Madras High Court
Ramalingam vs S.Subramanian on 7 September, 2017
Author: M.S.Ramesh
Bench: M.S.Ramesh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on : 07.08.2017
Pronounced on : 07.09.2017
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE M.S.RAMESH
Crl.O.P.Nos.13276, 13670, 13769,
14077, 14485 & 14595 of 2017
Ramalingam .. Petitioner in Crl.O.P.No.13276/2017
Vs.
1. S.Subramanian
2. The Inspector of Police,
Ambillikkai Police Station,
Oddanchatram Taluk,
Dindigul District. .. Respondents in Crl.O.P.No.13276/2017
Prayer in Crl.O.P.No.13276 of 2017: Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. praying to direct the 5th Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore to consider the Recall-Warrant petition filed by the petitioner on the same day in the event of surrender by the petitioner and seeks to Recall the Non-Bailable Warrant issued in C.C.No.21841 of 2005 pending on the file 5th Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore.
For Petitioners : Mr.N.R.Elango, Senior Counsel(Amicus Curiae)
for Mr.K.Raghupathy in Crl.O.P.No.13276/2017
Mr.S.Kalyanaraman in Crl.O.P.13670/2017
Mr.S.Parthasarathy in Crl.O.P.13769/ 2017
Mr.B.Vasudevan in Crl.O.P.No.14077/2017
Mr.A.G.Rajan in Crl.O.P.No.14485/2017
Mr.J.Franklin in Crl.O.P.No.14595/2017
For Respondent : No Appearance
(R1 in Crl.O.P.No.13276 of 2017
Respondent in Crl.O.P.14595/2017)
For Respondent : Mr.Rajarathinam,
State Public Prosecutor Assisted by
Mr.P.Govindarajan, APP (R2 in in Crl.O.P.No.13276 of 2017,
Respondent in
Crl.O.P.Nos.13670,13769,14077/2017)
C O M M O N O R D E R
One among the common questions that arises for consideration in the present petitions is as to whether the High Court, exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is empowered to quash or recall a Non-bailable Warrant when an alternate remedy under Section 70 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers cancellation of the warrant by the court that had issued the warrant.
2.An analogous proposition came to be dealt by me in a recent decision in K. Raghupathy Vs. Commissioner of Police reported in 2017 (2) Lw (Crl.) 177. The order was made on the basis of the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court of India in the cases of Ramesh Kumari Vs. State (N.C.T. Of Delhi) and others reported in 2006 (1) CTC 666 and Prabhu Chawla Vs. State of Rajasthan and another reported in CDJ 2016 SC 810. The relevant portion of the K. Raghupathys case reads as follows:
.5.For the sake of brevity, Section 482 of the Criminal Code of Procedure, 1973 is extracted:
Section 482: Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
6.The Section begins with a non obstante clause and in view of the inherent powers conferred therein, there cannot be a total ban on the High Courts interminable jurisdiction. In other words, the availability of an alternate remedy under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be an embargo for the High Court to exercise its inherent powers to secure the ends of justice in view of the non obstante clause. This Court is conscious of the fact that the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., must be exercised very sparingly and in the rarest of rare cases and the limitation to exercise this power is self restrained.
7.At the outset, I would like to reiterate the views expressed by my learned Brother Judge in the judgment reported in 2016(5) CTC 577 that there can be no circumvention of the time table prescribed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Lalita Kumari's case (supra) and I am in agreement with the proposition. But, in my considered view, the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Kumari Vs. State (N.C.T. Of Delhi) and others reported in 2006 (1) CTC 666 and Prabhu Chawla Vs. State of Rajasthan and another reported in CDJ 2016 SC 810 are binding on me. In Ramesh Kumari's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
3.. We are not convinced by this submission because the sole grievance of the Appellant is that no case has been registered in terms of the mandatory provisions of Section 154 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Genuineness or otherwise of the information can only be considered after registration of the case. Genuineness or credibility of the information is not a condition precedent for registration of a case. We are also clearly of the view that the High Court erred in law in dismissing the petition solely on the ground that the contempt petition was pending and the Appellant had an alternative remedy. The ground of alternative remedy nor pending of the contempt petition would be no substitute in law not to register a case when a citizen makes a complaint of a cognizance offence against the Police Officer.
8.From the aforesaid judgment, it is comprehensible that the amount of alternate remedy cannot be a bar for issuance of a direction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to register a case when cognizable offence is made out before the police officer. The aforesaid judgment came to be considered by my learned Brother Judge and was distinguished holding that the dictum laid down therein arose from the peculiar facts of that case and hence, the proposition laid down therein cannot be made applicable to the facts of the subject cases..
3.The aforesaid excerpt is self explanatory and came to passed in the light of the following propositions by the Honble Supreme Court of India holding that the existence of an alternate remedy shall neither limit nor affect the inherent powers of the High court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., to pass any order, if such an order is essential (i) to give effect to any order; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court; or (iii) if such an order is necessary to secure the ends of justice.
4.In the case of Prabhu Chalwa Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in 2016 (16) SCC 30, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:
6.In our considered view any attempt to explain the law further as regards the issue relating to inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is unwarranted. We would simply reiterate that Section 482 begins with a non obstante clause to state:
482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A fortiori, there can be no total ban on the exercise of such wholesome jurisdiction where, in the words of Krishna Iyer, J.
abuse of the process of the court or other extraordinary situation excites the Courts jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. (Raj Kapoor case 1980 (1) SCC 43, p. 48, para 10) We venture to add a further reason in support. Since Section 397 CrPC is attracted against all orders other than interlocutory, a contrary view would limit the availability of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC only to petty interlocutory orders! A situation wholly unwarranted and undesirable.
5.Likewise, in the case of Raj Kapoor v. State reported in (1980) 1 SCC 43, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has examined the power of High Courts under Section 482 vis-a-vis availability of alternative remedies under the Code and held as follows:-
10.The first question is as to whether the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 stands repelled when the revisional power under Section 397 overlaps. The opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing of the Code, not even Section 397, can affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of Section 482. Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law when a specific provision is made: easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code. In Madhu Limaye case [1977 (4) SCC 551] this Court has exhaustively and, if I may say so with great respect, correctly discussed and delineated the law beyond mistake. While it is true that Section 482 is pervasive it should not subvert legal interdicts written into the same Code, such, for instance, in Section 397(2). Apparent conflict may arise in some situations between the two provisions and a happy solution would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one or the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then, if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction(para 10).
In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the court or other extraordinary situation excites the courts jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court resulting in unnecessary litigation and delay. At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of inherent power, if glaring injustice stares the court in the face. In between is a tertium quid, as Untwalia, J. has pointed out as for example, where it is more than a purely interlocutory order and less than a final disposal. The present case falls under that category where the accused complain of harassment through the courts process. Can we state that in this third category the inherent power can be exercised? In the words of Untwalia, J.: (SCC p. 556, para 10) The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible. I am, therefore clear in my mind that the inherent power is not rebuffed in the case situation before us. Counsel on both sides, sensitively responding to our allergy for legalistics, rightly agreed that the fanatical insistence on the formal filing of a copy of the order under cessation need not take up this courts time. Our conclusion concurs with the concession of counsel on both sides that merely because a copy of the order has not been produced, despite its presence in the records in the court, it is not possible for me to hold that the entire revisory power stands frustrated and the inherent power stultified.
6.Thus, in view of the above pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, it is a settled proposition that there cannot be a total ban on the exercise of inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure where abuse of the process of Court or other extraordinary situation to excites the Court's jurisdiction.
7.It is now brought to my notice that petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not being entertained by the High Court for the purpose of cancellation or recalling of a Non Bailable Warrant in view of a judgment of this Court in P.A. Saleem Vs. State [1994 (2) LW Crl. 402] wherein it was held that the High Court exercising its power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot recall a Non Bailable Warrant. The relevant portion of the said order is as under:
20.Simplicitor, recall of warrant, in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code, in anyone of the actions, is not legally permissible and this will be patent, on a cursory perusal thereof. The said section prescribes that nothing in this Code, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is thus patently clear that the inherent power is capable of being exercising either to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
21. Re-call of a warrant can, by no stretch of imagination, be stated to come under the former clause, to give effect to any order under this Code, which would mean that this Court has the power to see whether the warrant that has been issued by a Magistrate under Section 70 had been executed by the issuance of the proper direction to the police officer or any other person to whom the same had been issued, if such an officer is keeping the warrant, without executing it, thereby hampering the progress of speedy trial. In view of the specific provisions engrafted under Sub-clause 2 of Section 70 of the Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved accused and further remedy by way of revision either under Section 397 or 401 of the Code, simpliciter re-call warrant cannot be stated to attract the latter clause also, namely, to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
The Court had also referred to the prevailing ills in the criminal justice system to justify denying relief under Section 482:
18. This sort of a practice had its origin, by assumption of power under Section 482 of the Code, without making an investigation therefor. The impelling occasion or moment has come to decide the tenability or otherwise of such a practice, when especially it tilted the very foundation of the smooth functioning of the administration of the criminal justice system, in the sense of creating or causing agonizing situation by prolongation of trials, especially in heinous crimes of murder and what not, by reason of indiscriminate and wanton absence of one or other of the accused, where there are more than one, by turns and by getting warrants issued to secure their appearance or production before Court, re-called by this Court, under Section 482 of the Code, with an ulterior motive of hampering the progress of trial, that what little bit of evidence available in a case is irretrievably getting lost either by death or creation of a situation, making it almost impossible for the investigating agency to trace the witness or by tampering, getting their memories failed etc., in process of passage of sands of time and thereby getting innumerable acquittals, as revealed by recent statistics, as earlier adverted to, rudely shocking, not only the conscience of this Court, but also eroding the faith of the society in the very system of administration of criminal justice in Courts, to which Judges themselves should not be responsible, either knowingly or unknowingly, sometimes by abuse or misuse of their power.
8.However, in a subsequent judgment in Francis Xavier V. Nelamangalam reported in 1995 (2) MWN (Cri.) 114, where another learned Judge, after considering the previous decisions of this Court including P.A. Saleem (supra), has held that the High Court can recall a NBW while exercising its power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., and noted thus:
12.From the above Supreme Court rulings, it is clear that the inherent powers of this Court are wide and the various conditions imposed by the rulings of the Supreme Court are only illustrative and not exhaustive. In the words of Justice Krishna Iyer, it is self-imposed restrictions. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are wide and in order to prevent abuse of process of Court and to secure the ends of justice, this court may exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., notwithstanding any specific provisions in Section 70 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, this Court will exercise its self-imposed restraint and direct the concerned party to approach the Court below to redress their respective grievance according to specific provisions given under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
9.The learned Judge of this Court after considering the previous decisions of this Court including the judgment in P.A. Saleem (supra), held that the High Court is well within its power to recall Non Bailable Warrant under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Justification in that case was on the basis of reliance of various Supreme Court judgments.
10.Among the conflicting decisions in P.A. Saleem and Francis Xavier by co-ordinate Benches, the latter decision in the case of Francis Xavier had taken into account, the decision of Saleem's case and hence, is binding on this Court.
11.The view in Francis Xavier's case has been upheld by the decision of the Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Prabhu Chawla's case. Hence, the judgments referred to, by the learned Public Prosecutor in Valampuri John v Peter [1997 (2) LW(Crl) 673]; Sennasi v State [CDJ 1997 MHC 728]; Sarathkumar v Inspector of Police [CDJ 2004 MHC 728]; Durgakumari v Jhansilakshmi [CDJ 2007 MHC 5561]; Prapbakaran v State [CDJ 2010 MHC 140]; Kannan v State [CDJ 2011 MHC 3064]; State v SubashKapoor [CDJ 2012 MHC 2553]; Sundar v State [CDJ 2016 MHC 656] need not be cited to, in view of the fact that none of these cases had reconsidered the proposition laid down in Francis Xavier's case or had gone into the scope of the power exercised by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Nevertheless, the view in Francis Xavier's case having been upheld by a Three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Prabhu Chawla's case, would be binding on this Court.
12.It would not be out of place to mention here that P.A. Saleem's case was pronounced in the year 1994, despite deprecation of interference by the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., it can only be seen that the situation has only worsen in the intervening 23 years. According to the data collected by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) for the year 2015, there are 61,999 Non Bailable Warrants were issued in Tamil Nadu alone.
13.It is worthwhile to recall and recollect the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494, wherein it has held that the task of statutory interpretation is a delicate one and judges must be attentive to the changes in social conditions as they seek to interpret the intentions of lawmakers. The relevant portion of the decision is as follows:
34. But the Court does not 'rush in to demolish provisions where judicial endeavour, amelioratively interpretational, may achieved both constitutionality and compassionate resurrection. The salutary strategy of sustaining the validity of the law and softening its application was, with lovely dexterity adopted by Sri Soli Sorabjee appearing for the State. The semantic technique of updating the living sense of dated legislation is, in our view, perfectly legitimated, especially when, in a developing country like ours, the corpus juirs is, in some measure a raj hand-over.
14.Similarly, in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal [(2007) 12 SCC 1], the Honble Supreme Court, has cautioned against the alacrity with which trial courts have issued NBWs and issued detailed guidelines to be followed by trial courts when issuing NBWs which is as follows:
When non-bailable warrants should be issued
53.Non-bailable warrant should be issued to bring a person to court when summons or bailable warrants would be unlikely to have the desired result. This could be when:
*it is reasonable to believe that the person will not voluntarily appear in court; or *the police authorities are unable to find the person to serve him with a summon; or *it is considered that the person could harm someone if not placed into custody immediately.
54.As far as possible, if the court is of the opinion that a summon will suffice in getting the appearance of the accused in the court, the summon or the bailable warrants should be preferred. The warrants either bailable or non-bailable should never be issued without proper scrutiny of facts and complete application of mind, due to the extremely serious consequences and ramifications which ensue on issuance of warrants. The court must very carefully examine whether the criminal complaint or FIR has not been filed with an oblique motive.
55.In complaint cases, at the first instance, the court should direct serving of the summons along with the copy of the complaint. If the accused seem to be avoiding the summons, the court, in the second instance should issue bailable warrant. In the third instance, when the court is fully satisfied that the accused is avoiding the court's proceeding intentionally, the process of issuance of the non-bailable warrant should be resorted to. Personal liberty is paramount, therefore, we caution courts at the first and second instance to refrain from issuing non-bailable warrants.
56.The power being discretionary must be exercised judiciously with extreme care and caution. The court should properly balance both personal liberty and societal interest before issuing warrants. There cannot be any straitjacket formula for issuance of warrants but as a general rule, unless an accused is charged with the commission of an offence of a heinous crime and it is feared that he is likely to tamper or destroy the evidence or is likely to evade the process of law, issuance of non-bailable warrants should be avoided.
57.The court should try to maintain proper balance between individual liberty and the interest of the public and the State while issuing non-bailable warrant.
15.It is seen from the Inder Mohan Goswami's case, that the guidelines stated therein, have been observed mostly in the breach by trial courts in Tamil Nadu. It is essential for the High Court, as the highest criminal Court and as a Court of supervision over all trial courts in the State, to reiterate these principles regarding issuance of Non Bailable Warrants and ensure compliance.
16.It is further seen that the cases in which trial courts issue Non Bailable Warrants may be broadly classified in four categories namely, (i) the trial court issues Non Bailable Warrants without issuing summons first, (ii) the trial court issues a Non Bailable Warrant when the accused is absent for one or two hearings without inquiring into the cause of absence, (iii) where the accused is absent for one or two hearings and files a petition under Section 317 of the Code, the Court rejects the petition and issues a Non Bailable Warrant and (iv) where the accused has intentionally absented himself from the trial and does not attend any hearings and then, the trial court issues a Non Bailable Warrant.
17.Among the aforesaid four categories, the first three categories of cases can be leniently considered by the High Court for the purpose of recalling a Non Bailable Warrant. Of course, such leniency could be to the subjective satisfaction of the reasonings of the petitioners as to the bona-fide inability to approach the lower Court seeking for recalling/cancellation of Non Bailable Warrant. Insofar as the fourth category is concerned, it would not be desirable to recall the warrant but to direct the petitioner to approach the Court which had issued warrant, seeking for a prior relief.
18.It is also brought to my notice that apart from various other reasons for the long pendency of cases before the trial Courts, the non execution of Non Bailable Warrant is one among the reasons. This fact is reiterated through the last data collected by the NCRB. In most of these pending cases, it is seen that whenever a Non Bailable warrant is kept pending execution, the usual practice among many of the Court is to adjourn the case on the ground that Non Bailable Warrant is pending.
19.In heinous crimes, where there is deliberate and continuous non appearance of the accused, the trial Court may proclaim him as person absconding under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:
82.Proclamation for person absconding: (1)If Any Court has reason to believe (whether after taking evidence or not) that any person against whom a warrant has been issued by it has absconded or is concealing himself so that such warrant cannot be executed, such Court may publish a written proclamation requiring him to appear at a specified place and at a specified time not less than thirty days from the date of publishing such proclamation (2)The proclamation shall be published as follows
(i) (a) it shall be publicly read in some conspicuous place of the town or village in which such person ordinarily resides;
(b) it shall be affixed to some conspicuous part of the house or home-stead in which such person ordinarily resides or or to some conspicuous place of such town or village;
(c) a copy thereof shall be affixed to some conspicuous part of the Court-house;
(ii)the Court may also, if it thinks fit, direct a copy of the proclamation to be published in a daily newspaper circulating in the place in which such person ordinarily resides (3)A statement in writing by the Court issuing the proclamation to the effect that the proclamation was duly published on a specified day, in the manner specified in clause (i) of subsection (2), shall be conclusive evidence that the requirements of this section have been complied with, and that the proclamation was published on such day.
[(4)Where a proclamation was duly published under sub-section(1) is in respect of a person accused of an offence punishable under Section 302, 304, 364, 367, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398,399, 400, 402, 436, 449, 459 or 460 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), and such person fails to appear at the specified place and time required by the proclamation, the Court may, after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, pronounce him a proclaimed offender and make a declaration to that effect.
(5)The provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) shall apply to a declaration made by the Court under sub-section (4) as they apply to the proclamation published under sub-section(1).] sub clause 4 & 5 inserted by Act 25 of 2005, S.12 (w.e.f.23.06.2006).
20.Thus, under Section 82 of Cr.P.C., there can be no impediment on the part of the trial Court to pronounce him as a proclaimed offender, instead of keeping the matter pending indefinitely for the purpose of having the warrant executed. Hence, the existence of the fourth category of cases cannot be a ground to preclude the High Court to do justice in the first three categories particularly, when they constitute a major portion of the pending cases in the State of Tamil Nadu, in which, Non Bailable Warrants are pending execution.
21.To sum up the findings rendered by me, it is reiterated that the issuance of Bailable Warrant or Non Bailable Warrant should be exercised with extreme caution and in the rarest of cases, bearing in mind that the pendency of Non Bailable Warrant is one of the major factors for the long pendency of cases before the trial Court. The trial Court shall also scrupulously follow the guidelines imposed in Inder Mohan Gowsami's case (supra) as well as the observations made in the present case while issuing Non Bailable Warrants or recalling the Non Bailable Warrants.
22.Before parting with the case, I would like to place on record the contributions of the learned Senior counsel Mr.N.R.Elango, who had acted as an Amicus Curiae and for his able assistance. Equally, I would also like to place on record the assistance of Mr.Rajarathinam, learned State Public Prosecutor and Mr.P.Govindarajan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor who had not only represented the State but had fairly presented the various legal propositions, for and against State, held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as well as this Court.
23.In the present cases in hand, Non Bailable Warrants came to be issued on 15.06.2017, 21.01.2016, 27.08.2015, 06.10.2016, 18.07.2017 and 07.04.2017 in C.C.No.21841/2005, C.C.No.3837/2005, C.C.No.90/2008, Spl. C.C.No.10/2016, C.C.No.309 of 2005 and STC.No.670 of 2016 pending on the file of the learned V Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai, learned Judicial Magistrate, Sathyamangalam, learned Sessions Judge, (Fast Track), Mahila Court, Namakkal, learned Judicial Magistrate-I, Kallakurichi and learned Judicial Magistrate, Kodumudi, Erode respectively. In view of my above findings, the Crl.O.P.Nos.13276, 13670, 13769, 14077, 14485, 14595 of 2017 stand allowed. Consequently, the Non Bailable Warrants issued against the petitioners are recalled.
24.It is made clear that the petitioners shall henceforth co-operate by regularly attending the proceedings before the concerned Court.
07.09.2017 DP Index:Yes Internet:Yes Note to Registry: Henceforth, the petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.c. Seeking for recall of NBWs issued by the trial Court shall be numbered and taken on file, if it is otherwise in order.
To
1.The Inspector of Police, Ambillikkai Police Station, Oddanchatram Taluk, Dindigul District.
2.The Public Prosecutor, High Court, Madras.
M.S.RAMESH.J, DP order made in Crl.O.P.Nos.13276, 13670, 13769, 14077, 14485 & 14595 of 2017 07.09.2017