Delhi High Court
The Delhi Ex-Servicemen Co-Operative ... vs The Delhi State Transport Authority, ... on 21 July, 1971
Equivalent citations: ILR1971DELHI642
JUDGMENT S. Rangarajan, J.
(1) This judgment will also dispose of similar petitions Nos. 348, 349 and 301 of 1971.
(2) The State Transport Authority, Delhi, which is function under the Motor Vehicles Act as well as the rules framed the under (the Delhi Rules came into effect by notification dated 2 March. 1940) resolved in its meeting dated 2nd March 1971 follows: "THESTA considered the representation of Delhi Provincial Motor Transport Union Congress, regarding issue of temporary permits on the routes at present being operated by certain private operators. The Sta has already recom mended to Dtu to start services on a number of new routes, where it was felt that there was need for additional buses in view of the increased traffic, but no similar provision was made in respect of the routes operated by the individual private operators within the Union Territory of Delhi. The matter has already been referred to the Central Road Research Institute, New Delhi, for their advice, regarding scope for augmentation of services on these routes, on long term basis, but detailed survey is likely to take some time and thereafter completion of formalities under section 57 of the M.V. Act 1939 will be necessary. In these circumstances it was considered that as an experimental measure, additional services may be allowed on the above noted routes in the interest of the convenience of the traveling public. It was, therefore, resolved to issue temporary permits for a period of four months each to the operators recommended by the Delhi Provincial Motor Transport Union Congress, on the local routes as mentioned in their representation. It was also resolved that the report of the Central Road Research Institute, New Delhi, when received, will be placed before the Sta for consideration and decision."
(3) The petitioner in CWP. 380 of 1971 is an existing transport operator on the route Delhi Railway Station to Rawata via Dhaola Kuan, Bijwasan and Najaf Garh for or portion of which temporary stage carriage permits were granted to respondents 2 to 5. Each temporary stage carriage permit was issued for four months only from 15th March 1971 to 14th July 1971. 1 (4) By the said resolution not only respondents Nos. 2 to 5 but a number of other operators have also been granted temporary stage carriage permits (for different routes) in the Union Territory of Delhi. The number of temporary stage carriage permits thus issued is stated to be about thirty-five for twenty five routes. The issue of these temporary permits has been challenged as a fraud on the powers conferred by the Motor Vehicles Act and has been described as an attempt to do indirectly what the State Transport Authority could not do directly. Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act which relates to the grant .of temporary permits reads as follows:- "TEMPORARYPermits-A Regional Transport Authority may, without following the procedure laid down in Section 57, grant permits, to be effective for a limited period not in any case to exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily : (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions suc h as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b) for the purposes of a seasonal business, or (c) to meet a particular temporary need, or (d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit; and may attach to any such permit any condition it thinks fit: Provided that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the grant of a new permit under section 46 or S. 54 during the pendency of the application: Provided further that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted more than once in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the renewal of a permit during the pendency of such application for renewal."
(5) Apart from the fact that the existing operators on the routes concerned were not given an opportunity to apply for the temporary permits thus granted it is further averred that the grant of such permits was done not only in contravention of law but fraudulently with theintention that such temporary permits would be granted to the same persons periodically for further periods of four months taking care, however, to leave a gap of a day or two in between, so as to make it appear that they were not being renewed The existence of any temporary need to issue temporary permits is also disputed. It is also contended that if section 62 of the Act conferred a jurisdiction upon the State Transport Authority to arbitrarily select any person for the grant of a temporary stage carriage permit without there being any criterion for such selection, then section 62 of the Act itself would be void as offending Article 14 of the Constitution. It was finally contended that since the State Transport Authority had authorised Shri Durga Dass, President of the Provincial Motor Union Congress, Delhi, to "select" persons for the grant of all the temporary permits of various routes the whole procedure adopted is illegal. In answer to the last of above said contentions it was stated as follows in paragraph 13 of the return-affidavit, dated 30th April 1971 of Shri 1. J. Talwar, Secretary of the State Transport Authority on behalf of the first respondent : "INreply to paragraph 13 it is stated that prior to the passing of the resolution dated 2nd March 1971, the Delhi Provincial Motor Transport Union Congress had approached the State Transport Authority for the issuance of the temporary permits and the petitioner had not applied for the temporary permits. In view of the fact that the buses are to be plied on the routes on the fares fixed by the State Transport Authority and every bus owner may not be interested in plying the buses on the said routes and in order that there should be no delay in the matter and also in order to find out persons who would be willing to take the temporary permits it was resolved on 2-3-1971 that the said Congress should recommend the names of the persons to whom the permits should be issued. It was after the said Congress had ascertained the wishes of their members and had recommended the names to the State Transport Authority for the issuance of the temporary permits, the said temporary permits were issued. It is denied that there has been any violation of law as has been alleged by the petitioner."
It was alleged in paragraph 21 of the Civil Writ Petition No. 348 of 1971 as follows: "THATShri Bal Mukund Bhatia, Director of the petitionercompany contacted the office of respondent No. 1 and came to know that two temporary permits were also going to be granted for the aforesaid route, i.e. Delhi Railway Station to Bharat Nagar and that Shri Durga Dass, President of the Provincial Motor Union Congress had been authorised by respondent No. 1 to select persons for grant of these and other proposed temporary permits."
It was traversed in the following manner by the Chairman of the State Transport Authority: "THATthe contents of paragraph 21 wherein it is stated that the Managing Director of the petitioner-company made any enquiries, before the above date, from the Office of the respondent No. I is denied. It is stated that decision had already been taken for requesting the Dtu to increase its transport facilities in respect of those routes where it was already plying. It was felt that regarding those routes which were being plied by the private operators and where also additional services were required temporary permits should be issued. In-as-much as no application for the grant of such temporary permits had been received and as till that time only the said Congress had approached respondent No. I for the grant of the temporary permits, it was resolved by the State Transport Authority on 2-3-1973, that the willingness of the members of the said Congress should be obtained as to who would be willing to run the buses on the said routes on the basis of temporary permits. It is stated that no other bus owner made any application till that date stating that he was interested in running the buses on the route. Keeping in view this as also the fact that the permits were only temporary, i.e. only for a period of four months, it was decided that it would be just and equitable that Shri Durgadas, who happened to be the President of the said Congress, should ascertain the wishes of the members of the Congress as to who would be willing to accept such permits and after the said wishes had been communicated to respondent No. I, it was only thereafter that respondent No. 1 unanimously decided to issue temporary permits under section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner at that time had not approached the Delhi Transport Authority for the grant of temporary permit and as such he cannot make any grievance to the fact that no temporary permit has been allotted to him or temporary permits have been allotted to somebody else. The perusal of the said resolution dated 2nd March 1971 would show that the routes in respect of which temporary permits would be issued had not been decided so far."
In answer to the contention that section 62 is ultra vires it was stated that the discretion contained in section 62 was vested with the State Transport Authority, a quasi-judicial body, and as such it could not be presumed that the same would be abused. The further contention, that the petitioner had not applied for a permit, was met by the rejoinder that no applications were called for and that the temporary permits were granted in "hush-hush manner"; only the persons to whom such permits were granted but not public at large, knew about it.
(6) A preliminary objection was taken that since the permits in question were to be effective only for four months, from 15th March 1971 to 14th July 1971, these petitions may be dismissed on the ground that the period had elapsed. Since in a case of this description it is likely that the writ petition takes some time at least for being heard it could not, in all fairness, be dismissed merely on the ground that by the time it is found possible to hear the said application the period of the impugned license has nearly run out. When the procedure adopted for granting the impugned temporary permils is questioned, it becomes necessary to so into the validity of the procedure adopted by a statutory authority, namely, the State Transport Authority, so that if the procedure adopted has been wrong the Authority may stand corrected.
(7) It is next contended that none of the petitioners in any of these writ petitions has any locus standi to file the present petition. None of them is entitled to attack the grant of the temporary permits being granted on the mere ground that their earnings have been reduced or are likely to be reduced. But, at the same time it is clear that none of the petitioners is a mere interlopper. Three writ petitions, barring civil writ petition No. 301 of 1971, have been filed by those who have at least one permanent permit in the route where temporary permits have been granted. The petitioner in C.W.P. 301/71 is an Association of motoroperators, known as Delhi Aya Nagar Chiragh Delhi Motor Association (Regd.); the associates are said to be seven transporters A one of whom has got a permanent permit for a bus operating on a route in respect of which temporary permits were granted.
(8) The kind of interest which a party invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court for relief by way of judicial review should have was indicated by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun- cil in the speech of Lord Denning in Attorney-General of Gambia v. Pierre Sarr N'jie (1961 A.C. 617 at page 634) (1) as follows : "The words "person aggrieved" are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him: but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests."
(9) Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Supreme Court in Godde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others recorded with approval the earlier observations of the Court in The Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. The State of West Bengal concerning the locus standi of a person to file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitu- tion of India: "ARTICLE226 confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part Iii or for any other purpose. It is, therefore, clear that persons other than those claiming fundamental right can also approach the court seeking a relief there under. The Article in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply there under; but it is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right............. The right that can be enforced under Art. 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or que narranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified."
Explaining the matter further, Subba Rao J. pointed out that even though ordinarily the petitioner should be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the petition, the personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest.
(10) Lord Denning M.R. speaking for the Court of Appeal in Regina v. Paddington Valuation Officer and another Ex-parte Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. (1965-3 Weekly Law Reports 426 at page 434) (4) stated that if a ratepayer or other person finding his name was included in an invalid list was entitled to have the list quashed and apply to have it quashed and that he is not to be put off by the plea that he has suffered no damage. He further added: "THECourt would not listen, of course, to a mere busybody who was interfering in things which did not concern him. But it will listen to any one whose interests are affected by what has been done..... So it will listen to any ratepayer who complains that the list is invalid."
(11) It is needless to multiply further authorities on this question for it seems clear in the light of the aforesaid principles, that the petitioners in these writ petitions, who either themselves or representing a group of transport operators, hold puce permits run buses on the routes where temporary permits have been granted are entitled to request the court to examine the legality, validity or propriety of the issue of the temporary permits on these routes.
(12) The facts admitted by the contesting respondents are that Shri Durga Dass, President of the Provincial Motor Union Congress, Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Congress) which claims to be a Central Organization of commercial motor transport operators of Delhi, wrote to the Director of Transport and Chairman, State Transport Authority, Delhi, on the 16th February 1971 informing him that the "member-operators" of the Congress had been running buses on certain local Delhi routes for over ten years and that they had been receiving numerous representations for quite some time that the existing number of services on "these routes" was utterly inadequate, resulting in inconvenience to passengers. After pointing out that additional services have been allowed from time to time to the Dtu and others whenever it was found that such additional services were required, the Congress requested that their "member-operators" should be allowed to run additional services on a temporary basis for the time being after following the regular process of law. There was an offer to send details of the routes where augmentation of trips was considered necessary and to supply the names of suitable operators for that purpose on receipt of a reply from the State Transport Authority. To this letter, there was a reply from the Chairman of the State Transport Authority (Shri S. C. Pandey) conceding that there was no denying that the needs of "commutors" in Delhi were progressively increasing and stating that if the Congress furnished the details asked for concerning the number of existing services with the names of the existing operators, the number of services proposed to be added and the operators recommended by the Congress for the grant of temporary permits, the request of the Congress would be sympathetically considered. The Congress was further informed that the Authority had at its meeting held in December 1970 decided that additional services should be introduced on two specified routes, namely (i) Najafgarh-Chhawla Bijwasan, Mahipalpur-MehrauliLado Sarai Khmpur-Tughlaqabad, Badarpur and (ii) BawanaNajafgarh, stopping at villages at the rate of two buses for each of the said routes. The above said letters were annexed as Annexures R-l and R-II to the return filed by the respondents 2 to 5 (the grantees of temporary permits in CWP. 380 of 1971) but the further letter which is stated to have been sent in reply thereto was neither annexed nor the details thereof mentioned in the return filed by them.
(13) A further affidavit was filed by Shri Durga Dass, President of the Congress, in CWP. 348 of 1971, during the course of the hearing, on 14th July 1971, referring specifically for the first time to his letter dated 27th February 1971, copy of which was annexed (as R-III to the said affidavit) informing the Chairman of the State Transport Authority that temporary permits may be issued to the persons mentioned in the enclosure to the said letter in respect of 25 specified routes, the operators for running the additional services having been "selected" by the Congress on criteria such as "experience, willingness and financial capacity."
(14) On 15th July 1971, further affidavits of the Chairman (Shri S. C. Pandey) in Cwp 348 of 1971 and the Secretary (Shri 1. J. Talwar) in Cwp 380/71 were filed. It was stated by Shri Pandey, in his further affidavit, dated 15th July 1971, that leave may be given to him for correcting the statement in paragraph 21 of his earlier affidavit by referring to his letter dated 18th February 1971 to the Congress instead of to the Resolution of the State Transport Authority dated 2nd March 1971 in both the places. Paragraph 21, which has been set out fully earlier, conveyed the idea that the State Transport Authority had, by its Resolution dated 2nd March 1971, asked for the willingness of the operators recommended by the Congress for the grant of temporary permits to be obtained and, what is more important, that even the specific routes in respect of which such temporary permits had to be granted had not been decided upon prior to the Resolution dated 2nd March 1971. If, instead of referring to the said Resolution of 2nd March 1971 in both the places. what was meant to be referred was only the letter dated 18th February 1971 written by the Chairman (Shri S. C. Pandey) to the Congress, there is some difficulty in comprehending certain portions of paragraph 21 of the said affidavit. In the first place, I am unable to follow the need for any reference being made to the routes in respect of which temporary permits were to be issu- ed not being decided upon in the letter of the Chairman (dated 18th February 1971) of the State Transport Authority to the President of the Congress. It is obvious that the decision in this regard was not of the Chairman but of the State Transport Authority. The second difficulty is caused by the concession made even in Shri Pandey's affidavit, dated 15th July 1971, that after passing the Resolution by the State Transport Authority on 2nd March 1971, certain changes were suggested by the Congress in its letters dated 10tb, 11th and 16th March 1971 which changes were agreed to by him. Copies of those letters themselves have not been annexed, but those changes which were suggested by the Congress in the aforesaid manner have been characterised by Shri Pandey as "minor". Shri Pandey had agreed to those changes. Probably on account of these changes at least Shri Pandey had taken the above position in the earlier affidavit in the view that the Chairman of the State Transport Authority could not by himself agree to changes which were suggested by the Congress after the Resolution of the Authority for the consisting of official and non-official members. Normally, if there was any Resolution of the State Transport Authority granting certain temporary permits there could not be any change of that Resolution except by the Authority composed of several persons. It appears probable, therefore, that on account of the point which was made during the hearing of this writ petition that even as per the admission in paragraph 21 of Shri Pandey's affidavit the specific routes in respect of which temporary permits were granted had not been decided upon till the time of the said Resolution, an effort has now been unfortunately made to explain away the said admission by suggesting that the reference in both the places in paragraph 21 of the affidavit were mistakenly made to the Resolution dated 2nd March 1971 instead of to the letter of Shri Pandey dated 18th February 1971 to the Congress. At least the last portion of the paragraph of the affidavit of Shri Pandey was not necessary if what was meant was that no decision in respect of the specific routes in respect of which temporary permits were granted had been made only up to the time of Shri Pandey's letter dated 18th February 1971, to the Congress. It seems difficult to visualise the need for any reference to this aspect at all in the context of the other allegations made in paragraph 21. This is a crucial consideration. It seems more probable, therefore, that the last sentence in paragraph 21 of the last affidavit contained a deliberate reference to the Resolution dated 2nd March 1971-not to the above letter dated 18th February 1971- in order to explain the fact that even subsequent to the date of the Resolution the Congress had been asking for changes, by its letters dated 10th, 11th, and 16th March, to which changes Shri Pandey says he agreed.
(15) It is contended on behalf of the contesting respondents that the resolution itself is consistent with the stand now taken by Shri Pandey in his affidavit dated 15th July 1971. The relevant portion of the Resolution dated 2nd March 1971 reads as follows: "ITwas, therefore, resolved to issue temporary permits for a period of four months each to the operators recommended by the Delhi Provincial Motor Transport Union Congress, on the local routes as mentioned in their representation."
(16) This portion of the Resolution, however, would support both the versions now put forward and in the earlier and the later affidavits of Shri Pandey. But what is of some significance is that in paragraph 21 of the CWP-348/71 it had been definitely averred by the petitioner-that Shri Bal Mukund Bhatia, Director of the petitioner-company, had contacted the office and had come to know that two temporary permits were going to be granted on the route on which he was operating and that the first respondent had been authorised to "select" persons for grant of these, and other temporary permits. In paragraph 21 of the affidavit of Shri Pandey there was a mere denial that Shri Bal Mukund Bhatia had made any enquiries from the Office of the State Trans- port Authority before 2nd March 1971. It was not stated that the willingness of the members of the said Congress was ascertained before 2nd March 1971. Per contra it was stated that such willingness had to be ascertained as per the Resolution dated 2nd March 1971 (which is now sought to be corrected as the letter dated 18th February 1971) and that the perusal of the said Resolution would show that the routes in respect of which temporary permits were to be issued had not been decided "so far".
(17) In none of the affidavits which have been filed, including the later affidavits of Shri Pandey and Shri Talwar, is there any allegation that the willingness of the persons, who were recommended by the Congress, had been obtained. A reference to "willingness" was, however, made in the letter dated 27th February 1971, alleged to have been written by the President of the Congress to the State Transport Authority, as stated above. It has yet to be emphasised that there is no allegation whatever that the operators concerned to whom temporary permits were to be granted as recommended by the Congress had authorised the President of the Congress to intimate to the Authority their willingness, on their behalf. There is no specific averment in any of the affidavits filed by Shri Durga Dass, President of the Congress, that he had taken the willingness of those member-operators-except what is mentioned in the said letter dated 27th February 1971- or that he had any authority legally or factually to get or express such willingness on their behalf. It is clear, even from the affidavit of Shri Pandey, dated 15th July 1971, that the persons to whom the temporary permits were granted filed their applications in the prescribed forms subsequent to the said resolution and that at a meeting of the State Transport Authority held on 5th April 1971 the permits so granted to the private operators were "confirmed" by the State Transport Authority. It was also admitted in the said affidavit that persons who had been recommended for the grant of temporary permits by the said Congress, and which recommendations had been accepted in the Resolution dated 2nd March 1971, but had not made any application for grant of any such temporary permits "were not considered granted". This makes the whole position really anomalous. If temporary permits had been granted by the Resolution, dated 2nd March 1971, on the basis of the willingness stated to be expressed by those who were recommended-in the submission of the contesting respondents there was no necessity to make any formal application for the grant of permits-then it is not possible to understand why applications for temporary permits were taken later than 2nd March 1971 (as conceded) and why temporary permits were not issued to (who are also not stated to have been willing) any who did not make such an application for the grant of temporary permits. These considerations make it difficult to accept the respondents' contention that the temporary permits were granted by virtue of the resolution dated 2nd March 1971. If they were not granted by the State Transport Authority, but only by the Chairman, to those as per the suggestion of Shri Durga Dass, President of the Congress, then it would tentamount to permits being granted to the nominees of the President Shri Durga Dass and there being really no grant of the same by the State Transport Authority. The subsequent confirmation of the ternporary permits by the State Transport Authority at its meeting on 5th. April 1971 would not improve the position because it is for the State Transport Authority exercising the powers conferred by section 62 to grant the said temporary permits itself and not for the State Transport Authority to confirm what had been done in effect by the President of the Congress, Shri Durga Dass This would amount to an abdication/delegation, which it would not legally be possible to make if what is authorised to be dor under section 62 is a quasi-judicial and not an administrativ act. Even if it is an administrative act, even after such delegation /abdication no close control was retained to make the act of the delegatee the act of the delegator.
(18) Reliance was placed for this position on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. P. K. Roy and others . Ramaswami J. speaking for the Supreme Court upholding the delegation in that case observed as follows: "THE principle of the maxim "delegatus non-potest delegare" has, therefore, no application to the present case. The maxim deals with the extent to which a statutory authori may permit another to exercise a discretion entrusted by the statute to itself. It is true that delegation in its general sense does not imply a parting with statutory powers by the authority which grants the delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that administrative authority would have to do for itself. If, however, the administrative authority named in the statute has and retains in its hands general control over the activities of the person to whom it has entrusted in part the exercise of its statutory power and the control exercised by the administrative authority is of a substantial degree, there is in the eye of law no "delegation" at all and the maxim "dclegatus non-potest delegare" does not apply (See Fowler (John) and Co. (Leeds) v. Duncan, 1941-Ch. 450) (6). In other words if a statutory authority empowers a delegate to undertake preparatory work and to take an initial decision in matters entrusted to it but retains in its own hands the power to approve or disapprove the decision after it has been taken, the decision will be held to have been validly made if the degree of control maintained by the authority is close enough for the decision to be regarded as the authority's own."
(19) In the present case, therefore, when the State Transport Authority left it to the President of the Congress (Shri Durga Dass) to suggest not only the routes for which but also the persons in whose favor the temporary permits should be granted without having any further say itself in the matter of such permits being granted there was clearly no retention of that degree of control which would be necessary to make the act of Shri Durga Dass, President of the Congress, the act of the State Transport Authority itself. Similar observations of Hegde J. (as he then was) in M/s. Mount Corporation and others v. Director of Industries and Commerce in Mysore, Bangalore and others (A.I.R. 1965, Mysore 143) (7), at page 149 were also relied upon : "IT is admitted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 & 2, that respondent I has accepted the decision of the Committee and made his recommendations on the basis of the said decision. When an authority exercises his jurisdiction under a statute, he has to exercise his own indidual judgment or discretion as the case may be. He cannot adopt the decision of any other body as his own."
(20) My attention has also been invited by Shri Madan Bhatia, in addition to the above said two decisions, to Allingham and another v. Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries (1948-1 All England Law Reports 780) (8). In that case by virtue of Regulation 66 of the defense (General) Regulations 1939, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries delegated to a county war agricultural com- mittee his powers, under regulation 62(1), to give "directions with respect to the cultivation, management or use of land for agricultural purposes". The Committee decided that eight acres of sugar beet should be grown by the occupiers of certain land, but left to its executive officer the selection of the field, which was required by the regulation to be specified in the notice to the occupier. The Officer consulted a local-sub-committee, appointed to make recommendations to the committee, and served a notice on the occupiers specifying the field to be so cultivated. It was held that on the principle of delegatus non-potest delegare, the committee could not delegate the power to determine the land to be cultivated to its officer, and, therefore, the notice was ineffective and non-compliance with it was not an offence. Lord Goddard, C. J. observed : "INthis case, it seems to me that the committee left to some one the duty of deciding that which the regulation, which has the force of a statute, requires them to decide for themselves." In a concurring but separate opinion Humphreys J. observed : "If the direction had been: "On a field, selected by us, the location of which we shall in due course direct the executive officer to convey to you", there would have been no objection. It is clear, however, that what they were saying was: "We shall leave to the executive officer the decision as to what land you are to cultivate in a particular way." They had no power to do that," etc."
(21) The position would only be worse for the State Transport Authority if the power to be exercised under section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act is considered a quasi-judicial power. It has already been noticed that the stand taken by them, in order to repel the attack that section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act offended Article 14 because it conferred an uncontrolled discretion to grant temporary permits, was that the exercise of the discretion under section 62 is a quasi-judicial power. In this view there is no need to go extensively into the question whether section 62 involves the exercise of a quasi-judicial act by the State Transport Authority.
(22) In two Full Bench decisions of the Punjab High Court, namely. The Ambala Ex-Servicemen Transport Co-operative Society Ltd.. Ambala City and another v. The State of Punjab and others and The Regional Transport Authority and others v. Gurbachan Singh (1971 Plr 452) (10), of three and five Judges respectively, there are observations to the effect that the issue of temporary permits under section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a quasi-judicial act. My attention has also been invited to a decision of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Kotah Transport Co. Ltd. v. The Regional Transport Authority and others , which held that the function under section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act is quasi-judicial.
(23) Dealing with an application to transfer a permit, falling under section 59(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Supreme Court held in M!s. Ravi Roadways v. Asia Bi and others , that this was a quasi-judicial act and hence the recommendation of the Rta to the Transport Commissioner recommending the transfer of such a permit was invalid. fortiori, the issue of temporary permits under section 62 is also a quasi-judicial act.
(24) The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was concerned in Jeffs and others v. New Zealand Dairy Production and Marketing Board and others (1966-3 All England Law Reports 863) (13), with a New Zealand Dairy Board's zoning orders delegating to a Committee the task of hearing of the interests concerned. The Committee's hearing lasted for two days but they devoted only two pages of their report to the evidence and arguments. The question then was whether the Board had made its decision or had merely adopted the view of its Committee. The majority held that the Board had decided validly. But the Privy Council reversed that decision upholding the dissent of North P., who held that the Board had not a full report of the evidence before it and had erred in adopting the summary report from the committee, without examining the evidence itself. Viscount Dilhome summed up the position, as follows: "THECommittee was not appointed by the board, nor was it asked by the board, to receive evidence for transmission to it. The committee's report did not state what the evidence was, and the board reached its decision without consideration of and in ignorance of the evidence. The board thus failed to hear the interested parties as it was under an obligation to do in order to discharge its duty to act judicially in the determination of zoning applications."
The factual position in the present case may be summed up as follows:
(25) The State Transport Authority did not apply its mind and determine the routes on which additional services were necessary; nor did it apply its mind, or determine itself, the persons to whom the temporary permits were to be granted. It merely left to the President of the Congress, which is the only one of several unions of transport operators in Delhi, to specify the routes on which additional services had to be permitted as well as the persons to whom the temporary permits had to be granted. The represen- tation on behalf of the Congress was that additional services were necessary in respect of the routes where the members of the Congress were operating. It is pointed out for the petitioners that even this was not strictly adhered to because item 20 in the list of recommendations made by the President of the Congress Delhi Railway Station-Bharat Nagar route (in the enclosure to his letter dated 27-2-1971) was not a route on which the existing operators were the member-operators of the Congress. The existing operators were stated to be the Safety Bus Service and Delhi Cantt. Janta Motor Transport Company who were not memberoperators of the Congress. Hence they were not recommended for the grant of temporary permits; on the other hand, the operators recommended for the grant of temporary permits in respect of item 20 were (i) The Ex-Servicemen Bus Service and (ii) The Capital Bus Service (P) Ltd. All that was urged in this respect on behalf of the grantees of the temporary permits was that a member-operator was already operating on a portion of the route. A copy of the said letter of recommendation dated 27th February 1971 having been filed during the course of the hearing the petitioners had no opportunity of filing a detailed reply. In order to settle this controversy a Road Map of Delhi marking in red the said route described as item No. 20 and making the route, which is being operated by a member-operator of the Congress in blue was handed over to me. It will be clear from a mere perusal of the same that the two routes are different. The said map would be retained as part of the record of this case. The above is at least one clear indication showing that the mind of the State Transport Authority was not applied to the question whether additional services were even being confined to the routes which, according to the first representation of the President of the Congress dated 16th February 1971, were those which required additional services. It is not even suggested that there was any other representation from any other source to the State Transport Authority to permit additional services on routes which were not being operated upon by the member-operators of the Congress. carte blanche had thus been given to the President of the Congress not only to suggest the routes where additional services were required but also the operators to whom temporary permits were to be granted.
(26) Looked at from any point of view, therefore, the procedure which was thus adopted does not seem legally permissible. There had been a virtual abdication of functions of the State Transport Authority to the President of the Congress. On this ground alone it follows that the temporary permits were not properly granted. But as the petition was being heard and before arguments could be concluded the period of four months for which alone the temporary permits were effective, had run out. While it will be futile to set aside those permits it has yet become necessary to point out that the procedure adopted by the State Transport Authority was not valid.
(27) A further argument was advanced before me concerning the requirement of notice. It is now settled law that a temporary permit may be issued to meet purely temporary needs-- vide Shah J. (as he then was) speaking for the Supreme Court in M/s. Gandhara Transport Co. Ltd. v. State of Punjab and others . But there is a difference of opinion among the High Courts as to whether notice has to be given to the interested parties before issuing a temporary permit under section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was held by Mr. Justice B. C. Mitra in Shri Krishnagopal Dutta v. Regional Transport Authority, Burdwan and othes. that notice to existing operators on the routes, giving them opportunity to make representations when temprary permits were granted even for a second time, was necessary. trary view was taken by a Division Bench of Assam and Nagaland High Court in Dibrugarh City Bus owners' Association v. The State Tansport Authority, Assam, Shillong and others (A.I.R. 1971, Assam and Nagaland. 27) (16) which held that there was no necessity to hear existing operators before a grant of temporary permit and that it was not a violation of a rule of natural justice to grant a temporary permit without giving such an opportunity to the existing operators.
(28) In the latest Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court (of five Judges) noticed above, it was observed that even though section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act did not preclude or forbid the Transport Authority from issuing a notice or considering representations, if any, made by interested parties yet, having regard to the fact that the proceedings were quasi-judicial in character the same must be taken in consonance with the rules of natural justice, which rules are not excluded by section 62 in cases where the temporary need is not immediate or pressing and there is time to hear persons already providing transport facilities along or near the route or area for which the temporary permit is intended to issue; it is not only expedient but proper that the notice should be issued to such persons as to afford them an opportunity of making representations and a hearing for the consideration thereof before the temporary permit is granted. In this respect the observations made in their earlier Full Bench decision in the Ambala Ex-Servicemen Transport Co-operative Society, above referred to, were dissented from. In fact. it was explained that a careful reading of the earlier Full Bench decision itself did not show that the issuance of notice before a grant of temporary permit was a must. In the earlier Full Bench decsion reference was made to sections 55 and 56 of the Motor Vehicles Act in order to sustain the validity of clause (d) of Section 62, as inserted by Punjab Act 28 of 1948 and it was pointed out that the issue of temporary permits under section 62 was not an uncontrolled discretion but was one which was controlled by the provisions like sections 55 and 56, etc. In other words, it was stated that even though section 62 permitted the grant of temporary permits without having recourse to section 57 still the applicability of sections 55 and 56 was not excluded by section 62. Having pointed out earlier that the procedure adopted for the grant of temporary permits in this case was not one which was legally permissible, it is needless to go into the above question concerning the requirement of notice and resolve the difference of judicial opinion, referred to above, in this case. I, therefore. refrain from stating anything more on this question.
(29) It has been stated in the return filed by the respondents, that none of the petitioners had applied for a temporary permit. It is obvious that at least such a contention could not be put forward by any of the respondents in the absence of even a notice being affixed on the notice board calling for applications for the grant of such permits. It will be sufficient, therefore, to point out that it would not lie in the mouth of the State Transport Authority to urge that none of the petitioners had applied when it did not even call for such applications.
(30) The effort by Shri B. N. Kirpal, appearing for the Delhi State Transport Authority, was only to point out that even though as a matter of fairness at least an opportunity should have been given enabling those desiring to apply for temporary permits to do so still the act of granting temporary permits without giving such an opportunity could not be said to be illegal; in other words, mere violation of fairness will not render the same illegal. Though from the point of view of a Court exercising powers of judicial review such fall from the requisite standard of fairness, short of illegality, may not warrant interference, the promotion of confidence of the public in the fairness of the administration would obviously require that the Government, in the matter of dealing with the grievances of the citizens against the administration, should at least not be willing to defeat or delay the citizen from seeking redress by means of judicial review when it is satisfied that the act complained of is not as fair as the Government would itself wish it to be. More, however, need not be stated on this question in the view taken by me that the State Transport Authority did not conform to legal requirements in granting the temporary permits in the manner it did.
(31) As already expressed, since the term for which the permits were granted has expired the grant of the permits does not require to be quashed. In this view the fact that some of the grantees of the permits have not been actually served and have not been heard in their defense in C.W.P. No. 301 of 1971 can hardly make any difference. Shri B. N. Kirpal, learned counsel for the Delhi State Transport Authority, expressly stated that he was not putting forward such a contention.
(32) The above discussion has been merely necessitated for the reason that when it has come to the notice of this Court that the permits concerned have not been validly granted, as explained above, it is the plain duty of this Court to express its opinion on the said question despite the period of the license granted having run out in order there may not be any repetition of the same or that any one may not obtain any further advantage if any, on the basis of the permits which have already been granted.
(33) Though no relief as such is granted in this writ petition this is a proper case for the petitioners having their costs from the contesting respondents in each of the writ petition. Counsel fee in each case Rs. 150.