substantially the same. After examination of the pleadings, the Tribunal has recorded a finding of fact that there is no commonality of a cause of action or likelihood of a conflict between the judgments. The prayers and the geneses of the respective proceedings are entirely distinct and different in their scope and relief. The issues before the Tribunal would essentially relate to environment ecology and its restoration while the proceedings before the High Court relate to entirely different issues with acquisition of land, its allotment and transfer to the third party. These issues in both the proceedings are neither substantial nor materially identical."
10. Having cited above, it is urged by learned counsel for the applicants that the cause of action, which first arose in the case in hand, would fall in the category of continuous/recurring cause of action, in the light of the Judgment cited above. Apart from this, there are other Judgments also quoted by him, such as "Hazi Arif & Ors. v/s State of UP & Ors. (07.10.2016 in OA No. 16 of 2014); Municipal Commissioner, Ghaziabad Municipal Corporation v/s Hazi Arif & Ors. (31.07.2017 in Civil Appeal Page 7 of 26 Diary No. 12873 of 2017); Rajeev Rai v/s Union of India & Ors. (26.05.2017 in OA No. 42 of 2016); State of Bihar v/s Deokaran Nenshi [(1973) 1 SCR 1004]; and Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v/s Ankita Sinha and Ors. [2021 SCC OnLine SC 897]".
11. Thereafter, learned counsel for the applicants has drawn our attention to the Judgment dated 10.12.2015, delivered by the Principal Bench of this Tribunal in the matter of Social Action for Forest and Environment v/s Union of India & Ors. (10.12.2015 in OA No. 87 of 2015), in which reliance is placed on following para:-
"45. We do not find any merit in the objections raised on behalf of the State of Uttarakhand. Under Section 14 of the NGT Act, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to entertain and decide all civil cases where substantial question arises to environment (including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment) is involved and such question arising out of the implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule-I of the NGT Act. Such application is required to be filed within a period of six months from the date on which cause of action or such dispute first arose. The Tribunal would entertain such an application beyond that period but not exceeding 60 days if it is shown that the applicant was prevented by a sufficient cause from filing the application. The 'cause of action first arose' would have to be understood in reference to continuing cause of action, where the cause of action is recurring and is distinct or is a new cause of action. It would be a fresh cause of action giving rise to period of six months from such date in such cases. Rafting and camping is an activity which has been carried on for years now. The Rules were framed in 2014 by the State of Uttarakhand under which permission and licenses for rafting and camping respectively are to be granted. According to the affidavit filed on behalf of the State, it is an annual feature and permission/license are granted from September to June every year. Thus, every year it is a fresh cause of action. Furthermore, the application even for deciding the question of limitation has to be read and construed in its Page 8 of 26 entirety. In the application, documents and affidavits filed thereto, it has been argued that in the recent years there has been a tremendous increase in rafting and camping authorities leading to pollution of the river, degradation of the forest and generation of large quantity of waste. A larger Bench of the Tribunal in the above referred cases has clearly stated the principle of law that when the application is based on recurring cause of action then fresh cause of action would not be hit by the language of Section 14 of the NGT Act and each fresh event would give a fresh cause of action and consequently the period of limitation of six months."
12. Learned counsel for the applicants has further placed reliance on the following paras of the Judgment passed by the Principal Bench of this Tribunal in the matter of Shiv Prasad v/s Union of India & Ors. (25.07.2016 in OA No. 24 of 2014):-
"13.In Doaba Paryavarn Samiti's case (Supra) the Principal Bench of this Tribunal while dealing with the issue of limitation in the application under Section 14 and Section 15 (b) and (c) read with Section 18 (1) and (2) of the NGT Act, 2010 for the relief seeking ban on the flying of the helicopter at Kedarnath Wildlife Sanctuary, Uttarakhand and direction to the Union of India and State of Uttarakhand to declare eco-sensitive zone of Kedarnath Wildlife Sanctuary, Uttarakhand and such other appropriate reliefs engaged itself with the exercise of interpreting the terms "cause of action first arose, recurring cause of action, continuous cause of action", and considering the factual matrix of the case observed that though the helicopter service has started years back and applicant approached the Tribunal in the year 2015 with the contention that the helicopter were flying without permission of the Board and in a manner which has serious effect on flora and fauna and the eco-system, eco- sensitive zone of the sanctuary and biodiversity thereof, "each flight would be an independent cause of action which will be a recurring cause of action, where the expression 'Cause of action first arose' appearing under Section 14 (3) of the Act would not Page 9 of 26 be attracted and renders the remedy of the applicant as barred by time".
14. In Hanumanthappa's case the Hon'ble Supreme Court vetted the use of phrase "first arose" in article 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 and made following observations:
"While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made a departure from the language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word "first" has been used between the words "sue" and accrued". This would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued."
15. "Cause of action" as understood in legal parlance is bundle of essential facts necessary to be proved by the claimant to the relief before he can succeed. Thus, these are entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim. Naturally, therefore the facts asserted in the application seeking relief need to be read in its entirety and not piecemeal to find out therefrom what would have prompted the applicant to seek reliefs as sought. In the instant case, the applicant is seeking closure of foundries/industries operating without EC or consent to operate under Water or Air Act and relocation of Jasodharpur industrial area which houses such industries. The applicant is further seeking effective reuse of solid waste slag generated by the respondent foundries and identification of alternative piece of land for storing slag, measures for pollution control such as installation of adequate pollution equipments, common effluent treatment plant, facility to monitor ambient air quality in and around JIA, besides seeking costs for environmental degradation caused. All these reliefs the application reveals are warranted by high levels of environmental degradation reached as disclosed through the CSE report following the inspection and the comprehensive study of JIA carried out in March, 2012. The Page 10 of 26 applicant has further specifically pleaded that despite making of recommendations by CSE in March, 2012, the respondent no. 4- Uttarakhand Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Board had chosen to overlook such recommendations vide para 19 of the application.
16. It is true that the applicant in the application pleaded "that the present application is being filed within six months from the date on which the cause of action, which is ongoing, and is, therefore, in accordance with Section 14 (3) of National Green Tribunal Act, 2010". However, this statement cannot give true meaning of what the applicant is seeking in relation to the provisions of law and facts of the case spelling out the nature of cause of action.
17. What surfaces through the report of CSE in March, 2012 is the cumulative wrong the foundries or industries running without EC or without consent under Water and Air Act or otherwise has done to the environment in and around Jasodharpur industrial area. Whether prior EC was/is required for establishing Jasodharpur Industrial area or the individual foundries/industries therein is a question which need not be answered at this stage. Answers to these questions could beget more questions necessary to be answered before adjudication for the reliefs as sought is done. Going by the case of the applicant as it is the cumulative wrong referred to herein above has prompted this application and the reliefs sought are those required for restitution and restoration of environment as well as for compensation for damage done due to pollution caused by the running foundries/industries in Jasodharpur industrial area as envisaged under Section 15 of the NGT Act, 2010. Section 15 of the NGT Act, 2010 reads as under:-
"15. Relief, compensation and restitution- (1) the Tribunal may, by an order, provide,-
(a) relief and compensation to the victims of pollution and other environmental damage arising under the enactments specified in the Schedule I (including accident occurring while handling any hazardous substance);Page 11 of 26
(b) for restitution of property damaged;
(c) for restitution of the environment for such area or areas, as the Tribunal may think fit.
(2) The relief and compensation and restitution of property and environment referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) shall be in addition to the relief paid or payable under the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 (6 of 1991).
(3) No application for grant of any compensation or relief or restitution of property or environment under this section shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless it is made within a period of five years from the date on which the cause for such compensation or relief first arose:
Provided that the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the application within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. (4) The Tribunal may, having regard to the damage to public health, property and environment, divide the compensation or relief payable under separate heads specified in Schedule II so as to provide compensation or relief to the claimants and for restitution of the damaged property or environment, as it may think fit.
(5) Every claimant of the compensation or relief under this Act shall intimate to the Tribunal about the application filed to, or, as the case may be, compensation or relief received from, any other court or authority.
18. Sub clause 3 of Section 15 of the Act in clear terms as under
Section 14 of the Act prescribes the period of limitation but with a difference in the extent of the period that is 5 years from the date on which case for such compensation or relief first arose. Both the Sections circumscribe power of the Tribunal to condone the delay in identical language in the provisos to the said Sections.
19. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant invited our attention to para nos. 23, 24, 30 and 31 in the Judgment delivered by the Principal Bench in the Forward Page 12 of 26 Foundation's case (O.A. No. 222/2014: The Forward Foundation A Charitable Trust & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and Ors.) dated 7th May, 2015 for our better understanding of concept of recurring cause of action which according to him comes into play in the present case. He urged us to consider the real gravamen of the case of the applicant and not to be carried away by the Statement in the application that the cause of action is "ongoing". Material para nos. 30 & 31 in the Judgment delivered in Forward Foundation's case (Supra) are reproduced hereunder:
"30. Now, we would deal with the concept of recurring cause of action. The word 'recurring' means, something happening again and again and not that which occurs only once. Such reoccurrence could be frequent or periodical. The recurring wrong could have new elements in addition to or in substitution of the first wrong or when 'cause of action' first arose'. It could even have the same features but its reoccurrence is complete and composite. The recurring cause of action would not stand excluded by the expression 'cause of action first arose'. In some situation, it could even be a complete, distinct cause of action hardly having nexus to the first breach or wrong, thus, not inviting the implicit consequences of the expression 'cause of action first arose'. The Supreme Court clarified the distinction between continuing and recurring cause of action with some finesse in the case of M. R. Gupta v. Union of India and others, (1995) 5 SCC 628, the Court held that:
"The appellant's grievance that his pay fixation was not in accordance with the rules, was the assertion of a continuing wrong against him which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was paid a salary which was not computed in accordance with the rules. So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to rules. It is no doubt true that it the appellant's claim is found correct on merits. He would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale in the future and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant's claim, if any, for recovery of arrears calculated on the basis of difference in the pay which has become time barred would not be recoverable, but he would be entitled to proper fixation of his pay in Page 13 of 26 accordance with rules and to cessation of a continuing wrong if on merits his claim is justified. Similarly, any other consequential relief claimed by 43 him, such as, promotion etc. would also be subject to the defence of laches etc. to disentitle him to those reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. It is to this limited extent of proper pay fixation the application cannot be treated as time barred since it is based on a recurring cause of action.
The Tribunal misdirected itself when it treated the appellant's claim as 'one time action' meaning thereby that it was not a continuing wrong based on a recurring cause of action. The claim to be paid the correct salary computed on the basis of proper pay fixation, is a right which subsists during the entire tenure of service and can be exercised at the time of each payment of the salary when the employee is entitled to salary computed correctly in accordance with the rules. This right of a Government servant to be paid the correct salary throughout his tenure according to computation made in accordance with rules, is akin to the right of redemption which is an incident of a subsisting mortagage and subsists so long as the mortgage itself subsists, unless the equity of redemption is extinguished. It is settled that the right of redemption is of this kind. (See Thota China Subba Rao and Ors. v. Mattapalli, Raju and Ors. AIR (1950) F C1."
31. The Continuing cause of action would refer to the same act or transaction or series of such acts or transactions. The recurring cause of action would have an element of fresh cause which by itself would provide the applicant the right to sue. It may have even be de hors the first cause of action or the first wrong by which the right to sue accrues. Commission of breach or infringement may give recurring and fresh cause of action with each of such infringement like infringement of a trademark. Every rejection of a right in law could be termed as a recurring cause of action. [Ref: Ex. Sep. Roop Singh v. Union of India and Ors., 2006 (91) DRJ 324, 44 M/s. Bengal Waterproof Limited v. M/s. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Company and Another, (1997) 1 SCC 99].
20. In light of the legal principles which have evolved through the judgments quoted by the rival parties, the facts in the Page 14 of 26 present case clearly reveal the case of recurring cause of action craving for reliefs under Section 15 of the NGT Act, 2010. Running of industries without EC or without enough environmental safeguards have generated serious adverse effect on flora and fauna and eco-system in and around such industries and cumulatively have given rise to an independent cause of action which will be recurring cause of action. As noted above, the CSE report brought to surface serious adverse impacts of running of the said industries on eco-system in and around such industries and made recommendations for remedying the situation and yet authorities remained cold. Obviously, this fact is an incident of recurring cause of action- a fresh composite and distinct which would prompt the application as one before us for remedial action not hit by the concept of cause of action first arose."
13. Thereafter, learned counsel for the applicants has further placed reliance on the following paras of the Judgment dated 16.01.2023 passed by the Principal Bench of this Tribunal in the matter of Waris Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v/s Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board (in Appeal No. 18 of 2020):-
"Page 15 of 26 Page 16 of 26 Page 17 of 26 Page 18 of 26 Page 19 of 26
"
14. Thereafter, learned counsel for the applicants has further placed reliance to the following paras of the Judgment dated 09.01.2025 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Waris Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v/s UPPCB (09.01.2025 in Civil Appeal No. 6398 of 2024):
"9. The appeal is partly allowed by setting the direction contained in clause (I) of paragraph 232 of the impugned judgment as well as by setting aside that part of paragraph 230 which holds the appellant liable for action under the PMLA."
15. Having drawn our attention to the above, it is urged by learned counsel for the applicants that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, vide order dated 09.01.2025, has set aside the direction contained in clause (I) of paragraph nos.230 & 232 of the impugned Judgment passed by the Tribunal and rest of the Judgment has been upheld. Hence, it is stated by him that the proposition of the recurring cause of action was also upheld. Page 20 of 26
16. Thereafter, learned counsel for the applicants has further placed reliance on the following paras of the Judgment dated 07.10.2016 passed by the Principal Bench of this Tribunal in the matter of Hazi Arif & Ors. v/s State of UP & Ors. (in OA No. 16 of 2014):
"53. The facts in the present case clearly reveal a case of recurring cause of action craving for relief under Section 15 of the NGT Act, 2010. Point no. 2 is therefore, answered negatively."
17. Having drawn our attention to the above part, it is submitted by learned counsel for the applicants that the issue no.2 pertains to the limitation. In this Judgment also, the Tribunal held that the cause of action was falling in the category of recurring cause of action. Further, it is submitted by him that Judgment delivered in above-mentioned O.A. was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide Judgment dated 31.07.2017 in the matter of Municipal Commissioner, Ghaziabad, Ghaziabad Municipal Corporation v/s Hazi Arif & Ors. (in Civil Appeal Diary No. 12873 of 2017), a copy of the Judgment is annexed at page no.1321 of the paper book.
18. Thereafter, learned counsel for the applicants has further placed reliance to the following paras of the Judgment dated 26.05.2017 passed by the Principal Bench of this Tribunal in the matter of Rajeev Rai v/s Union of India & Ors. (in OA No. 42 of 2016):
"Page 21 of 26 Page 22 of 26 Page 23 of 26
"
19. Having pointed out to the above rulings, learned counsel for the applicants submits that in the case in hand, it is true that the Consent to Operate was granted to Respondent Nos.7 to 11 on 20.05.2015, which is annexed at page no.600 of the paper book, for Ready Mix Concrete Plant at Gaimukh, which was valid upto 31.10.2019 and the Closure Order was issued by the MPCB on 27.03.2019 for the site, which is annexed at page nos.629 to 630 of the paper book. We believe that from 27.03.2019 onwards, the RMC plant was not being run at the site in question because also that is being affirmed by learned counsel for Respondent No.5- MPCB as well.
20. Now, as regards the 2nd site at Chene, learned counsel for Respondent No.5- MPCB has clarified that there was no Consent to Operate granted, but the activity of RMC was being operated there till Page 24 of 26 11.12.2024 and the same was observed to be in operation during the site visit made on 17.10.2024. Thereafter, a closure order dated 11.12.2024 was passed by the MPCB, a copy of which has been provided to us today by learned counsel for the applicants. This fact has also been admitted by learned counsel for Respondent Nos.7 to 11 as well in their affidavit.
21. Based on above facts, learned counsel for the applicants submits that the present Original Application has been filed on 11.12.2024, i.e. on the same day, when the Closure Direction for RMC plant at Chene was passed. Therefore, it cannot be said that he did not have the cause of action to file the present Original Application.
22. At this stage, we are of the view that it is incumbent upon the MPCB to make it clear as to whether for the casting yard, any permission is required to be granted by MPCB and whether the same falls under Consent Regime as per CPCB Classification of Industrial Sectors Under Red, Orange, Green and White Categories -2016 or not.
23. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that in other similar cases, the MPCB has been treating this activity under Green Category of the consent retime and as a proof thereof, he has annexed a document at page no.919 of the paper book, which is a Consent to Operate dated 27.12.2022 granted to one M/s. APCO Infratech Pvt. Ltd. Therefore, he has argued that the casting yard would also require Consent to be granted in the case in hand as well. However, learned counsel for Respondent No.5- MPCB is denying that the said activity requires any consent because the same, according to her, falls in White Category.
24. We, on our own, tried to locate "casting yard" in the categorization made by the CPCB. But we could not find the same covered under the Green Category or White Category or any other Category. Page 25 of 26
25. After having gone through the pleadings and having heard the arguments of learned counsel for the other counsels in respect of the limitation, we are reserving our opinion on limitation, subject to the receipt of reply of the MPCB in regard to the above because it involves giving finding on facts. We direct the MPCB to file their reply affidavit in this regard within a week and a copy of the same be also served upon learned counsel for the applicants, who may file rejoinder affidavit against the same, if any, before the next date.
26. We direct the Registry to list this matter for final hearing on the point of limitation on 10.09.2025.
Dinesh Kumar Singh, JM Dr. Vijay Kulkarni, EM August 26, 2025 ORIGINAL APPLICATION NO.235 OF 2024 (WZ) I.A. No.292 OF 2025 (WZ), I.A. No.293 OF 2025 (WZ) & I.A. No.429 OF 2025 (WZ) P.Kr Page 26 of 26