Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 19.9.2025 vs Of on 14 November, 2025
2025:HHC:38306
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 58 of 2013
.
Reserved on: 19.9.2025
Date of Decision: 14.11.2025.
Ramesh Chand ...Petitioner
Versus
of
State of H.P. ...Respondent
Coram
rt
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Ms Anu Tuli, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 26.2.2013, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Hamirpur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 18.4.2012 and order of sentence dated 27.4.2012, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Barsar, District Hamirpur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld and the appeal filed by the petitioner (accused 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 22025:HHC:38306 before the learned Trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed .
before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable of under Sections 354, 341, 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the victim (name being withheld to rt protect her identity) was bringing fuel wood on 17.4.2010. The accused Ramesh Chand stopped her, caught hold of her arms and touched her inappropriately at about 7.00 AM. He tore her shirt. She fell and shouted for help. The accused gave her beatings and abused her. He threatened to kill her and her children in case the incident was reported to anyone. Her mother-in-law and sister-in-law reached the spot and rescued her from the accused. The matter was reported to the police, and FIR (Ex.PW1/A) was registered. ASI Karan Singh (PW7) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW7/A). The victim produced a shirt, which was put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed. Seal impression (Ex.P1) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. The parcel containing the ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 3 2025:HHC:38306 shirt (Ex.P1) was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). Dr H.R. Kalia (PW5) medically examined the victim and found that she had .
sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused by kicks and fist blows. He issued MLC (Ex.PW5/A). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and of presented before the Court.
3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to rt summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 354 and 506 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its case. The informant (PW1) narrated the incident. (PW2) and (PW3) are the eyewitnesses. Madan Lal (PW4) witnessed the recovery of the shirt. Dr H.R. Kalia (PW5) medically examined the victim. Mansa Ram (PW6) produced the copy of the compromise. ASI Karam Singh (PW7) investigated the matter.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., stated that a false case was made against him ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 4 2025:HHC:38306 because of the land dispute. The witnesses deposed falsely. He claimed that he was innocent. The statements of Ajudhya Devi .
(DW1), Kartar Singh (DW2) and Satish Kumar (DW3) were recorded in defence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimony of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to a great weight. The of compromise was effected between the parties in which the accused had agreed not to keep any relation with the victim. This rt compromise corroborated the victim's testimony. It was admitted that the accused and the victim had a land dispute, but this was not sufficient to acquit the accused. The testimony of the victim was corroborated by independent witnesses and the medical evidence. The statements of defence witnesses were not credible. Therefore, the accused was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 324 and 506 of the IPC and was sentenced as under:-
Under Section 341 of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of ₹500/-
and in default of payment of fine, to
undergo further simple
imprisonment for one month.
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5
2025:HHC:38306
Under Section 323 of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment
for one month, pay a fine of ₹500/-
.
and in default of payment of fine, to
undergo further simple
imprisonment for two months.
Under Section 354 of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment
for six months, pay a fine of ₹1,000/-
of
and in default of payment of fine, to
undergo further simple
rt imprisonment for three months.
Under Section 506 of IPC To undergo rigorous imprisonment
for six months, pay a fine of ₹500/-
and in default of payment of fine, to
undergo further simple
imprisonment for two months.
It was ordered that all the substantive sentences shall run concurrently and the fine amount of ₹2,500/- would be paid to the prosecutrix as compensation after the expiry of period of appeal.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the testimony of the victim of sexual assault does not ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 6 2025:HHC:38306 require corroboration from an independent source. The statement of the victim was corroborated by the witnesses and .
the medical evidence. Enmity is a double-edged weapon --while it furnishes the motive for false implication, it also furnishes the motive for the commission of a crime. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from the enmity between the parties. The learned of Trial Court had rightly convicted and sentenced the accused.
Consequently, the appeal filed by the accused was dismissed.
rt
8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the petitioner/accused has filed the present petition, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. The prosecution's case was a result of vindictiveness. There were major contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, which made the prosecution's case highly doubtful.
The incriminating circumstances were not put to the accused, which prejudiced him. The child witness deposed that he had deposed as per the version of the victim, which made his testimony doubtful. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
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9. I have heard Ms Anu Tuli, learned counsel, for the petitioner/accused and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned .
Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
10. Ms Anu Tuli, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The learned Courts below erred in of appreciating the material placed before them. There were various contradictions in the statements of the prosecution rt witnesses. The prosecution's case was inherently improbable.
(PW2) did not support the prosecution's case, which made the prosecution's case doubtful. Therefore, she prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
11. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the learned Courts below had rightly held that the victim's testimony was corroborated by the independent witnesses and the Medical Officer. The enmity is a double-edged weapon -- while it furnishes the motive for false implication, it also furnishes the motive for the commission of a crime. Learned Courts below ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 8 2025:HHC:38306 have consistently found the prosecution's case to be true, and this Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of .
the fact. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
of
13. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in rt Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204:
(2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: -
"10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short "CrPC") vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 9 2025:HHC:38306 which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those .
findings.
14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
of
14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the rt purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case.
The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687:
(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) "12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law.
There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 10 2025:HHC:38306 erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not .
exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against of an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to rt whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC."
15. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
"12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 11 2025:HHC:38306 the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) "5. ... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can .
call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can of it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has rt already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ..."
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) "14. ... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 12 2025:HHC:38306 unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is .
possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based rt on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction."
14. In the above case, also a conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis.
16. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
"16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 13
2025:HHC:38306
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well-established principle of law that the .
Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative."
17. A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. of Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:
"27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional juris- diction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perver-
rt sity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Re-
visional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Ser- vices v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.
28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the ab-
sence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.
18. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
19. The informant stated that she was bringing the fuel wood on 17.4.2010. Petitioner/accused caught hold of both her hands at 7.00 AM and touched her inappropriately. He tore her ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 14 2025:HHC:38306 shirt. She fell, she shouted for help, and the accused gave her blows with his fists.
.
20. The statement of the informant is highly improbable.
She claimed that the accused caught hold of both of her hands, touched her inappropriately and tore her shirt. It is not explained how the accused could have caught her both hands of and touched her inappropriately and torn her shirt. After all, the accused had only two hands, which he could have used to catch rt hold of both hands of the victim or touch her inappropriately or tear her shirt. Hence, the submission of Ms Anu Tuli has to be accepted as correct, that the prosecution's version is inherently improbable.
21. The victim claimed that she was bringing the firewood. The accused stopped, touched her inappropriately and tore her shirt. It means that the fuel wood would have fallen on the spot; however, the Investigating Officer has not shown any fuel wood in the site plan (Ex.PW7/A). He had also not seized any fuel wood lying on the spot. Thus, the victim's testimony that she was carrying the fuel wood at the time of the incident was not corroborated by the recovery of any fuel wood.
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22. The victim stated that she shouted for help. Her mother-in-law and sister-in-law came to the spot and rescued .
her. Her mother-in-law (PW2) stated that the victim's son came to her and told her that the accused was quarrelling with the victim. She went to the spot and saw the accused. She counselled the accused not to quarrel. She was permitted to be cross-
of examined. She denied that she saw the accused beating and abusing the victim. She denied that the victim had sustained rt injuries, and her clothes were torn. Thus, she has not supported the victim's version.
23. The victim's sister-in-law was not examined, and an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution.
24. Thus, the witnesses cited in the FIR have not corroborated the victim's version.
25. The prosecution examined the victim's son (PW3).
He stated that he had accompanied the victim to bring fuelwood.
The accused came and objected to the taking of fuelwood. The accused gave beatings to the victim and tore her shirt. The victim told him to call her mother-in-law, and he went to call ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 16 2025:HHC:38306 the victim's mother-in-law, who rescued the victim from the accused.
.
26. The testimony of this witness is not acceptable. His name was not mentioned in the FIR or in the statement on oath by the victim. Therefore, his presence on the spot is highly doubtful. He admitted in cross-examination that he had of narrated whatever was told to him by his mother. He is a child witness aged 10 years, and the admission made by him in the rt cross-examination that he had deposed what was told to him would make it difficult to place reliance on his testimony.
27. The learned Courts below relied upon the statement of Madan Lal (PW4), who stated that the victim came to him and told him that the accused had beaten her and committed mischief with her at about 8.00 AM. He admitted in the cross-
examination that he had heard about the incident. The incident occurred at 7.00 AM, and the facts were narrated to him at 8.00 AM. Therefore, the narration was not part of the same transaction, and the statement made to him cannot be admitted in evidence. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sukhar v. State of U.P., (1999) 9 SCC 507: 2000 SCC (Cri) 419: 1999 ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 17 2025:HHC:38306 SCC OnLine SC 1005 that a contemporaneous statement is admissible under section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was .
observed at page 511:
"6. Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule whereunder the hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But for bringing such hearsay evidence within the provisions of Section 6, what is required to be of established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts, and there should not be an interval which would allow fabrication. The statements sought to be admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestae, must rt have been made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter. The aforesaid rule, as it is stated in Wigmore's Evidence Act, reads thus:
"Under the present exception [to hearsay] and utterance is by hypothesis, offered as an assertion to evidence the fact asserted (for example, that a car brake was set or not set), and the only condition is that it shall have been made spontaneously, i.e. as the natural effusion of a state of excitement. Now this state of excitement may well continue to exist after the exciting fact has ended. The declaration, therefore, may be admissible even though subsequent to the occurrence, provided it is near enough in time to allow the assumption that the exciting influence continued."
7. Sarkar on Evidence (15th Edn.) summarises the law relating to the applicability of Section 6 of the Evidence Act thus:
"1. The declarations (oral or written) must relate to the act which is in issue or relevant thereto; they are not admissible merely because they accompany an act. Moreover, the declarations must relate to and explain the fact they accompany, and not independent facts previous or subsequent thereto, ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 18 2025:HHC:38306 unless such facts are part of a transaction which is continuous.
2. The declarations must be substantially .
contemporaneous with the facts and not merely the narrative of a past.
3. The declaration and the act may be made by the same person, or they may be made by different persons, e.g., the declarations of the victim, assailant and bystanders. In conspiracy, riot & and the declarations of all concerned in the common of object are admissible.
4. Though admissible to explain or corroborate, or to understand the significance of the act, rt declarations are not evidence of the truth of the matters stated."
8. This Court in Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of A.P. [(1996) 6 SCC 241: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1290], considering the law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act, held thus:
(SCC pp. 246-47, para 15) "15. The principle of law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act is usually known as the rule of res gestae recognised in English law. The essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction that it becomes relevant by itself.
This rule is, roughly speaking, an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The rationale in making certain statements or facts admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statements or facts in relation to the fact in issue. But it is necessary that such a fact or statement must be a part of the same transaction. In other words, such a statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 19 2025:HHC:38306 for fabrication, then the statement is not part of res gestae."
9. In another recent judgment of this Court in Rattan .
Singh v. State of H.P. [(1997) 4 SCC 161: 1997 SCC (Cri) 525], this Court examined the applicability of Section 6 of the Evidence Act to the statement of the deceased and held thus: (SCC p. 167, para 16) "[T]he aforesaid statement of Kanta Devi can be admitted under Section 6 of the Evidence Act on account of its proximity in time to the act of murder.
of Illustration 'A' to Section 6 makes it clear. It reads thus:
'(a) A is accused of the murder of B by beating him. rt Whatever was said or done by A or B or the bystanders at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is a relevant fact.' (emphasis supplied) Here the act of the assailant intruding into the courtyard during the dead of the night, the victim's identification of the assailant, her pronouncement that the appellant was standing with a gun and his firing the gun at her, are all circumstances so intertwined with each other by proximity of time and space that the statement of the deceased became part of the same transaction. Hence, it is admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act."
28. Thus, the learned Trial Courts below erred in relying upon the testimony of this witness.
29. Mansha Ram (PW6) produced the copy of the compromise (Ex.PW6/A) effected between the accused and one Shilpa Devi. Learned Courts below relied upon this compromise to hold that it corroborated the testimonies of the witnesses ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 20 2025:HHC:38306 regarding his past conduct. However, this evidence is inadmissible in view of Section 14 of the Indian Evidence Act .
being evidence of a similar nature as mentioned in illustrations of (n), (o) and (p) of the Act. In Emperor v. Panchu Das and Goberdhone Singh, 1920 SCC OnLine Cal 24: (1919-20) 24 CWN 501: AIR 1920 Cal 500: 1920 Cri LJ 849, the prosecution adduced of evidence to show that the accused had robbed the women on earlier occasions. This evidence was held to be inadmissible. It rt was observed at page 517:
"It is plain that this section [14 of the Indian Evidence Act] is of no assistance. The existence of a state of mind such as intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will or goodwill towards a person or the ex- istence of a state of body or bodily feeling, was not and could not be in issue in the circumstances of the case. The defence was a complete denial, and no question of the character contemplated by sec. 14 did or could possibly arise. The first explanation to the section creates a further difficulty, because the relevant fact proved to show the existence of a relevant state of mind must show that the state of mind exists, not generally, but in reference to the particular matter in question. The evidence introduced was plainly not of this description. The illustrations (i),
(j), (o), and (p) clearly show that the evidence could not be admitted. Reference may particularly be made to the last two illustrations. A is tried for the murder of B by in-
tentionally shooting him dead. The fact that A, on other occasions, shot at B is relevant, as showing his intention to shoot B; but the fact that A was in the habit of shooting at people with the intent to murder them is irrelevant. A is ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 21 2025:HHC:38306 tried for a crime; the fact that he said something indicat- ing an intention to commit that particular crime is rele- vant, but the fact that he said something indicating a general disposition to commit crimes of that class is ir-
.
relevant. These illustrate the elementary principle that evidence of general deposition, habit and tendencies is not relevant.
From the statement of the case by Mr Justice Chaudhuri, it appears that secs. 14 and 15 were the only sections which had been referred to, and I have consequently con-
of sidered, up till now, the question of their true construc- tion. Upon a plain reading of these sections, I feel no doubt that they do not make the evidence admissible. This conclusion is supported by the decisions in Empress v.
rt Moodeliar [I.L.R. 6 Cal. 655 (1881)], Baharuddin Mandal v. Emperor [18 C.L.J. 578 (1913)] and Emperor v. Abdul Wahid Khan [I.L.R. 34 All. 93 (1911). In the first of these cases, Sir Richard Garth, C.J., pointed out that sec. 141 applies to that class of cases where a particular act is more or less criminal or culpable according to the state of mind or feeling of the person who does it, and added that the Court must be very careful not to extend the operation of the section to other cases where the question of guilt or innocence depends upon actual facts and not upon the state of a man's mind or feeling. Mr Justice Mitter, if I have read his judgment correctly, did not really dissent from this view. The same line of reasoning was adopted in the second I case, where it was ruled that proof cannot I be offered of an independent offence to show I that by reason of such independent offence, I the accused is more likely to have committed the one for which he is on trial; in other words, evidence of such collateral offence cannot be received as substantive evidence of the offence on trial, though under sec. 14 evidence may be given of intention and like matters where the factum of such intention or like matters is relevant. The distinction between cases where intention is and cases where intention is not rele- vant is illustrated by the decisions in Emperor v. Debendra, Prosad [I.L.R. 36 Cal. 573: s.c. 13 C.W.N. 973 (1909)] and Em-
::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 222025:HHC:38306 peror v. Abdul Wahid [I.L.R. 34 All. 93 (1911).] which lie on opposite sides of the dividing line. Reference may also be made to the decision of West, J., in R. v. Parbhudas [11 Bom. H.C.R. 90 (1874).] where he emphasised the inad-
.
missibility of evidence of one crime (not reduced to legal certainty by a conviction) to prove the existence of an- other unconnected, even though cognate crime. On behalf of the Crown, reliance was, however, placed upon the de- cisions in Mahin v. Attorney-General [[1894] A.C. 57], and R. v. Ball [[1911] A.C. 47 (52)]. reversing R. v. Ball [5 Cr. App.
of Rep. 238 (1910). R.v.Smith [[1911] Cr. App. Rep. 229.], R. v. Bond [[1906] 2 K.B. 389.] and R. v. Thompson [[1917] 2 K.B. 630: affirmed on H.L. [1918] A.C. 221.] which has been af- firmed by the House of Lords in Thompson v. The King rt [[1917] 2 K.B. 630: affirmed on H.L. [1918] A.C. 221.]. No useful purpose would be served by a detailed analysis of these decisions; most of them, along with other cases, were reviewed by this Court in Amritalal Hazra v. Emperor [I.L.R. 42 Cal. 957: s.c. 19 C.W.N. 676 (1915).] where the principles deducible therefrom as to the law administered in England were formulated in the following terms:--
"Facts similar to but not part of the same transac- tion as the main fact are not, in general, admissible to prove either the occurrence of the main fact or the identity of its author. But evidence of similar facts, although in general inadmissible to prove the main facts or the connection of the parties there- with, is receivable, after evidence aliunde on these points has been given, to show the state of mind of the parties with regard to such fact; in other words, evidence of similar facts may be received to prove a party's knowledge of the nature of the main fact or transaction, or his intent with respect thereto. In general, whenever it is necessary to rebut, even by anticipation, the defence of accident, mistake, or other innocent condition of mind, evidence that the Defendant has been concerned in a systematic course of conduct of the same specific kind as that in question may be given. To admit evidence under ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 23 2025:HHC:38306 this head, however, the other acts tendered must be of the same specific kind as that in question and not of a different character, and the acts tendered must also have been proximate in point of time to that in .
question."
I have re-examined these cases and I see no reason to doubt the accuracy of the above statement, which fully accords with the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal in the cases of R. v. Rodley [[1913] 3 K.B. 468; 9 Cr. App. Rep. 69; 23 Cox. 574 (1913).] and R. v. Ellis [[1910] 2 K.B. 746; 5 Cr.
of App. Rep. 41.] as also other recent cases, such as Thompson v. The King [[1917] 2 K.B. 630: affirmed on H.L. [1918] A.C.
221.], R. v. Fisher [[1910] 2. K.R. 149.], R. v. Mason [111 L.T.
336.], R. v. Baird [84 L.J.K.B. 1785 (1915).] and Perkins v.
rt Jeffery [[1915] 2 K.B. 702.]. It is plain that the principles so enunciated are of no assistance to the prosecution. On the other hand, there is an important passage in the judg- ment of Kennedy, J., in the case of R. v. Bond [[1906] 2 K.B. 389 (405).] to which the attention of the Standing Counsel was drawn by the learned Chief Justice in the course of the argument, as destructive of his contention:--
"The admissibility, not merely the weight, of the evidence depends upon the evidence of such con-
duct as would authorise a reasonable inference of a systematic pursuit of the same criminal object."
30. Similarly, it was held in Emperor vs. Gangaram Hari Pandit (05.07.1920 - BOMHC): MANU/MH/0102/1920 that the evidence of previous murders committed by the accused was inadmissible. It was observed:
"3. In the present case, there is no question as to whether the death of Dadu was accidental or intentional. It is the case on both sides that Dadu was murdered, and whoever assaulted Dadu intended to murder him. Whether the six persons mentioned by Gangaram actually committed the ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 24 2025:HHC:38306 murder or whether some of the present accused committed it is the real question. But it cannot be said that there is any point as to the death of Dadu being accidental. It may be a part of the prosecution case that, .
in attacking the party, assuming for the sake of argument that the enemies of the present accused were the assailants, the object was to go at Gangaram and not at Dadu. The fact remains that those who went to Dadu did murder him, i. e., they intended to do what their act would show they intended to do. Whether those persons were of actuated by a desire to go to Gaugaram more than at Dadu or whether they went to Dadu by mistaking him for Gangaram, they undoubtedly murdered him, and there can be no doubt that they intended to do so. There is no rt question of the death being accidental. I may refer to the observations in Rex v. Boyte [1914] 3 K.B. 339, which suggest the test to be adopted in determining whether evidence of similar acts is admissible under Section 15 or not in a particular case. Though there may be cases in which it may not be easy to determine whether the evidence is admissible under Section 15 or not, 1 do not think that in the present case there is any difficulty whatever. Though Section 9 of the Indian Evidence Act has not been relied upon on behalf of the Crown, I have considered it with reference to the question as to whether this evidence can be let in to explain the conduct of the persons who are said to have been falsely charged. I have already referred to this consideration so far as it can be said to fall within the scope of Section 8; and I am satisfied that to explain the conduct of those six persons in absconding when they received the news that their names were given as the assailants of Dadu, the belief on the part of some of them that on previous occasions false charges of that character had succeeded or had been brought would be relevant. There is evidence in this case to show that there was a belief in the village that the accused in Gangu's case were wrongly convicted; and that may be relevant to explain the conduct of the six persons in this case, but that belief might exist whether the ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 25 2025:HHC:38306 accused in that case were rightly convicted or not. In my opinion, that would not entitle the prosecution in this case relating to the murder of Dadu to prove that on two previous occasions some of the accused were concerned .
in similar murders and in charging others falsely. Taking a broad and general view of this type of evidence, I feel that, in effect, it amounts to evidence of habit for committing a murder under circumstances as are now alleged to exist. That kind of evidence is not relevant. It seems to me that the second part of the illustration (o) to of Section 14 clearly indicates that unless the evidence was particularly directed to show that on a previous occasion any one of the present accused made an attempt to murder any one of the six persons now said to have been rt falsely implicated, it would not be relevant. It is quite clear that the persons concerned in those two cases, the accused persons, were different. I also feel that there is some force in the argument urged on behalf of the defence as to such evidence being in substance evidence of bad character. Its net result is to create the impression on the mind of the Court that these persons are men of bad character and are in the habit of committing murders, and that, therefore, they must have committed murder on this occasion. That is a line of proof which, in my opinion, is excluded by the Indian Evidence Act and should not be allowed. We have, therefore, excluded from consideration only that evidence which has been adduced by the prosecution to show specifically that the charges in both those earlier murder cases were positively false and that the persons convicted in Gangu's case were innocent."
31. The judicial committee of the Privy Council also held in Noor Mohamed v. King, 1948 SCC OnLine PC 76: (1949) 62 LW 530: AIR 1949 PC 161 that the evidence of similar crimes is inadmissible in evidence. It was observed at page 532:
::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 262025:HHC:38306 "The first comment to be made on the evidence under re- view is that it plainly tended to show that the appellant had been guilty of a criminal act which was not the act with which he was charged. In Makin v. Attorney-General .
for New South Wales [(1894) A.C. 57 at p. 65.] Lord Her- schell, then Lord Chancellor, delivering the judgment of the Board, laid down two principles which must be ob-
served in a case of this character. Of these, the first was that:
"It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecu-
of tion to adduce evidence tending to show that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a per- rt son likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the offence for which he is being tried."
In 1934, this principle was said by Lord Sankey, then Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence of all the noble and learned Lords who sat with him, to be "one of the most deeply rooted and jealously guarded principles of our criminal law" and to be "fundamental in the law of evi- dence as conceived in this country." [Maxwell v. The Di-
rector of Public Prosecutions [(1935) A.C. 309 at pages 317,
320.].
The second principle stated in Makin's case [(1894) A.C. 57 at p. 65] :
"The mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to show the commission of other crimes does not reader it inad- missible if it be relevant to an issue before the jury, and it may be so relevant if it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the in- dictment were designed or accidental, or to rebut a de- fence which would otherwise be open to the accused."
The statement of this latter principle has given rise to some discussion. A plea of not guilty puts everything in issue which is a necessary ingredient of the offence charged, and if the Crown were permitted, ostensibly in ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 27 2025:HHC:38306 order to strengthen the evidence of a fact which was not denied and perhaps could not be the subject of rational dispute, to adduce evidence of a previous crime, it is manifest that the protection afforded by the "jealously .
guarded" principle first enunciated would be gravely im- paired.
This aspect of the matter was considered by the House of Lords in Thompson v. The King [(1918) A.C. 221]. Their Lordships need not allude to the facts of that case. It is enough to say that the evidence there admitted was held of to be relevant as one of the indicia by which the accused man's identity with the person who had committed the crime could be established. (See per Lord Parker of Waddington, at p. 231). In the words of Lord Atkinson, it rt rebutted the defence of an alibi which otherwise would have been open (pp. 230-1). Nothing of the kind can be suggested in the present case. The value of the case for the present purpose is that Lord Sumner dealt particu- larly with the difficulty to which their Lordships have re- ferred, and stated his conclusion as follows:
"Before an issue can be said to be raised, which would permit the introduction of such evidence so obviously prejudicial to the accused, it must have been raised in substance if not in so many words, and the issue so raised must be one to which the prejudicial evidence is relevant.
The mere theory that a plea of not guilty puts everything material in issue is not enough for this purpose. The prosecution cannot credit the accused with fancy de- fences in order to rebut them at the outset with some damning piece of prejudice"
There can be little doubt that the manner of Ayesha's death, even without the evidence as to the death of Goo- riah, would arouse suspicion against the appellant in the mind of a reasonable man. The facts proved as to the death of Gooriah would certainly tend to deepen that sus- picion, and might well tilt the balance against the accused in the estimation of a jury. It by no means follows that this evidence ought to be admitted. If an examination of it ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 28 2025:HHC:38306 shows that it is impressive just because it appears to demonstrate, in the words of Lord Herschell in Makin's case [(1894) A.C. 57.] "that the accused is a person likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed .
the offence for which he is being tried", and if it is other- wise of no real substance, then it was certainly wrongly admitted. After fully considering all the facts which, if ac-
cepted, it revealed, their Lordships are not satisfied that its admission can be justified on any of the grounds which have been suggested or on any other ground. Assuming of that it is consistent with the evidence relating to the death of Ayesha that she took her own life, or that she took poison accidentally (one of which assumptions must be made for the purposes of the Crown's argument at the rt trial), there is nothing in the circumstances of Gooriah's death to negate these possible views. Even if the appellant deliberately caused Gooriah to take poison (an assump- tion not lightly to be made, since he was never charged with having murdered her), it does not follow that Ayesha may not have committed suicide. As to the argument from similarity of circumstances, it seems on analysis to amount to no more than this, that if the appellant mur- dered one woman because he was jealous of her, it is probable that he murdered another for the same reason. If the appellant were proved to have administered poison to Ayesha in circumstances consistent with an accident, then proof that he had previously administered poison to Gooriah in similar circumstances might well have been admissible. There was, however, no direct evidence in ei- ther case that the appellant had administered the poison. It is true that in the case of Gooriah, there was evidence from which it might be inferred that he persuaded her to take the poison by a trick, but this evidence cannot prop- erly be used to found an inference that a similar trick was used to deceive Ayesha, and so to fill a gap in the available evidence. The evidence which was properly adduced as to Ayesha shows her to have been acquainted, as were, it may be supposed, most of the inhabitants of the village in which the appellant lived, with the fact that suspicion ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 29 2025:HHC:38306 rested on him in respect of Gooriah's death, and the the- ory that Ayesha was deceived into taking poison by a sim- ilar ruse to that which is supposed to have succeeded with Gooriah seems to their Lordships to rest on an improba-
.
ble surmise. The effect of the admission of the impugned evidence may well have been that the jury came to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the murder of Gooriah, with which he had never been charged, and hav- ing thus adjudged him a murderer, were satisfied with something short of conclusive proof that he had mur-
of dered Ayesha. In these circumstances, the verdict cannot stand, notwithstanding the care with which the learned Judge summed up the case, and the fairness with which the trial was conducted in all other respects.
rt With all due deference to the Court of Criminal Appeal, their Lordships feel bound to say that they are not con-
vinced that the method of approach which it thus ap- proved has any advantage over that which it rejects as in- correct. The expression "logically probative" may be un- derstood to include much evidence which English law deems to be irrelevant. Logicians are not bound by the rules of evidence which guide English Courts, and theo- ries of probability sometimes cause a clash of philosophic opinion. It would no doubt be wrong to interpret the ob- servations of the Court of Criminal Appeal as meaning that evidence can sometimes be admitted merely for the reason that it shows a propensity in the accused to com- mit crimes of the nature of that with which he is charged.
It cannot be supposed that the Court intended to lay down a proposition which would conflict with principles which have been laid down, or approved, by the House of Lords. It may be assumed that it is still true to say, as Lord Sum- ner said thirty years ago:
"No one doubts that it does not tend to prove a man guilty of a particular crime to show that he is the kind of man who would commit a crime, or that he is generally dis- posed to crime and even to a particular crime:" Thompson v. The King [(1918) A.C. 221 at p. 232.] ."::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 30
2025:HHC:38306 If all that the Court meant to say was that evidence of the kind specified in the first of the principles stated in Makin's case [(1894) A.C. 57.], may be admitted if it is rele- vant for other reasons, then the dictum has no novelty. It .
does seem, however, that the passage quoted was in- tended at least to bear the meaning that evidence ought to be admitted which is in any way relevant to a matter which can be said to be in issue, however technically, be- tween the Crown and the accused, because a little later in the judgment the following passage occurs:
of "It is of the utmost importance for a fair trial that the ev- idence should be prima facie limited to matters relating to the transaction which forms the subject of the indictment and that any departure from these matters should be rt strictly confined."
32. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the previous compromise.
33. The Medical Officer examined the victim. He found that the victim had sustained multiple injuries, which were possible from kicks and fist blows. He stated that the injuries cannot be caused by self-infliction, but may be possible by way of a fall. He noticed one abrasion on the interior aspect of the right wrist, joint and one abrasion on the posterior aspect of the right wrist joint. The right wrist joint is an accessible part of the body, and it is not explained why the injury could not have been self-inflicted. Further, he had not noticed any injuries on the other parts of the body, which does not corroborate the victim's ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 31 2025:HHC:38306 version that the accused had beaten and touched her inappropriately.
.
34. The victim admitted in her cross-examination that she has a dispute with the accused over the land. The accused had filed a civil suit against her. Two cases were pending between them. This shows that the relationship between the of parties was strained. Learned Courts below had rightly held that enmity is a double-edged weapon -- while it furnishes a motive rt for the commission of crime, it also furnishes a motive for false implication. The inherent improbability of the prosecution's case, non-corroboration of her testimony by the statement of her mother-in-law, the introduction of her son as a witness and non-examination of her sister-in-law will suggest that the enmity was not a motive for the commission of the crime.
35. The learned Courts below held that the testimony of the victim is to be reliable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tameezudeen Versus State 2009(15) SCC 566 that the principle that the prosecutrix's version has to be accepted in all cases is not correct. It was observed:
"7. It is true that in a case of rape, the evidence of the prosecutrix must be given predominant consideration, ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 32 2025:HHC:38306 but to hold that this evidence has to be accepted even if the story is improbable and belies logic, would be doing violence to the very principles that govern the apprecia- tion of evidence in a criminal matter."
.
36. This position was reiterated in Raju v. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 133: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 751: 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1808, wherein it was observed:
of
11. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim, but at the same time, a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The rt accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily, such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration.
12. Reference has been made in the Gurmit Singh case [(1996) 2 SCC 384: 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] to the amendments in 1983 to Sections 375 and 376 of the Penal Code making the penal provisions relating to rape more stringent, and also to Section 114-A of the Evidence Act with respect to a presumption to be raised with regard to allegations of consensual sex in a case of the alleged rape. It is, however, significant that Sections 113-A and 113-B were inserted in the Evidence Act by the same amendment by which certain presumptions in cases of abetment of suicide and dowry death have been raised against the accused. These two sections, thus, raise a clear presumption in favour of the prosecution, but no similar presumption with respect to rape is visualised as the presumption under Section ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 33 2025:HHC:38306 114-A is extremely restricted in its applicability. This clearly shows that, insofar as allegations of rape are concerned, the evidence of a prosecutrix must be examined as that of an injured witness whose presence at .
the spot is probable, but it can never be presumed that her statement should, without exception, be taken as the gospel truth. Additionally, her statement can, at best, be adjudged on the principle that ordinarily no injured witness would tell a lie or implicate a person falsely. We believe that it is under these principles that this case, and of others such as this one, need to be examined.
37. In the present case, there are various infirmities in the prosecution's case as noticed above, and the reliance cannot rt be placed upon the victim's statement without corroboration.
The learned Courts below erred in relying upon the statement of the victim. Therefore, the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below are not sustainable.
38. In view of the above, the present revision is allowed, and the judgment of conviction dated 18.4.2012 and order of sentence dated 27.4.2012, passed by the learned Trial Court and affirmed by the learned Appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 2012, dated 26.2.2013, are ordered to be set aside.
39. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner is directed to furnish bail bonds in ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS 34 2025:HHC:38306 the sum of ₹25,000/-with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which .
shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the petitioner on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
of
40. A copy of this judgment, along with the record of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. Pending rt applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 14th November 2025 (Chander) ::: Downloaded on - 05/12/2025 21:47:52 :::CIS