Karnataka High Court
Sri B S Belliappa vs Sri B S Thammaiah on 3 March, 2023
Author: B.Veerappa
Bench: B.Veerappa
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 3RD DAY OF MARCH, 2023
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.VEERAPPA
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S.HEMALEKHA
C.C.C. No.690/2020 (CIVIL)
BETWEEN:
SRI B.S. BELLIAPPA
AGED ABOUT 73 YEARS,
S/O. LATE SOMAIAH,
RESIDENT OF KOLKERI VILLAGE AND POST,
MADIKERI TALUK,
KODAGU DISTRICT - 571 201.
... COMPLAINANT
(BY SRI SUHAS P., ADVOCATE;
V/O. DATED 22.09.2022 SRI KIRAN KUMAR, HCGP TO
APPEAR ON BEHALF OF THE COMPLAINANT)
AND:
SRI B.S. THAMMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS,
S/O. LATE SOMAIAH
RESIDENT OF KOLKERI VILLAGE AND POST,
MADIKERI TALUK,
KODAGU DISTRICT - 571 201.
... ACCUSED
(BY SRI T.A. KARUMBAIAH, ADVOCATE)
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THIS CCC IS FILED UNDER SECTIONS 11 AND 12 OF
THE CONTEMPT OF COURT ACT, 1971, R/W ARTICLE 215
OF CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, BY THE COMPLAINANT,
WHEREIN HE PRAYS THAT THE HON'BLE COURT BE
PLEASED TO HOLD THE RESPONDENT HEREIN GUILTY OF
CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE OF
THE ORDER DATED 27/11/2019 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE
HIGH COURT IN W.P.NO.26546/2019 VIDE ANNEXURE-A
AND FURTHER BE PLEASED TO PUNISH THE RESPONDENT
HEREIN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE
CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971. FURTHER BE PLEASED
TO DIRECT THE RESPONDENT HEREIN TO OBEY THE
ORDER DATED 27/11/2019 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE
HIGH COURT VIDE ANNEXURE-A AND DIRECTED TO
REMOVE THE ILLEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS PUT UP BY THE
PETITIONER DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE ABOVE WRIT
PETITION AND GRANT SUCH OTHER RELIEFS WHICH ARE
JUST AND NECESSARY IN THE FACTS.
THIS PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDER ON 07/02/2023, COMING FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY,
K.S.HEMALEKHA J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
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ORDER
The present contempt petition is filed under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter after referred to as "the Act" for short) seeking to punish the accused-contemnor for wilful disobedience of the order dated 27/11/2019 passed by this Court in W.P.No.26546/2019, whereby this Court had directed the parties to maintain status quo till the next date of hearing and the status quo order was continued.
2. The brief facts leading to filing of this contempt petition are:
(i) the brother of the accused-contemnor namely, B.S.Nanjappa had filed O.S.No.56/1996 against his brothers for partition and separate possession and the said suit came to be decreed by way of a compromise allotting shares to each of the parties.-4-
(ii) the accused-contemnor and the complainants entered into a release deed by way of an exchange of certain properties and thereby acted upon the compromise decree.
(iii) This being so, the complainant filed O.S.No.32/2008 seeking rectification of the release deed, which was entered into by the complainant and the accused-contemnor. However, the said suit came to be dismissed.
(iv) the complainant filed FDP.No.5/2018 for execution of the compromise decree dated 05/12/1997 entered into between the parties in O.S.No.56/1996.
(v) The accused-contemnor who was respondent No.3 in FDP filed objections to the said FDP proceedings.
In the meanwhile, in the final decree proceedings, the Commissioner was appointed and a direction was issued -5- to effect partition of the landed properties in terms of the decree.
(vi) Aggrieved by the order of appointing the Court Commissioner, the accused-contemnor preferred W.P.No.26546/2019 seeking to quash the order dated 25/03/2019 appointing the Court Commissioner and by way of an interim prayer sought to stay the further proceedings in FDP.No.5/2018.
(vii) When the matter had come for preliminary hearing before this Court and the complainant appeared in the writ petition by entering a caveat, this Court on hearing the learned counsel for the parties and having interacted with the parties, referred the matter to mediation as the parties were brothers, in the meanwhile both the parties were directed to maintain status quo.
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(viii) It is stated by the complainant that inspite of status quo order being in operation, the accused- contemnor contemnor who was the petitioner in W.P.No.26546/2019 approached the Panchayat Development Officer ("PDO"), Napoklu seeking permission to carry out construction for opening of shops and letting out the shops to one Rafeeq K.A. and M.M.Ashraf and the tenants of the accused-contemnor also filed an application before the PDO, Napoklu, seeking licence for carrying out the business activities.
(ix) It is stated by the complainant that the action on the part of the accused-contemnor was in violation and hence, a notice was issued by the complainant to the President Napoklu Gram panchayat to take action against the accused-contemnor.
(x) It is stated that the accused-contemnor, inspite of the order of status quo and non-according of permission by the PDO, continued to put up construction -7- in the property exclusively belonging to the complainant and the complainant was forced to approach the jurisdictional police station and lodged complainant against the accused-contemnor.
3. On issuance of notice of this contempt petition, the respondents appeared and filed their objections inter alia stating that:
(i) the accused-contemnor has not disobeyed the order of status quo passed in W.P.No.26546/2019 and stated that the application filed before the authority seeking permission of repairs is in respect of Sy.No.8/5, measuring 3 cents with building No.115/A and not the property in Sy.No.8/4 (New No.8/12).
(ii) the application given by the tenants of the accused-contemnor for carrying on the business is also in respect of Sy.No.8/5 measuring 3 cents and the application submitted to the authority is dated -8- 30/08/2019 which is prior to the interim order passed by this Court.
(iii) the legal notice dated 12/01/2022 stating that illegal construction is in respect of Sy.No.8/12, whereas the application seeking to carry out repairs and seeking licence by the tenants is in respect of Sy.No.8/5 measuring 3 cents.
(iv) the accused-contemnor stated that even according to the complainant, in the compromise decree certain properties were allotted to the share of the complainant and certain properties were allotted to the share of the accused-contemnor and stated that W.P.No.26546/2019 filed by the accused-contemnor was challenging the appointment of the Court Commissioner in FDP No.5/2018, which was filed seeking implementing of the compromise decree arrived in O.S.No.56/1996.-9-
(v) the complainant has not made out a case either by producing any document that the accused-
contemnor has made any construction or alienated the property in the possession of the complainant.
(vi) the accused-contemnor is a law abiding person and he has not disobeyed any Court Order particularly, the order dated 27/11/2019 passed by this Court in W.P.No.26546/2019 and sought to drop the contempt.
4. This court vide order dated 22/09/2022 heard the learned counsel for the parties and held that the present contempt petition is a fit case to frame charge against the accused-contemnor and has framed charges and in view of the provisions of Rule 11 of the High Court of Karnataka (Contempt of Court Proceedings) Rules, 1981, we requested Sri Kiran Kumar, learned High Court Government Pleader to appear on behalf of the complainant and conduct the proceedings against the accused-contemnor.
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Accordingly, the evidence of the complainant and the accused-contemnor were recorded.
5. We have heard the learned counsel Sri Kiran Kumar for the complainant and Sri T.A.Karumbaiah counsel for the accused-contemnor.
6. Learned counsel, Sri Kiran Kumar appearing for the complainant would contend that,
(i) the order of status quo dated 27/11/2019 granted by this Court in W.P.No.26546/2019 has been wilfully and deliberately violated by the accused- contemnor by putting up construction in the property which was the subject matter in FDP and the writ petition.
(ii) the accused-contemnor was the petitioner in the writ petition and the order of status quo to be maintained between the parties was at the behest of the petitioner/accused-contemnor himself and the violation
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of the status quo order is on the face of it is evident from the objections filed by the accused-contemnor.
(iii) the letters seeking permission to carry out construction, for opening shops and letting out the shops to the tenants was sought by the accused- contemnor by approaching the PDO, Napoklu on 10/10/2019 and 31/12/2019 is evident that the said permission was sought after the order of status quo was granted by this Court.
(iv) the authorities though have not accorded any permission to carry out construction or opening the shop, the accused-contemnor in utter violation of the order of the status quo has put up construction in the property as is evident from the photographs produced by the complainant in Annexure-M series.
(v) the photographs furnished by the Commissioner along with Commissioner's Report dated
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21/10/2020 marked at Ex.C-9 clearly depicts that the property in which the accused-contemnor has put up construction is one and the same when compared to Annexure-M of the complaint and the Ex.C-9.
(vi) the accused-contemnor has wilfully disobeyed the interim order of status quo passed by this Court and accordingly, would contend that the accused-contemnor is liable to be punished for wilful disobedience of the order passed by this Court.
7. Per contra, T.A. Karumbaiah learned counsel appearing for the accused-contemnor would contend that,
(i) the illegal construction as stated by the accused-contemnor is in Sy.No.8/12, but the application seeking permission to construct and where the construction was put up was in respect of the Sy.No.8/5 measuring 3 cents. In the compromise decree in
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O.S.No.56/1996, item Nos.3 and 4 of Annexure - C, no survey number is mentioned and the property in which the accused-contemnor has put up construction is the property of the accused-contemnor bearing Sy.No.8/5 measuring 3 cents and not Sy.No.8/12 as contended by the complainant.
(ii) in the Final Decree Proceedings in FDP No.5/2018 the Commissioner has surveyed and submitted his report and accordingly, final decree proceedings were closed and the accused-contemnor has withdrawn the writ petition No.26546/2019, wherein the petitioner challenged the appointment of Court Commissioner in FDP.No.5/2018 and accordingly, the writ petition has been dismissed as having become infructuous and would state that there is no wilful disobedience by the accused-contemnor.
(iii) learned counsel would further submit that the accused-contemnor has not intentionally or wilfully
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disobeyed the interim order of status-quo granted by this Court and would contend that the complainant being a senior officer in the police department and was involved in a criminal case after his termination from service, he is using the influence and harassing the accused-contemnor by making false complaint and one such complaint is, the present contempt proceedings initiated against the accused-contemnor and accordingly, would contend that the complainant has not made out any ground for initiation of contempt proceedings against the accused-contemnor as there is no wilful disobedience of the order dated 27/11/2019.
8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material on record, the only point that would arise for our consideration is, "Whether the complainant has made out a case to punish the accused-contemnor under the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the
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Contempt of Courts Act in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case?"
9. We have given our anxious consideration to the contentions urged by learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material on record as well as the orders passed by this Court carefully.
10. This Court, on 22/09/2022, framed the charges and plea was recorded considering the counter filed by the accused-contemnor and the charges and plea read as under:
"CHARGE That you, accused in violation of the interim order dated 27.11.2019 granted by the learned Single Judge of this Court in WP No.26546/2019 (GM-CPC), directing both the parties to maintain status-quo till the next date of hearing filed an application before the concerned authority and obtained permission and proceeded to continue the construction. Thereby, you have willfully disobeyed the interim order passed by this Court.
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You, the accused in violation of the interim order has proceeded to construct the building as per Annexure-'M' series - photographs produced by the complainant and now the photographs produced by you clearly depicts that you have completed the construction and thereby you have deliberately disobeyed the order passed by this Court. Your conduct is nothing, but a daring ride on the Court and degrading the majesty of the judicial system thereby, you have deliberately disobeyed the order passed in above mentioned cases, which amounts to Civil Contempt within the meaning of the provisions of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 punishable under Section 12 of the said Act, within the cognizance of this Court.
PLEA Question: Have you heard the charge now read over and explained to you?
Answer : Yes Question: Do you plead guilty or have you any defence to make?
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Answer : Pleaded not guilty. I have defence
and stated that I had sought
permission from the concerned
authorities for the construction of a building in respect of Sy. No.8/5 and to that effect, photographs have been produced and has not violated the interim order passed by this Court and not put up any construction in old Sy. No.8/1 (new No.8/2), which is not the subject matter of the writ petition."
11. The complainant examined himself as CW.1 and got marked documents at Exs.C-1 to C-14. The accused-contemnor examined himself as DW.1 and got marked documents at Exs.D-1 to D-5.
12. The complainant, in his evidence, deposed that W.P.No.26546/2019 was filed by the accused- contemnor seeking to quash the entire proceedings dated 25/03/2019 appointing the commissioner in FDP.No.5/2018 and on hearing the accused-contemnor and the complainant-respondent in the writ petition
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wherein both the parties were directed to maintain status quo. It is stated in his evidence in Annexure-M series photos and the properties mentioned in FDP No.5/2018 are one and the same and the construction carried out in the said property was the subject matter of properties in FDP No.5/2018 and W.P.No.26546/2019. The complainant further deposed that the accused- contemnor though sought for permission to put up construction in the property and without there being any permission accorded by the gram panchayat, the illegal construction has been carried out by the accused- contemnor. The complainant denied in his cross- examination that the building constructed by the accused-contemnor does not pertains to the property mentioned in FDP.No.5/2018 or W.P.No.26546/2019. The complainant categorically stated that the construction put up is in the property which was the subject matter in the said writ petition as well as the FDP and denied that the accused-contemnor has put up
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construction in Sy.No.8/5. The relevant portion of the cross-examination reads as under:
"It is not true to suggest that Sy.Nos.8/4 and 8/12 are not given individually. Witness volunteers that it is in joint names of himself and the accused. The witness volunteers that in the Commissioner's report at paragraph 12, Sy.No.8/4 is mentioned. It is not true to suggest that the building constructed by accused does not pertain to the property mentioned in FDP or writ petition. The witness volunteers that it pertains to both FDP and Writ Petition. It is not true to suggest that the construction made by accused is in Sy.No.8/5. The witness volunteers that construction is made by accused in Sy.Nos.8/4 and 8/12 which is allotted to him. It is true that I have filed application for temporary injunction in the writ petition filed by the accused herein."
13. The accused-contemnor, in his evidence, has deposed that he has not put up any construction either in Sy.No.8/4 or 8/12, but has put up construction in Sy.No.8/5 which is not the subject matter in FDP
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No.5/2018 or W.P.No.26546/2019 and the construction put up is in 4 cents out of 50 cents in Sy.No.8/5 which has fallen to his share after the death of his father and that in the year 1997, he has made construction in the said 4 cents after obtaining necessary permission from gram panchayat. In his cross-examination, the accused-contemnor has admitted that FDP.No.5/2018 is in respect of the properties mentioned in the terms of compromise petition entered into in O.S.No.56/1996 and the report submitted by the Commissioner in FDP.No.5/2018 is in respect of all the properties mentioned in the compromise petition.
14. It is undisputed that writ petition was preferred by the very accused-contemnor assailing the order dated 25/03/2019 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge and CJM, Madikeri, in FDP.No.5/2018 appointing the Court Commissioner to demarcate the suit schedule property, by way of an interim prayer the
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petitioner/accused-contemnor sought to stay the further proceedings in FDP.No.5/2019. Learned Single on hearing the learned counsel for the parties in W.P.No.26546/2019 by its order dated 27/11/2019 passed the following order:
"Both the parties shall maintain status quo till next date of hearing." The perusal of the order passed by this Court vide order dated 27/11/2019 would depict that both the parties were directed to maintain status quo. The photographs produced by the complainant in Annexure - M series marked as Ex.C-2 shows that the photographs were taken on 26/12/2019 i.e., after the passing of the interim order to contend that the accused-contemnor is carrying on construction in the petition property inspite of the order of status quo. Exs.C-3 and C-4 are the applications submitted by the accused-contemnor seeking permission to carry out construction in Sy.No.8/5. It is also relevant to note that after the
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interim order of status quo granted by this Court the illegal construction was undertaken by the accused- contemnor. The complainant filed complaint before the PDO gram panchayat stating that the accused- contemnor is putting up construction in Sy.No.8/12 and requested the authorities to stop the illegal construction as there was an order of status quo granted by this Court. It is also relevant to note that the Commissioner's report produced and marked as Ex.C-9 would depict that the property in question forms part and parcel of the final decree proceedings and the photographs annexed along with the Commissioner's Report are the photographs which pertains to the petition property and they are one and the same.
15. The accused-contemnor though tried to contend that the construction is carried out in Sy.No.8/5, no material is produced to show about the construction being carried out in Sy.No.8/5, whereas the
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documents produced by the complainant would clearly depict that the construction carried out by the accused- contemnor is in the property, which forms the subject matter of FDP.No.5/2018 and W.P. No.26546/2019. The photographs produced at Annexure - M series and Ex.C- 9 pertain to the very same property, wherein the construction is being carried out by the accused- contemnor. Perusal of the statement of objection would also give an impression to this Court about the way in which the accused-contemnor is trying to take a stand that he is taking up construction in Sy.No.8/5 without there being any material on record. It is also relevant to note here that in the statement of objection filed by the accused-contemnor, nowhere it shows a sign of remorse or an apology about an act being carried out by the accused-contemnor. When all the properties which were part and parcel of FDP.No.5/2018 would form part and parcel of W.P.No.26546/2019 as the order in challenge in the writ petition was for appointment of the Court
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Commissioner in FDP.No.5/2018. Thus, the contention of the accused-contemnor that the property in question where the construction was carried out was not the part of order of status quo cannot be believed and does not appraise the mind of this Court.
16. The question that needs to be considered here is that, "whether the accused-contemnor is liable for punishment?"
17. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 have been invoked. Section 2(b) defines Civil Contempt which reads as under:
"2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a) x x x
(b) "civil contempt" means wilful
disobedience to any judgment, decree,
direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court"
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18. Reading of the said clause makes it clear that the following conditions must be satisfied to convict any person for civil contempt:
(a) There must be a judgment, decree, direction, order or other process of Court (or an undertaking given to the Court);
(b) There must be disobedience to a judgment, decree, direction, order or other process of Court (or an undertaking given to the Court);
(c) Such disobedience of a judgment, decree, direction, order or other process of Court (or an undertaking given to the Court) must be willful.
19. Section 12 provides for punishment of Contempt of Courts and the said proviso reads as under:
"12. Punishment for contempt of court.-
(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to
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six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both:
Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court.
Explanation.--An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt, the court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a
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civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit.
(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court in respect of any undertaking given to a court is a company, every person who, at the time the contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of each such person:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to such punishment if he proves that the contempt was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent its commission.
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (4), where the contempt of court referred to therein has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contempt has been committed with the
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consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of such director, manager, secretary or other officer.
Explanation.--For the purpose of sub- sections (4) and (5),--
(a) "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
(b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm."
(underlined by us)
20. The statute confers a special power upon the court to pass a sentence of imprisonment, or fine for the guilty of committing civil contempt and our view is fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sukhdev Singh vs. Hon'ble C.J., S. Teja Singh and the Hon'ble Judge of the Pepsu High
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Court at Patiala [AIR 1954 SC 186], has categorically held at para Nos.20, 21 and 22 as under:
"20. We have omitted references to the Bombay and Madras decisions after 1883 because the judicial Committee settled the powers of the three Chartered High Courts. What we are at pains to show is that, apart from the Chartered High Courts, practically every other High Court in India has exercised the jurisdiction and where its authority has been challenged each has held that it is a jurisdiction inherent in a court of Record from the very nature of the court itself. This is important when we come to construe the later legislation because by this time it was judicially accepted throughout India that the jurisdiction was a special one inherent in the very nature of the court.
The only discordant note that we know of was struck in - 'Emperor v. B. G. Horniman', AIR 1945 All 1 at p.4 (M), where a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that after the Act of 1926 the offence of contempt was punishable under an Indian Penal statute
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and so the Code of Criminal Procedure applied because of the words "any other law" in Section 5. In our opinion, this is wrong because the Act of 1926 does not confer any jurisdiction and does not create the offence. It merely limits the amount of the punishment which can be given and removes a certain doubt. Accordingly, the jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings and take seisin of the matter is as before.
"21. The Pepsu High Court was established in 1948 and Section 33 of the Ordinance which established it recites that it shall be a court of Record and that it shall have power to punish for contempt. It will be remembered that the Charter of 1774 which established a Supreme Court for Bengal said the same thing of that court and yet the Privy Council did not trace its powers about contempt from the Charter but from the Common Law. In the same way, the law by this time was so well settled in matters of contempt that the words "court of record" and "power to punish for contempt" had acquired a special meaning. Consequently, it is immaterial
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whether in 1948 the power of the Pepsu High Court was derived from Section 33 or was inherent in the nature of the court because whichever it is the jurisdiction is a special one, and had the legislature desired to take it away and confer another kind of jurisdiction it would have been necessary to use express words in view of the case law which by then had become well established.
22. In 1950 came the Constitution of India and Article 215 states that-
"Every High court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself."
Here again, whether this is a fresh conferral of power or a continuation of existing powers hardly matters because whichever way it is viewed the jurisdiction is a special one and so is outside the purview of the Criminal Procedure Code.
(emphasis supplied)
21. The Apex Court, in the case of Kapildeo Saha vs. State of Bihar [(1999) 7 SCC 569], held
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that for holding a person to have committed contempt, it must be shown that there was willful disobedience of the judgment or the order of the Court. The Apex Court held that the power to punish for the contempt is intended to maintain the effective legal system. As stated supra, the accused-contemnor has clearly and willfully violated the interim order passed by this Court and as such, the complainants have made out a contempt of Court against the accused-contemnor.
22. The Apex Court in the case of Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai and another vs. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai & others (Contempt Petition (Civil) Nos.12-13/2006) placing the reliance of the judgment of Anil Ratan Sarkar and others vs. Hirak Ghosh and others held at paragraph No.53 as under:
"53. In Anil Ratan Sarkar & Ors. v.
Hirak Ghosh & Ors., (2002) 4 SCC 21, this Court held that the Contempt of Courts Act has
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been introduced in the statute-book for securing confidence of people in the administration of justice. If an order passed by a competent Court is clear and unambiguous and not capable of more than one interpretation, disobedience or breach of such order would amount to contempt of Court. There can be no laxity in such a situation because otherwise the Court orders would become the subject of mockery.
Misunderstanding or own understanding of the Court's order would not be a permissible defence. It was observed that power to punish a person for contempt is undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the hands of Judiciary but that by itself operates as a string of caution and cannot be used unless the Court is satisfied beyond doubt that the person has deliberately and intentionally violated the order of the Court. The power under the Act must be exercised with utmost care and caution and sparingly in the larger interest of the society and for proper administration of justice delivery system. Mere disobedience of an order is not enough to hold a person guilty of civil contempt. The element of willingness is an
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indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act."
(emphasis supplied)
23. From the decision stated supra, it is clear that the punishing the person for contempt of Court is indeed drastic step and normally such action should not be taken. However, at the same time, it is not only power but the duty of the Court to uphold and maintain the dignity of the Courts and Majesty of the law which may call for such extreme steps. For proper administration of justice and to ensure the due compliance with the orders passed by the Courts, it is required to take strict view under the Act and it should not hesitate in wielding the potent weapon of contempt.
24. Accordingly, the point framed for consideration is answered in the affirmative holding that the complainant has made out a case to punish the accused-contemnor for wilful and deliberate disobedience of the order dated 27/11/2019 in
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W.P.No.26546/2019 in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
25. For the reasons stated supra, we pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The civil contempt petition is hereby allowed.
(ii) The accused-contemnor is hereby punished under the provisions of Section 12(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 (fifteen) days and pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-.
(iii) The Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is directed to prepare a warrant of commitment and detention in respect of accused-contemnor in Form No.3 as contemplated under Rule 16(1) of the High Court of Karnataka (Contempt of Court Proceedings) Rules, 1981 and take further action against the accused to undergo punishment imposed.
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(iv) The assistance rendered by the learned High Court Government Pleader, Sri Kiran Kumar, learned counsel for the complainants to arrive at this conclusion is appreciated and placed on record and the Karnataka State Legal Service Authority is directed to pay honorarium of Rs.10,000/- to Sri Kiran Kumar, learned High Court Government Pleader forthwith.
SD/-
JUDGE SD/-
JUDGE S*