Harsh Rekha Jain vs Shri Neeraj Jain on 25 February, 2026

[Cites 21, Cited by 0]

Delhi High Court - Orders

Harsh Rekha Jain vs Shri Neeraj Jain on 25 February, 2026

                          $~13
                          *         IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                          +         CS(OS) 285/2024, I.A. 7960/2024, I.A. 6665/2025, I.A. 12886/2025,
                                    I.A. 12887/2025 & O.A. 189/2025

                                    HARSH REKHA JAIN                                                        .....Plaintiff
                                                 Through:                             Ms. Samvedna Verma, Adv.
                                                                                      Mob: 9873600464
                                                                                      Email: [email protected]

                                                                  versus

                                    SHRI NEERAJ JAIN                                                        .....Defendant
                                                  Through:                            Mr. Karan Bidhuri, Adv.
                                                                                      Mob: 9711537925
                                                                                      Email:
                                                                                      [email protected]

                                    CORAM:
                                    HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA
                                                                  ORDER

% 25.02.2026 O.A. 189/2025

1. The present chamber appeal has been filed under Rule 5 Chapter II of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC"), challenging the order dated 16th September, 2025, passed by the learned Joint Registrar, wherein, the delay in filing the written statement of the defendant was not condoned, and the written statement was taken off the record.

2. As per the facts on record, the defendant was served by the Registry of this Court through E-mail on 03rd May, 2024. The written statement was filed by the defendant on 13th September, 2024, with a delay of One Page 1 of 12 This is a digitally signed order.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/defendant submits that the period of filing the written statement ought to be calculated from 20th May, 2025, as that is the day, when the defendant came across the E-mail dated 03rd May, 2024, and the defendant gained knowledge about the suit pending before this Court.

4. At this stage, it would be prudent to reproduce the impugned order, i.e., order dated 16th September, 2025, passed by the learned Joint Registrar (Judicial), wherein, it was held as follows:

"xxx xxx xxx

6. Perusal of record shows that summons of the suit was issued to the defendant and the same was served upon the defendant through e-mail on 03.05.2024. Further perusal of record shows that the defendant has entered appearance in this case through his counsel on 21.05.2024. Written statement filed on behalf of the defendant vide diary no.3790563/2024 dated 13.09.2024 was returned under objection. Thereafter, the defendant again filed the written statement vide diary no.5505679/24 dated 26.11.2024 but the same again returned under objection. Written statement of the defendant is still lying under objection.

7. The defendant was served through e-mail sent by the Registry on 03.05.2024 along with the attachment. The submission of defendant that copy of the plaint was supplied to counsel for defendant on 21.05.2025 is not tenable as the Registry sent attachment of the paper book with the e-mail. Perusal of record shows that the defendant has failed to file the written statement even within the extended period of 120 days and even thereafter, the defendant failed to remove the objections within the prescribed period. Accordingly, the captioned IAs are dismissed.

xxx xxx xxx"

5. The present suit would be governed by the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, wherein, as per Chapter VII Rule 2, the time for filing of the written statement is to be counted from the date of service of the Page 2 of 12 This is a digitally signed order.

"xxx xxx xxx

2. Procedure when defendant appears- If the defendant appears personally or through an Advocate before or on the day fixed for his appearance in the writ of summons;-

(i) where the summons is for appearance and for filing written statement, the written statement shall not be taken on record, unless filed within 30 days of the date of such service or within the time provided by these Rules, the Code or the Commercial Courts Act, as applicable. An advance copy of the written statement, together with legible copies of all documents in possession and power of defendant, shall be served on plaintiff, and the written statement together with said documents shall not be accepted by the Registry, unless it contains an endorsement of service signed by such party or his Advocate.

xxx xxx xxx"

(Emphasis Supplied)

6. Further, Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, clearly stipulates that the written statement has to be filed within a period of thirty (30) days of receipt of summons and the Court on being shown sufficient cause can extend the time for filing of the written statement for a further period not exceeding ninety (90) days, but not thereafter. Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, reads as under:

"xxx xxx xxx

4. Extension of time for filing written statement-If the Court is satisfied that the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause for exceptional and unavoidable reasons in filing the written statement within 30 days, it may extend the time for filing the same by a further period not exceeding 90 days, but not thereafter. For such extension of time, the party in delay shall be burdened with costs as deemed appropriate. The written statement shall not be taken on record unless such costs have been paid/deposited. In case the defendant fails to file the affidavit of admission/denial of documents filed by the plaintiff, the documents filed by the plaintiff shall be Page 3 of 12 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/03/2026 at 20:33:43 deemed to be admitted. In case, no written statement is filed within the extended time also, the Registrar may pass orders for closing the right to file the written statement.

xxx xxx xxx"

(Emphasis Supplied)

7. Reading of the aforesaid Rule makes it apparent that the written statement has to be filed within the outer limit of One Hundred Twenty (120) days from the service of the summons. The Court can condone delays beyond thirty (30) days only for a further period not exceeding ninety (90) days, i.e., the Court has the authority and power to condone delay in filing of written statement, which has been filed within the outer limit of 120 days, with the caveat that sufficient cause has been shown by the defendant for not filing within the period of 30 days.

8. The usage of the words, 'but not thereafter' in Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 clearly shows that this Court does not have any power to condone the delay in filing the written statement beyond the period of One Hundred Twenty (120) days. The Supreme Court in the case of P. Radha Bai and Others Versus P. Ashok Kumar and Another, (2019) 13 SCC 445, while interpreting the words, 'but not thereafter', held as under:

"xxx xxx xxx 32.4. The limitation provision in Section 34(3) also provides for condonation of delay. Unlike Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay can only be condoned for 30 days on showing sufficient cause. The crucial phrase 'but not thereafter' reveals the legislative intent to fix an outer boundary period for challenging an award. xxx xxx xxx 33.2. The proviso to Section 34(3) enables a court to entertain an application to challenge an award after the three months' period is expired, but only within an additional period of thirty dates, "but not thereafter". The use of the phrase "but not thereafter" shows that the 120 days' period is the outer boundary for challenging an award.

Page 4 of 12

This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/03/2026 at 20:33:43 If Section 17 were to be applied, the outer boundary for challenging an award could go beyond 120 days. The phrase "but not thereafter"

would be rendered redundant and otiose. This Court has consistently taken this view that the words "but not thereafter" in the proviso of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act are of a mandatory nature, and couched in negative terms, which leaves no room for doubt. (State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers [State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers, (2010) 12 SCC 210 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 605] , Assam Urban Water Supply & SewerageBoard v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd. [Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831] and Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel [Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel, (2018) 15 SCC 178 : (2019) 1 SCC (Civ) 141] .) xxx xxx xxx"

(Emphasis Supplied)

9. In this regard, reference may also be made to the case of Manhar Sabharwal Versus High Court of Delhi and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5945, wherein the Division Bench of this Court, settled the principles with respect to filing of written statements and the period of limitation thereof, whilst interpreting the words, 'but not thereafter', in the following manner:

"xxx xxx xxx

10. In Chapter VII, Rule 4 of the DHC Original Side Rules, the phrase 'but not thereafter' is used, to stipulate that the period of filing written statement may be extended beyond the period of thirty days, for a further period not exceeding ninety days, but not thereafter. The phrase 'but not thereafter', as used in various Legislations, and interpretation of the said phrase, as given in various judgments, have been dealt with by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Sarup Lugani Versus Nirmal Lugani, wherein, it has been held, as under:

"xxx xxx xxx

15. This is not the first time that the phrase, "but not thereafter"

have been used in the statute. The said preemptory words have been used in other provisions that have come up for interpretation before the Supreme Court. In Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470, the words "but not thereafter" were used in relation to the power of the court to condone the delay in challenging Page 5 of 12 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/03/2026 at 20:33:43 the award beyond the period prescribed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Concilliation Act, 1996 and the Supreme Court observed as below:--

"12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are "but not thereafter" used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase "but not thereafter" wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.

16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award "in accordance with" subsection (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an application "in accordance with" that sub- section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that "where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired ... the award shall be enforced under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court".

This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to "proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow" (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act."

16. In Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur, (2008) 3 SCC 70, on interpreting Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, which contains similar provisions, the Supreme Page 6 of 12 This is a digitally signed order.

"8. The Commissioner of Central Excise(appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short "the Limitation Act") can be available for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision of order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-section(1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days' period."

17. After referring to the above decision, in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited, (2009) 5 SCC 791, the Supreme Court went on to observe as under:

"30. In the earlier part of our order, we have adverted to Chapter VI-A of the Act which provides for appeals and revisions to various authorities. Though Parliament has specifically provided an additional period of 30 days in the case of appeal to the Commissioner, it is silent about the number of days if there is sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in the case of revision by the Central Government has been provided. However, in the case of an appeal to the High Court under Section 35-G and reference application to the High Court under Section 35-H, Parliament has provided only 180 days and no further period for filing an appeal and making reference to the High Court is mentioned in the Act. XXXX Page 7 of 12 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/03/2026 at 20:33:43

32. As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B, 35-EE, 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days. XXXX

35. It was contended before us that the words "expressly excluded"

would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act. The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court." xxx xxx xxx

19. In P. Radhabai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445, while construing the phrase, "but not thereafter" used in the proviso to sub section (3) of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Concilliation Act, the Supreme Court held thus:

"32.4. The limitation provision in Section 34(3) also provides Page 8 of 12 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/03/2026 at 20:33:43 for condonation of delay. Unlike Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay can only be condoned for 30 days on showing sufficient cause. The crucial phrase "but not thereafter" reveals the legislative intent to fix an outer boundary period for challenging an award.

XXXX 33.2. The proviso to Section 34(3) enables a court to entertain an application to challenge an award after the three months' period is expired, but only within an additional period of thirty dates, "but not thereafter". The use of the phrase "but not thereafter" shows that the 120 days' period is the outer boundary for challenging an award. If Section 17 were to be applied, the outer boundary for challenging an award could go beyond 120 days. The phrase "but not thereafter" would be rendered redundant and otiose. This Court has consistently taken this view that the words "but not thereafter" in the proviso of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act are of a mandatory nature, and couched in negative terms, which leaves no room for doubt. (State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers [State of H.P. v. Himachal Techno Engineers, (2010) 12 SCC 210 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 605], Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd. [Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 831] and Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel [Anilkumar Jinabhai Patel v. Pravinchandra Jinabhai Patel, (2018) 15 SCC 178 : (2019) 1 SCC (Civ) 141].)

34. In our view, the aforesaid inconsistencies with the language of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act tantamount to an "express exclusion" of Section 17 of the Limitation Act."

xxx xxx xxx

21. A conspectus of the decisions referred to above leaves no manner of doubt that where ever the phrase "but not thereafter" has been used in a provision for setting a deadline, the intention of the legislature is to treat the same as a preemptory provision. Thus, if Rule 15 of the DHC Rules mandates filing of a replication within a period of 30 days reckoned from the date of receipt of the written statement, with an additional period of 15 days provided and that too only if the court is satisfied that the plaintiff has been able to demonstrate that it was prevented to do so by sufficient cause or for exceptional and unavoidable reasons, can the time for filing the replication be extended for a further period not exceeding 15 days in any event, with costs imposed on the plaintiff. The critical phrase "but Page 9 of 12 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/03/2026 at 20:33:43 not thereafter" used in Rule 15 must be understood to mean that even the court cannot extend the period for filing the replication beyond the outer limit of 45 days provided in the DHC Rules. Upon expiry of the said period, the plaintiff's right to file the replication would stand extinguished. Any other meaning sought to be bestowed on the above provision, would make the words "but not thereafter", inconsequential.

xxx xxx xxx

31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that in case of any inconsistency, the provisions of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 will prevail over the Civil Procedure Code. The inherent powers contemplated in Rule 16 are not to be exercised to overcome the period of limitation expressly prescribed in Rule 5 for filing the replication. Nor can Rule 5 be circumvented by invoking any other provision or even the inherent powers of the court, contrary to the scheme of the Rules. The phrase, "but not thereafter" used in Rule 5 makes it crystal clear that the Rule is mandatory in nature and the court cannot permit the replication to be taken on the record after the plaintiff has exhausted the maximum prescribed period of 45 days. Any other interpretation will result in causing violence to the DHC Rules.

xxx xxx xxx"

(Emphasis Supplied)

11. Thus, it is manifest that the phrase 'but not thereafter', provides for an action, which is mandatory in nature.

xxx xxx xxx"

(Emphasis Supplied)

10. The said principle was again reiterated by the Division of Bench of this Court in the case of Delhi Gymkhana Club Limited Versus Col. Ashish Khanna Sm Retd and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7022, wherein, it was held as follows:

"xxx xxx xxx

21. The purpose of fixing an outer time limit under Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the DHC Original Side Rules for filing the written statement is to ensure that the delay in filing of written statement does not lead to further delay in adjudication of civil suits. The validity of this Rule having been upheld by the Division Bench in Manhar Sabharwal (supra), the said Rule becomes mandatorily Page 10 of 12 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/03/2026 at 20:33:43 applicable to all suits including non-commercial suits before the Delhi High Court (Original Side). Accordingly, the Court can only extend the period of 30 days for filing of written statement by further 90 days, but not beyond the period of 120 days in total in the opinion of this Court. The language of Rule 4, Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) is clear when it uses the term 'not thereafter', as is seen from the text extracted above. xxx xxx xxx"

(Emphasis Supplied)

11. Further, this Court notes that the defendant is a Non-Resident Indian ("NRI"), residing in Dubai, as per the averments made by the defendant. The defendant is a working professional, residing in Dubai. Therefore, the plea of the defendant that the defendant did not see the E-mail on 03rd May, 2024 and saw it only on 20th May, 2024, is not acceptable.

12. Even otherwise, the aforesaid Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, are very categorical to the extent of counting the period of filing of the written statement from the date of service of summons, which in this case would be the same as the date of receipt of summons of the Email dated 03rd May, 2024, therefore, the period of limitation for filing of the written statement is not to be calculated from the date of any purported knowledge. Furthermore, nothing has been brought on record by the appellant/defendant to show that they did not have the knowledge of the E-mail, and only averments are made in that regard. Therefore, the plea of the defendant in that regard, is liable to be rejected.

13. This Court finds no error in the aforesaid order passed by learned Joint Registrar (Judicial), in view of the detailed discussion hereinabove.

14. No merit is found in the present appeal.

15. The present appeal filed on behalf of the defendant is accordingly dismissed.

Page 11 of 12

This is a digitally signed order.

16. The written statement filed on behalf of the defendant has been returned under objection and the same cannot be taken on record, having been filed beyond the period of limitation.

17. Accordingly, admission/denial of documents has to be carried out, by the defendant only of the plaintiff documents.

18. List before the Joint Registrar (Judicial) on 16th March, 2026.

19. List before the Court on 10th April, 2026.

MINI PUSHKARNA, J FEBRUARY 25, 2026/SK Page 12 of 12 This is a digitally signed order.

The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above. The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 02/03/2026 at 20:33:43

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Delhi High Court - Orders

Harsh Rekha Jain vs Shri Neeraj Jain on 25 February, 2026