Himachal Pradesh High Court
Kasturi Devi vs Rajeev Sharma & Ors on 21 November, 2025
( 2025:HHC:39466 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
Civil Revision No. 193 of 2015
Decided on: 21.11.2025
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____________________________________________________
Kasturi Devi
........... Petitioner
Versus
Rajeev Sharma & Ors.
..........Respondents
____________________________________________________
Coram:
of
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge
Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the petitioners rt : Mr. Deepak Gupta, Advocate.
For the respondents : Mr. Sumit Sood, Advocate, for respondent No. 1.
:
Mr. Neeraj Gupta, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Ajit Pal Singh Jaswal, Advocate, for respondents No. 2 and 3.
____________________________________________________ Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral) The eviction petition in the case at hand was decided vide judgment dated 14.03.2001. The relevant portion, i.e., the relief granted therein reads as follow:-
"In view my findings and discussions above, petition succeeds and is hereby allowed with costs of Rs. 2,000/-. Respondents are ordered to be evicted from the demised premises consisting of 2 rooms, kitchen, Bathroom/toilet, store and glazed Verandah situated in ground floor (2nd storey), walterton Main Building, Chhota Shimla, Shimla-2, on the ground that they are in arrears of rent to the tune of Rs. 8314.47/- and on the ground of bonafide requirement of petitioner for his own use and occupation. Respondents are 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?::: Downloaded on - 12/12/2025 20:33:40 :::CIS
2( 2025:HHC:39466 ) directed to put the landlord in possession of demised premises. However it is made clear that respondents shall not be liable for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent if they tender/pay the arrears of rent within 30 days from today. In the facts and .
circumstances of the case, respondents are burdened with cost of the petition. Memo of Cost be prepared accordingly. File after due completion be consigned to record room."
2. Appeal against the same was preferred before the First Appellate Court on 05.05.2011. The same was decided on of 01.08.2015. The specific allegation made in the case at hand is that while filing the first appeal, the entire amount as awarded in rt the relief clause specifically the costs assessed at Rs. 2,000/-
was not deposited while filing the appeal. In this respect, attention is invited to CMP No. 23738 of 2024, specifically para No. 4 thereof, wherein it has been categorically asserted that costs assessed at Rs. 2,000/- have not been deposited by the present revision petitioner while filing the appeal before the First Appellate Court.
3. Response to the aforesaid paragraphs, specifically para No. 4 categorically reflects that only rent was deposited by the present petitioner while filing the first appeal, as it is categorically asserted that costs and interest were deposited by the other joint tenant one Smt. Shobha Chaurasiya while filing her application for setting aside the ex parte order under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC. The application under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC was filed by the other joint tenant Smt. Shobha Sharma @ Shobha ::: Downloaded on - 12/12/2025 20:33:40 :::CIS 3( 2025:HHC:39466 ) Chourasiya on 24.11.2011. The same was decided on 31.03.2021. Appeal preferred against the same was also dismissed.
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4. The requirement of depositing the amount due before filing the appeal before the First Appellate Court emanates from Section 14(2)(i) third proviso thereto of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act. The same is reproduced as follows:-
of "Provided further that the tenant against whom the Controller has made an order for eviction on the rt ground on non-payment of rent due from him, shall not be evicted as a result of his order, if the tenant pays the amount due within a period of 30 days from the date of order;"
5. The aforesaid provision specifically the expression "amount due" used therein came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court. The judgment is reported as 2005 (2) Shim. L.C. 498, titled Wazir Chand vs. Ambaka Rani and another, the relevant extract whereof is reproduced as follows:-
7. The legislative intent can also be clearly discerned from the fact that in the third proviso the Legislature advisedly did not use the expression "rent due" or "arrears of rent due". Had the Legislature used either of these two expressions or any other similar expression in the third proviso, perhaps one could argue that the legislative intent was that the tenant should be held liable to pay the rent or the arrears of rent only. But by using the expression "amount due"
in the third proviso the Legislature clearly intended that the arrears of rent alongwith interest and costs, as has been stipulated in the first proviso, should be paid by the tenant after the eviction order is passed ::: Downloaded on - 12/12/2025 20:33:40 :::CIS 4( 2025:HHC:39466 ) against him if the tenant wanted to avoid the enforcement or the execution of the eviction order.
6. In this respect, reference can also be made to .
2007(1) SLC 88, titled Bilasi Ram Vs. Bhanumagi, relevant extract whereof reads as follows:-
"4. By now it is well established, in the light of the authoritative pronouncements by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Wazir Chand v. Ambaka Rani and another, reported in 2005(2) Shim. L.C. of 498, based upon and in the light of the ratio in the case of Madam Mohan and another v. Kirshan Kumar Sood, reported in 1994 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 437, that the expression 'amount due' rt occurring in the aforesaid third proviso includes the arrears of rent, the interest thereupon @ 9% per annum and the amount of costs. It is also a well settled proposition of law by now that if the tenant fails to deposit the amount due within a period of 30 days from the date of order, the only option available in law is to enforce the eviction order.
Whether the shortfall is Rs.1/- or the shortfall is more than Rs.1/-, if there is any shortfall in the deposit of the amount, the eviction order has to be executed, because by not depositing the amount due in its entirety, the tenant forfeits the concession granted to him under the aforesaid third proviso and the only option thereafter is to executed the eviction order."
7. The sine-qua-non for maintaining an appeal before the First Appellate Court is deposit of the amount due i.e. arrears of rent alongwith interest & costs as contemplated in Section 14(2)(i) third proviso thereto. In Satish Kumar and Anr. Vs. Jagat Ram 2020(1) Shiml. LC 173., wherein it has been held that payment of rent due within the stipulated period of 30 days is a condition precedent and sine qua non for maintaining an appeal ::: Downloaded on - 12/12/2025 20:33:40 :::CIS 5( 2025:HHC:39466 ) before the Appellate Authority or else the order of Rent Controller has to be treated to have attained finality and the appeal must be dismissed. (See also Civil Revision No. 96/2023, titled .
Snowflake Education Society & Anr. vs. Raman Khanna, decided on 27th November, 2024 and 2020 (1) SLC 173, titled Satish Kumar vs. Jagat Ram).
8. In the aforesaid context, learned counsel appearing of on behalf of the petitioner submits that in so far as the ground of non deposit of amount "amount due" in terms of third proviso to rt Section 14(2)(i) is concerned, no such plea was taken before the First Appellate Court and hence, according to him, the plea now sought to be made by the present respondent is not maintainable, as the same is sought to have been waived.
9. Per Contra, learned counsel for the respondent contends that insofar as the plea of waiver is concerned, there can be no estoppel against law. In this respect reference can be made to (2015) 11 SCC 637, relevant extract whereof is reproduced as follows:-
In law equally the Tribunal ought to have realised that there can be no estoppel against law. If the law requires that something be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner, and if not done in that manner has no existence in the eye of the law at all. The Customs Authorities are not absolved from following the law depending upon the acts of a particular assessee. Something that is ::: Downloaded on - 12/12/2025 20:33:40 :::CIS 6( 2025:HHC:39466 ) illegal cannot convert itself into something legal by the act of a third person.
10. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the .
respondent further contends that benefits conferred on a tenant under the relevant statue can be enjoyed only on the basis of a strict compliance with the statutory provision. He further contends that equitable consideration have no place in such matters. No of lenient view can be taken in the matter if the law in this respect has not been complied with. Procedure prescribed is to strictly complied with if benefit of the beneficial provision is claimed by rt the tenant. In this respect, attention of this Court has been drawn to 2005 (7) SCC 211, titled Atma Ram vs. Shakuntala Rani, relevant paragraph is reproduced as follows:-
"18. In E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy, (2003) 1 SCC 123 the provisions of T. N. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 came up for consideration. The requirement of the Act was somewhat similar to the Rajasthan Rent Act and the A. P Rent Act considered by this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal, (1996) 1 SCC 243 and M. Bhaskar v J. Venkatarama Naidu, (1996) 6 SCC 228. Reiterating the view in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal, (1996) 1 SCC 243 and M. Bhaskar v. J.
Venkatarama Naidu, (1996) 6 SCC 228 this Court observed:
(SCC pp. 127 & 128, paras 5 & 8) "The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration has no place in such matters. The statute contains expression provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a precondition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance with the procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step i. e, to deposit rent in court. The last step can ::: Downloaded on - 12/12/2025 20:33:40 :::CIS 7( 2025:HHC:39466 ) come only after the earlier steps have been taken by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal, (1996) 1 SCC 243 and M. Bhaskar v. J. Venkatarama Naidu, (1996) 6 SCC 228. .
Admittedly the tenant did not follow the procedure prescribed under Section 8. The only submission that was advanced on behalf of the appellant was that since the deposit of rent had been made, a lenient view ought to be taken. We are unable to agree with this. The appellant failed to satisfy the conditions contained in Section 8. Mere refusal of the landlord to receive rent cannot justify the action of the tenant in straight away invoking section 8 (5) of the Act without following the of procedure contained in the earlier sub-sections i. e. sub- sections (2), (3) and (4) of section 8. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the eviction order passed against the appellant with respect to the suit premises on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent needs no interference."
rt
19. It will thus appear that this Court has consistently taken the views that in Rent Control legislations if the tenant wishes to take advantage of the beneficial provisions of the Act, he must strictly comply with the requirements of the Act. If any condition precedent is to be fulfilled before the benefit can be claimed, he must strictly comply with that condition. If he fails to do so he cannot take advantage of the benefit conferred by such a provision."
11. In my considered view, insofar as the plea of waiver raised by the petitioner is concerned there is no force in the arguments on account of the aforesaid reasons put-forth by the respondents.
12. Besides, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contends that in so far as the eviction order is concerned, it only directed the petitioner to deposit arrears of the rent and not the amount due and hence only arrears of rent were deposited.
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13. The lapse, if at all, is on the part of the petitioner who either under ill-advise or on account of his callous conduct deposited such amount which is not in consonance with the order .
and the Act. Hence, the argument that deposit was in consonance with the eviction order is rejected.
14. It is next contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that in terms of law laid of down in Rakesh Wadhawan Vs. M/s Jagdamba Industrial Corporation, 2002 (1) RCR (Rent) 514, the Supreme Court rt settled the issue regarding assessing of amount due from the tenant and held as follows:-
"What follows from the abovesaid discussion is that the proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (2) of Section 13 must be read as obliging the Controller to assess, by means of passing an order, the arrears of rent, the interest and the cost of litigation all the three, which the tenant shall pay or tender on the first date of first hearing of the main petition following the date of such assessment by Controller. Such order based on an opinion formed prima facie by perusal of the pleadings and such other material as may be available before the Controller on that day would be an interim or provisional order which shall have to give way to a final order to be made on further enquiry to be held later in the event of there being a dispute between the parties calling for such determination. The Controller would, however, at the outset assess the rent, the interest and the cost of application in the light of and to the extent of dispute, if any, raised by the tenant. Such amount, as determined by Controller shall be liable to be paid or tendered by the Controller on the 'first date of ::: Downloaded on - 12/12/2025 20:33:40 :::CIS 9( 2025:HHC:39466 ) hearing' falling after the date of the preliminary or provisional order of Controller. The expression "the date of first hearing" came up recently for the consideration of this Court in Mam Chand Pal Vs Smt. Shanti Agarwal, 2002(1) RCR (Rent) 326; (C.A. .
No.1187 of 2002 decided on 14.2.2002). It was held that 'the date of first hearing' is the date on which the Court applies its mind to the facts and controversy involved in the case. Any date prior to such date would not be date of first hearing. For instance, date for framing of issues would be the date of first of hearing when the Court has to apply its mind to the facts of the case. Where the procedure applicable is the one as applicable to Small Cause Courts, there being no provision for framing of the issues, any date rt fixed for hearing of the case would be the first date for the purpose. The date fixed for filing of the written statement is not the date of hearing. Keeping in view the interpretation so placed on 'the date of first hearing' the obligation cast by the proviso under consideration can be discharged by the Controller on any date fixed for framing of the issues or for hearing. It would be the obligation of the parties to place the relevant material on record, in the shape of affidavits or documents, which would enable the Controller to make a provisional judicial assessment and place it on record to satisfy the spirit of the proviso. It would be desirable if the Rent Controller specifically appoints a date for the purpose of such assessment and order so that the parties are put on adequate notice and bring the relevant material on record to assist the Controller. A litigant cannot be expected to be ready to comply with the order of the Controller on the very day on which the order is made. How could he anticipate what order the Controller would be making?"
15. On the basis of the aforesaid, it is contended that it is incumbent upon the Rent Controller at the time of passing of the ::: Downloaded on - 12/12/2025 20:33:40 :::CIS 10( 2025:HHC:39466 ) eviction order to ascertain three things, i.e., arrears of rent, interest and the costs of litigation and then to specify the amount due.
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16. In respect of the aforesaid a full Bench of this Court in Wazir chand v. Ambaka Rani and another, 2005(2) Shim.
LC 498 after considering the import of Section 14(2)(i) and after taking note of the judgment of the Apex Court in Madan Mohan of and another v. Krishan Kumar Sood, 1994 Supp(1) SCC 437, held as follows:-
rt "9........Undoubtedly, based on the ratio of Madan Mohan and another v. Krishan Kumar Sood (supra), the rent payable by the tenant to the landlord, which the Rent Controller would be specifying in the order of eviction would be the arrears of rent uptil the filing of the eviction petition under Section 14(2)(i) as well as the arrears of rent which have accumulated during the pendency f eviction petition, right up to the date of passing of the eviction order.........."
In the case at hand in the eviction order passed by the Rent Controller arrears of rent has been correctly calculated.
17. Insofar as calculation of interest is concerned, there is an acknowledged formula for calculating interest. In this regard, reference can be made to the judgment of this Court in 2012 (3) Shim. LC, 1265, titled Rewat Ram vs. Ashok Kumar & Ors., relevant extracts whereof reads as follows:-
"13...........there is an acknowledged formula for calculating interest on arrears of rent because rent accrues at the end of every month and interest on ::: Downloaded on - 12/12/2025 20:33:40 :::CIS 11( 2025:HHC:39466 ) each month's rent will be different. This formula reads as follows:-
Rent x No. of months x (No. of months + 1) x 9x2 x 12 x 100."
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18. The contention of learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of Smt. Shobha Chaurasiya is that application filed under Order 9 Rule 13 of CPC by Smt. Shobha Chaurasiya was within time from the date of knowledge.
of
19. In the case at hand, we are not concerned with the application preferred by the other joint tenant, Smt. Shobha rt Chaurasiya, filed under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC. In the case at hand, we are concerned with the appeal preferred by the present petitioner against the eviction order passed by the Rent Controller.
20. Since, in the present case, the petitioner did not deposit the amount due before the First Appellate Court in terms of Section 14(2)(i), third proviso of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act; hence, I am of the considered view that the appeal before the First Appellate Court was not maintainable.
21. In view of above, I find no merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed accordingly. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
Only the application wherein a determination of use and ::: Downloaded on - 12/12/2025 20:33:40 :::CIS 12( 2025:HHC:39466 ) occupation charges is to be done shall be kept pending as on principles of equity justice needs to be done inter-se the parties.
22. As on account of an interim order passed by this .
Court, benefits of use of the premises have been denied to the landlord for which the landlord needs to be suitably compensated by award of just, fair use and occupation charges.
of
(Bipin Chander Negi)
rt Judge
21st November, 2025
Shamsh Tabrez/susheel
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