Madhya Pradesh High Court
Union Of India (Uoi) vs Abdul Zarkhan And Kumar Sales Centre And ... on 17 December, 2002
Equivalent citations: (2003)179CTR(MP)547, [2003]260ITR358(MP)
Author: S.B. Sakrikar
Bench: S.B. Sakrikar
JUDGMENT S.B. Sakrikar, J.
1. This judgment shall govern the disposal of the aforesaid appeals. In the aforesaid appeals, a common question of law is involved, as such, they have been heard together and being disposed of by the common judgment.
2. The appellant-Union of India has directed the aforesaid appeals against the judgments dated June 25, 1992, and December 22, 1992, rendered by the ACJM (Economic Offences), Indore, respectively, in Criminal Case No. 95 of 1988 and Criminal Case No. 60 of 1990, whereby the learned magistrate acquitted the accused-respondents of the offences punishable under Section 276DD read with Section 278B of the Income-tax Act.
3. In both the cases the accused-respondents, in the relevant year of assessment, received cash deposits from the persons in contravention of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act. A prosecution was instituted against the respondents after issuing a show cause notice on the respective respondents. In Criminal Appeal No. 619 of 1993, the complaint was registered against the respondents on August 3, 1988, whereas in Criminal Appeal No. 622 of 1993, the complaint against the respondents of the said case was registered on March 30, 1990. The learned trial judge, on framing charges and completion of the trial, acquitted the accused-respondents of both the cases of the offences under Section 276DD read with Section 278B of the Income-tax Act by the impugned orders. Aggrieved, the appellant has filed the aforesaid appeals under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Leave to appeal as prayed for was granted by this court.
4. I have heard Shri R.L. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, and Shri M.A. Bohara and Shri D.D. Vyas, learned senior counsel with Smt. Anita Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in the respective appeals.
5. Considering the submissions of learned counsel and on perusal of the record, it emerged that the impugned judgments of the trial court does not require any interference, as the matter in controversy stands fully resolved from the law laid down by the apex court in the case of Kolhapur Cane Sugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 811 and the decision of this court in the case of Parmanand Das Brij Bhushan Das v. Union of India [2001] 249 ITR 328 (common order dated February 14, 2001, in Criminal Revision No. 528 of 1997 and other connected matters)
6. It is not in dispute in both the cases that the date of the alleged offence was prior to the coming into force of the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987. But the prosecution against the respective respondents was instituted after the coming into force of the aforesaid Act. As such, the prosecution for the alleged offences cannot be instituted or continued, on coming into force of the aforesaid Amendment Act of 1987. It is not in dispute that by the Amending Act of 1987 with effect from April 1, 1989, Section 276DD was deleted from the Income-tax Act of 1961, and a new provision by way of Section 271D has been inserted, which provides for imposition of penalty for the violation of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act. As such, after coming into force of the Amendment Act, the prosecution of the accused respondents under the repealed provision is not possible. In Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd.'s case AIR 2000 SC 811, it is held by the apex court that (page 821) :
"The position is well known that at common law, the normal effect of repealing a statute or deleting a provision is to obliterate it from the statute book as completely as if it had never been passed, and the statute must be considered as a law that never existed. To this rule, an exception is engrafted by the provisions of Section 6(1). If a provision of a statute is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, all actions must stop where the omission finds them, and if final relief has not been granted before the omission goes into effect, it cannot be granted afterwards. Savings of the nature contained in Section 6 or in special Acts may modify the position. Thus, the operation of repeal or deletion as to the future and the past largely depends on the savings applicable. In a case where the particular provision in a statute is omitted and in its place another provision dealing with the same contingency is introduced without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings then it can be reasonably inferred that the intention of the Legislature is that the pending proceedings shall not continue but a fresh proceeding for the same purpose may be initiated under the new provision."
7. In the Amendment Act of 1987, also there was no saving clause inserted for the pending proceedings. That being so, in the light of the decision of the apex court, the pending proceedings against the accused-respondents cannot continue under the repealed provisions, but a fresh proceeding for imposition of penalty may be initiated under the new provision, i.e., Section 271E of the Income-tax Act.
8. In view of the aforesaid legal position, no grounds are made out for interfering with the judgment of acquittals rendered by the trial court in the relevant criminal cases against the respective accused-respondents.
9. In the result, the appeals filed on behalf of the appellants are devoid of any merit and substance, deserve the fate of dismissal. Both the appeals filed on behalf of the appellants are accordingly dismissed. The accused-respondents of both the cases are on bail. Their bail bonds stands cancelled. A copy of this judgment be placed on the record of Criminal Appeal No. 622 of 1993.