Madhya Pradesh High Court
Devendra Dhakad vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 14 February, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3501
1 MCRC-6976-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 14th OF FEBRUARY, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 6976 of 2024
DEVENDRA DHAKAD
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Raj Bahadur Singh Tomar - Advocate for the applicant.
Shri Ajay Kumar Nirankari - Public Prosecutor for State.
Ms. Smrati Sharma - Advocate for respondent No.2.
ORDER
This application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashment of FIR in Crime No.26/2024 registered at Police Station Kailaras District Morena by which offense under Sections 427, 323, 294, 506 and 34 of IPC has been registered.
2. It is submitted by counsel for applicant that at the time of commission of offence, applicant was not present on the spot and in fact, he was present at working place which is evident from biomatrix presence of applicant. It is further submitted that in fact FIR in question was lodged by way of counter blast to the complaint made by applicant against complainant on CM Helpline. Therefore, it is submitted that FIR is a by-product of malafide action on the part of complainant.
3. Per contra, application is vehemently opposed by State Counsel as Signature Not Verified Signed by: RASHID KHAN Signing time: 2/18/2025 5:36:01 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3501 2 MCRC-6976-2024 well as counsel for respondent No.2.
4. It is submitted by Shri Nirankari that this Court can quash the proceedings only if uncontroverted allegations do not make out an offence. Defence of applicant cannot be taken not of because mini trial cannot be conducted.
5. Heard counsel for the parties.
6. Before considering the facts of the case, this Court would like to consider the scope of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others reported in (2021) 19 SCC 401 has held as under:-
"13. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from the decision of the Privy Council in Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 29 :
(1943-44) 71 IA 203 : AIR 1945 PC 18], the following principles of law emerge:
13.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offences.
13.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences.
13.3. However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will not permit an investigation to go on. 13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, in the "rarest of rare cases". (The rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing under Section 482 CrPC is not to be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the context of the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court.) 13.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint.
13.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage.
13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception and a Signature Not Verified Signed by: RASHID KHAN Signing time: 2/18/2025 5:36:01 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3501 3 MCRC-6976-2024 rarity than an ordinary rule.
13.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however, recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of the process by Section 482 CrPC. 13.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping.
13.10. Save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences.
13.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. 13.12. The first information report is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported.
Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR.
Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.
13.13. The power under Section 482 CrPC is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the Court to be cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the Court. 13.14. However, at the same time, the Court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960 SC 866] and Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 426], Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint. 13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused, the Court when it exercises the power under Section 482 CrPC, only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR."
8. In the light of judgments passed by the Supreme Court in the cases Signature Not Verified Signed by: RASHID KHAN Signing time: 2/18/2025 5:36:01 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3501 4 MCRC-6976-2024 of XYZ v. State of Gujarat reported in (2019) 10 SCC 337 , State of Tamil Nadu Vs. S. Martin & Ors. reported in (2018) 5 SCC 718, Ajay Kumar Das v. State of Jharkhand, reported in (2011) 12 SCC 319, Mohd. Akram Siddiqui v. State of Bihar reported in (2019) 13 SCC 350, State of A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh reported in (2010) 11 SCC 226, M. Srikanth v. State of Telangana, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 373, CBI v. Arvind Khanna reported i n (2019) 10 SCC 686, State of MP Vs. Kunwar Singh by order dated 30.06.2021 passed in Cr.A. No.709/2021, Munshiram v. State of Rajasthan , reported in (2018) 5 SCC 678, Teeja Devi v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2014) 15 SCC 221, State of Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 547, S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal reported in (2019) 2 SCC 336, Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460, Padal Venkata Rama Reddy Vs. Kovuri Satyanarayana Reddy reported in (2012) 12 SCC 437 and M.N. Ojha v. Alok Kumar Srivastav reported in (2009) 9 SCC 682, thus, it is clear that this Court can quash proceedings only if the uncontroverted allegations do not make out the offence. This Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot conduct of roving inquiry or mini trial to adjudicate the credibility and reliability of the allegations made in the FIR.
9. So far as contention of counsel for applicant that he was not present on the spot and he was at the place of his posting is concerned, undisputedly the documents on which applicant is placing reliance are private documents and are not public documents. Therefore, this Court cannot take judicial notice of the documents relying upon by counsel for applicant. Applicant Signature Not Verified Signed by: RASHID KHAN Signing time: 2/18/2025 5:36:01 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3501 5 MCRC-6976-2024 will be required to prove the documents by leading evidence before the Trial Court.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Pal v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), reported in (2015) 4 SCC 749 has held as under:-
25. At this juncture, we think it apt to deal with the plea of alibi that has been put forth by the appellant. As is demonstrable, the trial court has discarded the plea of alibi. When a plea of alibi is taken by an accused, burden is upon him to establish the same by positive evidence after onus as regards presence on the spot is established by the prosecution. In this context, we may profitably reproduce a few paragraphs from Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar: (SCC p. 293, paras 22-23) "22. We must bear in mind that an alibi is not an exception (special or general) envisaged in the Penal Code, 1860 or any other law. It is only a rule of evidence recognised in Section 11 of the Evidence Act that facts which are inconsistent with the fact in issue are relevant. Illustration (a) given under the provision is worth reproducing in this context:
'(a) The question is whether A committed a crime at Calcutta on a certain day. The fact that, on that date, A was at Lahore is relevant.'
23. The Latin word alibi means 'elsewhere' and that word is used for convenience when an accused takes recourse to a defence line that when the occurrence took place he was so far away from the place of occurrence that it is extremely improbable that he would have participated in the crime. It is a basic law that in a criminal case, in which the accused is alleged to have inflicted physical injury to another person, the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused was present at the scene and has participated in the crime. The burden would not be lessened by the mere fact that the accused has adopted the defence of alibi.
The plea of the accused in such cases need be considered only when the burden has been discharged by the prosecution satisfactorily. But once the prosecution succeeds in discharging the burden it is incumbent on the accused, who adopts the plea of alibi, to prove it with absolute certainty so as to exclude the possibility of his presence at the place of occurrence. When the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence has been established satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable evidence, normally the court would be slow to believe any counter-evidence to the effect that he was elsewhere when the occurrence happened. But if the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality and of such a standard that the court may entertain some reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene when the occurrence took place, the accused would, no doubt, be entitled to the benefit of that reasonable doubt. For that Signature Not Verified Signed by: RASHID KHAN Signing time: 2/18/2025 5:36:01 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3501 6 MCRC-6976-2024 purpose, it would be a sound proposition to be laid down that, in such circumstances, the burden on the accused is rather heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict proof is required for establishing the plea of alibi." (emphasis supplied)
11. The Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Sattar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 430 has held as under:-
"35. Undoubtedly, the burden of establishing the plea of alibi lay upon the appellant. The appellant herein has miserably failed to bring on record any facts or circumstances which would make the plea of his absence even probable, let alone, being proved beyond reasonable doubt. The plea of alibi had to be proved with absolute certainty so as to completely exclude the possibility of the presence of the appellant in the rented premises at the relevant time. When a plea of alibi is raised by an accused it is for the accused to establish the said plea by positive evidence which has not been led in the present case. We may also notice here at this stage the proposition of law laid down in Gurpreet Singh v. State of Haryana as follows: (SCC p. 27, para 20) "20. ... This plea of alibi stands disbelieved by both the courts and since the plea of alibi is a question of fact and since both the courts concurrently found that fact against the appellant, the accused, this Court in our view, cannot on an appeal by special leave go behind the abovenoted concurrent finding of fact."
36. But it is also correct that, even though the plea of alibi of the appellant is not established, it was for the prosecution to prove the case against the appellant. To this extent, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant was correct. The failure of the plea of alibi would not necessarily lead to the success of the prosecution case which has to be independently proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Being aware of the aforesaid principle of law, the trial court as also the High Court examined the circumstantial evidence to exclude the possibility of the innocence of the appellant."
12. So far as malafides of complainant is concerned, this Supreme Court in the case of Renu Kumari Vs. Sanjay Kumar and others reported in Signature Not Verified Signed by: RASHID KHAN Signing time: 2/18/2025 5:36:01 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3501 7 MCRC-6976-2024 (2008) 12 SCC 346 has held as under:-
9."8. Exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of CrPC. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under CrPC, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise.
The courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice on the principle of quandolexaliquidalicuiconcedit, concederevidetur et id sine quo res ipsaeesse non potest (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising the powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section, though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debitojustitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers the court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the report, the court may examine the question of fact. When a report is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the report has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
9. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866 : (1960) 3 SCR 388] this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the Signature Not Verified Signed by: RASHID KHAN Signing time: 2/18/2025 5:36:01 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3501 8 MCRC-6976-2024 institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. (AIR p. 869)
10. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. The court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. BhajanLal [1992 Supp (1) SCC335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] . A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102) '(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Signature Not Verified Signed by: RASHID KHAN Signing time: 2/18/2025 5:36:01 PM NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3501 9 MCRC-6976-2024 Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.'
11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision, in exercise of this power, is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC305 :
1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892] and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1].] It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in the court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. [See Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar [1990 SuppSCC 686 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 142] , State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192] , RupanDeol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194 :
1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] , State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan [(1999) 2 SCC 651 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 304] , State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 497] , Rashmi Kumar v.Signature Not Verified Signed by: RASHID KHAN Signing time: 2/18/2025 5:36:01 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:3501 10 MCRC-6976-2024 Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC 397 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 415], SatvinderKaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [(1999) 8 SCC 728 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1503] and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401] .]"
The above position was again reiterated in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [(2002) 3 SCC89 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 539] , State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta [(2004) 1 SCC 691 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 353] and State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [(2005) 13 SCC 540 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272] , SCC pp. 547-50, paras 8-
11."
13. Thus, it is clear that if complaint makes out a cognizable offence, then malafide of an informant would become secondary. Furthermore, enmity is a double edged weapon. If enmity provides a ground to falsely implicate a person, then at the same time it also provides a ground for committing the offence. Therefore, in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., this Court cannot quash the proceedings merely on the ground of enmity between the parties.
14. No other argument is advanced by counsel for applicant.
15. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of considered opinion that no case is made out warranting interference. Accordingly, the application fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA) JUDGE Rashid Signature Not Verified Signed by: RASHID KHAN Signing time: 2/18/2025 5:36:01 PM