Himachal Pradesh High Court
Vidya Devi vs Himachal Road Transport Corporation, ... on 12 June, 1989
Equivalent citations: I(1990)ACC388, AIR1990HP19
JUDGMENT Bhawani Singh, J.
1. Calamities do not come alone, they come in chain; so appears to have happened to Shrimati Vidya Devi, who at a very young age slides into the position of widowhood on the death of her husband late Nand Ram in the war in 1965. This calamity was followed by a dispute relating to the entitlement of pension admissible on the death of her husband and this dispute with her father-in-law came to be settled somewhere in 1968. Thereafter her father-in-law transferred the family property in the name of his surviving sons leaving her to depend on her parents being issueless. In this very chain of events, she herself was involved in an accident on 21-2-1974 while travelling by Himachal Road Transport Corporation Bus. She claimed compensation for the personal injuries she sustained in this accident by a claim petition but the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Mandi, rejected her petition holding that she could not ask for compensation for her bleeding injuries as the doors of the Court stood closed for her by lapse of time.
However, she continues her efforts to approach this Court through her brother as her next friend.
2. The brief facts of this case are that while travelling in the Himachal Road Transport Corporation Bus going from Mandi to Rewalsar, the Bus (NO. HPM-395) met with an accident on 21-2-1974. The cause of the accident is stated to be due to the rash and negligent driving by the driver. It happened while the vehicle was passing over a culvert. The appellant sustained multiple injuries on her head as well as the other parts of the body with the result that she remained unconscious for months together in Civil Hospital, Mandi, and ultimately turned paralytic as well as mentally unsound and her mental health continued as such till the date of filing of the petition. She turned a permanently disabled person, not in a position to take care of herself even in walking and needed a permanent helper.
3. She filed this petition on 20-10-1987 and in view of the provisions of Section 110-A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the same could not be entertained beyond the period of six months of the occurrence of the accident provided that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was satisfied that the petitioner was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. The petitioner had moved the Tribunal for the condonation of delay in filing the petition late. Number of circumstances have been explained in detail by production of documentary and oral evidence. This application was contested by the Himachal Road Transport Corporation which insisted for the dismissal of the petition of the petitioner being grossly barred by time in the absence of sufficient cause within the meaning of the proviso to Section 110-A(3) of the Act. 1 proceed to examine the evidence adduced by the petitioner showing sufficient cause to condone the delay in filing the claim petition.
4. Shri Chandermani (P.W. 1) is the brother of Shrimati Vidya Devi. He has filed this petition as a next friend of the appellant. He states that Vidya Devi sustained injuries on her head and had started bleeding from her nose and ear. She was admitted in the District Hospital, Mandi. Because of the injuries, she had become unconscious and she remained unconscious continuously for one month. She remained in the hospital for about two months. The doctor advised that she be taken home and made to walk by providing her help. She became paralytic and her right arm and right leg do not work. After the accident, she could not talk properly and could not identify persons properly. Her husband was in the army who died in active service in 1965. The appellant is illiterate and has no issue and she herself is not in a position to prosecute the petition; so, as next friend, he filed the claim petition on her behalf. Her father-in-law, after the death of the husband of the appellant and before the accident, had transferred the land in the name of his other sons. On 18-10-1987, he accompanied the appellant to Shri Dina Nath Sharma, Advocate, to seek legal help regarding the property having been transferred by her father-in-law only in the name of his other sons leaving out the petitioner. On seeing her condition, the Lawyer asked as to what had happened to her and on coming to know that she had met with an accident, he advised to file a claim petition through Shri G.P. Guleria, as advised by Shri Dina Nath, Advocate. This witness is running a watch rapair shop in Seri Bazar, Mandi, for the last several years. Prior to this, he used to sell vegetables on Rehri in Mandi town. Besides, he used to do agriculture work at home. He admits in cross-examination that after the death of her husband in 1965, Vidya Devi was turned out by her in-laws and she started living in her parents' house. The dispute with her father-in-law had occurred on the pension of her deceased husband which-was settled half-half in 1968. Regarding the transfer of property in the name of his other sons by the father-in-law of the appellant, the appellant came to know in 1987. On this day, she was not only shown to Shri Dina Nath, Advocate, she was taken before the Sainik Board at Mandi and in the office of the Sainik Welfare Officer. However, he admits that the petitioner was never taken to any Mental Hospital for the treatment at any time. He denies the suggestion that the appellant understands things and could also talk. After Vidya Devi was discharged from the hospital at Mandi, she was once taken to Chandigarh after about 6/7 months after the discharge from the hospital at Mandi and after she was taken to Chandigarh and brought back, she must have been shown to a doctor at Mandi 2/3 times, although he did not possess the slips. He did not know whether accident claims petitions are filed.
5. Shri Hem Singh (P.W. 2), a Pharmacist in Civil Hospital, Mandi, states that the record relevant in this case was not traceable in the hospital since record pertaining to a period of more than five years had been destroyed. However, he proves the Certificate Ex. P.W. 2/A issued by Shri Chandermohan Vaidya, then a doctor in Civil Hospital, Mandi, who has died 4/5 years back.
6. Shrimati Durga Sharma (P.W. 3) is the Ahlmad in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mandi. She produced a copy of the F.I.R. marked 'A', and statement of Dr. CM. Vaidya (P.W. 3), which is marked 'B', dated 10-8-1978. Mark 'C' in this file (File No. 214/74) is a photostat copy of the medico legal certificate issued by Dr. C.M. Vaidya in this case.
7. Shri Hem Chand (P.W. 4) was the Pradhan, Gram Panchayat Jamni, from 1962 to 1985. He states that Shrimati Vidya Devi belongs to his Panchayat. He states further that after the accident, she can move with the assistance of other person. Sometimes she talks properly and sometimes not, and before the accident she was alright and used to attend to her domestic work. After the death of her husband, she started living in the house of her parents and she was not given any share in the land of her husband by her father-in-law and regarding maintenance, she used to take her dispute up to the panchayat level. He had come to know when the petitioner had met with an accident. He had come to see her in the hospital at Mandi. He did not tell the petitioner that she should file a claim petition for compensation.
8. Doctor S. S. Guleri (P.W. 5) has proved the disability certificate (Ex. P.W. 4/A) dated 19-2-1988 stating the permanent disability to the extent of 60 per cent. He states that the opinion given in the MLC; an oblique reference to the fracture of the skull is given and this injury, associated with head injury, can cause this disability. He could not say that on account of these injuries, there is any mental derangement because for this purpose, consultation with Psychiatrist is required. Head injury rarely cause mental derangement. This statement pertains to paralytic cases also.
9. Finally, there is a statement of Shri D. N. Sharma, Advocate, Mandi (P.W. 6). He categorically states that Shrimati Vidya Devi and Chandermani came to him on 18-10-1987 regarding some immovable property dispute. He came to know about her accident. He was told that after the accident, it was not possible for her to move about and on being asked as to whether any claim petition had been filed by them, he was told that they did not know anything about it nor they have filed any. The petition was filed through Shri G.P. Guleria, Advocate. Her brother was with her whom he knew since long. This is the evidence produced by the petitioner and against this no evidence in rebuttal was produced by the Corporation.
10. Shri Rajiv Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant, has very strenuously urged that the evidence on record is so cogent and convincing that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal should have considered the same to condone the delay in question. It is further urged by him that the Tribunal has interpreted the provisions of Section 110-A(3) of the Act very narrowly whereas these provisions have to be construed quite liberally in favour of the claimant keeping in view the special circumstances of this case. It is also contended by him that the appellant is an illiterate village rustic woman. She is an issueless widow. Therefore, these factors should have been taken into consideration while deciding the application under Section 110-A(3) of the Act. In order to support his submission, reference to number of decisions has been made.
11. In 1970 Acc CJ 216 (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jagdip Singh Pathania), the claimant Jagdip Singh Pathania (35), an Executive Officer, Municipal Committee, Pathankot, sustained serious head injuries affecting brain and other parts of the body on 29-7-1966 and filed the application on 22-11-1967 beyond the period of 60 days prescribed under the Act. The question arose whether there was sufficient cause for the condonation of delay in filing the claim petition. The Tribunal not only allowed the application but also the claim to the extent of Rs. 75,000/ -. In appeal, it was contended that the claim-petition should have been dismissed as barred by time and the Tribunal was not justified in condoning the delay. Dealing with the question the learned Judge rejected the objection regarding delay after seeing that the result of the accident was that the claimant was an utter wreck having sustained fracture of the skull, dislocation and fracture of one of his shoulders and fracture of one of his legs and because of these injuries, he had remained confined to bed till 19-12-1966 and thereafter when he was advised to resume his duty on 19-12-1966, as an experimental measure to get mental condition consequent upon his head injury, he could attend his office only for a few days and even then could not devote his attention and time to the work he was expected to do. These facts were proved not only by the evidence of the two doctors under whose treatment he was, but also from the testimony of one Balak Ram (A.W. 14), Secretary of the Municipal Committee, Pathankot. Relying on New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Punjab Roadways, (1964) 66 Punj LR 166 : (AIR 1964 Punj 235), wherein it was held that the words "sufficient cause" used in proviso to Section 110-A(3) have to be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice where no serious negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputed to the claimant, the contention of the appellant was found to be of no substance.
12. In 1971 Acc CJ 320 : (AIR 1971 All 503) (Captain Komal Charan v. State of U.P.) the delay was due to the fact that the claimant remained in the hospital for four months and thereafter the claimant went to his village to meet his parents for afew days and then made enquiries and came to know that he could file an application under the Motor Vehicles Act. The explanation was not found sufficient by the Tribunal and it rejected the claim petition. However in appeal, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court allowed the plea by accepting the explanation of the claimant in his affidavit that he came to Bareilly for consulting lawyers with a view to take proceedings for recovery of damages. By this, he had an idea to take legal proceedings and on meeting Shri V. N. Mathur, he came to know that he could file a petition under the Motor Vehicles Act just as Chuni Lal had done. He filed the petition immediately. The Court further said as under (at p. 506 of AIR):
".....there is no element of laches in the conduct of the appellant. The explanation offered by him is natural and reasonable. He was confined to hospital for a long time. Thereafter, his desire to meet his parents was only natural. He spent a few days with his parents, before coming to Bareilly where alone he could take appropriate proceedings. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the Tribunal that the appellant was negligent in not having taken any legal advice in respect of the question of limitation provided for filing an application for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. We are satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from a making the application within time."
13. In 1972 Acc CJ 183 : (AIR 1972 Madh Pra 223) (Raju Narrayan v. Chogalal Bhagirath, the accident took place on 17-2-1964 and the claimant remained in the hospital up to 1-5-1964 and the claim petition was filed on 8-5-1964. He was permanently disabled. On the ground of delay, the Tribunal rejected the petition. The High Court, in appeal, reversed the order of the Tribunal and in para 4 of the Judgment, the learned Judge observed as under :
"4. In my view it is proper for the Tribunal to take a humane and not a mechanical view of delay that might occur in the filing of the claims. It is not suggested that the claims presented long after due date should be entertained blindly without any inquiry as to the sufficiency of the cause; but the tribunal should, as it were, place itself in the situation of a person who has suffered a motor accident or if it has been fatal, his dependants looking for their daily bread to the earnings of the deadman. Their immediate reaction is not a plan to file a claim but one of shock. If the victim has died then and there the dependants are, as it were, stupified for some time; if he is alive, the sufferer has almost always to spend sometime in the hospitals quite often on the margin between life and death....."
14. The Court has also relied upon the New India Assurance Co. v. Punjab Roadways, AIR 1964 Punj 235 as to the meaning and parameters of sufficient cause used in proviso to Section 110-A (3) of the Act.
15. In 1973 Acc CJ 257 : (AIR 1974 Orissa 24) (Hemalata Devi v. Sk. Lokman), the accident took place on 15-2-1969 and the claim petition was filed on 6-2-1970 as the claimant remained ill and was suffering from gout and sciatica for about two years. The Tribunal allowed the petition and in appeal it was contended that this act of the Tribunal allowing the petition after the same was barred by time, was wrong. It was held that the discretion given to the claims tribunal under the proviso is not any arbitrary or capricious discretion. It is a discretion guided and conditioned by judicial principles. It is not left to the whim and fancy of the claims tribunal to decide whether to entertain the application or not despite the expiration of the prescribed period. But the tribunal is bound to entertain the application when it is made out by the applicant that he was prevented by sufficient cause in making the application. While dealing with "sufficient cause", the Court came to the conclusion that the same means: "some cause beyond the control of the Party and for successfully invoking the aid of the court, the claimant must have acted with due care and attention."
16. In 1976 Acc CJ 464 : (AIR 1977 Guj 146) (Vasava Hiraben v. Ishwarbharti Karsanbharti Gauswami), the claim petition was filed within time. However, the same had to be returned due to some defect as to its maintainability and the new application was filed beyond the period of limitation along with an application for condonation of delay. The Tribunal rejected the application for condonation of delay on the ground that the petitioner had failed to explain the delay from 18-6-1974 to 19-7-1974. Justice P. D. Desai (as he then was), found on facts that the claimant was an unfortunate and illiterate widow belonging to a scheduled tribe; whose husband died in a motor vehicle accident and so driven to the Court on her petition being by the Tribunal on the ground that the same was barred by limitation and no sufficient cause for condonation of delay was made out. The learned Judge, after examining all the facts and circumstances of the case and the principles to be applied for the interpretation of "sufficient cause" under proviso to Section 110-A (3) of the Act, came to the conclusion that a liberal construction has to be given to these words. Further, the learned Judge observed that where the claimant is a rustic and illiterate, in that circumstances in appreciating the testimony, the court cannot apply the same standards as might be applied in dealing with sophisticated persons.
17. To the same effect are the observations of Karnataka High Court in 1981 Acc CJ 263 (Krishna Bai v. B. S. Desai) wherein it has been held that the existence of factors such as illiteracy, ignorance, desperation, financial stringency and illness constitute sufficient cause for condoning the delay.
18. The other judgments cited by Shri Rajiv Sharma are 1985 Acc CJ 641 (Punj & Har) (Gursharan Singh Sandhu v. State of Haryana), 1986 Acc CJ 1107 (Gauhati) (Niranjan Kaur v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 1987 Acc CJ 706 (Punj & Har) (Gurdial Singh through Ajmer Kaur v. Sawinder Singh) and 1986 Acc CJ 909 (Chief Engineer, Electricity cum Electrical Project, Bhuba-neswar v. Bhanumati Mishra). In the last case, the learned Judge of Orissa High Court, while dealing with the onus of proof under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and Section 5 of the Limitation Act and relying on the judgment of the same court in Hemalata Devi v. Sk. Lokman, 1973 Acc CJ 257 : (AIR 1974 Orissa 24), held that the question of delay in an application under Section 110-A of the Act is to be considered liberally and it is more liberal than the standard of judging sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
19. Finally, Shri Rajiv Sharma relies upon judgment of this Court reported in ILR (1984) Him Pra 259 (Mangal Chand v. the Forest Department through Divisional Forest Officer, Nichar) where the claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 was filed after 6 1/2 years and the Court allowed the same holding that the claimant was pursuing the matter with the department concerned under the genuine hope and belief that the authorities would voluntarily make the payment.
20. On the other hand, Shri Deepak Gupta, appearing for the Himachal Road Transport Corporation, referred to the statements of various witnesses and asserted that Chandermani (P.W. 1) knew the Advocate very well and used to meet him very often while carrying on his business at Mandi. Besides, appellant's another brother was working at Mandi and so they could have very easily filed the application within time. Further, it is stated that Dr. S. S. Guleria (P. W. 5) has said that head injury rarely cause mental derangement; so the injury was not such as to render Shrimati Vidya Devi incapable of filing the present petition. No further evidence has been adduced, the learned counsel urges to show that she suffered from the ailment right unto the filing of the application, tt is also asserted that when she could come to Shri D. N. Sharma (P.W. 6) on 18-10-1987, she could very well come to meet an Advocate and file the petition also. On these submissions, Shri Deepak Gupta asserts that there is no sufficient cause in filing the present petition beyond the period of limitation and the Tribunal was right in rejecting her application on this account.
21. After hearing the learned counsellor the parties, looking to the record and the evidence of the case and judgments cited at the Bar, I am of the opinion that the order of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in Claim Petition No. 55 of 1987 decided on 3-1-1989 deserves to be set aside as the Tribunal has taken a superficial and grossly unjudicial approach in the matter while examining the case. It has failed to see that the evidence on the record was quite sufficient to condone the delay. The tribunal has taken too strict a view while interpreting 'sufficient cause' in this case.
22. It is clear that the petitioner is a widow whose husband died in the service of the nation at a very young age leaving her to exist for herself in miserable conditions. She is a village rustic, an illiterate lady who had to fight to take a share of her husband's pension with her father-in-law. When she succeeded to get half share of the same, she is thrown out of her house to live with her parents. She could have depended on her children if she had any but there is no such case. Her father-in-law transfers the whole property in the name of his surviving sons.
23. Nothing out of it he gave to her for maintenance and she looks for legal assistance to get something out of it. These miseries are followed by the accident in question. It cripples her. It practically terminates her movements and physical strength with which she used to earn her livelihood by working in the villages. Shrimati Vidya Devi, once stated to be of good health and physique, is a wreck, as Chandermani (P. W. 1) states supported by Shri Hem Chand (P.W.4), Pradhan of Gram Panchayat. Her condition is seen by Shri D. N. Sharma (P.W 6). There is no reason to disbelieve these witnesses and it is clear that she continues to be of the same state as she had been right from the beginning.
24. Dr. S. S. Guleria (P.W.5) has very categorically stated that her disability is 60 percent and the same is of permanent nature and his statement pertains to paralytic cases also. This supports the version of her state of health. The stress of the learned counsel for the Corporation that this witness has said that head injury rarely cause mental derangement is of no consequence looking to his statement as a whole. Moreover, elimination of mental derangement due to head injury cannot be ruled out.
25. It is further in evidence that she has to be helped even in moving her from place to place. Besides, she is a lady. Chandermani (P. W. 1), who is her brother, is ignorant about the filing of such like claim petitions like many village illiterate rustics of far off places in the State. Even then he appears to have made all efforts to secure benefits to his sister by taking her to the Sanik Board at Mandi and other offices and as soon as he is advised by Shri D. N. Sharma (P.W.6) to file a claim petition, he rightly comes forward to file this petition as a next friend of Shrimati Vidya Devi.
26. Much has been said about the mental health of the claimant. It appears that the Tribunal wanted evidence and satisfaction that the widow became completely of unsound mind as a result of the accident, but she having been found coming to Mandi prior to the institution of the petition; the Tribunal appears to have concluded that her ailment was not of the degree as to render her incapable of looking after her interests, including the filing of the present petition in time. Such an approach is not envisaged under the law.
27. A person may not be of unsound mind, but there may be mental infirmity from which he may be suffering. Even a person of weak mind can sue through a next friend provided the court is satisfied that he/she is incapable of protecting his/her interests. In other words, it can be said that a person who is not of unsound mind may yet be mentally infirm by reason of a physical ailment, may be paraslysis. He is rendered so weak and helpless that his mental outfit is by no means the outfit of a normal and healthy man.
28. Evidence in this case is quite sufficient to indicate that Shrimati Vidya Devi is continuously suffering from mental ailment right from the beginning till the filing of the petition and these factors are sufficient to allow her to move the petition and claim compensation for the personal injuries sustained by her in this accident. Simply because a period of many years has passed, that should not, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, debar her from claiming the compensation which has been allowed in favour of all other claimants in this accident. Even otherwise, it is a case where the facts and circumstances of this case justify invoking the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience to do justice to the parties. I seek assistance of para 29 of the Supreme Court judgment reported in AIR 1975 SC 824 (Roshanlal Nuthiala v. R, B. Mohan Singh Oberai) and the same is reproduced as under :
"29. Shri Sen's strenuous submission summed up fairly is that undefined rules of equity are unruly horses and in India legal rights cannot be chased out by nebulous notions of good conscience lebelled equity. In a sense, he is right but to deny equitable jurisdiction for courts to promote justice is too late and too tall a jurisprudential proposition in any system. For, equity is not anti-law but a moral dimension of law rather, it is the grace and conscience of living law acting only interstitially. The quintessence of this concept may be stated thus:
"All great systems of jurisprudence have a mitigating principle or set of principles, by the application of which substantial justice may be attained in particular cases wherein the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law seem to be inadequate. From the point of view of general jurisprudence, "equity" is the name which is given to this feature or aspect of law in general. "American jurisprudence 2nd. Edn. Vol. 27 p. 516. Certainly when law speaks in positive terms, equity may not be invoked against it; but while applying the law the Court can and must ameliorate unwitting rigours inflicted by legalisms, where there is room for play, by the use of equity. After all, equity is the humanist weapon in the Court's armoury, whereby broad justice may be harmonised with harsh law, based, of course, on established principles. In the present case, certain sympathetic circumstances stand out indubitably and the benign interference sought by the appellant is spelt out of these facts. What are they?"
29. In view of the examination of the matter as aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the facts and circumstances of this case completely justify condonation of delay in filing the claim petition by Shrimati Vidya Devi through her brother Shri Chandermani as her next friend and the result is that this appeal is allowed and the order of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Mandi, dated 3-1-1989 is set aside and the Tribunal is directed to take up this matter on its original number and proceed with the matter immediately and decide the same on merits within a period of three months from today. In the event of her claim being allowed, take all steps to secure the payment of the same to her appropriately through the bank so that no one is able to misappropriate her compensation amount.
30. The Hinachal Road Transport Corporation will pay Rs. 2000/- as costs of this petition to the appellant.
31. Before parting with the case, I hope that the Corporation will settle this matter with the appellant before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal proceeds with the matter, as aforesaid, looking to the special facts and circumstances of this case as well as, the fact that the claimant is a issueless widow of a soldier, who is stated to have laid down his life for the defence of this nation and the society, which includes everyone of us, has at least some responsibility towards a widow.