Delhi District Court
Manoj Kumar vs Khyali Ram on 1 April, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. PURSHOTAM PATHAK, ASJ-05,
SOUTH DISTRICT, SAKET COURTS : DELHI
DLST010035332024
CA/142/2024
MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM
Mr. Manoj Kumar
S/o Shri Jagbali Singh
R/o B-249, Chattarpur Enclave,
Phase-II, New Delhi-110074 ........APPELLANT
VERSUS
Mr. Khyali Ram
S/o Late Shri Govind Ram
R/o 155, Chattarpur Enclave
Phase-II, New Delhi-110074 ........ RESPONDENT
DATE OF INSTITUTION : 16.04.2024
ARGUMENTS HEARD ON : 24.03.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT : 01.04.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal is directed against the impugned judgment dated 11.03.2024, whereby the appellant was convicted under Section 138 of NI Act and subsequent order on sentence dated 22.03.2024, passed by Ld. MM- 06, NI Act, South, in case titled as "Khyali Ram Vs. Manoj Yadav" bearing CT Cases 12597/2018, u/s 138 Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter referred to as NI Act). The appellant/convict Manoj Kumar was sentenced to pay the total cheque amount of Rs.14.5 lakhs and Rs. 7.5 lakhs to the complainant as compensation and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 6 months.
Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date: 2025.04.03 16:45:26 +0530 CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 1 of 17
2. The Ld. Magistrate has noted the factual position as under :-
"2. Brief facts of the complaint are that the complainant was willing to purchase a plot in Chattarpur Enclave in the name of his son. He contacted the accused who deals in sale / purchase of properties. The accused and a common friend namely Amarjit Singh had shown a plot B-121/2, Chattarpur Enclave and it was agreed that the complainant would purchase the said property for Rs.24 lakhs. He paid Rs.50,000/- as token money to the accused and thereafter, on 09.04.2018 he paid Rs.1 lakh, two separate receipts were executed by the accused against the payments received by him. On 13.04.2018, the complainant paid a further sum of Rs.2.5 lakhs through RTGS and on 27.04.2018, Rs. 3 lakhs was paid in cash. Receipt to this effect was also executed against the payments received by the accused. On 2.5.2018 the complainant paid Rs.7.5 lakhs through RTGS in the account of accused's business partner Amarjit Singh. It was agreed that the balance payments of Rs.9.5 lakhs shall be paid at the time of execution of sale deed and handing over the possession of the property. On 16.05.2018, the accused told the complainant that the said property is a disputed property and the sale deed cannot be executed. Therefore, the complainant demanded back the Rs.14.5 lakhs paid to the accused.
3. In discharge of the said liability, on 17.05.2018 the accused issued two cheques of Rs.7 lakhs bearing no.000353 and Rs.7.5 lakhs bearing no.000354 in the favour of the complainant's company i.e. Rajasthan Handicrafts. When the cheques were presented, cheque no.000354 was dishonored due to the reasons "drawer signature differ" vide return memo 13.06.2018 and cheque no.000353 was dishonored due to "funds insufficient" vide return memo dated 08.06.2018. The same was intimated to the accused who requested some more time and therefore, the cheques were presented again and again dishonored vide return memos dated 12.07.2018 and 16.07.2018, both for the reasons "funds insufficient". Legal notice dated 23.07.2018 was sent to the accused. The accused failed to pay within the statutory period. Thus, the complaint was filed u/s 138 NI Act."
3. Upon the receipt of complaint and after hearing respondent, the Ld. MM vide order dated 28.08.2018 summoned the appellant for offence u/s 138 NI Act. Notice u/s 251 Cr.P.C. was framed against the accused vide order dated 07.06.2022 to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. In his defence he stated that in addition Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.04.03 16:45:31 +0530 CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 2 of 17 to the instant complaint under Section 138 NI Act, the complainant also got lodged an FIR wherein he had paid back all of the amount through DD and accordingly the FIR was quashed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. He stated that the complainant had assured that he would be withdrawing the instant complaint also but he failed to do so.
4. Thereafter, accused was put to admission / denial of documents u/s 294 Cr.P.C. in which he admitted the correctness of cheques Ex. CW-1/B, Ex. CW-1/C and the return memo Ex. CW-1/D and Ex. CW-1/E.
5. The Ld. Trial court has summarized the complainants evidence as under:-
"In support of his case, the complainant had filed evidence by way of affidavit i.e. Ex.CW-1/R which reiterated the contents of the complaint. He relied upon the following documents :
(i) Original cheques as Ex. CW-1/B & CW-1/C;
(ii) Return memos as Ex.CW-1/D to CW-1/G;
(iii) Legal Demand Notice as Ex.CW-1/H;
(iv) Postal receipts are Ex.CW-1/I;
(v) Receipt dated 08.04.2018 as Ex.CW-1/J;
(vi) Receipt dated 09.04.2018 as Ex.CW-1/K;
(vii) Undated receipt as Ex.CW-1/L;
(viii) Receipt dated 27.04.2018 as Ex.CW-1/M;
(ix) Undated receipt as Ex.CW-1/N;
(x) Documents of bank statement of complainant marked as Mark-A and Mark-B."
6. Thereafter, the appellant sought permission to cross examine the complainant, which was allowed. On the closure of evidence of the complainant, incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence were explained to Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.04.03 16:45:35 +0530 CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 3 of 17 the appellant u/s 313 r/w section 281 Cr.P.C, to which he stated that he had given the cheques in question as blank signed cheques to the complainant as security. He stated that he do not remember whether he had received the legal demand notice or not. He further stated that complainant had registered an FIR bearing no. 312/2019, PS Maidan Garhi and the subject matter of that FIR was the same i.e. two cheques, which are the subject matter of the present complaint also. He stated that he has paid Rs.14,50,000/- to the complainant before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in CRL MC 6346/2016 and thereafter said FIR has been quashed being settled but the complainant has not withdrawn the present case.
7. The appellant has chosen not to lead defence evidence. Thereafter, matter was listed for final arguments and after hearing the submissions of both the parties, the Trial Court vide impugned judgment convicted the appellant for the offense u/s 138 NI Act.
8. Being aggrieved, the appellant has filed the present appeal on following grounds:-
i. that Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that the appellant in his response to notice U/s 251 Cr.P.C. dated 07.06.2022 has admitted that he had made the entire payment of the cheque amount to the respondent, hence the matter should have been compounded in view of the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court of Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.04.03 16:45:40 +0530 CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 4 of 17 India titled as Damodar S. Prabhu Vs. Syed Baba Lal AIR 2010 (SC) 1907"
ii. that the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that the appellant appeared before the court on 03.07.2019 and thereafter deposited the cheques amount before the Hon'ble High Court on 24.02.2020, in compliance of order dated 09.01.2020 passed in Bail Application no. 3052/2019.
iii. that the Ld. Trial Court has failed to consider that the respondent admitted in his cross examination that he has lodged the FIR on the same issue and also admitted to have received the cheques amount from the appellant in the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi.
iv. that the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that in order dated 05.03.2021 passed in bail appeal no. 3052/2019 and Crl. M.C. No. 6346/2019 the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi was pleased to decline the request of respondent for payment of interest in addition to the said demand draft.
v. that the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that the appellant may not be prosecuted for the same offence which has been compounded and quashed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and the continuation of the complaint by the respondent even after receipt of entire cheque amount is an abuse of process of law.
Digitally
signed by
PURSHOTTAM
PURSHOTTAM PATHAK
PATHAK Date:
2025.04.03
16:45:43
+0530
CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 5 of 17
vi. that the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that the appellant had categorically mentioned in his application to compound the offence that as he has made the entire payment to the respondent at the first stage of trial and the same should have been compounded without any cost.
vii. that the Ld. Trial Court has passed the judgment and order on sentence on the basis of surmises without application of mind.
9. I have heard arguments advanced by Ld. counsels for both the parties. I have gone through the written submissions and also perused the Trial court record.
10. Ld. Counsel in addition to above grounds, argued that the Trial Court has failed to appreciate that the appellant has already returned the cheques amount to the complainant and in view of same the matter should have been compounded. He argued that the cheques in question were given as security to the complainant and after the return of cheque amount, there was no further liability to pay any amount to the complainant. He further argued that this court has ample power to compound the offense hence considering that he has already made the payment, his application moved for compounding may be allowed. He submitted that the impugned judgment and order on sentence are not tenable in law being full of surmises and conjectures and same are liable to be set-aside.
Digitally
signed by
PURSHOTTAM
PURSHOTTAM PATHAK
PATHAK Date:
2025.04.03
16:45:48
+0530
CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 6 of 17
11. On the other hand, Ld counsel for the respondent has contended that the Ld. Trial Court had rightly arrived at the finding of guilt and had convicted the appellant. He further argued that there is a clear presumption under Section 138 NI Act in favour of the complainant and it was for the appellant to rebut that presumption which he miserably failed to rebut. He submitted that the appellant's reliance on the case of Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal, (2010) 5 SCC 663 is misplaced as the appellant failed to compound the offense at the first instance and the respondent/ complainant also did not agree to the compounding. He submitted that the payment of cheque amount before Hon'ble High Court of Delhi does not absolve the appellant of the liability under section 138 of the NI Act as the complaint under section 138 NI Act is an independent proceeding unaffected by any FIR.
12. In order to decide the present appeal, it would be expedient to refresh our understanding of the law on the subject.
Section 138 of the NI Act provides as under:-
"138 Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. - Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for [a term which may be extended to two years], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless-Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM
PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.04.03 16:45:51 +0530 CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 7 of 17
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
Explanation:- For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.]"
13. A bare perusal of Section 138 of the NI Act would show that three fundamental requirements for applicability of such Section are: (1) that there should be legally recoverable enforceable debt and (2) that the drawer issued cheque to satisfy part or whole of the debt and (3) that thirdly that the cheque issued had been returned due to insufficiency of funds in the account of drawer. Before we proceed further, it would also be expedient to refer to the provisions of Section 118 (a) of the NI Act and Section 139 of the Act that provide as under:-
Section 118 (a) in The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
(a) of consideration - that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;
(b)as to date- that every negotiable instrument bearing date was made or drawn on such date.
(c) as to the time of acceptance- that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its due date and before its maturity......
Section 139 in The Negotiable Instruments Act,
139. Presumption in favour of holder. - It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.04.03 CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 8 of 17 16:45:56 +0530 cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability."
14. In view of the aforesaid proposition of law, reverting to the instant appeal, it is not in dispute that the cheque in question was drawn by the appellant from his bank account. Further, it is also not in dispute that the appellant is the signatory of the cheque in question.
Presentation of cheque in question is also not in dispute.
15. Further, as noted above, once the execution of the cheque by the appellant is proved/admitted, the presumption of the same being drawn for consideration stands attracted in terms of Section 139 NI Act. Now, in the case at hand, so far as the question of existence of basic ingredients for drawing of presumption U/s 118 (a) and 139 of the NI Act is concerned, it is apparent that the appellant has not denied his signature on the cheque in question, which has been drawn in favour of the respondent on a bank account maintained by the appellant. Hence, the said presumption can be drawn.
16. The onus, therefore, shifts on the appellant to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a presumption.
17. Hence, it is now to be examined as to whether the appellant brought any material on record or pointed out glaring discrepancies in the material produced by the respondent for dislodging the presumption which meets the standard of preponderance of probabilities.
Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAMPURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
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18. The first and foremost contention of the appellant is that the proceedings under Section 138 NI Act is barred as the complainant has already lodged an FIR against the appellant based on same facts and that FIR has been quashed after the return of cheque amount to the complainant.
19. Admittedly, an FIR u/s 420/34 IPC was lodged at the instance of complainant against the appellant which was quashed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi vide order dated 05.03.2021, when the appellant returned the cheque amount to the complainant. The doctrine of Double jeopardy is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case for the reason that the ingredients of FIR under Section 420 IPC are entirely different from case under Section 138 NI Act. In the present case, appellant is involved in a case under Section 138 of NI Act for which mens rea i.e. fraudulent intention at the time of insurance of cheque is not required to be proved.
20. In "Sandeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat and Anr." (2012) 7 Supreme Court Cases 621, it has been stipulated that the subsequent institution of a complaint under IPC after a complaint under NI Act does not amount to the accused being punished twice for the same offence as the said two offences are different in nature. Following observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court are relevant.
Digitally
signed by
PURSHOTTAM
PURSHOTTAM PATHAK
PATHAK Date:
2025.04.03
16:46:05
+0530
CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 10 of 17
"Admittedly, the appellant had been tried earlier for the offences punishable under the provisions of Section 138 N.I. Act and the case is sub judice before the High Court. In the instant case, he is involved under Sections 406/420 read with Section 114 IPC. In the prosecution under Section 138 N.I. Act, the mens rea i.e. fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of issuance of cheque is not required to be proved. However, in the case under IPC involved herein, the issue of mens rea may be relevant. The offence punishable under Section 420 IPC is a serious one as the sentence of 7 years can be imposed. In the case under N.I.Act, there is a legal presumption that the cheque had been issued for discharging the antecedent liability and that presumption can be rebutted only by the person who draws the cheque. Such a requirement is not there in the offences under IPC. In the case under N.I. Act, if a fine is imposed, it is to be adjusted to meet the legally enforceable liability. There cannot be such a requirement in the offences under IPC. The case under N.I. Act can only be initiated by filing a complaint. However, in a case under the IPC such a condition is not necessary. "
21. The Ld. Trial Court relying on the above judgment has rightly observed that, in the present case there is no bar from prosecution of the accused under Sectin 138 NI Act as the proceedings under Section 420 IPC does not create any bar from prosecution under Section 138 NI Act. Further, there is also no specific direction with respect to trial of this case in order dated 05.03.2021 of Hon'ble High court of Delhi. I do not find any reason to take a view different from what Ld. Trial Court has taken.
22. The another contention of appellant is that the Trial Court has failed to compound the matter despite payment of cheque amount, hence, matter may be compounded. An application for compounding has also been moved on behalf of the appellant in support of his contention.
23. On the other hand, Ld. counsel for respondent challenged such contentions of appellant and submitted that without consent of the complainant, offence cannot be Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.04.03 16:46:08 +0530 CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 11 of 17 compounded, therefore, the application filed by the appellant for compounding shall be rejected.
24. Ld. Counsel for the appellant has taken the plea that once the appellant has returned back the cheque amount to the complainant the Trial Court should have compounded the offence, even in the absence of any consent from the complainant.
25. Ld. counsel for appellant referred to judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal, (2010) 5 SCC 663, to submit that even in the absence of consent of the complainant/ respondent, this court can compound the offence. Ld. counsel referred to the guidelines framed by Supreme Court in aforesaid judgment as laid down in paragraph 21
(i) (b). It was stated in these guidelines that if the accused did not make an application for compounding at the first or second hearing of the case, then if an application for compounding was made before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding could be allowed subject to condition that the accused would be required to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition for compounding, with the legal services authority or such authority as the court deemed it fit. Ld. counsel submitted that there is no mention of taking consent from the complainant for the purpose of compounding the offence, either in Section 147 NI Act or in the aforesaid guidelines framed by Supreme Court. Therefore, even in absence of Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.04.03 16:46:13 +0530 CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 12 of 17 the consent of the complainant trial court should have compounded the offence, instead of passing a judgment of conviction. He further submitted that the compounding can be done by this Court as well, therefore, the offence in question should be compounded as the appellant has already made the payment.
26. During the arguments a query was made from the Ld. Counsel for the appellant regarding the application for compounding, which he has mentioned in the appeal to have been moved before the Ld. Trial Court. Ld. counsel for the appellant conceded that the appellant had not moved any application for compounding before the Ld. Trial Court.
27. Section 147 was inserted in NI Act by way of amendment in the year 2002, to make the offence compoundable. While framing the guidelines for compounding of the offence, Supreme Court in the case of Damodar S. Prabhu (supra) observed that "Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is in the nature of an enabling provision, which provides for the compounding of offences prescribed under the same Act, thereby serving as an exception to the general rule incorporated in sub-Section (9) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. which states that "No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this Section" A bare reading of this provision would lead us to the inference that offences punishable under laws other than the Penal Code also Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.04.03 16:46:17 +0530 CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 13 of 17 cannot be compounded. However, since Section 147 was inserted by way of an amendment to a special law, the same will override the effect of Section 320 (9) Cr.P.C especially keeping in mind that Section 147 Carries a non obstante clause."
28. Supreme Court no where stated in this judgment that the compounding could be done without consent of the complainant. Rather, in para 18 of the same judgment, it was further observed by the Court that "It is quite obvious that with respect to the offence of dishonor of cheques, it is the compensatory aspect of the remedy, which should be given priority over the punitive aspect." Thus, the Supreme Court was more concerned with the compensatory aspect of the remedy so as to promote the compounding and the Court had refused to read the bar created by Section 320 of Cr.P.C in compounding of an offence under other Act than IPC.
29. Similar question was raised before High Court of Delhi in the case of J.L.G Retails Ltd. v. Abhishek Mehra, Crl.M.C. No.2804/2013 and Crl.M.A. No.10705/2013 decided on 22.07.2013. In that case also the complainant had not agreed to compound the offence under Section 138 N.I. Act and Delhi High Court had refused to compound the offence under Section 147 of the Act. This judgment of High Court of Delhi was approved by a three judges bench of Supreme Court in S.L.P (Crl.) No.281/2014 decided on 29.10.2014. The Supreme Court Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.04.03 16:46:21 +0530 CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 14 of 17 observed that compounding can be done only bilateral and not unilateral.
30. Thus, the law in respect of compounding of offence under Section 138 NI Act is well settled in the terms that it can be done at any stage of the proceedings, but at the same time consent of the complainant is an important factor for compounding of the offence. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the contentions of appellant in regard to the compounding of the present matter without the consent of the complainant. Even before this Court, respondent no.2/complainant did not agree compounding, therefore, the offence cannot be compounded. The application filed by the appellant is also accordingly disposed off.
31. As noted above, once the execution of the cheque by the accused is proved/admitted, the presumption of the same being drawn for consideration stands attracted in terms of Section 139 NI Act. Now, in the case at hand, so far as the question of existence of basic ingredients for drawing of presumption U/s 118 (a) and 139 of the NI Act is concerned, from the aforesaid discussion, it is apparent that the appellant has not disputed that he has taken the amount of Rs. 14,50,000/- from the complainant.
32. The appellant had not led any evidence to rebut the presumption. As far as evidence of complainant is concerned, he has deposed as per his affidavit. Appellant has also failed to lead any evidence to rebut the mandatory presumption drawn in favour of complainant. The case put Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAM PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
2025.04.03 16:46:24 +0530 CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 15 of 17 forth by the appellant does not satisfy the requirement of rebuttal even if tested on the touch-stone of preponderance of probability. The appellant has miserably failed to rebut such presumption.
33. Accordingly, the defence of the accused as to the absence of liability towards the cheque in question has not been proved by the standard of preponderance of probabilities.
34. In view of my above discussion, I find no illegality or infirmity in the judgment dated 11.03.2024, whereby appellant was convicted, hence, conviction of appellant is maintained for offence u/s 138 NI Act.
35. As far as the point of the sentence is concerned, Ld. counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Ld. Trial Court has imposed an additional compensation of Rs.7,50,000/- on the appellant without any basis. The Trial Court has passed an order sentencing appellant to pay the total cheque amount of Rs.14.5 lakhs (which appellant has already paid) and Rs.7.5 lakhs as compensation to the complainant, with a default sentence of simple imprisonment for a period of 6 months. The Ld. Trial Court has already taken a lenient view while awarding the compensation. Hence, I do not find any reason to modify the same. There is no illegality in the order. The order on sentence dated 22.03.2024 is also upheld. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed.
Digitally signed by PURSHOTTAMPURSHOTTAM PATHAK PATHAK Date:
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36. TCR alongwith a copy of this judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial Court.
37. A copy of this judgment be given to Ld. Counsel for appellant.
38. Appeal file be consigned to the record room after Digitally signed by due compliance. PURSHOTTAM PATHAK PURSHOTTAM PATHAK Date: 2025.04.03 16:46:33 +0530 ANNOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT (PURSHOTAM PATHAK) TODAY ON THIS ASJ-05(SOUTH) st 1 DAY OF APRIL, 2025 SAKET COURTS: N.D (This judgment contains total 17 signed pages) CA/142/2024 MANOJ KUMAR Vs. KHYALI RAM Page 17 of 17