Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Shri V S Verma vs Delhi Development Authority on 15 March, 2010
Central Administrative Tribunal Principal Bench, New Delhi O.A.No.501/2009 This the 15th day of March 2010 Honble Shri Shanker Raju, Member (J) Honble Dr. Ramesh Chandra Panda, Member (A) Shri V S Verma Aged about 56 years s/o Shri Bhika Ram r/o House No.91, Village Gazipur, Delhi-96 ..Applicant (By Advocates: Shri Sidharth Joshi and Ms. Preeti Chaurasia) Versus 1. Delhi Development Authority through its Vice Chairman Vikas Sadan, INA, New Delhi 2. Shri Nand Lal Finance Member Delhi Development Authority Vikas Sadan, INA, New Delhi 3. Shri Pramila H Bhargava Commissioner (Personnel) Delhi Development Authority Vikas Sadan, INA, New Delhi ..Respondents (By Advocate: Shri Karunesh Tandon) O R D E R
Shri Shanker Raju:
An Assistant, by virtue of this OA, impugns respondents order dated 25.6.2008 whereby on a minor penalty charge sheet, a penalty of withholding of one increment for one year without cumulative effect has been imposed upon the applicant. Also assailed is an order passed on 23.12.2008 upholding the punishment at the appellate level.
2. Applicant working as an Assistant has been issued a memorandum for a minor penalty under Regulation 27 of DDA Conduct, Disciplinary and Appeal Regulation, 1999 on the ground that while putting up letters as to the assessment of requirement of land to the Secretary/President, Mansarover CGHS Ltd. instead of sending the communication at Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi, he negligently prepared and put the letter to Deputy Director, who had sent the same at the old address, which was neither approved by the RCS nor was any consultation made. Applicant, who responded to the aforesaid clearly stated that as per the documents available and the letter written by the housing society, the address was not furnished by the RCS and the only available address was at New Delhi, on which the communication has been sent. It is also stated that no loss has been caused to the DDA and on a mere judgment of error such a penalty imposed cannot be sustained in law.
3. It is also stated that in one of the cases once the superior officer has also sent recommendations, the junior officer was let-off, i.e., Ved Prakash, Superintendent in identical situation. As such, applicant alleges discrimination.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents vehemently opposed the contentions and stated that the applicant has never verified the address of the RCS where the society was registered and has sent the letters to a wrong address with negligence, which is a misconduct and he has been appropriately punished. It is stated that no infirmity has cropped up in the inquiry.
5. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the records.
6. Negligence is a misconduct only which has culpability with a resulted damage, as ruled by the Apex Court in Union of India v. J. Ahmed, 1979 (2) SCC 286. It is also held by the Apex Court in Inspector, Prem Chand v. Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi & others, 2007 (5) SCALE 421 that an error of judgment is not a misconduct.
7. In the above view of the mater, the applicant was punished for sending letters at a wrong address, yet we find on the record that the only address of the society available as supplied by the RCS was at a place where letters have been sent by the applicant. Moreover, no address was available, except the old one in the record of DDA.
8. Moreover, the communication of the society with DDA shows the address on which the communication was sent by the applicant. As such bonafidely, the applicant had sent the letters to the available address. Even the superior officer has forwarded the same. In the above view of the matter, we do not find any malafide and wrongful intention on part of the applicant. Mere sending letters on a wrong address, which has not culminated in any loss to the DDA, the minor penalty imposed is on a judgment of error, which would not amount to a misconduct.
9. Moreover, once the higher authority has been found responsible in case of Shri Ved Prakash, Superintendent, punishing the applicant would be discriminatory under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
10. Apart from the above grounds on seeing the orders passed by the disciplinary as well as appellate authorities, we find that both the orders are passed without dealing with the contentions of the applicant and are non-speaking, which cannot be countenanced in law.
11. Resultantly, OA is allowed. Impugned orders are set aside. Consequences to follow in accordance with law. No costs.
( Dr. Ramesh Chandra Panda ) ( Shanker Raju ) Member (A) Member (J) /sunil/