Madhya Pradesh High Court
Virendra Singh Mehta vs Hemant on 4 May, 2022
Author: Subodh Abhyankar
Bench: Subodh Abhyankar
: 1: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SUBODH ABHYANKAR
ON THE 04 OF MAY, 2022
ARBITRATION APPEAL No. 20 of 2018
Between:-
1. VIRENDRA SINGH MEHTA S/O LATE SHRI SAJJAN SINGH MEHTA ,
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS R/O 44 GULMOHAR
MAIN, SAKET INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. SMT. KIRAN MEHTA W/O SHRI VIRENDRA SINGH MEHTA , AGED
ABOUT 67 YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS R/O 44, GULMOHAR MAIN
SAKET (MADHYA PRADESH)
3. ANKUSH MEHTA S/O SHRI VIRENDRA SINGH MEHTA , AGED ABOUT
40 YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS R/O 44, GULMOHAR MAIN SAKET
(MADHYA PRADESH)
.....APPELLANTS
(BY SHRI AMIT AGRAWAL, SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH SHRI ARJUN
AGRAWAL,ADVOCATE)
AND
1. HEMANT MEHTA S/O LATE SHRI RAJENDRA MEHTA , AGED ABOUT 42
YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS R/O ORGANE VISTA, NEW PALASIA,
INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
2.RAKHI W/O SANJAY SAHANI D/O LATE SHRI RAJENDRA MEHTA ,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS, OCCUPATION: HOUSE WIFE R/O ORANGE
VISTA, NEW PALASIA, (MADHYA PRADESH)
3. MALA MEHTA W/O LATE SHRI RAJENDRAMEHTA , AGED ABOUT 56
YEARS, R/O ORENGE VISTA, NEW PALASIA, (MADHYA PRADESH)
4. SMT. SURYA KUMARI MEHTA DECEASED THR LRS RAJKUMARI W/O
SUNIL DUGAR , AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS, OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE
FLAT NO. 401 MAYA REGENCY, 3/6 NEW PALASIA INDORE (MADHYA
PRADESH)
5. SMT. SURYA KUMARI MEHTA DECEASED THR LRS INDIRA W/O
ABHAY FILODIA , AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS, OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE
132/B, GANESHKHND ROAD, PUNE (MAHARASHTRA)
6. SMT. SURYA KUMARI MEHTA DECEASED THR LRS TARA W/O KIRAN
SHAH, AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS, OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE 11312
: 2: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018
BARNSLEY WAY MARRIOTS VILLE MD 21104 UNITED STATE OF
AMERCIA (OTHER COUNTRY)
7. SMT. SURYA KUMARI MEHTA DECEASED THR LRS UMA W/O
PURUSHOTTAM DUA , AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS, OCCUPATION:
HOUSEWIFE 352, B, AD SECTOR SCHEME NO. 74 INDORE (MADHYA
PRADESH)
8. SMT. SURYA KUMARI MEHTA DECEASED THR LRS MINA W/O DR.
RAJKAMAL SINDHAR, AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS, OCCUPATION:
HOUSEWIFE 2139 OLD BRIDGE ROAD, RIVERSIDE CA 92506 UNITED
STATE OF AMERICA (OTHER COUNTRY)
9. SMT. SURYA KUMARI MEHTA DECEASED THR LRS SHEELA W/O
VIRENDRA MEHTA , AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, OCCUPATION:
HOUSEWIFE 7, RADIO COLONY, NEAR GANDHI PARK COLONY INDORE
(MADHYA PRADESH)
10. DR. JAYA MEHTA D/O LATE SHRI ANAND SINGH MEHTA , AGED
ABOUT 59 YEARS, OCCUPATION: SOCIAL SERVICE R/235-B, ANOOP
NAGAR, (MADHYA PRADESH)
11. DR. KALPANA MEHTA DECEASED THR LRS ADITI MEHTA D/O
KALPANA MEHTA 64 SRIAGAR MAIN (MADHYA PRADESH)
12. SUNIL MEHTA S/O SHRI MANOHAR SINGH MEHTA , AGED ABOUT 54
YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS R/O 14-15, GULMARG COLONY
(MADHYA PRADESH)
13. SMT. RAJ MEHTA W/O SHRI SUNIL MEHTA , AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE R/O 14-15, GULMARG COLONY (MADHYA
PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI NILESH AGRAWAL, ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.1,2 &3
SHRI A.K. CHITALE, SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH SHRI ROMESH DAVE &
SHRI SHEKHAR BHARGAVA,SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH MS.RITU
BHARGAVA, ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.4 & 5 AND SHRI VISHAL
BAHETI, ADVOCATE OF RESPONDENT NOS. 6 & 7)
ARBITRATION APPEAL No. 35 of 2018
Between:-
1. VIRENDRA SINGH MEHTA S/O LATE SHRI SAJJAN SINGH MEHTA ,
AGED ABOUT 74 YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS 44, GULMOHAR
MAIN SAKET, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
2, SMT. KIRAN MEHTA W/O SHRI VIRENDRA SINGH MEHTA , AGED
ABOUT 67 YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS 44, GULMOHAR MAIN
SAKET, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
3. ANKUSH MEHTA S/O SHRI VIRENDRA SINGH MEHTA , AGED ABOUT
40 YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS 44, GULMOHAR MAIN, SAKET,
INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
: 3: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018
.....APPELLANTS
(BY SHRI AMIT AGRAWAL, SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH SHRI ARJUN
AGRAWAL,ADVOCATE)
AND
1. HEMANT S/O LATE SHRI RAJENDRA MEHTA , AGED ABOUT 42
YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS ORANGE VISTA NEW PALASIA,
INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
2. RAKHI W/O SANJAY SAHANI D/O LATE SHRI RAJENDRA MEHTA ,
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS, OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE ORANGE VISTA,
NEW PALASIA, INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
3. MALA MEHTA W/O LATE SHRI RAJENDRA MEHTA , AGED ABOUT 56
YEARS, OCCUPATION: UNEMPLOYED ORANGE VISTA, NEW PALASIA,
INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
SMT. SURYA KUMARI MEHTA DECEASED THR LRS RAJKUMARI W/O
4.SUNIL DUGAR , AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS, OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE
FLAT NO. 401, MAYA REGENCY, 3/6 NEW PALASIA (MADHYA PRADESH)
5.SMT. SURYA KUMARI MEHTA DECEASED THR LRS INDIRA W/O
ABHAY FILODIA , AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS, OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE
132/B, GANESHKHND ROAD, PUNE (MAHARASHTRA)
6. SMT. SURYA KUMARI MEHTA DECEASED THR LRS TARA W/O KIRAN
SHAH , AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS, OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE 11312
BARNSLEY WAY MARRIOTS VILLE MD 21104 UNITED STATE OF
AMERCIA (OTHER COUNTRY)
7. SMT. SURYA KUMARI MEHTA DECEASED THR LRS UMA W/O
PURUSHOTTAM DUA , AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS, OCCUPATION:
HOUSEWIFE 352, B, AD SECTOR SCHEME NO. 74 INDORE (MADHYA
PRADESH)
8. SMT. SURYA KUMARI MEHTA DECEASED THR LRS MINA W/O DR.
RAJKAMAL SINDHAR , AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS, OCCUPATION:
HOUSEWIFE 2139 OLD BRIDGE ROAD, RIVERSIDE CA 92506 UNITED
STATE OF AMERICA (OTHER COUNTRY)
9. SMT. SURYA KUMARI MEHTA DECEASED THR LRS SHEELA W/O
VIRENDRA MEHTA , AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, OCCUPATION:
HOUSEWIFE 7, RADIO COLONY, NEAR GANDHI PARK COLONY
INDORE (MADHYA PRADESH)
10. DR. JAYA MEHTA D/O LATE SHRI ANAND SINGH MEHTA , AGED
ABOUT 59 YEARS, OCCUPATION: SOCIAL SERVICE R/235-B, ANOOP
NAGAR, (MADHYA PRADESH)
11. MS. KALPANA MEHTA DECEASED THR LRS ADITI MEHTA D/O
KALPANA MEHTA 64, SHRINAGAR MAIN, INDORE (MADHYA
PRADESH)
12. SUNIL MEHTA S/O SHRI MANOHAR SINGH MEHTA , AGED ABOUT
: 4: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018
54 YEARS, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS GULMARG COLONY (MADHYA
PRADESH)
13. SMT. RAJ MEHTA W/O SHRI SUNIL MEHTA , AGED ABOUT 52
YEARS, OCCUPATION: HOUSEWIFE R/O 14-15, GULMARG COLONY
(MADHYA PRADESH)
14. SHIVAN DAS MAHANT S/O BANWARI DAS MAHANT VILLAGE
BORTALAI, TEHSIL ITARSI, DISTRICT HOSHANGABAD /PRESENTLY
R/O CLASSIC APARTMENT, FLAT NO. 303, BENGALI CHOURAHA,
BEHIND NAKODA BAKERY, KANADIA ROAD, INDORE (MADHYA
PRADESH)
.....RESPONDENTS
(BY SHRI NILESH AGRAWAL, ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.1,2&3
SHRI A.K. CHITALE, SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH SHRI ROMESH DAVE &
SHRI SHEKHAR BHARGAVA,SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH MS.RITU
BHARGAVA, ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.4 & 5 AND SHRI
VISHAL BAHETI, ADVOCATE OF RESPONDENT NOS. 6 & 7 )
...........................................................................................................
These Arbitration Appeals coming on for judgment this day,
the court passed the following:
JUDGMENT
This Judgment shall also govern disposal of Arbitration Appeal No.35 of 2018 as the parties are same and common question of law is involved in both the appeals.
02. This appeal has been preferred under Section 37 (1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred as the Act, 1996) being aggrieved of the order dated 21.3.2018, passed by the XII Additional Sessions Judge, Indore in Arbitration Case No.124/20216, whereby the learned Judge has dismissed the application preferred by the appellants under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 and has upheld the Award dated 20.4.2016 passed by the sole Arbitrator in Arbitrator Case No.42/2007.
03. Arbitration Appeal No.35/2018 has been preferred against : 5: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 the order dated 21.3.2018 passed by the learned XII Additional District Judge, Indore in M.J.C.No.2/2016 under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
04. In brief, the facts giving rise to the present appeals are that the appellants(hereinafter referred to as the claimants) filed a claim for specific performance of three MOUs dated 31.5.2002, 10.10.2002 and 16.4.2004 essentially claiming relinquishment of 40% share by the respondent Nos. 4 & 5 and 20% share from the respondent Nos. 6 & 7 in plot No.1, Scheme No.54,PU-IV commercial, Bhamori Dubey, Vijay Nagar, Indore (hereinafter referred to as 'the land in question').
05. The case of the claimants/appellants before the sole Arbitrator was that initially the parties entered into an MOU dated 31.5.2002. The appellants, along with the respondent Nos. 1,2,3 and 3A (now deceased and represented by LRs.) were arrayed as parties of the first part; respondent Nos. 4 & 5 were arrayed as parties of the second part and the respondent Nos.6 & 7 were arrayed as parties of the third part. This MOU, in respect of the land in question contemplated that partnership business of M/s Mehta Motors was established in 1970, after the death of Shri A.S. Mehta, his family members and Shri M.S. Mehta had shown unwillingness to continue in business and after repeated negotiations, appellant No.1 V.S. Mehta suggested that assets of Mehta family were important from the point of view of its status and prestige and hence, need to be kept in the family itself.
: 6: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 In the aforesaid MOU Clause 1(a) reads as under:
"1(a) That the parties of the first part will take over the entire assets and liabilities of M/s Mehta Motors {(except) 10 rented shops and tenancy rights of showroom, situated at 41, old Palasia} and M/s Mehta properties, Bhamori.
Mr. V.S.Mehta representing parties of the first has agreed that a net consideration of Rs.218.80 lacs will be paid to the parties of the second part and Rs.109.40 lacs to the parties of the third part consequent to signing of this MOU"
06. Subsequently, on 10.10.2002 a supplementary MOU was also executed in the following relevant terms :-
"And now whereas, after detailed discussion between the parties hereto, the party of the first part has intimated the schedule of payment to be made by him starting from today the 10 th of October 2002 are as under:-
Installment Date Second part Third part (Rs.in lacs) Total FIRST 10.10.02 44.00 22.00 66.00 SECOND 31.03.03 i. 28.00 14.00 42.00 ii.16.00 8.00 24.00 THIRD 01.10.03 44.00 22.00 66.00 FOURTH 31.03.04 44.00 22.00 66.00 FIFTH 01.10.04 42.00 21.40 64.20 Paras d,e,f and g of the same read as under:-
: 7: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 "d. That in case there is delay in making payment by the party of the first part in respect of each and every installment due on the dates mentioned here in above, the party of the first part shall be required to pay interest on each of the installments due at @ 1% above Bank FD rate for 1 year for the period of delay in payment upto 3 months & between 4 to 6 months interest @ 2% above F.D. Rate of that installment.
In case the installment due is paid in advance then grace of that much time will be allowed in next installment. It is hereby clarified that such delay will in no case exceed more than 6 months as above from due date of each installment. In case of further default, the mediator (Arbitrator) can impose such penalty, on the party of the first part, as he deems fit.
e. That, the parties of the second and third part shall extend their full com-operation either in disposing off or fruitful use of the property being show room and workshop and workshop situated at Bhamori, Indore owned by Mehta Properties, so that the disposal of the aforesaid property may be smoothly completed. The parties of the first part will be entitled to construct this property or entering into any agreement for construction with any builder/developer and will further be entitled to entering into agreement for sale of this property, to which parties of the second and third part shall sign all such documents giving their clear consent and will not take any objection whatsoever either directly or indirectly. However, transfer of any portion of the property shall be restricted only to the extent of proportionate share of the sale price of the said portion which has been received by the parties of second and third by that time.
f. That, the share in Showroom and Workshop situated at Bhamori of the parties of the first, second and third part is in the ratio of 40%, 40% and 20% respectively. That on payment of second to fifth installments the parties of the second and third part shall relinquish their rights in the said property in proportion to the amount of each installment received by them, in favour of the party of the first part. It is hereby understood by and between the parties hereto that there will be automatic relinquishment of the rights of the parties of the second and third part in favour of the party of the first part on payment of each of the second to fifth installments by the party of the first part to the parties of second and third part.
g. That, the final document relating to complete
: 8: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018
relinquishment of the rights of the parties of the second and third part of 40% and 20% respectively in the showroom and workshop at Bhamori property shall be registered with the Registrar of immovable properties. It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that the stamp fees, registration and other expenses incurred for executing the said document shall be borne by the parties hereto proportionately according to their shares in the said property at 40%, 40% and 20% respectively.
h. If any dispute is raised by any party with respect to the shares/rights title owned by the parties the second part then will have to be got cleared by the parties of the second part at their own risk, cost and expenses, with respect to such dispute/claim by any party. It will be the sole responsibly of the parties of the second part to obtain no objection for the same. However, this liability will seize on the full & final payment of the last installment relating to this property and registration of the relinquishment deed in favour of the part of the first part."
(emphasis supplied)
07. On 10.10.2002, possession of the plot in question was given by M/s Mehta Properties to the appellants. The documents regarding which were also placed on record. On 16.4.2004, another MOU was executed between the parties with the following stipulations:-
"In continuation to supplemental MOU dated 10.10.2002, the parties have to further confirm as under : .....
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
4. That the party of first part has requested to the party of the second and third part to consider extension of time for part payment of installment due on 30.9.2003 of Rs. 30 lacs, installment due on 31.3.2004 of Rs. 66 lacs installment due on 01.10.2004 of Rs.64.20 lacs for which the parties hereto have agreed as under :...
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
(d) The party of the first part further agrees to pay the fifth installment of Rs.64.20 lacs due on 01.10.2004 along with interest @ 1% above FD rate upto 31.12.2004 and 2% above FD rate upto 31.03.2005 and thereafter the rate of : 9: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 interest will be 12% from 01.4.2005 to 30.9.2005 and under no circumstances further extension of time will be allowed.
That, the interest on the fifth installment due on 01.10.2004 shall also be paid quarterly at the rates now mentioned from its due date i.e. 01.10.2004."
(emphasis supplied)
08. Since the matter could not be settled amicably, in 2005, M/s M.M. Mehta and company was approached by all the parties in respect of their dispute. On 30.9.2005, the appellant No.1 submitted a letter to the erstwhile Arbitrator and claimed that the properties should be relinquished proportionate to the number and extent of installments paid in accordance with clause 4(f) of the supplementary MOU. However, no reply to the said letter was given either by the erstwhile Arbitrator, or by the respondents and thus, the matter remained pending.
09. On 20.4.2006, a letter was sent by appellant No.1 to the respondent Nos.4, 5, 6 & 7 (Annexure A/5) offering the due balance principal amount along with interest @ 12% per annum upto 31.12.2006, seeking consent of the respondents for relinquishing their rights in the said property subject to which original cheques were to be handed over.
10. A reply to the aforesaid letter was sent by the respondent Nos. 4 to 7 vide their letter dated 30.1.2007 to the erstwhile Arbitrator refusing to accept the balance amount and the interest stating that, "this is clearly a willful default by the first party. In view of the default committed by the first party, the MOU stands cancelled in toto and status quo ante MOU dated 31.5.2002 stands : 10: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 restored automatically. We request you to re-open the entire matter and commence the process of renegotiation afresh MOU". However, on 17.3.2007, the erstwhile Arbitrator M/s M.M. Mehta and company withdrew as Arbitrator which led to filing of the application under Section 11 (6) of the Act, dated 26.3.2007, by the appellants before this Court for appointment of substitute Arbitrator which was registered as MCC No.287/2007 (AC No.42/2007), and although it was opposed by the respondents, however, vide its order dated 23.11.2015, i.e., after a period of 8 years 7 months and 28 days to be precise, this Court was pleased to allow the application and appointed Shri Justice S.P. Khare, a retired Judge of this Court, as the sole Arbitrator to decide the dispute between the parties.
11. On 10.12.2015, statement of the claim was filed by the appellants before the sole Arbitrator seeking the following reliefs:-
"It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Tribunal may be pleased to allow the claim and direct the respondent nos. 4 to 7 to accept the balance principal with interest at such rate as may be determined and relinquish their rights by executing appropriate documents in respect of property, namely plot situated at Bhamori Dubey, Indore along with costs in favour of Claimants. "
12. The case of the appellants is that even before the said Arbitrator, the appellants offered two cheques with balance principal amount and up to date interest. However, the respondent Nos.4 to 7 again refused to accept the same. On 13.1.2016, separate written statements/replies to claim were filed by the respondent Nos.1 to 3A, and respondent Nos.5, 6 & 7 and the appellants also filed corresponding separate rejoinder to the replies filed by the : 11: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 respondents No.1, 2, 3A, 5, 6 & 7. A Counter claim was also submitted by Respondent No.5 Kalpana Mehta (now deceased through LR Aditi Mehta) seeking the following relief:
(I) That, the status of the Second and Third Respondent Ms. Kalpana Mehta as partners in the firm "Mehta Motors" and co-
owners in "Mehta Properties" having forty percent share in each of the business entity be restored back as existed as on 31.05.2002.
(II) That, the Claimants represented through Shri V.S. Mehta who are managing the affairs of "Mehta Motors" and "Mehta Properties" from 31.05.2002 may kindly be directed for rendition of accounts of both the entities and distribnution of profits/income earned during these years as per audited accounts by these two entities.
(III) That, the party of First part which has made payment of Rs.108 Lakhs to the Second Respondents towards part payment may kindly be directed to accept payment of Rs.108 Lakhs being the refund of payment made in terms of MOUs due to determination of these MOUs for the reasons stated hereinabove and to restore back their postition and status in the firm and co- ownership as was existed on 31.05.2022.
(IV) The Claimant, who is in the possession of the property of Mehta Motors and Mehta Properties, be directed to hand over the possession to Second, Third and Fourth Respondents who holds sixty Percent share therein.
13. As no evidence was led by either of the parties, learned Arbitrator, after appreciating the evidence on record, passed the final Award on 20.4.2016, and while rejecting the claim of the appellants, the counter claim of the respondent no.5 Kalpana Mehta (now deceased through LR Aditi Mehta) has been allowed.
14. The aforesaid Award was challenged by the appellants under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 before the learned XII Additional District Judge, Indore who has affirmed the Award passed by the learned Arbitrator vide its impugned judgment dated 21.6.2018. Thus, this appeal under Section 37 of the Act, 1996.
: 12: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018
15. Shri Amit Agrawal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant has argued the matter at length and has submitted that the following questions arise for consideration of this Court: -
1. Whether the impugned award is liable to be set aside under Sections 34 (2) (a) (iv) and 34 (2-A) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (herein after referred to as the Arbitration Act) on the touch stone of vesting of title by automatic relinquishment, as is contemplated under Clause (4) (f) of MOU dated 10.10.2002?
2. Whether the impugned award recording a finding of automatic abrogation of MOU on account of alleged breach attributable to the appellants is liable to be set aside being contrary to fundamental policy of Indian Law besides being patently illegal?
3. Whether the findings about the readiness and willingness in the impugned award are perverse?
4. Settling equities between the parties and relief.
16. In support of his contention, Shri Amit Agrawal has also cited various decisions namely;
1. Jagdeo Singh Vs. Bisambhar reported as AIR 1937 NAGPUR
186.
2. Mukesh Kumar & others vs. Col. Harbans Waraich & others reported as (1999) 9 SCC 380.
3. Jeet Mohinder Singh vs. Harminder Singh Jassi reported as (1999) 9 386.
4. PSA SICAL Terminals Pvt. Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of V.O. Chidambranar Port Trust Tuticorin & others reported as AIR 2021 SC 4661.
5. State of Chhatisgrah & Another v. Sal Uduog Pvt. Ltd. reported as 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1027.
6. Welspun Specialty Solutions Ltd. (Formaly known as Remi Metals Gujarat Ltd.) reported as 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1053.
7. Project Director, National Highways No.45E and 220 National Highways Authority of India v. M.Hakeem & another reported as 2021 SCC OnLine SC 473.
17. Lastly, reliance was also placed upon by Shri Agrawal on a recent decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of State : 13: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 of Chhattisgarh and Another vs. Sai Udyog Private Limited reported as 2021 SCC Onlie SC 1027, para 25.
18. Shri Shekhar Bhargava, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 4 & 5, on the other hand has opposed the prayer and it is submitted that no illegality has been committed by the learned Arbitrator while passing the award as also by the learned Judge of the lower Court in affirming the award passed by the Arbitrator under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. In support of his contentions Shri Bhargava has also cited the various decisions. Shri Ashok Chitale, learned Sr. Counsel also appearing for the respondent Nos. 4 & 5 has advanced his arguments regarding the scope of interference u/s.37 of the Act of 1996 and has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of South East Asia Marine Engg. & Constructions Ltd. (SEAMEC LTD.) v. Oil India Ltd., reported as (2020) 5 SCC 164 .
19. Shri Vishal Baheti, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 6 & 7 has also opposed the appeal and it is submitted that the appellant has failed to show his readiness and willingness to perform the contract and in fact, the appellant had no financial capacity to perform the contract, which is apparent from the documents filed on record. To bolster his submissions, Shri Bahtei has relied upon the following decisions:
1. M/s Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. Oil & Natural Gas Company reported as AIR 2010 SC 3400.
2. K.T. Construction (I) Ltd. v. State of M.P. & another reported as 2016(3) MPLJ 316.
: 14: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018
20. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.
21. So far as the scope of s.34 of the Act is concerned, the Supreme Court in the case of South East Asia Marine Engg. & Constructions Ltd. (SEAMEC LTD.) v. Oil India Ltd., reported as (2020) 5 SCC 164 has held as under:-
"12. It is a settled position that a court can set aside the award only on the grounds as provided in the Arbitration Act as interpreted by the courts. Recently, this Court in Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd.3 laid down the scope of such interference. This Court observed as follows : (SCC pp. 11-12, para 24) "24. There is no dispute that Section 34 of the Arbitration Act limits a challenge to an award only on the grounds provided therein or as interpreted by various Courts. We need to be cognizant of the fact that arbitral awards should not be interfered with in a casual and cavalier manner, unless the Court comes to a conclusion that the perversity of the award goes to the root of the matter without there being a possibility of alternative interpretation which may sustain the arbitral award. Section 34 is different in its approach and cannot be equated with a normal appellate jurisdiction. The mandate under Section 34 is to respect the finality of the arbitral award and the party autonomy to get their dispute adjudicated by an alternative forum as provided under the law. If the Courts were to interfere with the arbitral award in the usual course on factual aspects, then the commercial wisdom behind opting for alternate dispute resolution would stand frustrated."
13. It is also settled law that where two views are possible, the Court cannot interfere in the plausible view taken by the arbitrator supported by reasoning. This Court in Dyna Technologies observed as under : (SCC p. 12, para 25) "25. Moreover, umpteen number of judgments of this Court have categorically held that the Courts should not interfere with an award merely because an : 15: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 alternative view on facts and interpretation of contract exists. The Courts need to be cautious and should defer to the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal even if the reasoning provided in the award is implied unless such award portrays perversity unpardonable under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
14. However, the question in the present case is whether the interpretation provided to the contract in the award of the Tribunal was reasonable and fair, so that the same passes the muster under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act?
15. In the present case, the respondent has argued that the view taken by the Arbitral Tribunal was not even a possible interpretation, therefore the award being unreasonable and unfair suffers from perversity. Hence,the respondent has pleaded that the award ought to be set aside. In this context, we may state that usually the Court is not required to examine the merits of the interpretation provided in the award by the arbitrator, if it comes to a conclusion that such an interpretation was reasonably possible.
(emphasis supplied)
22. So far as the impugned Award is concerned, learned Sole Arbitrator has framed the following issues and answered the same in the following manner : -
Issues Findings
1. Whether the time stipulated in clause 4 of Yes
the supplementary agreement dated
16.4.2004 for payment of money to the
respondents no 4 to 7 was the essence of the
contract?
2. Whether the claimants committed breach of Yes
contract
: 16: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018
Whether the claimants were and are ready No
3. and willing to perform their part of the
contract?
4. Are the claimants entitled to the relief of No
specific performance on the terms proposed by them?
5. Whether in case the claimants are held not entitled to the relief claimed by them, the Yes respondent No.4 to 7 would be entitled to the restoration of the position existing on 31.5.2002
23. Much emphasis has been laid by Shri Agrawal, learned Sr.Counsel appearing for the appellants on para 4(f) of the MOU dated 10.10.2002, which is already reproduced, is once again being mentioned for conveniene, it reads as under:-
"f. That, the share in Showroom and Workshop situated at Bhamori of the parties of the first, second and third part is in the ratio of 40%, 40% and 20% respectively. That on payment of second to fifth installments the parties of the second and third part shall relinquish their rights in the said property in proportion to the amount of each installment received by them, in favour of the party of the first part. It is hereby understood by and between the parties hereto that there will be automatic relinquishment of the rights of the parties of the second and third part in favour of the party of the first part on payment of each of the second to fifth installments by the party of the first part to the parties of second and third part."
(emphasis supplied)
24. Apparent it is from the aforesaid condition that on payment of second to fifth installments, the parties of the second and third part shall relinquish their rights in proportion to the amount of each : 17: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 installment received by them, in favour of the party of the first part. However, on a close scrutiny of the impugned award passed by the learned sole arbitrator, this court finds that there is absolutely no reference of this condition by the learned sole arbitrator in the entire impugned award. The learned sole arbitrator has given a finding in para 11 of the Award that the consequence of not paying the installments money would be that the contract of relinquishment of the co-ownership rights would stand abrogated or annulled. In the considered opinion of this court in the absence of such specific stipulation in any of the MOUs, the sole arbitrator could not have inserted the aforesaid condition on his own while interpreting the MOUs specially, when the MOU itself provides for proportionate and automatic relinquishment. In the considered opinion of this court when the parties have agreed for proportionate relinquishment of the properties, in the absence of any specific clause to the contrary, it has to assumed that their intention was to finally transfer the proportionate property, otherwise it could also have been stipulated that the properties would be relinquished only after the entire payments are made.
25. So far as compliance of MOU dated 10.10.2002 is concerned, the sole arbitrator has given its finding in para 12 of the award while deciding the issue whether the time was the essence of the contract in the following manner:-
"12. It cannot be lost sight of that the payments were actually to be made as per Agreement dated 10.10.2002 so as to bind the respondents No.4 to 7 to relinquish their co- ownership rights in the property as per agreement. The : 18: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 terms of that agreement were not adhered to and, there was breach and laches on the part of the claimants. The parties once again negotiated and a fresh agreement was drawn up. The claimants were given opportunity or a concession to make payments within the extended period. There was breach of contract by them. Therefore, the respondents No.4 to 7 cannot be directed to execute the relinquishment deed in favour of the claimants."
26. It is found that so far as the payments made by the appellants are concerned, their status vis-a-vis various installments which were to be paid by the appellants is as under :-
Installment Date Second part Third part (Rs.in lacs) Total FIRST 10.10.02 44.00 22.00 66.00 paid fully SECOND 31.03.03 i. 28.00 14.00 42.00paid ii.16.00 8.00 fully 24.00paid fully THIRD 01.10.03 44.00 22.00 66.00- part of rs.30 lacs paid FOURTH 31.03.04 44.00 22.00 66.00 not paid FIFTH 01.10.04 42.00 21.40 64.20 not paid
27. Thus, out of Rs.328.20 lacs, the appellants have paid Rs.162 lakhs in principal and according to the appellants, out of this amount Rs.54 lakhs was towards the Mehta Properties at Bhamori Dube, Indore. Thus, in terms of the MOU dated 10.10.2002, the respondents were required to relinquish their rights in proportion to the amount of each installment received by them, in favour of the party of the first part. This relinquishment was not subject to the : 19: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 entire payment which was to be made by the appellants and that is why it was clarified that the relinquishment would be in proportion to the amount of each installment received by the respondent. In the considered opinion of this court, such relinquishment was not and cannot be said to be revocable or subject to payment of entire amount of installments in the absence of any specific condition stipulated in the contract itself. The learned Sole arbitrator has only relied upon the MOU dated 16.04.2004 to come to a conclusion that the time was the essence of the contract which provided that the entire amount was to be paid latest by 30.09.2005 by paying additional interest and under no circumstances further extension of time will be allowed however, while holding so, the learned sole arbitrator lost sign of para 4(f) of the earlier MOU dated 10.10.2002 which provided for the proportionate relinquishment of the property to the extent installments are paid, which in the considered opinion of this court put the parties to the MOU in an irrevocable spot. And, merely if a notice dated 30.01.2007 was sent by the respondents Jaya Mehta, (deceased) Kalpana Mehta and Sunil Mehta, the respondents no.4, 5 & 6 herein, that they are terminating the contract for nonpayment as per the MOU dated 16.04.2004, it would not be construed as revocation of the entire MOUs on the part of the respondents especially when they did not even offer to remit the amount received by them under the MOUs. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the time was the essence of the contract between the parties. This court is of the considered opinion : 20: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 that the non-consideration of para 4(f) of the MOU dated 10.10.2002 amounts to patent illegality and goes to the root of the matter, sufficient enough to set aside the award u/s 34 of the Act of 1996.
28. In this regard, reference may be had to the decision relied upon by Shri Agrawal in the case of Sai Udyog Private Limited (supra), the relevant para 25 of the same reads as under:-
" 25. To sum up, existence of Clause 6(b) in the Agreement governing the parties, has not been disputed, nor has the application of Circular dated 27th July, 1987 issued by the Government of Madhya Pradesh regarding imposition of 10 supervision charges and adding the same to cost of the Sal seeds, after deducting the actual expenditure been questioned by the respondent-Company. We are, therefore, of the view that failure on the part of the learned Sole Arbitrator to decide in accordance with the terms of the contract governing the parties, would certainly attract the "patent illegality ground", as the said oversight amounts to gross contrawention of Section 28 (3) of the 1996 Act, that enjoins the Arbitral Tribunal to take into account the terms of the conteract while making an Award./ The said ' patent illegality' is not only apparent on the face of the Award, it goes to the very root of the matter and deserves interference. Accordingly, the present appeal is partly allowed and the impugned Award, insofar as it has permitted decution of 'supervision charges' recovered from the respondent-Company by the appellant- State as a part of the expenditure incurred by it while calculating the price of the Sal seeds, is quashed and set aside, being in direct conflict with the terms of the contract governing the parties and the relevant Circular. The impugned judgment dated 21st October, 2009 is modified to the aforesaid extent."
(emphasis supplied)
29. So far as the finding recorded by the learned sole arbitrator that the cost of the property has risen manifold and it would not be equitable to allow the prayer of specific performance of contract is : 21: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 concerned, it would be worth mentioning here that the application for appointment of arbitrator A.C. No.27/2007 was decided by this court on 23.11.2015, to be precise, in 8 years 7 months and 28 days. This court is of the considered opinion that there cannot be more blatant misuse of the indulgence shown by the High Court to accede to the requests for adjournments. The aforesaid application was also opposed by the respondents ('tooth and nails', as submitted by shri Agrawal, ld. Sr. Counsel for the appellalant) which is apparent from the order passed by this court in AC No.27/2007, thus, to say that it would be inequitable to grant the relief of specific relief to the appellants after so many years would be like rewarding the respondents for their dilatory tactics.
30. In respect of Issue No.3, "Whether the claimants were and are ready to perform their part of contract", the finding of the Arbitrator is as hereunder: -
"(15) Issue No.3:-
The claimants were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract within the stipulated time having failed to pay the installment in time. Section 16(b) it the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who "violates any essential terms of the contract". Again as per section 16(c) of this Act has to "aver and prove" that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him. The claimants in this case have made ritual recital and observed an empty : 22: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 formality of making averments that they were ready and wiling to perform their part of the contract but it is admitted that they did not make payment of the installment within a time stipulated in the agreement dated 16.4.2004. The readiness and willingness should be in accordance with the terms of the contract. That principle has been made clear by the Supreme Court in M.P. Thirugnanan vs. R. Jagan AIR 1996 SC 116, Ajab Singh Vs. Tulsi AIR 2000 SC2493, Chandrani Vs. Kamalrani AIR 1993 SC1742 and in Nardamand AIR 2011 SC 3234. The readiness and willingness after the expiry of the terms of the contract is not of much relevance. In this case, my attention has been invited to a letter dated 30.9.2005 and some correspondence and notices exchanged between the parties in 2006. These documents go to show that the claimants were making assertions of performing their part of the contract but actually they did not make payment of the installments in time and thus, they were not ready and willing to perform their part of the contract within the period of the contract."
31. So far as the readiness and willingness to perform the contract on the part of the claimant is concerned, in the considered opinion of this court, the MOUs dated 10.10.2002 and 14.04.2004 clearly stipulate eventualities of delayed payments and even the condition that in case of further default the mediator (Arbitrator) can impose such penalty , on the party of the first part , as he deems fit(see para
d), in such circumstances, the question of readiness and willingness would not arise on the part of the claimant especially when he has already parted with a sum to the tune of Rs.1.62 crores and had also tendered cheques even before the erstwhile arbitrator but were not : 23: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 accepted by the respondent. Thus, the finding recorded by the sole arbitrator that the appellants were not willing and ready to perform their part of MOU bears out of misreading or non-reading of the terms of the MOUs and amount to patent illegality. it has to be seen whether the claimant / appellant had sufficient means to pay the amount agreed to be paid under the contract to the respondents and the said averments have been made in para No.26 and 27 of the statement of claim, which read as under: -
" 26. That, as per the consolidated statement of account (Annexure P/24) a sum of Rs.1,10,80,000/- as principal and a sum of Rs.1,46,25,600/- as interest (w.e.f. 01/1/2005 to 31.12.2015) payable to respondent No.4 and 5 is due and the claimants are appending separate cheques of covering aforesaid amount payable to respondent No.4 and 5 are appended to the claim petition in a sealed envelop marked as Article "A" . Original Cheques shall be handed over to the Hon'be Arbitrator along with this petition.
As per the consolidated statement of account (Annexure P/24) a sum of Rs.55,40,000/- as principal and a sum of Rs.73,12,800/- as interest (w.e.f. 01/01/2005 to 31/12/2015) payable to respondent No.6 & 7 is due and the claimants are appending separate cheques covering aforesaid amount payable to respondent No.7 are appended to the claim petition in a sealed envelop marked as "Article "B".
27. That, the claimants are ready and willing and have always been ready and willing to perform their part of the contract and shall always be willing to pay the amount due to respondent no. 4 to 7.
The claimants reserve unto themselves liberty to raise a question as to whether respondent no. 4 to 7 should be awarded interest w.e.f. 01/03/2007 till 31/12/2015 because during previous proceedings principal and interest due to respondent no.4 to 7 was offered to them which they voluntarily did not accept as is clear by (Annexure P/17 to P/21)". Subject to decision of this question the claimants are ready and willing to even offer interest for this period subject to final outcome of this proceeding to show their readiness and willingness.
: 24: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 Even otherwise looking to the nature of contemplation in the MOUs the claimants were to pay money and interest in consideration thereof respondent no.4 to 7 were to relinquish their shares in plot at Bhamori Dubey to claimants. In these circumstances no hardship apparently is inferable to prejudice the interest of the respondent no.4 to 7. It is further fathomable that the contracts (MOUs) contemplated payment of interest in case of delay in payment of installments. However, contemporaneous silence in the MOUs regarding the effect of delay clearly spells out that time was not of the essence of the contract."
32. Admittedly, the appellants were required to pay to the respondents an amount which comes to a sum of Rs.1,10,80,000/- as principal and a sum of Rs.1,46,25,600/- as interest (w.e.f. 01/1/2005 to 31.12.2015) for the respondent No.4 and 5 and a sum of Rs.55,40,000/- as principal and a sum of Rs.73,12,800/- as interest (w.e.f. 01/01/2005 to 31/12/2015) for respondent No.6 and 7, but u/s.51 of the Contract Act, which provides that, 'a promisor is not bound to perform, unless reciprocal promisee ready and willing to perform' reads as under:-
"51. Promisor not bound to perform, unless reciprocal promisee ready and willing to perform.--When a contract consists of reciprocal promises to be simultaneously performed, no promisor need perform his promise unless the promisee is ready and willing to perform his reciprocal promise. --When a contract consists of reciprocal promises to be simultaneously performed, no promisor need perform his promise unless the promisee is ready and willing to perform his reciprocal promise."
Illustrations
(a) A and B contract that A shall deliver goods to B to be paid for by B on delivery.
A need not deliver the goods, unless B is ready and willing to pay for the goods on delivery.
B need not pay for the goods, unless A is ready : 25: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 and willing to deliver them on payment.
(b) A and B contract that A shall deliver goods to B at a price to be paid by instalments, the first instalment to be paid on delivery.
A need not deliver, unless B is ready and willing to pay the first instalment on delivery.
B need not pay the first instalment, unless A is ready and willing to deliver the goods on payment of the first instalment."
33. In view of the same, as the respondents have not performed their part of duties and have not transferred the proportionate property to the appellant and have also not offered to remit the amount received by them from the appellant, if according to them they have terminated the MOUs, the appellants' readyness and willingness to perform the contract does not arise. The decision cited by Shri Baheti in this behalf are of no avail and are distinguishable under the facts and circumstances of the present case.
34. So far as the issue no.5 is concerned, that, 'Whether in case the claimants are held not entitled to the relief claimed by them, the respondent No.4 to 7 would be entitled to the restoration of the position existing on 31.5.2002, 10.10.2002 and 16.04.2004 the Arbitrator has given the following findings:-
"18. Issue No.5:-
As the agreements dated 31.05.2002, 10.10.2002 and 16.04.2004 have fallen to the ground so far as the property in dispute in this case (Bhamori property) the status quo ante which existed before the Agreement dated 31.05.2002 would revive. The claimants cannot have exclusive title and possession on this property. The claimants and the respondents No.1 to 7 would continue to be co-
: 26: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 owners and it joint possession of the property. There is "letter of concession" dated 10.10.2002 (Annexure P/13 by which the co- owners handed over physical possession of this property to the claimants "on terms and conditions mentioned in the said supplementary MOU dated 10.10.2002 and also the subsequent MOU dated 16.04.2004 have not been complied with by the claimants by their failure to pay the installments within the stipulated time and the claimants have no right to retain exclusive possession of this property which is of the co-ownership of the claimants and the respondents. All the respondents have right to joint possession and joint management of this property being the joint or co-owners.
19. The respondent No.4 has not separately submitted the statement of defence. Her case is the same as that of her sister respondent No.5 who has submitted the statement of defence.
Smt. Ritu Bhargwa, Advocate appeared before me on the date of arguments and has participated on her behalf in the arbitration proceedings.
20. In the result, the claim of the claimants for specific performance of contract of relinquishment of the rights by the respondent No.4 to 7 in the property in dispute i.e. Plot No.1 Scheme No.5 PU-IV commercial situated at Bhamori Dubey and the Buildings standing thereon is dismissed. The claimants and the respondents No.1 to 7 continue to be co-owners of this property. The claimants will bear their cost of arbitration and pay that of the respondent No.4 to 7 including the arbitration fee. The respondents No. 4 to 7 have paid the arbitration fee of Rs. 4,25,275/-. The claimants have not claimed any other relief. They have not asked for the refund of the money paid by them to the respondents No.4 to 7 as required by Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and therefore, that could not and has not been considered by me.
35. As discussed by this court in the foregoing paras, the MOUs cannot be said to have fallen on the ground as the same would still survive.
36. As a result, this Court finds that the decisions, rendered by the sole arbitrator as also the learned Judge of the District Court, suffer from patent illegality and do not reflect the terms and the conditions of the contract in their right perspective. Resultantly, the : 27: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 impugned judgement as also the Award dated 20.04.2016 are hereby set aside.
37. Now the most important question before this court is the relief which can be given to the appellants. It is true that a relief of Specific performance is discretionary in nature and there is no doubt about it that the current market price of the property has risen by many fold since the date of first MOU dated 31.05.2002. In such circumstances, to ask the respondents to accept the amount which they were liable to take in the year 2002 would be to put them under extreme financial losses, may be owing to their own lapses, but in such scenario, guidance may be taken from the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in identical circumstances. In the case of Nanjappan v. Ramasamy, (2015) 14 SCC 341, it has been held by the Supreme Court as under :-
"14. Considering the totality and the facts and circumstances, in our view, it is not appropriate to grant discretionary relief of specific performance to the respondent-plaintiffs for more than one reason. Admittedly, the suit property is the only property of the appellant-defendant and the appellant is said to have constructed a house and where he is currently residing with the family. As compared to the respondents, the appellant will suffer significant hardship if a decree for specific performance is granted against the appellant. Considering the circumstances, such as the construction of the residential house over the suit property, sale consideration, passage of time and hardship caused to the appellant, makes it inequitable to exercise the discretionary relief of specific performance and the concurrent finding of the first appellate court and the High Court decreeing the suit for specific performance is to be set aside.
15. The next point falling for determination is the relief to be granted to the respondent-plaintiffs. Admittedly, the respondents have paid advance amount of Rs 42,500, even though, the respondents are not entitled to the relief of specific : 28: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 performance, in our view, the advance amount of Rs 42,500 paid by the respondents is to be refunded to the respondents with interest @ 9% p.a. In addition, the appellant is directed to pay compensation of Rs 2,00,000 to the respondents.
16. In the result, the impugned judgment dated 17-11-2011 passed by the High Court in Nanjappan v. Ramasamy1 is set aside and this appeal is allowed. The appellant shall refund Rs 42,500 with 9% interest per annum from the date of third agreement of sale dated 9-3-1993. Both the parties shall bear their respective costs.
(emphasis supplied)
38. So far as the property at Bhamori Dubey, Indore is concerned, it is directed that due to the lapse of long period of time which comes to around 20 years, instead of the specific performance of contract, the interest of justice would be served if the appellants/claimants are directed to restore the possession property in question to the respondents as the appellants and the respondents shall continue to to be the co-owners and in joint possession of this property. The respondents No. 5 to 8, who are the parties of the second and third part are directed to remit the entire amount, if any, to the party of the first part (L.Rs. included) in proportion which they have received towards the property at Bhamori from the party of the first part, within a period of one year, with interest @ 6% p.a., from the date of payment. In addition, considering the fact that the price of the property has risen many folds, the respondents No. 5 to 8 are also directed to pay a sum of Rs.25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five lacs only) to the party of the first part, to be specific, the amount of Rs.12,50,000/-(Rupees Twelve Lacs Fifty Thousand only) shall be paid to the appellants whereas the : 29: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018 remaining amount of Rs.12,50,000/-(Rupees Twelve Lacs Fifty Thousand only) shall be paid to respondent No.1, 2,3 and the leagal representives of the respondent 3A in proportion to their share under the MOUs within the aforesaid time. If the said amount is not paid within the aforesaid stipulated period, the same shall bear the interest @ 12% p.a. from today till it is paid. Accordingly, A.A. No.20/2018 stands partly allowed.
39. Also heard A.A. No.35/2018, being an appeal against the order 21.3.2018 passed by the learned XII Additional District Judge, Indore in M.J.C.No.2/2016 under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Considering the fact that this appeal is pending since 2008 and the original case is of 2002, and there is no interim relief in favour of the appellant, no case for interference is made out at this stage. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed.
40. A signed copy of the judgment be placed on the record of Arbitration Appeal No.35/2018.
(Subodh Abhyankar )
JUDGE
moni
Digitally signed by MONI RAJU
Date: 2022.05.05 17:38:55 +05'30'
: 30: A.A. Nos.20 of 2018 & 35/2018
THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, INDORE BENCH Arbitration Appeal No.20-2018 (Virendra Singh Mehta and two others vs. Hemant Mehta and others) Arbitration Appeal No.35-2018 ( Virendra Singh Mehta and two others vs. Hemant Mehta and others) Indore, Dated: 01.04.2022 Shri Amit Agrawal, learned Senior counsel with Shri Arjun Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellants.
Shri Nilesh Agrawal, learned counsel for the respondent No.1, 2 & 3.
Shri A.K. Chitale, learned Senior counsel with Shri Romesh Dave, learned counsel and Shri Shekhar Bhargava, learned Senior counsel with Mrs. Ritu Bhargava, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.4 & 5.
Shri Vishal Baheti, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 6 & 7.
Arguments heard.
Reserved for judgment.
(Subodh Abhyankar ) JUDGE Indore, Dated: 04 .05.2022 Judgment delivered, signed and dated.
(Subodh Abhyankar ) JUDGE moni