Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Kollu Raveendra, vs State Of Andhra Pradesh, on 30 October, 2025
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
CRIMINAL PETITION No.1619 of 2025
Between:
1. KOLLU RAVEENDRA,, S/O. LATE SUBBA RAO, AGED 56 YEARS,
HINDU, R/O. D.NO.28/331, CIRCLEPETA, MACHILIPATNAM.
2. MOHAMMED ILIYAS BASHA,, S/O. IQBAL BASHA, 51 YEARS, R/O.
D.NO.29/9 INAGUDURUPET, MACHILIPATNAM.
3. MOTAMARRI VENKATA BABA PRASAD,, S/O. SESHSAVATHARAM,
AGED 59 YEARS, VYSYA, D.NO. 10/37, NIZAMPET,
MACHILIPATNAM.
4. ABDUL SAYYED KHAJA,, S/O. ABDUL SAYYED BAJI, 49 YEARS,
MUSLIM , R/O. D.NO.5-251, FATHULLABAD, MACHILIPATNAM.
5. PANCHAPARVALA KASI VISWANADHARAO,, S/O.
KODANDARAMAIAH, 63 YEARS, KAPU CHILAKALAPUDI,
MACHILIPATNAM.
6. GANIPISETTI GOPALAKRISHNA,, S/O. CHALAPATHIRAO, 64
YEARS, KAPU, R/O. D.NO. 14/68/4, NEAR SHAKTHI GUDI,
EDEPALLI, MACHILIPATNAM.
7. MARAKANI PARABRAHMAM,, S/O.SESHAGIRIRAO, 69 YEARS,
ELAMA, RUSTUMBADA, MACHILIPATNAM.
8. METTU SURYANARAYANA,, S/O. ADINARAYANA, 60 YEARS, R/O.
D.NO.8/34-1, GODUGUPET, MACHILIPATNAM.
9. SANKULA SATYANANDAN,, S/O. DHANUNJAYRAO, R/O. D.NO.
30/574-3, MUSTHAKHANPET, MACHILIPATNAM.
10.KORASIKA SRINU,, S/O. MOHANARAO, AGED 37 YEARS, R/O.
D.NO. 15-456-45-42-A, H.B. COLONY, MACHILIPATNAM.
11. ANGARA THULASIDAS,, S/O. RAMAKRISHNA, 47 YEARS, R/O.
D.NO. 9/627, BALARAMUNIPET, MACHILIPATNAM.
12.PALLAVAJJULA VENKATA PHANIKUMAR,, S/O.
VENKATESWARARAO, 49 YEARS. BRAHMIN, R/O. D.NO. 24-224-1,
RAMANAIDUPET, MACHILIPATNAM.
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13.DALAYI JYOTHIBABU,, S/O.RAMAKRISHNARAO, 48 YEARS, RELLI,
R/O. OGEESPET, MACHILIPATNAM
14.VEKANTI RAMBABU,, . S/O. KRISHNA, 54 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.
9/306-1, YERUKALAVARI VEEDHI, BALARAMUNIPET,
MACHILIPATNAM.
15.BODDU SRINIVAS,, S/O. NANCHARAIAH, 52 YEARS R/O. D.NO.
28/832, JALALPET, MACHILIPATNAM.
16.KUMBHA RAVI KIRAN,, S/O. SURIBABU, AGED 34 YEARS, R/O.
D.NO.30/36-1, MALAKAPOATNAM MACHILIPATNAM.
17.CHITTAJALLU NAGARAMU,, S/O. RANGARAO, 52 YEARS,
SURYBALIJA, R/O. D.NO.5/264-1, FATHULLABAD,
MACHILIPATNAM.
18.PALLAPOTHU SIVA SANKARARAO,, S/O. KRISHNAMURTHY, 53
YEARS, PATHARAMANNAPET, MACHILIPATNAM.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED(S)
AND
1.STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, AMARAVATI, GUNTUR
DISTRICT.
2.THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, KRISHNA DISTRICT AT
MACHILIPATNAM.
3.STATION HOUSE OFFICER, SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
INUGUDURU POLICE STATION.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
****
DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 30.10.2025
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SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No
2. Whether the copy of Judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the
fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No
_________________________
Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J
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Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025
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* THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
+ CRIMINAL PETITION No.1619 of 2025
% 30.10.2025
# Between:
1. KOLLU RAVEENDRA,, S/O. LATE SUBBA RAO, AGED 56 YEARS,
HINDU, R/O. D.NO.28/331, CIRCLEPETA, MACHILIPATNAM.
2. MOHAMMED ILIYAS BASHA,, S/O. IQBAL BASHA, 51 YEARS, R/O.
D.NO.29/9 INAGUDURUPET, MACHILIPATNAM.
3. MOTAMARRI VENKATA BABA PRASAD,, S/O. SESHSAVATHARAM,
AGED 59 YEARS, VYSYA, D.NO. 10/37, NIZAMPET,
MACHILIPATNAM.
4. ABDUL SAYYED KHAJA,, S/O. ABDUL SAYYED BAJI, 49 YEARS,
MUSLIM , R/O. D.NO.5-251, FATHULLABAD, MACHILIPATNAM.
5. PANCHAPARVALA KASI VISWANADHARAO,, S/O.
KODANDARAMAIAH, 63 YEARS, KAPU CHILAKALAPUDI,
MACHILIPATNAM.
6. GANIPISETTI GOPALAKRISHNA,, S/O. CHALAPATHIRAO, 64
YEARS, KAPU, R/O. D.NO. 14/68/4, NEAR SHAKTHI GUDI,
EDEPALLI, MACHILIPATNAM.
7. MARAKANI PARABRAHMAM,, S/O.SESHAGIRIRAO, 69 YEARS,
ELAMA, RUSTUMBADA, MACHILIPATNAM.
8. METTU SURYANARAYANA,, S/O. ADINARAYANA, 60 YEARS, R/O.
D.NO.8/34-1, GODUGUPET, MACHILIPATNAM.
9. SANKULA SATYANANDAN,, S/O. DHANUNJAYRAO, R/O. D.NO.
30/574-3, MUSTHAKHANPET, MACHILIPATNAM.
10.KORASIKA SRINU,, S/O. MOHANARAO, AGED 37 YEARS, R/O.
D.NO. 15-456-45-42-A, H.B. COLONY, MACHILIPATNAM.
11. ANGARA THULASIDAS,, S/O. RAMAKRISHNA, 47 YEARS, R/O.
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D.NO. 9/627, BALARAMUNIPET, MACHILIPATNAM.
12.PALLAVAJJULA VENKATA PHANIKUMAR,, S/O.
VENKATESWARARAO, 49 YEARS. BRAHMIN, R/O. D.NO. 24-224-1,
RAMANAIDUPET, MACHILIPATNAM.
13.DALAYI JYOTHIBABU,, S/O.RAMAKRISHNARAO, 48 YEARS, RELLI,
R/O. OGEESPET, MACHILIPATNAM
14.VEKANTI RAMBABU,, . S/O. KRISHNA, 54 YEARS, R/O. D.NO.
9/306-1, YERUKALAVARI VEEDHI, BALARAMUNIPET,
MACHILIPATNAM.
15.BODDU SRINIVAS,, S/O. NANCHARAIAH, 52 YEARS R/O. D.NO.
28/832, JALALPET, MACHILIPATNAM.
16.KUMBHA RAVI KIRAN,, S/O. SURIBABU, AGED 34 YEARS, R/O.
D.NO.30/36-1, MALAKAPOATNAM MACHILIPATNAM.
17.CHITTAJALLU NAGARAMU,, S/O. RANGARAO, 52 YEARS,
SURYBALIJA, R/O. D.NO.5/264-1, FATHULLABAD,
MACHILIPATNAM.
18.PALLAPOTHU SIVA SANKARARAO,, S/O. KRISHNAMURTHY, 53
YEARS, PATHARAMANNAPET, MACHILIPATNAM.
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED(S)
AND
1.STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, AMARAVATI, GUNTUR
DISTRICT.
2.THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, KRISHNA DISTRICT AT
MACHILIPATNAM.
3.STATION HOUSE OFFICER, SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
INUGUDURU POLICE STATION.
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S):
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! Counsel for the Petitioners : Mallavolu Nikitha
^Counsel for the Respondent : P.Akhila Naidu, Assistant Public Prosecutor
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. Crl.P.(MD).Nos.1356 of 2018 and batch dated 20.09.2018
2. 1962 SCC OnLine SC 342
3. Crl.P.No.2069/2023 dated 01.03.2023
4. 2006 (3) ALT (Crl.)49 (A.P)
5. (2010) 9 SCC 567
6. (1971) 3 SCC 329
7. (1996) 3 SCC 533
8. (1998) 2 SCC 391
9. (2005) 7 SCC 352
10. (1953) 1 SCC 637
11. (1994) 4 SCC 95
12. (1981) 2 SCC 185
13. 1968 SCC OnLine SC 253
14. (2020) 20 SCC 1
15. 2020 SCC OnLine AP 726
7
Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025
Dr.YLR,J
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THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION No.1619 of 2025
ORDER:
Criminal Petition No.1616 of 2025 has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 20231 challenging the chargesheet filed in C.C.No.828 of 2020 on the file of the learned II Additional Judicial First- Class Magistrate, Machilipatnam for the alleged offences punishable under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code, 18602 and Section 3 of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 18973 in Crime No.146/2020 of Inaguduru Police Station.
2. The Sub-Inspector of Police, Inaguduru Police Station filed a purported complaint under Section 190(1) and 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19734. Whereas based on the occurrence report prepared by L.W.2 in the laptop of the Sub-Inspector of Police, Inaguduru Police Station, L.W.2 had registered the occurrence report as a case in FIR No.146 of 2020 under Section 188 of 'the I.P.C' and Section 3 of 'the Act.,' on 13.06.2020 and investigated into. L.W.2 is the Head Constable of Inaguduru Police Station. L.W.3, the Sub-Inspector of Police, had taken up further investigation, visited the scene of offence, prepared a sketch and examined L.Ws.1 & 2 by recording their statements. L.W.3 later had issued notices to the 1 the BNSS 2 the I.P.C 3 the Act 4 the Cr.P.C 8 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025 Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025 Petitioners/Accused on 26.06.2020 and received explanations from them. After completion of the investigation, it was mentioned in the complaint that L.W.3 filed chargesheet. Whereas the Sub-Inspector of Police filed the case as a complaint under Sections 190(1) and 200 of 'the Cr.P.C.' Thus there is no actual complaint filed by the Sub-Inspector of Police strictly in accordance with Section 190 read with 200 of 'the Cr.P.C.'
3. It is pertinent to examine the applicability of Section 3 of 'the Act', which provides that any person disobeying any regulation or order made under 'the Act' shall be deemed to have committed an offence punishable under Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.' However, in the present case, there is no material placed on record to establish that any valid regulation or order issued under 'the Act' was in force on the date of the alleged offence, i.e., 13.06.2020. The Government Order G.O.R.T.No.211, which may have formed the basis for invoking the provisions of 'the Act', had expired on 23.03.2020. Therefore, the invocation of Section 3 of 'the Act' appears to be legally unsustainable.
4. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioners and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor.
5. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record.
6. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is: 9 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025
Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025 "Whether the proceedings in C.C.No.828/2020 on the file of the learned II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Machilipatnam is liable to be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of 'the Cr.P.C.,'/Section 528 of 'the BNSS'?"
7. Ms. M.Nikitha, learned Counsel for the Petitioners relied on another judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in C. Muniappan v. State of T.N.,5 wherein at paragraph Nos.28 & 29, it is held as under:
"28. Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 188 IPC or abetment or attempt to commit the same, unless, there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned for contempt of his lawful order. The object of this provision is to provide for a particular procedure in a case of contempt of the lawful authority of the public servant. The court lacks competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein. The legislative intent behind such a provision has been that an individual should not face criminal prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated by malice, ill will or frivolity of disposition and to save the time of the criminal courts being wasted by endless prosecutions. This provision has been carved out as an exception to the general rule contained under Section 190 CrPC that any person can set the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the court from taking cognizance of certain offences until and unless a complaint has been made by some particular authority or person. Other provisions in CrPC like Sections 196 and 198 do not lay down any rule of procedure, rather, they only create a bar that unless some requirements are complied with, the court shall not take cognizance of an offence described in those sections. (Vide Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar [(1971) 3 SCC 329 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 608 : AIR 1971 SC 1708] , Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat [(1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 548 :
AIR 1971 SC 1935] , Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh [(1996) 3 SCC 533 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 521] , State of Punjab v. Raj Singh [(1998) 2 SCC 391 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 642] , K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy [(2005) 7 SCC 352 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1673] and Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] .)
29. The test of whether there is evasion or non-compliance with Section 195 CrPC or not, is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In Basir-ul-Haq v. State of W.B. [(1953) 1 SCC 637 : AIR 1953 SC 293 : 1953 Cri LJ 1232] and Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa [AIR 1966 SC 1775 : 1966 Cri LJ 1491] , this Court held that the provisions of this section cannot be evaded by describing the offence as 5 (2010) 9 SCC 567 10 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025 Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025 one being punishable under some other sections of IPC, though in truth and substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 CrPC. Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it."
8. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar6, at paragraph No.12 held as under:
"12. According to Mr Jyoti Narayan, the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken by the Magistrate to be adjudged, is the time when cognizance is actually taken under Section 190 of the Code and applying that test in the present case, it will be seen that there has been a breach of Section 195(1)(b) and (c) and Section 476 of the Code. The proposition that the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken is to be adjudged is the time when cognizance is actually taken is laid down by this Court in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur [AIR 1967 SC 528 :
(1967) 1 SCR 520 : 1967 Cri LJ 528] . The Magistrate has normally got jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code in the circumstances enumerated therein. Section 195 is in fact a limitation on the unfettered powers of a Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code. Therefore, at the stage when the Magistrate is taking cognizance under Section 190, he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his power of taking cognizance under Section 190 has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of Section 195(1). Therefore, it is needless to state that if there is a non-compliance with the provisions of Section 195, the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences enumerated therein."
9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh7, at paragraph No.6 held as under:
"6. The object thereby is to protect persons from needless harassment by prosecution for private vendetta; to preserve purity of the judicial process and unsullied administration of justice; to prevent the parties of the temptation to pre-empt the proceedings pending in a court and to pressurise and desist parties from proceeding with the case. Equally when the act complained of relates to an offence, i.e., contempt of lawful authority of public servant, or against public justice or for offences relating to documents produced or given in evidence, public justice demands absolute bar of private prosecution and that power be given to the court to lay complaint under Section 340 of the Code as per the procedure prescribed therein. In Patel Laljibhai case [(1971) 2 SCC 376 :
1971 SCC (Cri) 548 : AIR 1971 SC 1935] the main controversy was as 6 (1971) 3 SCC 329 7 (1996) 3 SCC 533 11 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025 Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025 to when the accused had become a party to the proceedings. However, after the Code came into force in 1974 replacing the earlier Code of 1898 it was omitted and so it is no longer of any relevance. It is seen that the appellants therein had filed a civil suit on the basis of a cheque dated 22-11-1963 and the civil suit had come to be dismissed on 30-1-
1965. Thereafter, the private complaint was filed on 16-11-1965. In the light of those facts it was held that the respondent was a party to the proceedings in the suit and that, therefore, the private complaint was not maintainable."
10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Raj Singh8, at paragraph No.2 held as under:
"2. We are unable to sustain the impugned order of the High Court quashing the FIR lodged against the respondents alleging commission of offences under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 IPC by them in course of the proceeding of a civil suit, on the ground that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC prohibited entertainment of and investigation into the same by the police. From a plain reading of Section 195 CrPC it is manifest that it comes into operation at the stage when the court intends to take cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1) CrPC; and it has nothing to do with the statutory power of the police to investigate into an FIR which discloses a cognizable offence, in accordance with Chapter XII of the Code even if the offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in court. In other words, the statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way controlled or circumscribed by Section 195 CrPC. It is of course true that upon the charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, but nothing therein deters the court from filing a complaint for the offence on the basis of the FIR (filed by the aggrieved private party) and the materials collected during investigation, provided it forms the requisite opinion and follows the procedure laid down in Section 340 CrPC. The judgment of this Court in Gopalakrishna Menon v. D. Raja Reddy [(1983) 4 SCC 240 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 822 : AIR 1983 SC 1053] on which the High Court relied, has no manner of application to the facts of the instant case for there cognizance was taken on a private complaint even though the offence of forgery was committed in respect of a money receipt produced in the civil court and hence it was held that the court could not take cognizance on such a complaint in view of Section 195 CrPC."8
(1998) 2 SCC 391 12 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025 Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025
11. The Hon'ble Apex Court in K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy9, at paragraph Nos.3 & 4 held as under:
"3. By the impugned order, the High Court of Madras quashed the prosecution of the respondents, which was launched under Sections 467, 468, 471, 472 and 477-A read with Section 34 of the Penal Code (for short "IPC") on the ground that the complaint was barred under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "CrPC"). Undisputedly, the forgery is said to have been committed before the document was filed. Earlier, there was diverse opinion of this Court as to whether protection of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC was available in relation to forgery committed prior to the filing of document or after its filing. A Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] has categorically laid down in para 33 of the judgment that protection engrafted under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it had been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis. This being the position, in our view, the High Court was not justified in quashing prosecution of the respondents on the ground that provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC were applicable.
4. Mr K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the respondents are entitled to claim protection under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, which enumerates the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC. It has been pointed out that according to the petition of complainant, the accused persons had falsely filed a complaint before the Deputy Registrar, Chits, who dismissed the matter finally. The said complaint was not dismissed by the Deputy Registrar on merits, but without any adjudication, inasmuch as there was no finding that the complainant had lodged a false complaint before the Deputy Registrar. The present complaint does not relate to falsity or otherwise of the complaint before the Deputy Registrar; rather according to the prosecution case, the accused persons are said to have forged the document. This being the position, in our view, the provisions of Section 195(1)(a) CrPC, shall have no application to the case in hand. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in quashing prosecution of the respondents."
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Basir-Ul-Huq v. State of W.B.,10 at paragraph No.12 held as under:
9
(2005) 7 SCC 352 10 (1953) 1 SCC 637 13 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025 Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025 "12. Section 195 CrPC, on which the question raised is grounded, provides, inter alia, that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188IPC, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. The statute thus requires that without a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned no prosecution for an offence under Section 182 can be taken cognizance of. It does not further provide that if in the course of the commission of that offence other distinct offences are committed, the Magistrate is debarred from taking cognizance in respect of those offences as well. The allegations made in a complaint may have a double aspect, that is, on the one hand these may constitute an offence against the authority of the public servant or public justice, and on the other hand, they may also constitute the offence of defamation or some other distinct offence. The section does not per se bar the cognizance by the Magistrate of that offence, even if no action is taken by the public servant to whom the false report has been made. It was however argued that if on the same facts an offence of which no cognizance can be taken under the provisions of Section 195 is disclosed and the same facts disclose another offence as well which is outside the purview of the section and prosecution for that other offence is taken cognizance of without the requirements of Section 195 having been fulfilled, then the provisions of that section would become nugatory and if such a course was permitted those provisions will stand defeated. It was further said that it is not permissible for the prosecution to ignore the provisions of this section by describing the offence as being punishable under some other section of the Penal Code."
13. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners also relied on a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Mata Bhikh11, wherein at paragraph Nos.15 & 16 it is held as under:
"15. On a scrutiny of Section 195(1)(a), we are of the view that a successor in office of a public servant concerned will also fall within the ambit of the expression 'public servant concerned'. Any other view contrary to it will only create difficulties in certain situations. For example, in a case where a public servant concerned promulgates a preliminary order under Section 133, 145 or 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and is transferred or retires or ceases to be in office on any account before a final order is passed, would it mean that the successor who is under the law to continue the same proceeding has no right to file a complaint if the preliminary order is disobeyed. The answer would be that the successor in office can file a complaint. In every such situation, one cannot expect the superior officer to whom the public servant is administratively subordinate to file a complaint against the wrongdoers 11 (1994) 4 SCC 95 14 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025 Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025 disobeying either the preliminary order or the final order promulgated by the public servant concerned.
16. Therefore, in the light of the dictum laid down in Ajaib Singh [AIR 1968 SC 1422 : 1969 Cri LJ 4 : 70 Pun LR 1131] we are of the view that the successor in office of the public servant gets into the same position of the public servant concerned and he is in law eligible to file a complaint against wrongdoers. To say in other words, the successor in office falls within the ambit of the expression 'public servant concerned'. The view taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and accordingly, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed."
14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy12, at paragraph No.8 held as under:
"8. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld."
15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Ajaib Singh v. Joginder Singh13, at paragraph No.5 held as under:
"5. The learned counsel next contends that the complaint could only be filed by the Magistrate before whom the original proceedings were taken. He says that according to Section 195(1)(b) CrPC a complaint in respect of Sections 193, 195 and 211 IPC, can only be made by the Court in which the proceedings out of which the offences arose took place. We see no force in this contention. Section 559 enables a successor-in- office of a Magistrate to file a complaint. The relevant portion of Section 559 reads as follows:
"559. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Code, the powers and duties of a Judge or Magistrate may be exercised or performed by his successor in office.
(2) When there is any doubt as to who is the successor in office of any Magistrate, the Chief Presidency Magistrate in a Presidency town, and the District Magistrate outside such towns, shall determine by order in writing the Magistrate who shall, for the purposes of this Code or of any proceedings or order thereunder, be deemed to be the successor in office of such Magistrate."12
(1981) 2 SCC 185 13 1968 SCC OnLine SC 253 15 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025 Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025 This section was substituted for the original Section 559 by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (18 of 1923). Since the amendment it has been held, and we think rightly, that a successor in office of a Magistrate can file a complaint under Section 476, CrPC, in respect of an offence under Section 195 IPC, committed before his predecessor. (See Behram v. Beparor [27 Cr LJ 776] Bara Kanon Manjhi v. Gopi Manjhi [AIR 1927 Pat 327] ; and In re Subramaniam Chettiar [AIR 1957 Mad 442] . This section applies to all Magistrates and there is no reason why the plain terms of the section should be cut down to limit it, as suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant, to Magistrates whose courts are permanent. It seems to us further clear that sub-section (2) has not the effect of limiting Section 559(1) Section 559(2) applies when there is a doubt as to who the successor is, and that doubt can be resolved in the manner laid down in sub-section (2). The sub-section does not mean, as contended by the learned counsel, that until a successor is determined under sub-section (2) there is no successor for the purposes of sub-section (1). If there is no doubt about who the successor is, then that person can exercise the powers under sub-section (1). We accordingly hold that the complaint was properly filed by Shri Joginder Singh "Karangarhia", Magistrate."
16. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bandekar Bros. (P) Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni14, wherein at para No.48, it is held as under:
"48. Equally important to remember is that if in the course of the same transaction two separate offences are made out, for one of which Section 195 CrPC is not attracted, and it is not possible to split them up, the drill of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC must be followed. Thus, in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy [State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 395] , this Court referred to a judgment of the Madras High Court (V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy, In re [V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy v. State, 1953 SCC OnLine Mad 236 : AIR 1955 Mad 237] ) and approved its ratio as follows : (Hemareddy case [State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, (1981) 2 SCC 185 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 395] , SCC pp. 190-91, paras 7-8) "7. ... In the third case, Somasundaram, J., has observed : (V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy case [V.V.L. Narasimhamurthy v. State, 1953 SCC OnLine Mad 236 : AIR 1955 Mad 237] , SCC OnLine Mad) 'The main point on which Mr Jayarama Ayyar appearing for the petitioner seeks to quash this committal is that on the facts an offence under Section 193 IPC is disclosed for which the court cannot take cognizance without a complaint by the court as provided under Section 195(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The first question which arises for consideration is whether on the facts mentioned in the 14 (2020) 20 SCC 1 16 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025 Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025 complaint, an offence under Section 193 IPC is revealed. Section 193 reads as follows:
"193. Punishment for false evidence.--Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
"Fabrication of false evidence" is defined in Section 192. The relevant portion of it is:
"Whoever causes any circumstance to exist intending that such circumstance may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding and that such circumstance may cause any person who in such proceeding is to form an opinion upon the evidence to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of such proceeding is said "to fabricate false evidence"."
The effect of the allegations in the complaint preferred by the complainant is that the petitioner has caused this will to come into existence intending that such will may cause the Judge before whom the suit is filed to form an opinion that the will is a genuine one and, therefore, his minor daughter is entitled to the property. The allegation, therefore, in the complaint will undoubtedly fall under Section 192 IPC. It will, therefore, amount to an offence under Section 193 IPC i.e. fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in the judicial proceeding. There is no doubt that the facts disclosed will also amount to an offence under Sections 467 and 471 IPC. For prosecuting this petitioner for an offence under Sections 467 and 471, a complaint by the court may not be necessary as under Section 195(1)(b) CrPC a complaint may be made only when it is committed by a party to any proceeding in any court.
Mr Jayarama Ayyar does not give up his contention that the petitioner, though he appears only a guardian of the minor girl, is still a party to the proceeding. But it is unnecessary to go into the question at the present moment and I reserve my opinion on the question whether the guardian can be a party to a proceeding or not, as this case can be disposed of on the other point viz. that when the allegations amount to an offence under Section 193 IPC, a complaint of court is necessary under Section 195(1)(a) CrPC and this cannot be evaded by prosecuting the accused for an offence for which a complaint of court is not necessary.'
8. We agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge and hold that in cases where in the course of the same transaction an offence for which no complaint by a court is necessary under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an offence for which a complaint of a court is necessary under that sub-section, are committed, it is not possible to split up and hold that the prosecution of the accused for the offences not mentioned in Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be upheld.""
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Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025
17. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Kantamaneni Ravishankar v.
State of A.P.,15 at para No.86 it is held as under:
"86. Therefore, to register a crime against a person, who disobeyed the ordinance, there must be a complaint from public servant about the disobedience of ordinance. Hence, the very registration of crime for the offence punishable under Section 188 of I.P.C. is contrary to the settled law laid down by the Apex Court and other High Courts (referred supra) and the police officer is incompetent to register a crime for the offence punishable under Section 188 of I.P.C. on the complaint of any other person other than a public servant and any other person, who is authorized by pubic servant. Consequently, registration of crime against the petitioner is vitiated by irregularity."
18. A learned Single Judge of Madras High Court in Jeevanandham v. State of Tamil Nadu16 at paragraph No.25 observed as under:
"25. In view of the discussions, the following guidelines are issued insofar as an offence under Section 188 of IPC, is concerned:
a) A Police Officer cannot register an FIR for any of the offences falling under Section 172 to 188 of IPC.
b) A Police Officer by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 41 of Cr.P.C will have the authority to take action under Section 41 of Cr.P.C., when a cognizable offence under Section 188 IPC is committed in his presence or where such action is required, to prevent such person from committing an offence under Section 188 of IPC.
c) The role of the Police Officer will be confined only to the preventive action as stipulated under Section 41 of Cr.P.C and immediately thereafter, he has to inform about the same to the public servant concerned/authorised, to enable such public servant to give a complaint in writing before the jurisdictional Magistrate, who shall take cognizance of such complaint on being prima facie satisfied with the requirements of Section 188 of IPC.
d) In order to attract the provisions of Section 188 of IPC, the written complaint of the public servant concerned should reflect the following ingredients namely;
i) that there must be an order promulgated by the public servant;
ii) that such public servant is lawfully empowered to promulgate it;
iii) that the person with knowledge of such order and being directed by such order to abstain from doing certain act or to take certain order with certain property in his possession and under his management, has disobeyed; and
iv) that such disobedience causes or tends to cause;
(a) obstruction,annoyance or risk of it to any person lawfully employed;
or 15 2020 SCC OnLine AP 726 16 Crl.P.(MD).Nos.1356 of 2018 and batch dated 20.09.2018 18 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025 Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025
(b) danger to human life, health or safety; or
(c) a riot or affray.
e) The promulgation issued under Section 30(2) of the Police Act, 1861, must satisfy the test of reasonableness and can only be in the nature of a regulatory power and not a blanket power to trifle any democratic dissent of the citizens by the Police.
f) The promulgation through which, the order is made known must be by something done openly and in public and private information will not be a promulgation. The order must be notified or published by beat of drum or in a Gazette or published in a newspaper with a wide circulation.
g) No Judicial Magistrate should take cognizance of a Final Report when it reflects an offence under Section 172 to 188 of IPC. An FIR or a Final Report will not become void ab initio insofar as offences other than Section 172 to 188 of IPC and a Final Report can be taken cognizance by the Magistrate insofar as offences not covered under Section 195(1)(a)(i) of Cr.P.C.
h) The Director General of Police, Chennai and Inspector General of the various Zones are directed to immediately formulate a process by specifically empowering public servants dealing with for an offence under Section 188 of IPC to ensure that there is no delay in filing a written complaint by the public servants concerned under Section 195(1)(a)(i) of Cr.P.C."
19. A Police Officer, by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 41 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' is authorized to take action when a cognizable offence under Section 188 of 'the I.P.C' is committed in his presence. This authority also extends to situations where preventive action is necessary to stop a person from committing such an offence. However, the scope of the Police Officer's role is strictly limited to preventive measures. Once such preventive action is taken, the officer must immediately inform the concerned or authorized public servant. This step is crucial to ensure that the public servant can file a written complaint before the learned Jurisdictional Magistrate, who may then take cognizance of the matter upon being prima facie satisfied that the legal requirements under Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' are fulfilled. 19 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025
Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025
20. To validly attract the provisions of Section 188 of 'the I.P.C.,' the written complaint submitted by the public servant must clearly reflect certain essential ingredients. Firstly, there must be an order that has been duly promulgated by the public servant. Secondly, the public servant must be lawfully empowered to issue such an order. Thirdly, the accused must have had knowledge of the order and must have been directed either to abstain from performing a specific act or to take a particular course of action regarding property under their possession or management. Lastly, the disobedience of such an order must result in or have the tendency to result in one or more of the following consequences: obstruction, annoyance, or the risk thereof to any person lawfully employed; danger to human life, health, or safety; or the likelihood of a riot or affray. These elements are essential to establish the offence and must be clearly articulated in the complaint.
21. Any promulgation issued under Section 30(2) of the Police Act, 1861, must satisfy the test of reasonableness. Such promulgations are intended to serve as regulatory measures and must not be interpreted as blanket powers that suppress democratic dissent. The Police must exercise this authority with restraint and ensure that it does not infringe upon the constitutional rights of citizens to express their views and engage in peaceful protest. The promulgation must be proportionate, justified, and aimed at maintaining public order without curtailing fundamental freedoms. 20 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025
Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025
22. For an order to be considered validly promulgated, it must be made known through public and open means. Private or selective communication does not constitute a valid promulgation. Acceptable methods include public announcements such as beat of drum, publication in the official Gazette, or dissemination through widely circulated newspapers. This ensures that the public is adequately informed and that the order is not enforced in secrecy, thereby upholding transparency and fairness in the enforcement process.
23. It is also imperative that no Judicial Magistrate takes cognizance of a Final Report that reflects offences under Sections 172 to 188 of 'the I.P.C.' However, this does not render the FIR or Final Report void ab initio with respect to other offences. The learned Magistrate retains the authority to take cognizance of offences not covered under Section 195(1)(a)(i) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' thereby preserving the integrity of the investigation and ensuring that justice is not compromised due to procedural technicalities. This distinction ensures that while procedural safeguards are respected, they do not become a barrier to addressing other substantive offences.
24. There is no reference in the chargesheet/complaint that Sub-Inspector of Police has obtained necessary permission from his administrative head. Undoubtedly, Sub-Inspector of Police is a public servant, as per Section 21 of 'the I.P.C.' However, there was no complaint lodged intrinsically. Originally, FIR was registered and an investigation was conducted and filed a chargesheet. 21 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025
Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025 However, having noticed the embargo under Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' the Sub-Inspector of Police styled the chargesheet as complaint. What is complaint is defined under Section 2(d) of 'the Cr.P.C.' Section 2(d) says as under:
"2(d) "complaint" means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report."
25. No doubt, even a chargesheet apart from other details also contains allegations in writing filed before the Court/Magistrate with an intention to take action as contemplated under 'the Cr.P.C.,' that some known person had committed an offence, but that doesn't include a complaint. Police report is filed under Section 173(2) of 'the Cr.P.C.' Police report is defined under Section 2(r) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' as under:
""police report" means a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under Sub-Section (2) of section 173 of 'the Cr.P.C;"
26. Therefore, if a report is filed by a police officer before a Magistrate under Section 173(2) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' it is a police report. Section 173(2) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' says as under:
"Section 173 (2) - (i) As soon as it is completed, the officer-in-charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating -
(a)the names of the parties;
(b)the nature of the information;
(c)the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case;
(d)whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom;
(e)whether the accused has been arrested;22 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025
Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025
(f)whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties;
(g)whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170.
(h) whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence under sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB, or 376E of the Indian Penal Code.
(ii)The officer shall also communicate, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him, to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given."
27. On a careful perusal of the so called purported complaint filed by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Inagaduru Police Station, it has got all the tappings of a police report contemplated under Section 173(2) of 'the Cr.P.C.' The Sub- Inspector of Police had not obtained any sanction from his administrative head of the district. Therefore, the complaint filed by the Sub-Inspector of Police cannot be a treated as a complaint under Section 2(n) of 'the Cr.P.C.,' it has to be treated a police report under Section 173(2) of 'the Cr.P.C.'
28. Therefore, the Magistrate was not authorized to take cognizance based on the so-called purported complaint lodged by the Sub-Inspector of Police. Therefore, the Criminal Petition is required to be quashed for want of filing the complaint in proper mode and format.
29. Ms. M.Nikitha, learned Counsel for the Petitioner relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab17, wherein it was mentioned that a complaint was not filed by the Tahsildar but a chargesheet was put in by the Station House Officer; letter of the Superintendent of Police was forwarded to the Tahsildar and he asked for a calendar; the letter was 17 1962 SCC OnLine SC 342 23 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025 Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025 filed along with chargesheet by contending that it satisfied the requirements under Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.' However, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that it was not due compliance with the provisions of Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,' as there was no complaint in writing filed by the public servant concerned. Eventually, it was observed that cognizance of the case was, therefore, wrongly assumed by the Court without the complaint in writing of the public servant namely the Tahsildar in that case. Ultimately, it was ruled that the trial was thus without jurisdiction ab initio and the conviction could not be maintained.
30. In the instant case also, it was not the Tahsildar of Inaguduru mandal filed a complaint. The contention of the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor that the complaint filed by the Sub-Inspector of Police was rightly taken cognizance by the learned Magistrate cannot be accepted for the reason that such complaint cannot be considered a complaint under Section 2(n) of 'the Cr.P.C.'
31. Considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in C. Muniappan, Daulat Ram supra, the learned Judicial First-Class Magistrates were not authorised to take cognizance in view of the embargo under Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.' 24 Crl.P.No.1619 of 2025 Dr.YLR,J 30.10.2025
32. A fortiori, G.O.R.T.No.211 expired by 23.03.2020, the alleged offence occurred on 13.06.2020. As on the date of the commission of the alleged offence, the Government Order was not in vogue.
33. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed, quashing the proceedings on the file of learned II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Machilipatnam in C.C.No.828 of 2020.
_________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 30.10.2025 Note: LR copy to be marked B/o VTS