Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand And Ors vs Jaishree Jha on 28 January, 2014
Equivalent citations: 2014 (2) AJR 209
Author: R. Banumathi
Bench: Chief Justice, Shree Chandrashekhar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 174 of 2013
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1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Secretary, Personnel, Administrative
Reforms and Rajbhasa Department,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
3. The Deputy Secretary, Personal, Administrative
Reforms and Rajbhasa Department, Government
of Jharkhand, Ranchi ... ... Appellants
Versus
Jaishree Jha ... ... Respondent
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CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR
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For the Appellants : Mr. Jai Prakash, A.A.G.
For the Respondent : Mr. R. Krishna, Advocate
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C.A.V. on 21/01/2014 Pronounced on 28/1/2014
The State of Jharkhand has preferred this Letters
Patent Appeal challenging order dated 21.02.2013 passed in
W.P.(S) No. 2431 of 2012 whereby, the final order dated
19.04.2012has been quashed with cost of Rs. 60,000/-.
2. The respondent herein (the writ petitioner) was appointed in the State Administrative Service. She was posted as Block Development Officer in Bero Block during the period between 14.08.1988 and 07.11.1990. A show-cause notice was issued to her on the allegation of committing irregularity and non-adjustment of funds while she was posted in Bero Block. She was put under suspension on 08.03.1996 and a charge-memo dated 2 17.04.1996 was served upon her in which various charges of financial irregularity were framed. On 23.09.1996, an enquiry officer was appointed however, as the presenting officer did not turn up during the enquiry proceeding for about one year, the enquiry officer showed his inability to continue and conclude the proceeding. On 23.09.1997, the Divisional Commissioner, Patna was appointed as conducting officer. He held the proceeding on five different dates between 01.01.1998 to 07.05.1998 however, inspite of notices sent to the department, neither the presenting officer appeared nor the department produced any evidence or witness. On 07.05.1998, the enquiry officer submitted an interim report recommending that the suspension order may be revoked however, the enquiry may proceed. On 31.08.1998, another enquiry officer was appointed who conducted the proceeding on as many as sixteen different dates. Neither any witness was examined nor any document was exhibited on behalf of the department and the presenting officer also appeared on few dates only. On 30.10.2001, the presenting officer was directed to present written submission and on the same day, the enquiry proceeding was closed. An enquiry report dated 23.10.2002 was submitted finding all the charges, except charge no. 5
(a), proved. The petitioner approached this Court in W.P.(S) No. 1367 of 2003 challenging the entire departmental proceeding and the enquiry report which was submitted on 3 23.10.2002. Thereafter, a second show-cause notice was issued to the respondent on 29.08.2006, to which the respondent submitted her reply on 16.09.2006. However, no final order was passed. During the pendency of the writ petition, the final order dated 01.03.2007 was passed imposing punishment of "censure" and withholding three annual increments.
3. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent herein and quashed the final order dated 01.03.2007. The State of Jharkhand preferred Letters Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No. 103 of 2012 which was disposed of by order dated 28.03.2012 modifying order dated 06.01.2012 to the extent that the department was granted liberty to pass a fresh order, in accordance with law. By order dated 19.04.2012 "a penalty of censure" has been inflicted upon the respondent. Aggrieved, the respondent approached this Court in W.P.(S) No. 2431 of 2012 which has been allowed by the impugned order dated 21.02.2013.
4. Mr. Jai Prakash, the learned Additional Advocate-General appearing for the appellant-State of Jharkhand has assailed the impugned order dated 21.02.2013 on the ground that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge that "there was no material on record to substantiate the charges against the petitioner", is contrary to the record produced by the department. The learned counsel has also questioned the direction issued in 4 paragraph no. 48 of the impugned order whereby, the claim of the writ petitioner for promotion was directed to be considered by the department. The learned counsel has submitted that there is a mechanism provided under the Rules which has to be followed for recommending the name of a person for promotion in the I.A.S. Cadre. The procedure prescribed thereunder involves several consultation and recommendation and therefore, the direction of the learned Single Judge contained in paragraph no. 48 cannot be sustained in law. The learned Additional-Advocate General has further submitted that, the award of cost of Rs. 60,000/- to be paid to the writ petitioner was not justified. Since the impugned order contains no reason for awarding cost of Rs. 60,000/- and infact without identifying the reason which warranted infliction of cost to be paid to the writ petitioner, the order awarding cost to the writ petitioner is liable to be interfered with. He has referred to decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2009) 16 SCC 351, (2010) 15 SCC 776, (2010) 11 SCC 233 and (2011) 14 SCC
692.
5. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that, the case against the respondent is based on 'no evidence'. During the departmental proceeding, no document was produced, exhibited and proved by the department in support of the charges framed against the respondent. Even the documents which have been annexed 5 along with the charge-memo, have not been proved in the course of the departmental enquiry and therefore, no reliance can be placed on those documents for proving the charge against the respondent. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that, for no fault of the respondent, the departmental proceeding was continued for more than 18 years and in the end, only a punishment of "censure" has been awarded to the respondent. Since the delay in the departmental proceeding has been caused due to laches on the part of department itself, the punishment awarded to the respondent is liable to be quashed. Relying on a document filed before the Writ Court, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that, the penalty order dated 19.04.2012 has been passed on the direction of the Chief Minister and therefore, it is liable to be quashed. The learned counsel has further submitted that, by penalty order dated 01.03.2007 and 19.04.2012, only a minor punishment has been awarded to the respondent however, the departmental proceeding was continued illegally for more than 18 years and therefore, it is apparent on the face of record that the departmental proceeding against the respondent was continued only to deny her the legitimate promotion in higher grade/rank. To fortify his contentions the learned counsel has relied on decisions reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570, (2006) 5 SCC 88, (2012) 5 SCC 242, (2010) 10 SCC 539 and (2010) 2 SCC 772.
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6. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant-State of Jharkhand has contended that reliance of the learned Single Judge on the report of the Chief Secretary, Principal Secretary of Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms and the Deputy Commissioner for holding that, there was no material to substantiate the charge against the respondent, was misplaced in as much as, in all the three reports the authorities have not recorded that there was no evidence against the respondent. Referring to paragraph nos. 26 and 39 of the impugned order dated 21.02.2013, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that, the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge is contrary to the materials placed on record. We have gone through the entire record and carefully examined the submission of rival parties. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned Additional Advocate-General. Though, a reference has been made to the report of the Chief Secretary, Principal Secretary of Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms and the report of the Deputy Commissioner, the learned Single Judge has quashed the impugned order on the ground of its being mechanical, cryptic and being violative of the principles of natural justice besides, holding that the case against the respondent is based on "no evidence".
7. We find that the specific plea of the writ petitioner that the enquiry conducted against her was improper and in 7 violation of the principles of natural justice has not been challenged by the department by producing cogent evidence. The plea of the writ petitioner that no material was produced by the department in support of the charges framed against her, has also not been controverted by the appellant in the present proceeding and therefore, merely, because a reference to the reports of the Chief Secretary, Principal Secretary of Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms and the report of the Deputy Commissioner, has been made by the learned Single Judge, the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that there was no material/evidence brought on record in support of the charges framed against the petitioner, cannot be held to be contrary to the record of the case. In fact those reports are not part of the disciplinary proceeding against the respondent and therefore, the department also cannot be permitted to rely on those reports. We find sufficient reasons for agreeing with the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge.
8. In this connection referring to the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that the documents furnished along with the charge-memo could not have been considered by the enquiry officer, we find that during the departmental proceeding, the department did not produce any witness. Inspite of repeated notices issued by the successive enquiry officer, the department did not examine 8 any witness. It cannot be disputed that mere production and marking of a document is not enough. The execution of a document has to be proved by admissible evidence. The charge-memo would indicate that in support of the charge, the department relied on an interim enquiry report of one Aabhash Kumar Jha; however, he also has not been examined by the department. It is not the case of the department that the respondent herein admitted the contents of the documents and therefore, we are of the opinion that the enquiry officer could not have based his finding on the documents annexed with the charge-memo.
9. In "Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank", reported in (2009) 2 SCC 570 when the management merely tendered the documents and no witness was examined to prove the documents, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the reliance placed by the enquiry officer on those documents, was erroneous as the documents produced by the Department could not have been treated as evidence.
10. In "M/S. Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. Workmen & Ors.", reported in (1971) 2 SCC 617,the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus,
14. "........ When a document is produced in a Court or a Tribunal the questions that naturally arise is, is it a genuine document, what are its contents and are the statements contained therein true. ................. Even if all technicalities of the Evidence Act are not strictly applicable except insofar as Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the rules prescribed 9 therein permit it, it is inconceivable that the Tribunal can act on what is not evidence such as hearsay, nor can it justify the Tribunal in basing its award on copies of documents when the originals which are in existence are not produced and proved by one of the methods either by affidavit or by witness who have executed them, if they are alive and can be produced............."
11. Relying on the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the learned Additional Advocate-General has submitted that the findings recorded in the departmental proceeding was not liable to be interfered with by the Writ Court. It was contended that the High Court exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot reappreciate the evidence as it has not been constituted as a Court of Appeal and, since the learned Single Judge has reappreciated the evidence and came to a conclusion that the case against the petitioner is based on 'no evidence', the impugned order dated 21.02.2013 is liable to be set-aside. In view of the facts brought on record in the proceeding before the Writ Court, we are of the opinion that the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge is not based on reappreciation of the evidence on the record. The fact that the documents produced by the department cannot be considered legal evidence, on the basis of which a finding of misconduct cannot be recorded, we are in agreement with the finding of the learned Single Judge that the case against the petitioner is based on 'no evidence'.
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12. Further, from the enquiry proceeding dated 12.04.1999 it appears that the enquiry officer has recorded that the documents requested by the respondent were not supplied to her. When an objection was taken by the department that the documents requested by the respondent were either not issued or were not relevant for the proceeding against the respondent, on 01.06.1999, the department was directed to submit an application in that regard. However, from the proceeding before the enquiry officer, it does not appear that the stand taken by the department was ever pleaded on affidavit before the enquiry officer. On 15.10.2001, the Drawing and Disbursing Authority was directed to appear with the records however, neither the Drawing and Disbursing Authority appeared before the enquiry officer nor the records were produced and on the next date, that is, on 30.10.2001, the enquiry proceeding was closed. The enquiry officer has submitted the enquiry report only on the basis of the charge-memo and the documents furnished along with the charge-memo. The delinquent employee was not even afforded an opportunity to present her case. In a departmental proceeding after the evidence led by the department concludes, a delinquent employee must be afforded an opportunity to produce evidence in support of his/her case and submit representation to the enquiry officer. Admittedly, such a procedure has not been adopted 11 by the enquiry officer and after a lapse of about one year, the enquiry report dated 23.10.2002 was submitted finding the charges except, charge no. 5 (a), proved against the respondent. Thus, we find that, the procedure adopted by the enquiry officer was not in consonance with the principles of natural justice.
13. The learned Single Judge has taken note of the manner in which the impugned order dated 19.04.2012 has been passed without discussing any evidence or material on record. In the earlier proceeding also, the penalty order was passed without discussing any evidence on record and without even indicating that the disciplinary authority agreed or disagreed with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. The order passed by the Writ Court on 06.01.2012 was affirmed by the Letters Patent Court with the following observations:
"However, we are of the considered opinion that there is no illegality in the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 06.01.2012, as the impugned order, which is placed on record as Annexure-17, clearly indicates that the order is not only an order without assigning any reason, but has passed only after narrating the facts of the case and without even holding that Disciplinary Authority has concurred with the findings recorded by the inquiry officer and straight away order of punishment has been passed after stating that in view of the inquiry report punishment is inflicted."12
14. In the impugned order dated 21.02.2013 the learned Single Judge has expressed anguish, over the manner in which the impugned order dated 19.04.2012 has been passed, in these words;
"Earlier order of the respondents, holding the petitioner guilty, was quashed by this Court due to the said infirmities. The manner of the order was deprecated and the matter was remitted to the respondents to pass a fresh order, in accordance with law. The respondents have again passed laconic and non-speaking order, making mockery of the said direction of this Court."
15. In England, at one time it was thought that there is no requirement for recording reasons by the administrative authorities for its decision. Lord Denning M.R., in "Breen Vs. Amalgamated Engineering Union",reported in (1971) 2 Q.B. 175, recorded his dissenting opinion that "the giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration." The Committee of Justice in its report has expressed its view thus; "No single factor has inhibited the development of English administrative law as seriously as the absence of any general obligation upon public authorities to give reasons for their decisions."
16. In "Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. Vs. Union of India", reported in (1976) 2 SCC 981, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of the order, must be observed in its true spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the 13 requirement in law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus;
6. "...........It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasijudicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasijudicial order must be supported by reasons. That has been laid down by a long line of decisions of this Court ending with N.M. Desai v. Testeels Ltd.1. But, unfortunately, the Assistant Collector did not choose to give any reasons in support of the order made by him confirming the demand for differential duty. This was in plain disregard of the requirement of law. The Collector in revision did give some sort of reason but it was hardly satisfactory. He did not deal in his order with the arguments advanced by the appellants in their representation dated December 8, 1961 which were repeated in the subsequent representation dated June 4, 1965. It is not suggested that the Collector should have made an elaborate order discussing the arguments of the appellants in the manner of a Court of law. But the order of the Collector could have been a little more explicit and articulate so as to lend assurance that the case of the appellants had been properly considered by him. ........... The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasijudicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law..........."
17. In "Woolcombers of India Ltd. Vs. Workers Union", reported in (1974) 3 SCC 318, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
5. "......... The giving of reasons in support of their conclusions by judicial and quasijudicial authorities when exercising initial jurisdiction is essential for various reasons. First, it is calculated to prevent unconscious unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching the conclusions. The very search for reasons will put the authority on the alert and minimise the chances of unconscious infiltration of personal bias or unfairness in the conclusion. The authority will adduce reasons which will be regarded as fair 14 and legitimate by a reasonable man and will discard irrelevant or extraneous considerations.
Second, it is a wellknown principle that justice should not only be done but should also appear to be done. Unreasoned conclusions may be just but they may not appear to be just to those who read them. Reasoned conclusions, on the other hand, will have also the appearance of justice. ............... So it is necessary to emphasise that judicial and quasijudicial authorities should always give the reasons in support of their conclusions."
18. A perusal of the penalty order dated 19.04.2012 discloses that the disciplinary authority has only recorded the chequered history of the case over last 16 years. After indicating the penalty imposed on 01.03.2007 and the orders passed by this Court in earlier proceeding, the disciplinary authority has concluded thus;
"In the light of order of Hon'ble Court, the charge against Smt. Jha, the defence submitted by her, reply of second show-cause, enquiry report and other relevant documents have been considered again.
The charge against Smt. Jha is clearly serious in nature. After review, the charge of dereliction of duty, providing inappropriate benefit to outside suppliers in the implementation of schemes for vested interests and the charge of misappropriation and misuse of government fund by working arbitrarily against Government direction are proved. Smt. Jha is guilty of dereliction of duty and financial irregularity and therefore, under Rule 49 of Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rule, 1930, she is awarded penalty of Censure, which shall come in force with effect from the date of issuance of the order and it is decided to close the departmental proceeding."
19. It is apparent from the order dated 19.04.2012 that the specific defence taken by the delinquent officer to the proceeding before the enquiry officer has not been discussed by the disciplinary authority. In fact none of the 15 defence taken by the delinquent officer has been considered by the disciplinary authority. Even a finding has not been recorded by the disciplinary authority whether the defence of the officer is accepted or not. The agreement or disagreement with the enquiry report has also not been indicated in the final order dated 19.04.2012. We are of the opinion that the penalty order dated 19.04.2012 does not satisfy the requirement of law.
20. Coming to the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the penalty order dated 21.02.2013 is liable to be interfered with as, it has been passed on the dictate of the Hon'ble Chief Minister, we find that the respondent herein produced a document before the Writ Court which would indicate that the file relating to the disciplinary proceeding against the respondent was placed before the Chief Minister on 12.04.2012 and he gave a direction to impose penalty of "censure" upon the respondent. It is settled law that the statutory duty/discretion must be exercised by the person or authority in whom the duty/discretion is vested and if such discretion is exercised under direction or in compliance with instructions of some other person or authority, it would amount to failure to exercise the discretion altogether. This principle has its genesis in the maxim 'delegatus non potest delegare' which has been succinctly explained in the Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol.-I as under, 16 "In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. I, in respect of sub-delegation of powers it has been said:
"In accordance with the maxim delegatus non potest delegare, a statutory power must be exercised only by the body or officer in whom it has been confided, (H. Lavender & Son Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government) unless sub-delegation of the power is authorised by express words or necessary implication (Customs and Excise Comrs. v. Cure and Deeley Ltd. and Mungoni v. Attorney General of Northern Rhodesia). There is a strong presumption against construing a grant of legislative, judicial, or disciplinary power as impliedly authorising sub-delegation; and the same may be said of any power to the exercise of which the designated body should address its own mind. Allam & Co. v. Europa Poster Services Ltd. ..."
21. In "Sahni Silk Mills (P) Ltd. and another v. Employees' State Insurance Corpn.", reported in (1994) 5 SCC 346, the maxim, 'delegatus non potest delegare' has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court thus,
12. "..................... The maxim delegatus non potest delegare was originally invoked in the context of delegation of judicial powers saying that in the entire process of adjudication a judge must act personally except insofar as he is expressly absolved from his duty by a statute. The basic principle behind the aforesaid maxim is that "a discretion conferred by statute is prima facie intended to be exercised by the authority on which the statute has conferred it and by no other authority, but this intention may be negatived by any contrary indications found in the language, scope or object of the statute". (Vide John Willis, "Delegatus non potest delegare, (1943) 21 Can. Bar Rev. 257,
259)."
22. In "Purtabpore Co. Ltd. Vs. Cane Commissioner of Bihar & Ors." reported in (1969) 1 SCC 308, the Cane Commissioner, Bihar passed an order reserving certain villages under clause 6 (1) (a) of the Sugar Cane Control 17 order 1960. The Chief Minister directed the Cane Commissioner to divide the area into two portions and allotted one portion to another person. On the direction of the Chief Minister, the Cane Commissioner passed orders which were challenged before the High Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the executive officers entrusted with statutory discretion cannot be absolved from their duty to exercise their personal judgment in individual cases unless explicit statutory provision has been made for that. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus,
11. "........The Cane Commissioner merely carried out the orders of the Chief Minister. It is true that the impugned orders were issued in the name of the Cane Commissioner. He merely obeyed the directions issued to him by the Chief Minister. We are unable to agree with the contention of Shri Chagla that though the Cane Commissioner was initially of the view that the reservation made in favour of the appellant should not be disturbed, he changed his opinion after discussion with the Chief Minister. From the material before us, the only conclusion possible is that the Chief Minister imposed his opinion on the Cane Commissioner. The power exercisable by the Cane Commissioner under Clause 6(1) is a statutory power. He alone could have exercised that power. While exercising that power he cannot abdicate his responsibility in favour of anyone -- not even in favour of the State Government or the Chief Minister. It was not proper for the Chief Minister to have interfered with the functions of the Cane Commissioner. In this case what has happened is that the power of the Cane Commissioner has been exercised by the Chief Minister, an authority not recognised by clause (6) read with clause (11) but the responsibility for making those orders was asked to be taken by the Cane Commissioner."
23. In the background of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we find that the final order dated 18 19.04.2012 is vitiated on account of the order passed by the Chief Minister on 12.04.2012. The record produced by the respondent indicates that the file relating to departmental proceeding against the respondent was placed before the Chief Minister when he ordered imposition of penalty of "censure". The opinion of the Chief Minister appears to have weighed with the disciplinary authority. Our attention has not been drawn to any rule which provides that the record of the disciplinary proceeding was required to be placed before the Chief Minister.
24. Now, coming to the facts of the case, we find that, the show-cause notice was issued to the respondent on 18.01.1995 whereas, the alleged irregularities committed by the respondent pertains to the year, 1989-1990. The respondent was suspended on 08.03.1996 and the charge-sheet was drawn on 17.04.1996. After a lapse of more than six years the enquiry report was submitted on 23.10.2002. The respondent herein approached this Court in the year, 2003 itself, however, the final order was passed in the year, 2007 which was quashed by this Court. Thereafter, the penalty order was passed in the year, 2012. The materials brought on record would indicate that the delay in the departmental proceeding can be attributed solely to the Department. After the charge-sheet was drawn in the year, 1996, three enquiry officers were changed. The proceeding before the enquiry officer would indicate that, 19 the department did not cooperate during the enquiry proceeding as the department failed to examine any witness and the presenting officer did not appear on most of the occasions. We are of the view that keeping a person in suspense while the departmental proceeding was kept pending for many years, would certainly affect the physical and physiological condition of the delinquent employee. Pendency of the departmental proceeding for a long period would keep the person in a state of agony. The learned Single Judge has also recorded that the prolong departmental proceeding has caused immense mental stress and agony to the writ petitioner.
25. In "State of Punjab Vs. Bani Singh", reported in (1990) Supp. SCC 738, the proceeding was initiated in the year, 1987 with respect to the irregularities committed in the year 1975-77. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to proceed further.
26. In "M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India & Ors.", reported in (2006) 5 SCC 88, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus,
16. "............ The Tribunal as also the High Court failed to take into consideration that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after six years and they continued for a period of seven years and, thus, initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as also continuance thereof after such a long time evidently prejudiced the delinquent officer."
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27. In "State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan" reported in (1998) 4 SCC 154, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under,
19. "It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations."
28. Taking note of earlier decisions of the Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "P.V. Mahadevan Vs. Managing 21 Director, T.N. Housing Board", reported in (2005) 6 SCC 636 observed that keeping the higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and stress to the officer concerned. The Hon'ble Supreme Court did not permit the department to proceed further in the departmental enquiry and it was quashed at the stage of enquiry itself. In view of the facts brought on record, we are of the opinion that for the mistake committed by the department in continuing the departmental proceeding for more than 18 years, the respondent should not be made to suffer. The respondent has been awarded only a penalty of "censure" and, she has already undergone mental agony and suffering due to the prolonged proceeding which was initiated in the year, 1996.
29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order dated 21.02.2013 whereby penalty order dated 19.04.2012 has been quashed. However, in so far as, the direction contained in paragraph no. 48 of the impugned order is concerned, we clarify that the claim of the respondent would be considered in accordance with law. Further, since no reason has been assigned by the learned Single Judge for awarding cost of Rs. 60,000/- to be paid to the Writ-Petitioner, we are inclined to accept the submission of the learned Additional Advocate-General that award of cost to the respondent is not justified and accordingly, that part of the impugned 22 order is set-aside.
30. In the result, the Letters Patent Appeal is partly allowed in the above terms.
(R. Banumathi, C.J.) (Shree Chandrashekhar, J.) Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi The 28th day of January, 2014 Amit/A.F.R.