Central Information Commission
Shri Vinod Surana vs Life Insurance Corporation Of ... on 24 October, 2008
CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION
2nd Floor, August Kranti Bhawan
New Delhi-110066
Complaint No.CIC/AT/A/2007/01502
Dated : 24th October, 2008
Name of the Appellant: Shri Vinod Surana
No.224, NSC Bose Road
Chennai-600 001.
Public Authority: Life Insurance Corporation of India
Chennai.
Date of Hearing 30.07.2008
Date of Decision 24.10.2008
FACTS OF THE CASE:
1. This case was first heard on 7.5.2008. The complainant was present through his Counsel, Shri Kalyan Jhabak, while the respondents requested exemption from appearance at the hearing. At the time of hearing, following points were raised by the complainant:-
(i) That there was a concerted attempt by both CPIO and Appellate Authority of concealment of facts regarding compliance by the respondents with the statutory requirements cast on them by the Tamil Nadu Lifts Act, 1997;1
(ii) The CPIO evaded answering the complainant's queries by saying that the lift was out of commission since March, 2007.
(iii) The First Appellate Authority's decision was communicated to him under the signature of the CPIO and this proves that the Appellate Authority was guided solely by the CPIO. The Appellate Authority was not independently applying his mind to the task at hand.
2. The respondents, on the other hand, through their written-submissions stated that the intention of the complainant was to harass the officials of the LIC and to force wastage of respondents' resources.
3. The Commission, after perusal of the records, observed as follows:-
"11. The T.N. Lifts Act, 1997 was brought into force for the precise purpose of ensuring that those who are using the Lifts are not exposed to the risk of accidents. A duty was cast on the respondents not only to obtain a license for the lift, but also to have it regularly inspected and to renew the license each year. Any citizen of the country has all the right to know from the respondents whether or not they comply with the provisions of the statute. No amount of whining about ongoing litigation and so on will absolve the respondents of the responsibility cast on them both under the T.N. Lifts Act and the RTI Act.
12. The Commission noted that the position taken by the respondents was not only untenable it smacked of imperious notions about their own assumed lofty positions. This is 2 further evidenced by the fact that, as pointed out by the complainant, the Appellate Authority herein, the Zonal Manager considers himself so lofty that he would not even sign the communication as First Appellate Authority to the appellant. It is time these functionaries are taught the virtues of humility."
4. In the light of the above observations, the following directions were issued by the Commission:-
"(i) Summons be issued to the AA, Shri B.Manivannan, Zonal Manager and the CPIO, Shri Venkateswaran to be present for further hearing in the matter on 30.07.2008 at 1200 Noon.
(ii) Show-cause notice for penalty under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act be issued to the CPIO, Shri Venkateswaran for giving misleading and evasive reply to the complainant. Returnable in 2 weeks.
(iii) A notice may be issued to the AA, Shri B.Manivannan to explain why he did not sign the decision taken by him in the first-appeal of the complainant in spite of the fact that he was discharging a statutory duty (Section 19(1)), which could not be delegated to others. He should show cause as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him.
(iv) Show-cause notices (Section 19(8)(b)) be issued to the head of the public authority, viz. Chairman & Managing Director, Life Insurance Corporation of India and the Appellate Authority as to why a compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand) only may not be awarded to the complainant for the harassment and detriment suffered by the complainant due to 3
a) non-serious disposal of the appellant's RTI-
application through giving evasive and misleading response, and
b) delayed response by the AA.
(v) A direction may issue to the head of the public authority, viz. CMD, LIC to institute an enquiry as to how a file pertaining to statutory compliance by the respondents to the requirement of the Tamil Nadu Lifts Act could go missing. This enquiry report should be made available to the Commission within 4 weeks from the date of this order.
(vi) AA has stated in his order that the file and the documents related to the RTI-query of the complainant had gone missing. He should furnish a sworn-affidavit within 4 weeks of this order as to who informed him that this file had gone missing.
(vii) A sworn affidavit must also be filed, within 4 weeks of this order, by the holder of the information, who furnished the above information to the AA."
5. The aforesaid orders of the Commission were duly communicated to the CPIO, the First Appellate Authority and the Chairman and the Managing Director of the respondent Public Authority.
6. CPIO, Appellate Authority and the Chairman, LIC have separately filed their written-submissions in response to the show-cause notices issued to them. All replies are dated 21.6.2008 and were received by the Commission on 01.07.2008.
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7. In pursuance of the order of the Commission, the respondent Public Authority ordered an enquiry in regard to the missing records. The enquiry was conducted by Shri S.K. Mitter, Executive Director (Insp), LIC. The inquiry report dated 26.06.2008 was submitted by the Managing Director, vide his letter dated 02.07.2008.
8. The matter was heard on the scheduled date of hearing, i.e. 30.07.2008. The complainant was represented by his Counsel, Shri Kalyan Jhabak. Shri P.N. Lekhi, Senior Advocate argued the case on behalf of the respondent Public Authority as well as on behalf of the CPIO and the Appellate Authority. The following were present at the time of hearing:-
APPELLANT:
Shri Kalyan Jhabak for Vinod Surana RESPONDENTS:
1. Shri J. Venkateswaran, Former Secretary [Estate] CPIO) SZ, LIC of India
2. Shri B. Manivannan Zonal Manager, LIC Southern Zonal Office
3. Shri P.N. Lekhi, Senior Advocate
4. Shri Kamal Mehta, Advocate 5 ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION:
I. Whether imposition of penalty under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act on the CPIO for giving misleading and evasive reply to the complainant is justified?
II. Whether a departmental proceedings should be directed to be initiated against Shri B. Manivannan, Zonal Manager, LIC.
III. Whether award of compensation is justified for the harassment and detriment, if any suffered by the complainant?
IV. What further orders/directions can be issued in this case?
DECISIONS & REASONS:
9. Mr. P.N. Lekhi, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the respondents, has broadly made the following submissions:-
(i) that the Commission has already pre-decided the whole issue and has come to the conclusion to impose penalty / recommend drawal of disciplinary proceedings; and
(ii) that the First Appellate Authority is a quasi-judicial authority constituted under the RTI Act and that issue of notice to the First Appellate Authority is, therefore, outside the powers conferred on the Commission.6
Giving example, the Senior Counsel argued at length that the lower courts are never made a party even though their decisions are challenged before the superior courts. It is never so that the presiding officer of a lower court, which has passed an order, is called upon to appear and explain it before the Appellate Court or Authority.
10. Since the submissions made by Shri Lekhi, Senior Counsel are in the nature of preliminary objections, it will be, therefore, desirable to decide the above matter before the substantive issues are dealt with.
11. Shri Lekhi has contended that the Commission has already pre-decided the whole matter. According to him, the Commission has also decided to impose penalty on the CPIO and recommend initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the First Appellate Authority. It may be mentioned that the findings of the Commission recorded in the order dated 30.05.2008 were on the basis of the records and the submissions received by the Commission. What the Commission was dealing with was not an appeal-petition, but a complaint filed and registered under Section 18 of the RTI Act. As such, the Commission was not adjudicating on any issues, but was enquiring as to whether the complainant:
(i) had been given a response to a request for information or access to information within the time-limit specified under this Act; or
(ii) whether the information given by the CPIO was incomplete or misleading as alleged by the complainant.7
12. At the time when the matter was first heard on 30.05.2008, the complainant had submitted that CPIO had evaded answering the complainant's queries by saying that the lift was out of operation since March, 2007 and the Appellate Authority had made the evasion worse by saying that the records and documents were 'not traceable'. The complainant took serious objection to the fact that the response in pursuance of the first-appeal petition was communicated to him under the signature of the CPIO and not the Appellate Authority. The complainant, therefore, was apprehensive that the Appellate Authority was guided solely by the CPIO and was not independently applying his mind to the task at hand.
13. On receipt of the complaint-petition, Commission had asked the CPIO and the Appellate Authority both to appear before it. The Appellate Authority was, however, given the option either to appear in person or authorize an officer not below the rank of CPIO who was conversant with the matter to represent him. At the time of hearing, neither the CPIO nor the First Appellate Authority or any of his representatives were present.
14. In their written-response submitted before the Commission, the CPIO and the First Appellate Authority thus did not respond to the facts in issue in the complaint case. Instead, they raised irrelevant issues such as that the appellant was engaged in litigation against them. The Commission, inter-alia, took a serious view of the respondents' filing inane and pointless written-submissions, while they were expected to assist the Commission by informing it as to why they could not provide the information requested. Under the circumstances, the 8 Commission inferred that the respondents had taken a position which was not only untenable, but also smacked of imperious notion about their own assumed lofty positions. Under these circumstances, the Commission had to issue summons for personal appearance of both the CPIO and the First Appellate Authority. The Commission also took serious note of the fact that communication which should have been signed by the First Appellate Authority was communicated under the signature of the CPIO who was otherwise respondent in a quasi-judicial proceeding before the First Appellate Authority. The First Appellate Authority totally ignored the fact that it was discharging a statutory duty under Section 19(1) of the RTI Act and it was unaware of the fact that this duty could not be delegated to a party to the proceeding.
15. The Commission has, therefore, recorded findings of fact regarding denial of information to the application. It also came to a prima-facie determination that the RTI-application and the First Appeal had been dealt with in a very casual and non-serious manner and, that as specified in Section 18(2), there were reasonable grounds to hold an enquiry in the matter. What remained to be decided was whether the CPIO or the First Appellate Authority was liable to be proceeded under Section 20 of the Act and as to whether the respondent Public Authority was liable to pay the compensation for the loss and detriment suffered by the applicant under Section 19(8)(b). This finding was, however, prima-facie in nature and subject to rebuttal by the CPIO, the First Appellate Authority and the respondent Public Authority.
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16. The 2nd submission of the Senior Counsel was that the First Appellate Authority was a quasi-judicial authority under the RTI Act and as such, the issue of notice to the First Appellate Authority was outside the powers conferred on the Commission.
17. No doubt a judicial officer or a lower court is generally not involved in a case as a respondent in an appeal preferred against a decision by such lower Court in a judicial proceeding. This is because a judicial officer or a court is not connected either with the facts in issue or with the parties to the proceedings. The court or the judicial officer is unconcerned with the outcome of the appeal and as such, there is no necessity for impleading him in an appeal proceeding even though the appeal may involve a legal challenge to the order passed by him/it. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Savitri Devi Vs. District Judge, Gorakhpur" (AIR1999SC976) disapproved impleading of a judicial officer who disposed of the matter in a civil proceeding in a writ petition filed in the High Court. The court ruled that --
"There was no necessity for impleading the judicial officers who disposed of the matter in a civil proceeding when the writ petition was filed in the High Court; nor is there any justification for impleading them as parties in the Special Leave Petition and describing them as contesting respondents. We do not approve of the course adopted by the petitioner which would cause unnecessary disturbance to the functions of the concerned judicial officers. They cannot be in any way equated to the officials of the Government. It is high time that the practice of impleading judicial officers disposing of civil proceedings as parties to writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or Special Leave Petitions 10 under Article 136 of the Constitution of India was stopped. We are strongly deprecating such a practice."
18. In this context, it would be pertinent to refer to a decision of the Karnataka High Court in Civil Writ Petition No.2928 of 2008 decided on 29.2.2008 (AIR 2008Kar 149). In this case, the State Information Commission, Karnataka moved a petition before the Hon'ble High Court seeking deletion of its name from the array of the parties. Rejecting the petition of the State Information Commission, Karnataka, the Hon'ble High Court has observed --
"The Commission cannot be equated to a civil court. The Commission is neither directly subordinate to the High Court nor its orders are subject to appellate or revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The Commission is not even under the administrative control of the High Court. Therefore, I am of the view that the Commission is a necessary party to the proceedings because in its absence, an effective order cannot be made. The presence of the Commission is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceedings."
19. Similarly, in Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia Vs. Additional Member, Board of Revenue, Bihar (AIR1963SC786), while dealing with the necessity of impleading parties as necessary or proper parties to a proceeding, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
"7. To answer the question raised it would be convenient at the outset to ascertain who are necessary or proper parties in a proceeding. The law on the subject is well settled; it is enough if we state the principle. A necessary party is one without whom no order 11 can be made effectively; a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding."
20. Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that a subordinate court or a tribunal which passed a decree, in an appeal before the higher court, need not be made a party but it was different in the case of writ of certiorari inasmuch as if the tribunal or authority is not made party to the writ, it can easily ignore the order of the High Court. The Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:
"9. .... It is said that in an appeal against the decree of a subordinate court, the court that passed the decree need not be made a party and on the same parity of reasoning it is contended that a tribunal need not also be made a party in a writ proceeding. But there is an essential distinction between an appeal against a decree of a subordinate court and a writ of certiorari to quash the order of a tribunal or authority : in the former, the proceedings are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure and the court making the order is directly subordinate to the appellate court and ordinarily acts within its bounds, though sometimes wrongly or even illegally, but in the case of the latter, a writ of certiorari is issued to quash the order of a tribunal which is ordinarily outside the appellate or revisional jurisdiction of the court and the order is set aside on the ground that the tribunal or authority acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. If such a tribunal or authority is not made party to the writ, it can easily ignore the order of the High Court quashing its order, for, not being a party, it will not be liable to contempt. In these circumstances whoever else is a necessary party or not the authority or tribunal is certainly a necessary party to such a proceeding. In this case, the Board of Revenue and the 12 Commissioner of Excise were rightly made parties in the writ petition.
21. The RTI Act does not per-se define a First Appellate Authority (AA) but only describes in Section 19(1) that he (the AA) must be a serving officer of the Public Authority and that he must be senior in rank to the CPIO. (Even a third party also has been conferred a right to an appeal before the First Appellate Authority.) There is no doubt that a First Appellate Authority is exercising statutory power and is, therefore, required to act in a judicial manner. All proceedings before an Appellate Authority are `quasi-judicial'. Being a quasi-judicial authority, a First Appellate Authority is obliged to give a decision only after hearing all parties to a case. But can a First Appellate Authority be equated with a court or be regarded as a judicial authority? The answer is clearly in the negative. The very fact that the RTI Act does not per-se define a First Appellate Authority but only describes that it shall be an officer who is senior in rank to the CPIO, makes it clear that such an officer cannot be regarded as a judicial officer, nor can he be equated with a court of law, although it is expected, that being an officer of the same department / public authority, he will be a neutral umpire between an information-seeker and the CPIO.
22. The First Appellate Authority is a subordinate Appellate Authority and its orders are appealable before the Information Commission constituted under the RTI Act. But such an authority is not administratively subordinate to the Commission. The decision of the Commission would be binding only if such authority is there before the Commission as respondent. It is also crucial to note 13 that the First Appellate Authority is very much a part of the respondent Public Authority and is senior in rank to the CPIO. On many occasions, the AA may himself be the holder-of-the-information, or may exercise administrative control over the CPIO and may otherwise play an active role in denying information to an applicant. Therefore, it is necessary that a First Appellate Authority is impleaded as a party and even be directed to appear and present its viewpoint, if required or deemed necessary. The nature of the duty of the First Appellate Authority and its involvement with the dissemination of information process makes it more administrative rather than quasi-judicial authority. The preliminary objections of Mr. Lekhi, therefore, are not tenable.
23. The issue before the Commission is whether the response of the CPIO in pursuance of the RTI-application was misleading and evasive, so as to warrant imposition of penalty under Section 20(1) of the RTI Act. It would be pertinent to refer to the RTI-application submitted by the complainant and what was actually asked for by him. The complainant, in his RTI-application submitted on 20.8.2007, has asked for the following information:-
"1. Copy of the License for the working of the lift at the above-mentioned address issued by the Inspector of Lifts.
2. Copies of letters from the Inspector of Lift evidencing annual renewal of the license for the above-mentioned period.
3. Copies of any letters / documents from the Electrical Inspectorate (as per the Tamil Nadu Lifts Act) bringing to light any discrepancies in the maintenance of the list.14
4. Details of inspections carried out from in respect of the lift in the abovementioned building by LIC as well as the local authorities and copies of the corresponding inspection reports.
5. Which department of LIC ― the Estates Department or the Legal Department ― is responsible for follow up and compliance with the Tamil Nadu Lifts Act, 1997? Please furnish copies of documents evidencing the same.
6. Names and designations of the officer(s) of LIC responsible for maintenance and operation on the lift.
7. Copies of internal guidelines regarding ensuring periodical compliance by the Life Insurance Corporation of India with the various rules, regulations concerning its properties including complying with the National Building Code, Tamil Nadu Lifts Act, fire & safety requirements etc. issued by various Government Departments."
24. The CPIO has denied the information, vide his response sent on 14.9.2007. His response is as follows:-
"We are informed by the department concerned that our lift provided at National Insurance building has completely stopped functioning from March, 2007 and it is not fit for running and hence the question of submitting details asked for by you does not arise."
25. The complainant, in his complaint-petition, has urged that non-functioning of the lift is not justified grounds for denying information under the RTI Act. The information is of such nature that can be furnished irrespective of the non-functioning of the lift. The complainant, therefore, believes that the response 15 given is incomplete and misleading. Accordingly, he has invoked the jurisdiction of this Commission by filing the complaint-petition under Section 18 of the RTI Act.
26. In his written-submission, the CPIO stated that the post of CPIO is an additional responsibility apart from the normal duty. He has further explained that whenever any application under the RTI Act was filed in his office, his duty was to transfer it to the concerned department or office which was holding the information and thereafter obtain the same and pass it on to the applicant.
27. In the present case, the information sought related to the Engineering Department of the LIC as it concerned the functioning of the Lift in the building occupied by the appellant in this case. The building was inherited by LIC in the year 1986 and since then the lift had been giving many problems. The lift became dysfunctional in the 1990s and several attempts to repair the same failed. It was closed down in 2007. Because of this fact, no license was taken nor was it renewed. There are no corresponding records available. In his reply, the CPIO pleaded that there was no mala-fide intention and that he had provided whatever information was available with him. The letter dated 12.01.2007 sent by him to the appellant was only an intimation of action being taken on the appeal and not any final reply.
28. An analysis of the RTI-application will establish that the applicant was not asking as to whether the lift was functioning or not functioning, or whether it was fit for running. The complainant had asked for copies of documents clearly 16 specified by him. There was no ambiguity in the queries. The response given by the CPIO was entirely unrelated to what had been asked for by the applicant and hence wholly irrelevant. The applicant had asked for the copies of the documents and other particulars about running of the lift, while the CPIO's reply was informing that the lift had completely stopped functioning and that it is not fit for running. Reply was wholly incongruent with the queries.
29. The circumstances under which the information was withheld from the appellant leads to a strong inference that the CPIO has denied the information on a ground which has no relevance either to the facts-in-issue or the law. The RTI-application has been handled casually and in a most perfunctory way. The manner in which the RTI-application has been disposed of by the CPIO is evidence enough that this he has done knowingly. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Commission is of the opinion that the CPIO has knowingly and without any reasonable cause, given misleading information to the applicant and has, therefore, rendered himself liable for imposition of penalty under Section 20(1) of the Act. In the instant case, the RTI-application was submitted on 20.08.2007 and the information requested is yet to be provided. The Commission, therefore, orders imposition of maximum penalty of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) only, which shall be recoverable in three monthly installments, i.e. Rs.8,000.00 each for the first two months and, Rs.9,000/- for the last / third month, to be recovered from the salary of the CPIO, beginning with 1st December, 2008. The methods of recovery of the penalty amount and crediting it, is contained in the guideline enclosed to this order as 17 Annexe. The head of the public authority, viz. the Chairman, LIC shall report compliance to the Commission within 1 week of having effected the recovery of each installment.
30. CPIO is further directed to provide all information to the applicant within seven days from the date of receipt of this order and submit compliance report to the Commission within one week of disclosing the information. The complaint stands decided accordingly.
31. Aggrieved by the response of the CPIO, the applicant in this case approached the First Appellate Authority, i.e. the Zonal Manager, LIC, Shri B. Manivannan pointing out how the CPIO had refused to divulge the requested information. In his appeal-petition, appellant also mentioned that the information sought pertained to details such as copies of the license for the working of the lift, documents evidencing only renewal of license, officers responsible for the maintenance of the lift, etc., none of which has any relevance to the fact that the lift stopped functioning in March, 2007. The appellant submitted hat the information asked for by him under the RTI Act is of such a nature that it can be furnished irrespective of whether the lift was functional or not. From the records, it appears that the appeal-petition was sent on 24.9.2007. There is nothing on the record to show as to whether the First Appellate Authority issued any notice of hearing or heard the appellant. However, on 12.11.2007 (almost one and half months after receipt of the appeal), the CPIO and not the Appellate Authority informed the appellant as follows:- 18
"We are in receipt of the above said appeal. In this context, we wish to inform you that the relevant records are not immediately traceable by the department concerned. We shall revert to you as soon the same are located."
32. At the time when the matter was first heard, it was pointed out that the communication sent to the appellant was not signed by the First Appellate Authority but by the CPIO. The Commission noted that the position taken by the respondents was not only untenable, it smacked of imperious notion about their own assumed lofty position. At the time of hearing, none of the respondents were present and in the light of these facts, the Commission decided to issue summons for appearance of the Appellate Authority and the CPIO. The Commission also decided to issue notice to the Appellate Authority, Shri B. Manivannan, Zonal Manager, LIC Southern Zonal Office, to explain why he did not sign the appellate decision (in the first-appeal) in spite of the fact that he was discharging a statutory duty which could not be delegated to others. The Commission also asked him to show cause as to why disciplinary action (under Section 20(2) of the RTI Act) should not be initiated against him.
33. In pursuance of the above notice, the following submissions have been made by the First Appellate Authority:-
(i) That he, as the First Appellate Authority, on receipt of appeal petition on 26.09.2007, instructed his subordinate staff including the 19 CPIO to trace any related communication including those from the licensing authorities regarding the lift.
(ii) Since the relevant records were not immediately traceable, an interim acknowledgement of the appeal from the CPIO was given to the appellant and what was communicated was not any final order passed by him as Appellate Authority.
(iii) There was no intention to harass the applicant. In fact, he was only informed that the records were not readily available in the department and that the department will revert back soon.
(iv) The lift in the LIC building at Chennai was constructed in 1946 and it was inherited by the LIC in the year 1956. The lift was repeatedly in need of repair and did not function well. From the year 1980 onwards, the lift started having several operational problems which resulted in frequent break-downs. The non-availability of spare-parts compounded the problem. Considering the safety and security of the occupants, the usage of the lift was stopped from the year 2007.
(v) No information has been deliberately withheld and the response given was only an interim reply, which cannot be deemed as an appellate order. No damage or consequential loss has been caused to the applicant and the question of awarding any compensation under Section 19, therefore, does not arise.20
(vi) The First Appellate Authority has further submitted that now he is in a position to reply to each of the query of the applicant and that he is awaiting further order from the Commission for providing information.
(vii) The Appellate Authority has further submitted that under Section 20 read with Section 19(5) of the RTI Act, it is not subject to any penal jurisdiction of the CIC.
34. In pursuance of this show cause notice, the First Appellate Authority submitted that immediately after the receipt of the appeal-petition, he had instructed his subordinates including the CPIO to trace any related communication including those regarding this lift since the year 1997 when the Tamil Nadu Lifts Act came into effect. He says that what was communicated by the CPIO was interim reply by the department and not order of the Appellate Authority.
35. From the submission made by the Appellate Authority, it appears that in so far as the appeal-petition is concerned, he did not take any action as Appellate Authority. Whatever actions have been taken by him were in his administrative capacity as a superior officer of the respondent Public Authority. If that be so, he becomes as much liable for imposition of penalty as the CPIO. Admittedly, therefore, he has taken no action on the appeal-petition submitted to him under Section 19(1) of the RTI Act. In the concluding paragraphs of his response, he has submitted that he is now in a position to reply to each query of 21 the applicant but as the proceedings are pending at the CIC, he is awaiting further orders of the Commission to communicate the same in this appeal. He has expressed his willingness to send the reply to the appeal even in the reasonable time as may be fixed by this Commission. The fact remains that reply is yet to be sent to the applicant.
36. As has been observed above, the First Appellate Authority in this case has not acted as Appellate Authority, but as senior officer within the same Public Authority. The Appellate Authority itself has admitted that response given by the CPIO was not in any way connected with the Appeal Petition per-se and that he did not act as an Appellate Authority. Thus, he has merely acted as a senior officer in his administrative capacity when he has tried to give response to the applicant. The question before the Commission, therefore, is whether the response from the Appellate Authority, who happens to be an officer senior than the CPIO, is misleading or not. If it is misleading, he is liable not only under Section 20(1) but also under Section 20(2) of the Act. As has been stated above, the Appellate Authority has informed the applicant that the records are not traceable. In his written-submissions, there is no justification on what has been communicated to the applicant.
37. The First Appellate Authority is legally obliged to dispose of an appeal petition within 30 days of the receipt of the appeal or within such extended period not exceeding a total of 45 days. In this case, there is nothing on record to signify any extension of time for disposal of First Appeal. Even assuming that the 22 period of disposal of First Appeal was extended up to 45 days, still what has been communicated to the applicant is that the "records are not traceable".
38. In this context, it is also pertinent to refer to 2nd proviso of Section 20(1) of the Act, which provides that the burden of proof is on the CPIO/officer concerned. It is he who has to establish that after receipt of the application seeking information, he has acted in a diligent manner.
39. The inconsistencies between the statements made by the CPIO and the First Appellate Authority leave no doubt that a misleading information has been given deliberately and knowingly to the applicant. This renders both the CPIO and the First Appellate Authority liable. The Commission, vide its earlier order has decided and called upon the CPIO to show cause as to why a penalty as provided under Section 20(1) of the Act be not imposed on him. Similarly, the First Appellate Authority was called upon to show cause as to why a disciplinary proceedings be not recommended against him under Section 20(2) of the Act. The Commission is of the view that the First Appellate Authority, being an officer senior in rank to the CPIO, is liable to be proceeded against as he has --
(i) caused delay in furnishing of information beyond the period prescribed under the Act;
(ii) provided misleading information to the applicant.
40. The Commission accordingly directs the head of the public authority, viz. Chairman, LIC to initiate appropriate disciplinary proceedings against the 23 Appellate Authority, Shri B. Manivannan, Zonal Manager and report compliance to the Commission within 45 days from the date of receipt of this decision.
41. The issue that needs to be decided now is whether the complainant has suffered any detriment or loss so as to necessitate award of compensation under Section 19(8)(b) of the RTI Act.
42. In pursuance of the Show Cause Notice issued to the respondent public authority, the Chairman of the L.I.C., Shri T.S. Vijayan, in his response has submitted that the Managing Director has taken immediate steps to advise the Zonal Manager, Southern Zone Office, vide letter dated 13.5.2008 to take remedial action immediately and to set right the irregularities. The general directions have been given that the RTI matters be handled with utmost seriousness in the Southern Zonal Office. He also submitted that, as ordered by the Commission, Shri S.K. Mitter, Executive Director (Inspection) from the Central Office, has been directed to conduct an enquiry and the report will be placed before the Commission within 4 weeks.
43. Insofar as the RTI-application and the way it has been dealt with, the Chairman of the L.I.C. has merely forwarded what has been stated by the Zonal Manager in his reply, which is as under:-
(a) The lift referred to was installed in the year 1946.
(b) The building was inherited by LIC of India in the year 1956.
(c) The Tamil Nadu Lifts Act came into force in the year 1997.24
(d) LIC has had no query or complaint or intimation received about the lift from the Tamil Nadu Government Authorities.
(e) It was impossible to repair the lift since the technology had become obsolete.
(f) The lift stopped functioning from March, 2007. Hence the reply given by the CPIO is the correct information.
(g) As for the appeal, which was received on 24.9.2007, against the order dated 14.9.2007, the matter was probed further, but no records could be located.
(h) The Zonal Manager submits that the reply dated 12.11.2007 by the CPIO was only an interim reply, i.e. "That the records are not immediately traceable and they would revert as soon as records are located."
(i) In none of the communication, it was informed to the applicant that the file was missing.
(j) The Zonal Manager had ordered the Department to produce all the records in connection with the lift as per the Lifts Act, to rule out any possibility of omission. This, according to the Zonal Manager, was the reason for the delay in passing the Appellate Order.
44. From the above, it appears that no explanation has been given either about the delay in furnishing of the information or about misleading information being given. There is an assurance from the Chairman that the CPIO and the Appellate Authority of the Southern Zone Office would be serious in 25 implementing the provisions of the RTI Act, 2005. It is a fact that the complainant, who submitted an application seeking information on 20.08.2007, is yet to receive the information asked for by him, even though the information asked for by him was held by and available with the public authority. The enquiry conducted by Shri S.K. Mitter has also affirmatively stated that the office is maintaining record pertaining to the Tamil Nadu Lifts Act and that all relevant records like licenses and AMCs are maintained, each building-wise, where the particular lift is installed. The respondent public authority and its officers, more particularly the CPIO and the Appellate Authority, should have made these records available to the applicant, instead of sending cryptic reply that "records are not traceable".
45. The Right to Information Act, 2005 empowers a citizen and entitles him to get an information from a public authority and any denial of this right by a public authority without any just and reasonable cause results in detriment. In this case, the complainant has suffered loss due to non-availability of information and due to the fact that he had to approach this Commission for seeking redress. This, therefore, is a fit case where award of compensation is justified. Accordingly, it is ordered that the respondent public authority, viz. LIC shall pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) only to the complainant for the loss and detriment suffered by him due to non-furnishing of information. The Chairman, LIC may, in his discretion, recover this amount from the officers responsible for the negligence and the delay which caused harassment and detriment to the appellant.
26 The issue is decided accordingly.
46. Before parting with this appeal, the Commission would like to state that what the applicant wanted was a simple information available with the public authority and it could have been easily made available by the CPIO. The First Appellate Authority, being a senior officer, could have done so immediately after receipt of the First Appeal. Far from it, the AA appeared to be working in tandem with the CPIO in providing to the applicant replies entirely unconnected with his RTI-queries. Even while the second-appeal petition was pending, nothing prevented the CPIO / the Appellate Authority or the respondent public authority from providing information to the applicant. Instead of doing that, the public authority, the CPIO and the Appellate Authority busied themselves in contesting the case at public cost. We would also urge the head of the public authority, viz. Chairman, LIC to examine whether officers of the public authority, who are found responsible for negligence in the matter of disclosure of information under the RTI Act, or are involved in preventing its disclosure, should be allowed to defend themselves before the Commission at the cost of the public authority. It is a matter which C&AG must also study for appropriate guidance to the public authorities.
47. It is not out of place to mention in the context of this case that the RTI Act is a citizen-friendly Act, which gives the right to the citizen and casts on the officers of the public authority certain specific responsibility. 27 In successive judgments, High Courts have highlighted the fact that the interpretation of the provisions of this Act should be done to deepen and expand the citizen's right to access information. In Bhagat Singh Vs. Chief Information Commissioner and Ors., Delhi High Court observed that the Act is an effectuation of the right to freedom of speech and expression. A rights based enactment is akin to a welfare measure and, as such, it should receive a liberal interpretation. Similarly, Madras High Court in Tamil Nadu Road Development Company Ltd. Vs. Tamil Nadu Information Commission and Anr. also held that the Act must receive a purposive interpretation to further the purpose of the Act. Any interpretation which frustrates the purpose of the Act must be eschewed. The citizen and information-seekers have, subject to a few exceptions, an overriding right to be given information on matters in the possession of the State and public agencies that are covered by the Act. As is reflected in its preambular paragraphs, the enactment seeks to promote transparency, arrest corruption and to hold the Government and its instrumentalities accountable to the governed.
48. The Calcutta High Court also in Pritam Rooj Vs. University of Calcutta and Ors. (AIR 2008 Calcutta 118) observed that the RTI Act must be seen to be a legislative attempt to enlarge the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India, keeping with the constitutional vision in Part IV, abreast with the changing times when the said Act's avowed purpose is to bring about transparency and curb corruption. It follows from it that officers who are found either overtly or covertly to have prevented disclosures of information, must be dealt with sternly lest either through their inaction or 28 deliberately evasive action, they succeed in defeating the purpose of this Act.
Announced on this the 24th day of October, 2008. Notice of this decision be given free of cost to the parties.
(A.N. Tiwari) Information Commissioner Authenticated true copy. Additional copies of orders shall be supplied against application and payment of the charges, prescribed under the Act, to the CPIO of this Commission.
(D.C. Singh) Under Secretary & Asst. Registrar 29