Delhi High Court
M.I. Hussain vs N. Singh And Ors. [Along With Lpa No. ... on 7 November, 2005
Equivalent citations: AIR2006DELHI86, 125(2005)DLT223, 2005(85)DRJ282, AIR 2006 DELHI 86, 2006 (2) AJHAR (NOC) 490 (DEL), 2006 (3) AKAR (NOC) 281 (DEL), MANU/DEL/2000/2005, (2005) 85 DRJ 282, (2005) 125 DLT 223
Author: Markandeya Katju
Bench: Markandeya Katju, Madan B. Lokur
JUDGMENT Markandeya Katju, C.J.
Page 2005
1. These appeals have been filed against the impugned judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court dated 20.7.2005 in WP(C) No. 11718/2005.
2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record.
3. The appellant is an unaided private recognised school in Delhi and the writ petitioner is a student of the said school having joined it in 1993 in Nursery Class and had passed Class X examination in May 2005 conducted by the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) securing an overall percentage of 65.2% marks with 60% marks in science and mathematics. The writ petitioner applied for admission in science stream in Class XI in the appellant school, but has been offered commerce stream without mathematics. It is alleged by the writ petitioner that as many as 90 seats in the science stream are still lying vacant and hence, the writ petitioner should be admitted in one of those seats. However, the writ petitioner was informed by the Principal by a letter dated 4.7.2005 that he cannot be admitted to the science stream as he did not have the requisite marks in class X in mathematics and science. In the case of the writ petitioner, N. Singh, his rank in the school is 238/299 and in the case of Anr. writ petitioner, B. Dhami, the rank is 241/299.
4. The stand of the appellant is that the percentage for admission in science stream was initially notified as 80%, but ultimately students having 70% marks in science and mathematics have been allotted science stream in so far as internal students are concerned. In the case of external students the initially notified cut off percentage of marks was 90%, but subsequently the last admission was made at 78% in the science stream. Since the writ petitioners (who were internal candidates) secured much less than 70%, they were not admitted in science stream.
5. The respondents (writ petitioners) relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Principal, Cambridge School v. Payal Gupta and the learned single Judge, who allowed the writ petition has also relied on the aforesaid decision.
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6. The learned single Judge in his judgment observed that "A School exists for its students and not vice-versa; it is not an industry". The learned Judge further went on to say in paragraph 6 of the judgment as follows:-
"There are some educational institutions who consider only results to be of importance. In doing so they forget that their existence is for education and not for results."
With due respect to the learned Judge, we are not in agreement with these observations. Good schools are certainly concerned about their reputation and their image in society, and for this purpose the results are certainly of great importance.
7. The learned single Judge was of the view that since seats in Class XI in science stream were still available for being filled up by the students from the school itself, the school should be directed to permit the writ petitioner to join science stream in Class XI. Without profound respect to the learned single Judge, there are several flaws in his reasoning in the impugned judgment.
8. Admittedly, the Appellant did not file any counter affidavit to the writ petition before the learned single Judge. However, the Division Bench considering the appeal on 8th August, 2005 was of the view that the averments in the writ petition necessitated a counter affidavit. Accordingly, with the consent of parties we permitted the Appellant to file a counter affidavit to the writ petition so that at least the pleadings are complete.
9. In paragraph 4 of the counter affidavit of the Principal of the school it has been stated that in over 50 years of the history of the institution it has created a name for itself in the field of education and has produced large number of successful citizens in various walks of life. In paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit it is averred that the procedure being adopted by the school for allocation of streams to its students joining in Class XI has been consistently followed over the years for decades, both in this school and also in other schools in the country irrespective of whether they are aided, unaided or government schools.
10. In paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit it is alleged that the writ petitioner was an average student throughout and his performance for the last three years is annexed as Annexure R-1. He was put in the remedial classes after school hours under intimation to his parents but despite remedial classes his performance had not been satisfactory as is evident from the results of the remedial classes. Even after remedial classes he secured only 20% marks in mathematics in the remedial class test whereas in biology he showed little improvement and secured 30% marks. After half-yearly examination held in September 2004 he was again asked to attend remedial classes in four subjects i.e. Maths, Chemistry, Biology and Geography, and, was advised to work hard which was duly acknowledged by his parents. However, his performance even after the remedial classes showed result of 37% in Maths, 48% in Biology, 45% in Chemistry and 66% in Geography.
11. The result of Class X examination conducted by the CBSE was declared on 26.5.2005 and the details of the result computed for 299 students Page 2007 who appeared from the school is Annexure C. It is stated that the writ petitioner finds mention at Rank No. 238 among the qualified students out of 299 students who had appeared for the examination and his rank with respect to the science stream i.e. combination of Maths and General Sciences is 245 out of 299 students and his percentage of marks comes to 60%. Hence, on the basis of the result and in view of his aptitude, it was decided to award him commerce stream without maths. In paragraph 13 of the counter affidavit it is mentioned that all the qualified students were offered various streams in Class XI as per the aptitude, relative merits and availability of vacancy. In paragraph 15 of the counter affidavit it is stated that after the declaration of the results by CBSE certain changes were made on the basis of final results and 106 students from internal students have been granted science, 150 have been granted commerce and 22 have been granted humanities. While awarding the above subjects, apart from the above criteria the aptitude and performance of the child in the opted field/subject throughout the year was taken into consideration. The writ petitioner was also awarded commerce stream as per his aptitude and performance throughout the year. The school commenced classes for Class XI in the respective streams w.e.f. 3rd April 2005 which continued till 12th May,2005. It is alleged in paragraph 17 of the counter affidavit that the writ petitioner never questioned the allotment criteria of the subject till the result was pronounced by CBSE and attended only 8 days out of total 28 days when classes were held.
12. In paragraph 19 of the counter affidavit it is alleged that the parents of the writ petitioner met the Principal on various occasions after declaration of the class X Board results and every effort was made to explain to them the concern of the institution with respect to awarding of commerce stream instead of science to the petitioner on the basis of his performance and aptitude and the appellant without any malice or mala fide deemed it in the interest of the child to award him commerce stream without maths. The same procedure has been adopted for all the students while awarding different streams.
13. In paragraph 22 of the counter affidavit it is stated that the subject content of science and maths in 11th and 12th class is much tougher compared to 10th class being a specialised stream, and, therefore, for students with poor foundation/lack of interest and low aptitude it becomes very stressful to the child who suffers and this has produced negative results and will be harmful for him. The action of the school is bona fide and as per the policy and practice adopted by the school over the years.
14. In our opinion, there is no legal principle that all vacant seats must necessarily be filled up. If such a contention is accepted,it would mean that vacant seats have to be filled up even by filling them up with students who have no aptitude for science or maths. We cannot countenance any such argument. Many schools have a reputation to uphold and protect, and they can certainly fix the minimum criteria below which it will not admit students to a particular stream even if seats remain vacant. The writ petitioner has not been able to show any legal right to get admission to science stream. Moreover, there are 36 students of the school who have passed Class X Page 2008 examination with higher merit than the writ petitioner and were seeking admission to science stream, but have been denied the same. Hence, the writ petitioner can have no legal right to get admission in science stream.
15. As regards the decision in Payal Gupta's case (supra), in our opinion that decision has no application to the facts of this case. We have carefully perused the judgment of the Supreme Court in the said case. All that that judgment says is that students who have passed out of Class X in a school should be admitted in Class XI in that school, if seats are available. That decision does not say that such a student must be admitted in a particular stream of his choice. In the present case, the school is not denying the petitioner admission to the school. The school is only not giving him science stream as he does not have aptitude and marks for the same. The school has admitted the writ petitioner in commerce stream without maths. We cannot see any objection to such an approach of the school and hence Payal Gupta's judgment (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case.
16. As discussed above, what Payal Gupta's case mandates is that students who have passed out of Class X from a school should be admitted to Class XI in that school, if seats are available. This mandate is being followed in the present case. Respondent No.1 has been given admission to Class XI and is attending classes in the same school. Payal Gupta's case does not require the school to give admission to the student in a stream of his choice even if seats are available in that stream. In fact, such a question did not even arise for decision by the Supreme Court. The contention of learned counsel in this regard deserves to be rejected. It must be remembered in this context that a case is only an authority for what it decides. As observed by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra :-
"A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. On this topic this is what Earl of Halsbury,LC said in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495:
"Now before discussing the case of Allen v. Flood (1898) AC 1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically Page 2009 from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all."
17. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and Ors. the Supreme Court observed:-
"The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it."
18. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd (2003) 2 SC 111 (vide para 59), the Supreme observed:-
" It is well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision."
19. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd and Anr. v. N.R.Vairamani and Anr. (AIR 2004 SC 778), a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation.
20. In the same judgment the Supreme Court also observed:-
" Court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.
In London Graving dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton (1951 AC 737 at p.761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:
"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Wiles,J as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to distract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge."
10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co (1970 (2) All ER 294) Lord Reid said, "Lord Atkin's speech ... is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition it will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry,J in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of Russell L.J as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972 (2) WLR 537) Lord Morris said:
"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in setting of the facts of a particular case."
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11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper.
12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:
"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and Anr. is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of Anr.. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to Anr. case is not at all decisive."
*** *** *** "Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it."
21. The writ petitioner got only 60% marks in science whereas the school has fixed minimum 70% marks in Class X for admission to the science stream in Class XI.
22. It appears that the school has taken a policy decision and it is not proper for this Court to interfere in such decisions.
23. It is well settled that in policy matters this Court has a very limited scope of interference vide Union of India v. International Trading Co,, , State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya, , Krishnan Kakkanth v. Government of Kerala , G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council and Federation of Railway Officers Association v. Union of India, .
24. In Union of India v. International Trading Co. 2003 (51) ALR 598 (vide Paragraph 17) the Supreme Court observed:
"The Courts as observed in G.P. Mahajan v.Jalgaon Municipal Council, are kept out of the lush field of administration policy except where the policy is inconsistent with the express or implied provision of a statute which creates the power to which the policy relates, or where a decision made in purported exercise of power is such that a repository of the power acting reasonably and in good faith could not have made it. But there has to be a word of caution. Something overwhelming must appear before the Court will intervene. That is and ought to be a difficult onus for an applicant to discharge. The Courts are not very good at formulating or evaluating policy. Sometimes when the Courts have intervened on policy Page 2011 grounds the Court's view of the range of policies open under the statute or of what is unreasonable policy has not got public acceptance. On the contrary, curial views of policy have been subjected to stringent criticism.
As Professor Wade points out (in Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade, 6th Edition), there is ample room within the legal boundaries for radical differences of opinion in which neither side is unreasonable. The reasonableness in administrative law must therefore distinguish between proper course and improper abuse of power. Nor is the test the Court's own standard of reasonableness as it might conceive it in a given situation. The point to note is that the thing is not unreasonable in the legal sense merely because the Court thinks it to be unwise."
25. In Tamil Nadu Education Dept., Ministerial and General Subordinate Services Association v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., , the Supreme Court while examining the scope of interference by the Courts in public policy held that the Court cannot strike down a circular/Government Order or a policy merely because there is a variation or contradiction. The Court observed: "Life is sometimes contradiction and even inconsistency is not always a virtue. What is important is to know whether mala fides vitiates or irrational and extraneous factors fouls".
26. In that decision that Court also observed :
"Once, the principle is found to be rational, the fact that a few freak instances of hardship may arise on either side cannot be a ground to invalidate the order or the policy. Every cause claims a martyr and however, unhappy we be to see the seniors of yesterdays becoming the juniors of today, this is an area where, absent arbitrariness and irrationality, the Court has to adopt a hands-off policy."
27. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and High Secondary Education and Ors. v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kumarsheth, , the Supreme Court considered the scope of judicial review in a case of policy decision and held as under:-
"The Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the policy evolved by the Legislature and the sub-ordinate regulation making body. It may be a wise policy, which will fully effectuate the purpose of the enactment or it may be lacking in effectiveness and hence calling for revision and improvement. But any drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a rule or regulation will not render it ultra vires and the Court cannot strike it down on the ground that in its opinion, it is not a wise or prudent policy but is even a foolish one, and that it will not really serve to effectuate the purpose of the Act. The legislature and its delegate are the sole repositories of the power to decide what policy should be pursued in relation to matters covered by the Act and there is not scope for any interference by the Courts unless the particular provision impugned before it can be said to suffer from any legal infirmity in the sense of its being wholly beyond the scope of Page 2012 the regulation-making power or it being inconsistent with any of the provisions of the parent enactment or in violation of any of the limitation imposed by the Constitution."
28. A similar view has been reiterated in Delhi Science Forum and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr., ; UP. Katha Factories Association v. State of U.P. and Ors., ; and Rameshwar Prasad v. Managing Director, U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Limited and Ors. .
29. In Netai Bag and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., , the Supreme Court observed:
"The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by the government merely because it feels that Anr. decision would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or logical."
30. The Government is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments and policy decisions which may be necessary or called for under the prevalent peculiar circumstances. While deciding the said case, the Court referred to and relied upon its earlier judgments in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nandlal Jaiswal, and Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, , wherein the Court held that judicial interference with policy decision is permissible only if the decision is shown to be patently arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide. A similar view has been reiterated in Union of India and Ors. v. Dinesh Engineering Corporation and Anr. .
31. In Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi Administration and Ors. , it has been held that in exercise of their powers of judicial review, the Courts do not ordinarily interfere with policy decisions of the executive unless the policy can be faulted on the ground of mala fide, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or unfairness etc. If the policy cannot be touched on any of these grounds, the mere fact that it may affect the interests of a party does not justify invalidating the policy.
32. In State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. v. Padam Dev and Ors. , the Supreme Court held that unless a policy decision is Page 2013 demonstrably capricious or arbitrary and not informed by any reason or discriminatory or infringing any statute or the Constitution it cannot be a subject of judicial interference under the provisions of Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution. Similar view, has been reiterated in State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Lata Arun, .
33. This Court cannot ordinarily interfere in administrative matters, since the administrative authorities are specialists in matters relating to the administration. The court does not have the expertise in such matters, and ordinarily should leave such matters to the discretion of the administrative authorities. It is only in rare and exceptional cases, where the Wednesbury principle applies, that the Court should interfere, vide Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651, Om Kumar v. Union of India, 2001 (2) SCC 386. In U.P., Financial Corporation v. Naini Oxygen & Acetylence Gas Ltd. the Supreme Court observed:
"However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Corporation is an independent autonomous statutory body having its own constitution and rules to abide by, and functions and obligations to discharge. As such, in the discharge of its function it is free to act according to its own light. The views it forms and the decisions it takes are on the basis of the information in its possession and the advice it receives and according to its own perspective and calculations. Unless its action is mala fide, even a wrong decision taken by it is not open to challenge. It is not for the Courts or a third party to substitute its decision, however more prudent, commercial or business like it may be, for the decision of the Corporation. Hence, whatever the wisdom ( or the lack of it ) of the conduct of the Corporation, the same cannot be assailed by making the Corporation liable."
34. In Haryana Financial Corporation and Anr. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills and Anr. (2002) 1 UPLBEC 937 (vide paragraph 10) the Supreme Court observed:
"If the High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the decisions and orders of quasi-judicial authorities, it follows equally that it cannot do so in the case of administrative authorities. In the matter of administrative action, it is well known that more than one choice is available to the administrative authorities. They have a certain amount of discretion available to them. They have "a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred". (per Lord Diplock in Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Metropolitan Borough Counsel of Tameside, 1977 AC 1014). The Court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of administrative authorities in such cases. Only when the action of the administrative authority is so unfair or unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken that action, the Court can intervene. To quote the classic passage from the judgment Page 2014 of Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, 1947 (2) ALL ER 680:
"It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyer familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word 'unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general discretion of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with the discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority".
35. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India the Supreme Court observed:
(3)The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action.
(4)The Court does not sit as a court of appeal over administrative decisions but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made.
(5)The Court does not have the expertise to correct an administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise, which itself may be fallible."
As Lord Denning observed:
"This power to overturn executive decisions must be exercised very carefully, because you have got to remember that the executive and the local authorities have their very own responsibilities and they have the right to make decisions. The courts should be very wary about interfering and only interfere in extreme cases, that is, cases where the Court is sure they have gone wrong in law or they have been utterly unreasonable. Otherwise you would get a conflict between the courts and the government and the authorities, which would be most undesirable. The courts must act very warily in this matter." (See 'Judging the World' by Garry Sturgess Philip Chubb).
36. In our opinion judges must maintain judicial self restraint while exercising the powers of judicial review of administrative or legislative decisions.
"In view of the complexities of modern society," wrote Justice Frankfurter, while Professor of Law at Harvard University, "and the restricted scope of any man's experience, tolerance and humility in passing judgment on the worth of the experience and beliefs of Ors. become crucial faculties in the disposition of cases. The successful exercise of such judicial power calls for rare intellectual disinterestedness and penetration, lest limitation in personal Page 2015 experience and imagination operate as limitations of the Constitution. These insights Mr.Justice Holmes applied in hundreds of cases and expressed in memorable language:
"It is a misfortune if a judge reads his conscious or unconscious sympathy with one side or the other prematurely into the law, and forgets that what seem to him to be first principles are believed by half his fellow men to be wrong."
37. In writing a biographical essay on the celebrated Justice Holmes of the U.S.Supreme Court in the dictionary of American Biography, Justice Frankfurter wrote:
"It was not for him (Holmes) to prescribe for society or to deny it the right of experimentation within very wide limits. That was to be left for contest by the political forces in the state. The duty of the Court was to keep the ring free. He reached the democratic result by the philosophic route of skepticism " by his disbelief in ultimate answers to social questions. Thereby he exhibited the judicial function at its purest."
(see 'Essays on Legal History in Honour of Felix Frankfurter' Edited by Morris D.Forkosch).
38. In our opinion adjudication must be done within the system of historically validated restraints and conscious minimization of the judges' preferences. The Court must not embarrass the administrative authorities and must realize that administrative authorities have expertise in the field of administration while the Court does not. In the word of Chief Justice Neely:
"I have very few illusions about my own limitations as a Judge. I am not an accountant, electrical engineer, financier, banker, stockbroker or system management analyst. It is the height of folly to expect Judges intelligently to review a 5000 page record addressing the intricacies of a public utility operation. It is not the function of a Judge to act as a super board, or with the zeal of a pedantic school master substituting its judgment for that of the administrator."
39. In administrative matters the Court should therefore ordinarily defer to the judgment of the administrators unless the decision is clearly illegal or shockingly arbitrary. In this connection Justice Frankfurter while Professor of Law at Harvard University wrote in 'The Public and its Government'"
"With the great men of the Supreme Court constitutional adjudication has always been statecraft. As a mere Judge, Marshall had his superiors among his colleagues. His supremacy lay in his recognition of the practical needs of government. The great judges are those to whom the Constitution is not primarily a text for interpretation but the means of ordering the life of a progressive people."
40. In the same book Justice Frankfurter also wrote"
"In simple truth, the difficulties that government encounters from law do not inhere in the Constitution. They are due to the judges who interpret it. That document has ample resources for imaginative statesmanship, if judges have imagination for statesmanship."
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41. In Keshvanand Bharathi v. State of Kerala, Khanna J. observed:
"In exercising the power of judicial review, the Courts cannot be oblivious of the practical needs of the government. The door has to be left open for trial and error."
42. In Indian Railway Construction Co.Limited v. Ajay Kumar (2003) 2 UPLBEC 1206 (vide paragraph 14) the Supreme Court observed that there are three grounds on which administration action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is illegality, the second is irrationality and the third is procedural impropriety. These principles were highlighted by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister of the Civil Service 1984 (3) All ER 935. The Supreme Court observed that the Court will be slow to interfere in such matters relating to administrative functions unless the decision is tainted by any vulnerability enumerated above, like illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. The famous case, commonly known as the 'Wednesbury's case' is treated as the landmark in laying down various principles relating to judicial review of administrative or statutory discretion.
43. Lord Diplock explained irrationality as follows:
"By irrationality I mean what can be now be succinctly referred to as Wednesbury unreasonableness. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it."
44. No doubt in the present case the policy decision is that of the management of the school and not of the Government, but in our opinion there is no real difference between the policy decisions of the Government and the policy decisions of other bodies so far as the principle enunciated above is concerned. In our opinion the policy decision of the school in fixing the minimum marks for admission in science stream cannot be said to be so outrageous in defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person could have arrived at it. The school has to safeguard and uphold its reputation and at the same time it does not want to put children who do not have sufficient aptitude in maths and science to such a stress that they may not able to cope up with the subject and they may even be harmed mentally or physically. In our opinion the school management has expertise in the matter and the Court should not strike down administrative decisions solely because it is perceived by it to be unwise. A Judge cannot act on the belief that he he knows better than the executive on a question of policy, because he can never be justifiably certain that he is right. Judicial humility should, therefore, prevail over judicial activism in this respect.
45. In Krishnan Kakkanth v. Government of Kerala, the Supreme Court observed:
Page 2017 "To ascertain unreasonableness and arbitrariness in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution, it is not necessary to enter upon any exercise for finding out the wisdom in the policy decision of the State Government. It is immaterial whether a better or more comprehensive policy decision could have been taken. It is equally immaterial if it can be demonstrated that the policy decision is unwise and is likely to defeat the purpose for which such decision has been taken. Unless the policy decision is demonstratably capricious or arbitrary and not informed by any reason whatsoever or it suffers from the vice of discrimination or infringes any statute or provisions of the Constitution, the policy decision cannot be struck down. It should be borne in mind that except for the limited purpose of testing the public policy in the context of illegality and unconstitutionality, courts should avoid "embarking on uncharted ocean of public policy".
46. In TMA Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. the Supreme Court observed vide para 55:-
"the essence of a private educational institution is the autonomy that the institution must have in its management and administration. There, necessarily, has to be a difference in the administration of private unaided institutions and the Government-aided institutions. Whereas in the latter case, the Government will have greater say in administration, including admissions and fixing of fees, in the case of private unaided institutions, maximum autonomy in the day-to-day administration has to be with the private unaided institutions. Bureaucratic or governmental interference in the administration of such an institution will undermine its independence."
47. It is well settled that in academic/educational matters Courts should be reluctant to interfere vide Rajendra Prasad Mathur v. Karnataka University, , J. P. Kulshreshtra v. Allahabad University, , University of Mysore v. Govinda Rao, , etc.
48. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied on admission criteria for Class XI in Government schools. In our opinion this has no application to the present case because the appellant school is not a Government school.
49 Learned counsel for the respondent (writ petitioner) has also submitted that imposing of cut-off marks is without any statutory sanction. In our opinion it is not necessary that there must be a statutory sanction for imposing of Page 2018 such cut-off marks. The school is free to take such policy decision as it deems fit for maintaining its standards and reputation.
50. An administrative decision does not always require a statutory sanction. For instance, it is well settled that for holding interviews for selection/admissions short-listing can be done, and it is not necessary that all those who have got marks above the statutory minimum marks must necessarily be called for the interview. In such cases the authorities can impose a non-statutory cut-off minimum marks at their discretion, and as long as there is no discrimination, the Court will not interfere, vide M.P. Public Service Commission v. Navnit Kumar Potdar, .
51. In this case there is no allegation that there is discrimination against the writ petitioner.
52. For the reasons given above, the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside.