Kerala High Court
Radhakrishnan vs Circle Inspector Of Police on 4 March, 2009
Bench: A.K.Basheer, P.Bhavadasan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
CRL.A.No. 639 of 2005()
1. RADHAKRISHNAN,S/O.KESAVAN,
... Petitioner
Vs
1. CIRCLE INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
... Respondent
2. THE STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY
For Petitioner :SRI.A.X.VARGHESE
For Respondent :SRI.K.S.MADHUSOODANAN
The Hon'ble MR. Justice A.K.BASHEER
The Hon'ble MR. Justice P.BHAVADASAN
Dated :04/03/2009
O R D E R
A.K. BASHEER & P. BHAVADASAN, JJ.
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Crl. Appeal No.639 of 2005
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Dated this the 4th day of March, 2009.
JUDGMENT
Bhavadasan, J, Appellant was prosecuted for the offences of uxoricide, Infanticide and also for causing disappearance of evidence. He was found guilty on all counts. Therefore he was convicted for those offences and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 201 Indian Penal Code. Sentences were directed to run concurrently.
2. The accused, his deceased wife and the child were staying together. The accused married deceased Latha about four years ago. At the time of the incident deceased Latha was carrying. Accused suspected that his wife was infidel to him. Prosecution case is that the accused due to his suspicious nature and inferiority complex and since his wife could not satisfy his sexual urge, decided to do away with her. The accused runs business in jewellery. According to the prosecution, the accused had schemed to kill his wife. As part of the scheme he was in search of a house situate in a place far away from the main stream. Crl.A.639/2005. 2 He located the house, in which the couple along with the child were staying at the time of the incident. That is a short distance away from the main road. The allegation is that on 17.5.1997 the accused came to his house in the noon, stabbed his wife Latha to death and smothered his child also to death. The further allegation is that the accused caused disappearance of the evidence by throwing away the jewellery of Latha into a river.
3. C.W.1 laid Ext.P11 first information report before Thrikkakara Police Station. P.W.35, the then Sub Inspector of Thrikkakara Police Station reduced Ext.P11 into writing and thereafter registered Crime No.96 of 1997 as per Ext.P11(a) FIR. He informed the matter to his superior officers. P.W.36 took over investigation. As the case was one of unnatural death, the RDO conducted the inquest. The RDO concerned conducted inquest over the body of Latha and the child Radhul Krishnan and drew up Exts. P1 and P2 inquest reports respectively. Thereafter the body was sent for autopsy. P.W.19 the Forensic Surgeon conducted autopsy over the body of the lady and the child. He issued Ext.P9 autopsy report relating to Latha and Ext.P10 autopsy report relating to Radhul Krishnan. Ext.P9 indicated that Latha died due to the injuries sustained on the neck and as per Ext.P10 it is seen that the child had been smothered to death. P.W.36 recorded statements of witnesses and he produced the articles Crl.A.639/2005. 3 seized during inquest before court. He seized M.O.16 as per Ext.P15 mahazar. As per Ext.P16 mahazar he seized the treatment records relating to the accused from Susrusha Nursing Home, Cochin showing the treatment undergone by the accused and marked as Ext.P4. He also seized the case sheet of Central Hospital, Cochin as per Ext.P6 mahazar. On search of premises, where Diana Jewellery was run by the accused, he was able to seize M.O.17 as per Ext.P17 search list. According to prosecution, M.O.1 knife was recovered as per Ext.P18 mahazar. He filed Ext.P19 report seeking to have Section 302 IPC and Section 201 IPC incorporated in the charge. He had got the plan prepared and obtained other documents and completed the investigation. He laid charge before court.
4. JFCM-I, Aluva took cognizance of the offences. On appearance of the accused before the said court all formalities were completed. The learned Magistrate found that the case is one exclusively triable by a Sessions court and therefore committed the case to Sessions Court, Ernakulam under Section 209 of Criminal Procedure Code. The Sessions Court on getting records, made over the case to Sessions Court North Parur for trial and disposal.
5. On receipt of the records, the Sessions Court, North Parur issued summons to the accused. In the meanwhile, it is worthwhile to Crl.A.639/2005. 4 mention that as per directions given by the court, re-investigation was conducted by P.W.37. The Sessions Court thereafter, after preliminary hearing, framed the charges under Sections 302 and 201 of Indian Penal Code against the accused. The charge was read over to him. He pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Therefore, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 37 and Exts.P1 to P22 marked. They also had M.Os.1 to 20 identified and marked. After the closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused was questioned under Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code enabling him to offer his explanation to the incriminating circumstances brought out in evidence against him. He denied all circumstances and maintained that he is innocent. He went on to say that on the date of the incident he closed his shop at 9.30 p.m.. According to him, while he was on his way to drop an employee of his, he found that there was a light on the rear portion of the house. He knocked at the door and called out his wife. According to him there was no response. He would say that soon thereafter the two persons who had come along with him also entered the house along with the accused. According to the accused, in the light available, he found his wife lying on the floor in a pool of blood. He switched on the light. He did not see the child near its mother. Later he found his child dead on the bed. Hearing his wails, the neighbours rushed to the place. He was asked Crl.A.639/2005. 5 to inform the police. He did so. He also informed the family of his wife. Police had come on the same night itself. He says that he overheard a conversation that Ganesh, a close friend of his had come to his house on the same day. He also stated that he came to know that Ganesh was leaving by 11'o clock train on the same date. Even though he along with the police officers reached the Railway station, the train had left. According to him, he was illegally detained for a long period and he filed a petition before the High Court. Then he was arrested and remanded to custody. He would say that he is innocent and had been falsely implicated.
6. The court below on hearing both sides found that the accused could not be acquitted under Section 232 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the court directed the accused to enter on defence. The accused produced no evidence. Exts.D1 and D2 were marked on his side. On hearing both sides, the court below found that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the case against the accused. He was therefore convicted and sentenced as already mentioned.
7. The question is whether any interference is called for with the finding of the court below. Heard learned counsel for the appellant, learned Public Prosecutor and also Sri.K.S. Madhusoodanan, who appeared on behalf of the petitioner in I.A. 4758 of 2005, which was allowed by this Crl.A.639/2005. 6 court. The following points arise for consideration:
I) What is the cause of death of Latha and her child Radhul Krishnan?
II) Has the prosecution established that it was the accused, who had inflicted fatal injuries on his wife and smothered his child to death?
III) What, if any, are the offences committed by the accused? IV) What is the proper order as to sentence?
8. Point No. I) That Latha and Radhul Krishnan are not alive is the fact not in dispute. They met with the untimely death on 17.5.1997. There is also no dispute regarding the fact that Latha died due to stab injury received by her and the child was smothered to death. There is also no dispute regarding the fact that Latha and her child were living along with the accused. It is to be noticed that at the time of the incident Latha was carrying. The house they were residing was taken on rent by the accused.
9. Exts.P1 and P2 are the inquest reports drawn up by the RDO, who conducted inquest over the body of Latha and Radhul Krishnan respectively. Exts.P9 and P10 are the postmortem certificates of Latha and the child respectively. The inquest reports disclose the injuries found on the body of the respective persons. On a perusal of Ext.P9 the following injuries are seen:
Crl.A.639/2005. 7
"(1) Contusion 2.5 x 0.5 cm. on the right side of neck 6 cm.
Below right ear.
(2) Contusion 2 x 0.5 cm. 1 cm. below injury No.1.
(3) Stab wound 2.5 x 0.5 on the right side of neck 1.5 cm. below the right angle of lower jaw. Margins of the wound were regular and clearly cut. Back and lower end blunt and front and upper end sharply cut. The wound was directed upwards backwards and to left ending in the posterior wall of naso. Pharynx for a depth of 8 cms; cutting the underlay muscles and vessles.
(4) Stab wound 1.5 x 0.5 cms on the left side of neck 2 cm. below the angle of left side of lower jaw."
The cause of death is shown as due to the injuries mentioned as 3 and 4. Post mortem certificate shows that there were stab wounds and other injuries. Ext.P10, the postmortem certificate relating to the child shows that the findings are consistent with death due to occlusion of air passage by odema. Doctor opined that even though no antemortum injuries were located, it could be concluded that the death was due to smothering. P.W.34 had conducted the postmortem over the body of late Latha and her child. He deposed that the cause of death of Latha was due to injuries 3 and 4 shown in the postmortem certificate. He is also of the opinion that those injuries could have been caused by the use of a weapon of the nature shown Crl.A.639/2005. 8 to him. According to the witness, injury Nos.3 and 4 are fatal and they caused the death of the victim. As already noticed, the evidence is clear to the fact that Radhul Krishnan was smothered to death. It is a clear case of homicide.
10. Point Nos.II & III) The next question that arises for consideration is whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that it was the accused who had caused the death of his wife and child. The case is built up on circumstantial evidence. The court below has relied on five circumstances for coming to the conclusion that the acts of the accused had been established. They are
1. enemity of the accused towards deceased Latha.
2. Frequent change of house for staying, which according to the lower court was part of the scheme of the accused.
3. At the time of the incident, the accused was at home.
4. Nobody else could have entered the house and stabbed Latha and smothered the child to death.
5. The accused had concealed M.O.1 knife and thrown away the jewelery of deceased Latha into a river.
11. The court below found that there was an ugly scar on the body of Latha, which causes aversion in the mind of the accused. The Crl.A.639/2005. 9 accused had a complaint that his wife, late Latha, was unable to satisfy his sexual urge. It is also stated by the court below that there is evidence to show that he had compelled Latha to get money from her house. The finding of the court below is that the accused had no liking for his wife and child. He also doubted the paternity of the child. The court below also came to the conclusion that the accused was at home at the relevant time.
12. The question that arises for consideration is whether the court below is justified in coming to the above conclusion. Before entering into a discussion of the evidence in the case, certain aspects may be noticed.
13. The case is built on circumstantial evidence. The courts have been cautioned that while appreciating circumstantial evidence, the court must adopt a very cautious approach and should record the conviction only if all the links in the chain are complete, pointing to the accused and every hypothesis of evidence is capable of being negatived on evidence. Great care must be taken in evaluating the circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonable to enable two inferences, one in favour of the accused must be accepted. The circumstantial evidence relied on must have been fully established and must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. But, that is not to say that the prosecution has to meet any other hypothesis put forward by the prosecution to answer the far fetched and Crl.A.639/2005. 10 fanciful it might be, nor does it mean that the prosecution evidence must be rejected on the slightest doubt because law permits rejection, if the doubt is reasonable and not otherwise. It is not every lingering or fanciful doubt that can be regarded as a reasonable doubt. A doubt must be reasonable and it must be such that a reasonable person would entertain. Doubt of fleeting nature approximating to vague hunches cannot pass muster a reasonable doubt. Usually three tests are applied in such cases. They are, (1) The circumstances from which the inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and fully established.
(2) Those circumstances should be of definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused.
(3) The circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and no one else.
14. These aspects had been considered in a number of decisions. It is unnecessary to refer all of them. In the decision reported in Chattar Singh v. State of Haryana (AIR 2009 SC 378), the court held as follows:
"It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the Crl.A.639/2005. 11 incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1977 SC 1963); Eradu and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad (AIR 1956 SC 316); Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1983 SC 446); State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 1224); Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC
350); Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. (AIR 1989 SC 1890). The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab (AIR 1954 SC 621), it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring the offences home beyond any reasonable doubt.
We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C.Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P. ((1996) 10 SCC 193, wherein it has been observed thus:
"In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain Crl.A.639/2005. 12 of evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence...."
In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. And Ors. (AIR 1990 SC 79)l, it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:
"(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;
(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence."
In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992 Crl. L.J 1104), it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully Crl.A.639/2005. 13 established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt.
Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book "Wills' Circumstantial Evidence" (Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial evidence: (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order t justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and in capable of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis that that of his guile, (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted."
15. In the decision reported in Ujjagar Singh v. State of Punjab ((2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 272), it was held as follows:
"We have considered their arguments very carefully. In Mahmood v. State of U.P., it has been observed that in a case dependent wholly on circumstantial evidence, the court must be satisfied-
"(a) that the circumstances from which the inference of guilt is to be drawn, have been fully established by Crl.A.639/2005. 14 unimpeachable evidence beyond a shadow of doubt;
(b) that the circumstances are of a determinative tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused;
and
(c) that the circumstances, taken collectively, are incapable of explanation of any reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt sought to be proved against him."
Int his case this court held that the omission of the prosecution, inter alia, to have the fingerprints found on the alleged murder weapon was fatal to the prosecution story.
In sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, this court discussed the ratio of the judgments in Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P., Tufail v. State of U.P., Ram Gopal v. State of Maharashtra and Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra and observed thus:
"153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be proved' and must be or should be proved' as was held by this court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra where the following observations were made:
"19...... Certainly, it is a primary principle that the Crl.A.639/2005. 15 accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between "may be" and "must be" is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."
Mr. Goburdhun has also cited Mahmood v. State of U.P., Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharastra, Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, Omwati v. Mahendra Singh, Sudama Pandey v. State of Bihar and Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P. In support of his plea relating to the evaluation of circumstantial evidence. These judgments have broadly followed the principles laid down in the judgments referred to above and need not therefore be dealt with by us in extenso. It must nonetheless be Crl.A.639/2005. 16 emphasised that whether a chain is complete or not would depend on the facts of each case emanating from the evidence and no universal yardstick should ever be attempted. It is in this background that we must examine the circumstances in the present case."
15(a) In the decision reported in Vinay D. Nagar v. State of Rajasthan ((2008) 5 SCC 597) it was held as follows:
"Further, in Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. It was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:
"10(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;
(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence."
The principle of law is well established that where the Crl.A.639/2005. 17 evidence is of a circumstantial nature, circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and the facts, so established, should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and they should be such as to exclude hypothesis than the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."
16. In this context, it is useful to ascertain what is meant by 'reasonable doubt'. In the decision reported in Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa ((2002) 8 SCC 381) it was held as follows:
"It is submitted that the benefit of doubt should be given on account of the co-accused's acquittal. It was submitted that the evidence is inadequate to fasten guilt, and therefore the prosecution cannot be said to have established its case beyond doubt.
Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let a hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting the guilty escape is not doing justice according to law. (See Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh) Crl.A.639/2005. 18 Prosecution is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused. (See State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava). A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary , trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish. (See Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.). Vague hunches cannot take the place of judicial evaluation.
17. It is also well settled that if on analysis of circumstantial evidence the court feels that two views are possible, then the view favourable to the accused will have to be accepted. (See the decision reported in State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981 SCC (Crl) 762)). It is also useful to mention the principles regarding 'appreciation of evidence'. In the decision reported in State of Maharashtra v. Siraj Ahamed Nisar Ahmed (2007 (5) SCC 161) it was held as follows:
"While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the Crl.A.639/2005. 19 approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a right of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence, more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawback and infirmities pointed out in the evidence, as a whole, and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence even by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matter not touching the core of matter in issue, hyper technical approach by taking sentence out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole."
18. It may not be inappropriate to refer to two of the decisions in this context. They are 1) Lalliram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008 (10) SCC 69), wherein it was held as follows:
"As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellant a decision has to be considered in the background of the factual scenario. In criminal cases the question of a precedent particularly relating to appreciation of evidence is really of no consequence. In Amankumar case it was observed that a prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice. There is no rule f law that Crl.A.639/2005. 20 her testimony cannot be acted upon without corroboration in material particulars. She stands n a higher pedestal than the injured witness. In the latter case there is injury in the physical form which in the former both physical as well as psychological and emotional. However, if the court finds it difficult to accept the version of a prosecutrix on the face value, it may search for evidence direct or circumstantial."
2) Charan Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1975 SC 246) "In the context of what value should be attached to the statements of the witnesses examined in this case our attention has been invited by the learned counsel for the appellants to a number of authorities. We have refrained from referring those authorities, because, in our opinion, reference to those authorities is rather misplaced. The fate of the present case like that of every other criminal case depends upon its own facts and the intrinsic worth of the evidence adduced in the case rather than what was said about the evidence of witnesses in other decided cases in the context of facts of those cases. The question of credibility of a witness has primarily to be decided by referring to his evidence and finding out as to how the witness has fared in cross-examination and what impression is created by his evidence taken in the context of the other facts of the case. Criminal cases cannot be put in a straight jacket. Though there may be similarity between the fact of some cases, there would always be shades of difference and quite often that Crl.A.639/2005. 21 difference may prove to be crucial. The same can also be said about the evidence adduced in one case and that produce in another. Decided cases can be of help if there be a question of law like the admissibility of evidence. Likewise, decides cases can be of help if the question be about the applicability of some general rule of evidence, example the weight to be attached to the evidence of an accomplice. This apart, reference to decided cases hardly seems a apposite when the question before the court is whether the evidence of a particular witness should or should not be accepted."
19. After having noticed the above principles an endeavour shall now be made to ascertain if the prosecution has succeeded in proving the guilt of the accused.
20. The prosecution will have to establish the following facts by adducing acceptable evidence: 1) Taking on rent a house in an isolated place with the intention of doing away with his wife. 2) Complaint of the accused that Latha was incapable of satisfying his sexual urge and also that the ugly scar on the body of Latha caused aversion in him. 3) the accused was demanding money from the mother and brother of Latha, but he did not succeed. Therefore the accused thought that no purpose will be served by keeping Latha alive. 4) Latha and child had gone to her parental house for two weeks stay. After one week the accused brought back Latha and the Crl.A.639/2005. 22 child. 5) He tried to falsely implicate Ganesh for the acts committed by him. 6) Strange behaviour of the accused before and after the crime.
7)Recovery of M.O.1 knife.
21. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant pointed out that the court below has not properly appreciated the evidence and has omitted to take note of relevant facts and that has led to miscarriage of justice. Several important and significant facts have been omitted to be noticed by the court below. A careful analysis of the evidence in the case will clearly show that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. There is nothing to show, according to the learned counsel, that the accused was at home when Latha and her child met with death. No one had seen the accused coming to his house or going out of his house before and after the incident. The query to P.W.2 by the accused, of the whereabouts of Latha without going into his own house and also his query regarding Ganesh has been given undue significance. Evidence will show that the accused was not at home when the incident occurred. There is also no evidence to show that the accused had any aversion for Latha and he wanted to do away with her. If the evidence of P.Ws. 26 and 27 are properly considered, the court below would not have made the mistake of holding that Exts. P4 and P5 are against the Crl.A.639/2005. 23 accused. Learned counsel also pointed out that the court below was not justified in law in taking recourse to Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act regarding the recovery of the weapon. According to counsel at best there could be a strong suspicion against the accused. But that is not sufficient in law.
22. Learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand contended that the court below has considered every aspect in detail and analysed the evidence to come to the conclusion that the offences have been established. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, there are clinching items of evidence against the accused, which were noticed by the court below. May be there are some flaws in the investigation. But according to the learned counsel that need not result in throwing out of the prosecution case. It was stated by the learned Public Prosecutor that investigation could have been more honest and sincere. The evidence relied on by the court below is sufficient to show 1) aversion of the accused towards his wife, 2) need for money and he is not able to get any money from the house of Latha 3) the attempt on the part of the accused in trying to implicate Ganesh and the recovery of M.O.1 as per the statement given by him. According to the learned Public Prosecutor these items of evidence form a complete chain pointing unerringly to the guilt of the accused.
Crl.A.639/2005. 24
23. The principles to be applied in cases based on circumstantial evidence had already been adverted to. The rule regarding appreciation of evidence has also been referred to. One has to appreciate the available evidence in the proper perspective and reach a conclusion one way or the other. It is not the quantity of evidence but the quality that matters. There is no straight jacket formula for appreciation and evaluation of evidence and each case has to be considered based on the facts of that case. Precedents may not be of much help in the appreciation and evaluation of evidence. The test is to see if the witnesses are trustworthy and the evidence passes scrutiny. The attempt should not be to find out if more evidence could have been produced, but to see whether the evidence produced is sufficient.
24. The prosecution has a case that the accused was enemical towards his wife and also had a strong aversion for her. The charge framed by the court below makes mention of the word 'enemity'. Before going into this aspect further, one fact has to be noticed. Prosecution also has a case that the accused was not successful in getting money from the house of Latha. It is not in dispute that Latha had a scar on her body. The main items of evidence relied on by the prosecution is testimony of P.Ws.26 and 27 and Exts.P4 and P5. From Exts.P4 and P5 it can be seen that the accused Crl.A.639/2005. 25 had taken treatment from a General Physician and also from Psychologist. It is useful to refer to those documents now. Ext.P4 is the case sheet maintained in the Susrusha Nursing Home, Cochin, where the accused had taken treatment from Dr.M.C.Mathews. A perusal of Ext.P4 shows that the accused had some problem. It appears that the scar on the body of Latha caused annoyance and aversion in him. He would also say that the reason for the scar, which is a surgical one was not disclosed to him. He was mentally upset. It is also seen from the said documents that at times the accused had no desire for sex. Ext.P5 shows that the accused was seen by clinical Psychologist and he found that the accused had some problems. But it is interesting to notice that the Doctor had also noted that his wife had no grievance against her husband, ie., the accused. It is difficult to understand as to how the court below could conclude that based on the entires in Exts.P4 and P5, that the accused had strong aversion for his wife. Moreover, they are of the year 1996 and 1995 respectively. The evidence given by P.Ws. 26 and 27 are also of no help to the prosecution. Here, one has to note that the accused and Latha had a child and as on the date of the incident she was also carrying. Even assuming that the accused had an aversion to his wife, that did not affect their marital life much. It would appear that the court below was too hasty to come to the conclusion that the Crl.A.639/2005. 26 accused was sexually starved. May be his wife was incapable of arousing sexual instincts in him. But to say that that is the cause of the murder is going too far. May be that he also had a suspicion about his wife. Even though the prosecution would say that the accused suspected the paternity of the child, there is no evidence in that regard. One must recollect that when his wife met the Doctor P.W.27, she had no complaints about her husband. Moreover, Ext.P5 would indicate that on treatment, the condition of the accused had improved.
25. Equally unacceptable is the story regarding the enemity of the accused towards his wife. It is true that the accused had borrowed money from his brother in law and also had demanded money from the mother in law. The accused was not successful in getting their help. The evidence discloses that he had borrowed from several persons but he repaid only some of them. There is also evidence to show that there are debts due to others also. There is nothing in the evidence of P.W.11, the brother of deceased Latha to show that the accused had exhibited any conduct to show that he was annoyed with his wife for not getting money from her house. It would appear that the aversion and enemity theory is blown out of proportion. Of course there is the evidence of P.Ws.9, 10 and 11 to show that late Latha was dejected and was unhappy. But there is nothing in their Crl.A.639/2005. 27 evidence to show that the accused was cruel to her or was continuously harassing and torturing her.
26. Another aspect highlighted by the prosecution is that the accused was in search of a house situated in an isolated place. Records have been produced before the court below to show that the accused was residing in houses on rent, taken from various persons periodically.
27. Merely because the accused had been shifting his residence , it could not lead to the conclusion that he was scheming against his wife. A perusal of Ext.P8 would reveal that the house is near a main road and it is easily accessible from the main road. Plan also shows that immediately on the western side of the house and also on the eastern side of the house there are two companies functioning there. There is a house occupied by people immediate on the northern side of the house of the accused. Perusal of Ext.P8 plan does not reveal that the house where the accused and his family were living is in an isolated place. In fact the evidence is to the effect that if any one goes to the house of the accused, it can be easily noticed. There is yet another aspect. It has come out in evidence that the accused was in dire financial difficulties and he found it difficult to pay a high rent. He was not in a position to afford such a luxury. The evidence shows that the rent for the house where the incident occurred Crl.A.639/2005. 28 was less and the accused could afford it. There is also evidence to show that the accused had easy access to the new jewellery shop opened by him. Therefore the theory of the prosecution case that the house in question was chosen with ill motive cannot be readily accepted.
28. It may be noticed here that there is no evidence at all to show that the accused had illtreated his wife demanding money from her house. P.W.11, the brother of deceased Latha says that the accused had approached him to borrow money, but he was unable to oblige him. P.W.11 has no case that for money, his sister was being illtreated by the accused. One fails to understand as to how the accused could gain by doing away with Latha. It is true that P.W.11 had stated that the ornaments given to Latha at the time of her marriage had been squandered by the accused. The prosecution has also shown that the accused was in need of money. If that be so, it escapes one's understanding as to why the accused would throw away the ornaments of deceased Latha into a river. There is also an allegation that the accused wanted to appropriate ornaments of Latha. The demand for money and the causing of annoyance etc., are incompatible with the theory of throwing away the jewelery in to the river. The prosecution case is that after stabbing Latha to death, he had removed all the gold ornaments and throws them into a river to efface the evidence. It Crl.A.639/2005. 29 must be noticed here that two rings were recovered from the body of Latha at the time of inquest. There is nothing to show that Latha had large quantity of ornaments at the time of her death. As already noticed, there is absolutely nothing to show that the accused had illtreated either Latha or the child or had exhibited any such conduct, by which he could extract money from the house of deceased Latha.
29. The suggestion put forward by the learned Public Prosecutor is that if he could do away with Latha, he could marry again and also get ornaments seems to be far fetched. One cannot readily accept the same. Also just because of the scar found on the body of Latha had caused aversion to the accused, it does not follow that he wanted to do away with her. Therefore it could be seen that neither the scar nor the need for money from the house of Latha appear to be the motive for the act.
30. Now comes the main question as to whether there is any evidence to show that the objectionable acts were committed by the accused. It has already been noticed that the motive alleged is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. It may be borne in mind that in a case of circumstantial evidence the motive has a significant role. It may not be possible to say that absence of motive by itself is a ground to throw out the prosecution case. Even in cases based on circumstantial evidence, if there Crl.A.639/2005. 30 are clinching items of evidence, pointing to the guilt of the accused, the mere fact that the prosecution has not been able to prove the motive may not by itself be fatal. In this case, the prosecution has put forward a definite motive and they have failed to prove the same.
31. The next question that arises for consideration is the presence of the accused in the house at the time of the incident. Going by the prosecution case, the objectionable act took place around 2 - 3 p.m. on 17.5.1997. The prosecution mainly relies on the conduct of the accused before and after the incident to show that he was responsible for the same.
32. The defence has attempted to show that the claim of the prosecution that in the noon the accused went to his house and after committing the act returned to the shop cannot be accepted. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that it is true that P.Ws.6, 7 8 and 12 saw the accused going to the STD booth after 3 p.m. Learned Public Prosecutor points out that even though the accused visited two or three telephone booths, he did not telephoned from those booths. It is also stated that the accused had gone to the tea shop of P.W.12. The act of the accused, according to the Prosecutor, in going to various STD booths and tea shop is an attempt made by him to raise the plea of alibi. If as a matter of fact the accused wanted to use the phone, he would have done so when he had gone to the booth of Crl.A.639/2005. 31 P.W.6. The act of the accused in simply going to the booths and returning without using the telephone and tea shop show his complicity in the act.
33. One will have to presume that the accused was scheming for a long time and taking steps to carry out his act to perfection. True the conduct of the accused before and after the incident were also highlighted.
34. It is true that P.W.2 in his evidence has stated that on the date of the incident at about 9 p.m., while he and his wife were in the courtyard of their house, the accused came to the gate of the house in a scooter and asked him whether Latha and the child were in their house. P.W.2 replied in negative. P.W.2 stated that thereafter without going into his house the accused went on his scooter on the eastern side. Thereafter he heard a cry from the house of the accused. When he came out of his house he was two other persons standing near the compound wall of his compound. He also saw the accused coming out of his house weeping and wailing that his wife had been put to death and so also his child. P.W.2 also stated that earlier when the accused met him and asked about his wife and child, the accused had also asked whether a Maharastrian (Bombaywala) had come to the place. Learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that these are all parts of the scheme formulated by the accused to show that somebody else had done the act.
Crl.A.639/2005. 32
35. One may recollect that the incident is stated to have taken place at about 3 p.m. on 17.5.1997. The evidence of P.Ws.6, 7 8 and 12 show that the accused had visited the booth and the tea shop after 3 p.m.. It has also come out from the evidence of P.Ws.6, 7, 8 and 12 that even though the accused reached their respective booths, he did not make any calls from there. It is not possible to understand as to why the accused had asked P.W.2 whether a Maharashtrian had come to the place. This is an indication to show that he was not then much concerned about his wife and child then. Public Prosecutor would say that that is because, by that time he had committed the heinous act and he wanted to make it appear that he was not aware of the same.
36. There is an explanation offered by the defence. According to the defence the accused came to his house at about 9'o clock and after switching on the light on the rear portion of the house he knocked the door and since there is no response he thought that his wife and child might have gone to the house of P.W.2. Since there was no response, he would say that he assumed that they have gone to the temple and while returning they might have gone to his shop. Therefore without entering into his house, he had gone to his shop.
37. Even though it may appear that though there is substance Crl.A.639/2005. 33 in the above claim, the accused was not at able to establish those facts at the time of evidence. As of now evidence is that the accused asked P.W.2 at about 9'o clock in the night on 17.5.1997 whether his wife and child had come to the house of P.W.2. P.W.2's evidence is that at about 9'o clock without entering his house the accused asked whereabouts of his wife and child to P.W.2. So also there is something odd about his query about Ganesh. It appears from his conduct that he had expected Ganesh to come there. It is also true that the behaviour of the accused when P.W.2 told him that his wife and child had not come to his house, he immediately left the place without entering the house to verify whether his wife and child were at home, was strange. So also his conduct of going to the STD booths and returning from there without making any calls do generate suspicion.
38. However, one aspect has to be noticed. There is absolutely no evidence in this case to show that the accused had the habit of taking lunch from his house. There is also no evidence to show that anybody had seen the accused at or about the time of the incident in the house on the illfated day. It has already been noticed that on either side of the house of the accused there are companies and residential houses. The evidence also would indicate that it is possible to see persons going to the house of accused. There is also no evidence to show that on the ill fated day contrary Crl.A.639/2005. 34 to the usual practice he had gone home to take lunch. May be the conduct of the accused in going from booth to booth etc. may not be very acceptable. The prosecution says that those were to hood-wink the investigating agency.
39. True that the conduct of the accused immediately before and after the incident seems to be strange and suspicious. The claim of the defence that it is a normal conduct does not inspire confidence in the mind of this court. The defence is unable to give satisfactory explanation as to why the accused had thought of going into his house while giving a lift to C.W.1 and P.W.4. The evidence shows that those two had mounted the scooter of the accused and the accused had promised to drop them at a place further away from his house. P.W.4 had categorically stated that at the time when they started from the shop of the accused, there was no intention to go to the house of the accused. However, when the accused reached the place, he suddenly took his vehicle into the house. P.W.4 has also stated that he and C.W.1 waited outside and the accused went inside. Soon thereafter he heard the loud cry of the accused that his wife had been put to death and his child is missing. It was thereafter that the lights of the house were switched on. Learned Public Prosecutor may be justified in contending that this is a very abnormal behaviour and that can only be false. According to the Crl.A.639/2005. 35 learned Public Prosecutor without switching on the light in the house, the accused could not have seen his wife lying on the floor. There is some substance in the above contention. May be there is a strong suspicion about the accused's conduct regarding the post incident behaviour. It may be possible to say that the accused may have been aware of incident, but to go further and say that it was he who had committed the objectionable acts is too far fetched. True his nervous and erratic behaviour in simply going to the STD booths and then to tea shop may create a strong doubt in the mind of the court. Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. In order to hold that it was the accused, who had committed the act solely based on his post incident behaviour may not be proper and legal since a lot of assumptions and presumptions will have to be made. Those presumptions have to rest on conjunctures and surmises. There is thus want of convincing evidence to hold that it was the accused who had committed the act based on his pre and post incident behaviour.
40. Next item of evidence relied on by the prosecution is recovery of M.O.1 knife on the basis of a confession statement stated to have been given by the accused. In other words, the prosecution relies on Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act to prove the fact against the accused. Learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that the evidence of P.W.30 and 31 Crl.A.639/2005. 36 and 36 along with Ext.P7 mahazar and Ext.P7(a), the portion of the confession statement made by the accused will show that M.O.1 knife was recovered at the instance of the accused. That goes a long way in establishing the complicity of the accused.
41. It is well settled that in order to attract Section 27, which is in the nature of an exception to Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, two essential ingredients will have to be established. Disclosure statement on the basis of which recovery is said to have been made must 1) disclose authorship of concealment and (2) the factum of concealment. The Section is based on the theory of confirmation by subsequent facts. As already noticed Section 27 is an exception to Sections 25 and 26. Exception is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the information given by the accused, it gives some guarantee of truth of that fact. In the decision reported in Geejaganda Somaiah v. State of Karnataka (AIR 2007 SC 1355) it was held as follows:
"Section 25 of Evidence Act mandates that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence. Similarly Section 26 of the Evidence Act provides that confession by the accused person while in custody of police cannot be proved against him. However, to the aforesaid rule of Sections 25 to 26 of the Evidence Act, thee Crl.A.639/2005. 37 is an exception carved out by Section 27 of the Evidence Act providing that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Section 27 is a proviso to Sections 25 and 26. Such statements are generally terms as disclosure statements leading to the discovery of facts which are presumably in the exclusive knowledge of the maker. Section 27 appears to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and accordingly it can be safely allowed to be given in evidence.
As the section is alleged to be frequently misused by the police, the courts are required to be vigilant about its application. The court must ensure the credibility of evidence by police because this provision is vulnerable to abuse. It does not, however, mean that any statement made in terms of the aforesaid section should be seen with suspicion and it cannot be discarded only on the ground that it was made to a police officer during investigation. The court has to be cautious that no effort is made by the prosecution to make out a statement of accused with a simple case of recovery as a case of discovery of fact in order to attract the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act."
Crl.A.639/2005. 38
42. In the decision reported in Ramachandran v. State of Kerala (2008(4) KLT 464) it was held as follows:
"It is often seen that appropriate evidence regarding the discovery under S. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is not being brought in. The mahazar for the seizure of the material object, the extracted portion of the statement of the accused which lead to the discovery or even the evidence given by the investigating Officer regarding that, may not mention the authorship of the sale/concealment of the material object. This often happens either because of ignorance of the relevancy and importance of evidence regarding the authorship of concealment/sale of the material object or inadvertence in recording the statement of the accused. The information leading to the discovery of the fact may be available in the statement of the accused recorded by the investigating Officer. That statement is being recorded in the first person where, the accused starts by saying what he did in the particular case (which ofcourse is not admissible in evidence) and in the course of that statement, he refers to the concealment/sale etc. of the material object. At that particular portion of the statement, the accused may not have referred to his concealing/selling the material object. In such situation, it is the responsibility of the investigating officer to state in the evidence about the authorship of the concealment/sale of the material object if done by the accused and as the accused told him, in case it is so. If the investigating Officer does not say Crl.A.639/2005. 39 that, then, certainly the Law Officer who conducts the prosecution for the complainant/State has to elicit that matter from the witness. And, if for any reason the Law Officer also does not do that, then it is the duty of the trial court to do that. S.165 of the Indian Evidence Act enables the court to put any question to any witness in order to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant facts. The courts while conducting the trial of cases must bear in mind that they are not silent spectators of the proceedings in the courts. The courts must be alert and alive and make use of, wherever necessary the power under S.165 of course, maintaining the fairness of the trial or other proceedings. To avoid embarrassment if any, to the parties to the proceedings, the questions put by the court to the witnesses can be recorded as 'question by court' or indicated in any other manner permitted under law. The courts must also consider whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case it is necessary to grant leave to the parties or their agents to cross examine the witness upon the answer given in reply to such questions."
43. In the decision reported in George v. State (2005(3) K.L.J.
593) it was held as follows:
"It is true that even if the statement may not fall within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of the accused leading a police officer to a particular place and pointing out an article kept there will be relevant Crl.A.639/2005. 40 under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. There is clear distinction between the conduct of person against whom an offence is alleged, which is admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act if such conduct is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact (See Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Admn._ -AIR 1979 Sc 400). In Raveendran & Others v. State (1989 (2) KLJ
534) it was held as follows:-
"The evidence of the circumstances simplicitor that the accused led a police officer and pointed out the place or article kept hidden, would be admissible as conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any statement by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of S.27."
In V.Ravi v. State of Kerala (1994 Crl.L.J. 162) also it was held that the confession though not admissible under Section 27, it is admissible under Section 8. But, the conduct alone is not sufficient to find a person guilty of the offences alleged against him.
It is settled position of law that recovery is not substantive evidence. It is corroborative evidence (See D.B.DEshmukh v. State AIR 1970 Bombay 438; Babboo v. State of M.P. - AIR 1979 SC 1042; and Harish Natwarlal Mistry and ors. Etc. v. State of Gujarat - 1993 (1) Crimes 451). The evidence on record shows that in none of the recoveries the authorship of concealment is established."
44. In the decision reported in Sankara Narayanan v. State of Crl.A.639/2005. 41 Kerala (2006(3) K.L.T. 429) it was held as follows:
"Mr. Sujith Mathew Jose, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State on the other hand for a contrary view relied upon another judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000 SCC (Cri) 2630, paragraph 26 of the judgment which is relevant and which supports the contention of the learned Public Prosecutor reads as follows:
"We too countenance three possibilities when an accused points out the place where a dead body or an incriminating material was concealed without stating that it was concealed by himself. One is that he himself would have concealed it. Second is that he would have seen somebody else concealing it. And the third is that he would have been told by another person that it was concealed there. But if the accused declines to tell the criminal court that his knowledge about the concealment was on account of one of the last two possibilities the criminal court can presume that it was concealed by the accused himself. This is because the accused is the only person who can offer the explanation as to how else he came to know of such concealment and if he chooses to refrain from telling the curt as to how else he came to know of it, the presumption is a well- justified course to be adopted by the criminal court that the concealment was made by himself. Such an interpretation is not inconsistent with the principle embodied in S.27 of the Evidence Act."
Crl.A.639/2005. 42
45. Bearing the above principles in mind, we may now have a look at Ext.P7(a), which according to the prosecution is the confession statement given by the accused which led to the recovery of the knife. The said portion reads as follows:
Unfortunately for the prosecution the above disclosure statement does not reveal authorship of concealment. Of course there is evidence given by P.Ws. 35 and 36 investigating officers regarding recovery. But when the statement relied on by the prosecution does not reveal authorship of concealment, Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act has no application. Therefore this ground relied on by the court below also cannot be accepted.
46. The conduct of accused could be relevant under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. Again even assuming that Section 27 of the Evidence Act is applicable, that is not substantive evidence. Crl.A.639/2005. 43
47. There are certain disturbing facts noticed in this case. The incident occurred on 17.5.1997. Initially the crime was registered under the caption unnatural death. It appeared from the record that one Sri.Ganesh, who was suspected to have a role in the incident was arrested on 21.5.1997 from Bombay and brought to Kerala. Remand report filed before the JFCM, Aluva and he was remanded till 24th May, 1997. There is nothing seen from the records about the accused till the name of the accused appears for the first time in the remand report dated 30.5.1997.
48. It is significant to notice that there is a mass petition complaining about the investigation of the case and also a habeas corpus petition before the Honourable High Court of Kerala filed by the father of the accused as O.P.8908 of 1997 filed on 27.5.1997. The Original Petition was disposed of by order dated 2.6.1997. The judgment in the said case reads as follows:
"Heard the counsel for the parties. The matter is pending before the criminal court and Sri.Radhakrishnan is already in judicial custody. The question of his production before this court is not required, since the entire matter is seized with the criminal court.
The Original Petition is accordingly dismissed."
It has to be noticed that the original petition contained allegations that the Crl.A.639/2005. 44 accused had been taken into custody long ago and kept in illegal custody. After the filing of the original petition the arrest of the accused was recorded. May be he had been under surveillance. Remand report filed in relation to the custody of Ganesh does not indicate that the accused had played any role in the incident. Suddenly on 30th May, 1997 the name of the accused appear in the records. The claim of the accused that he was falsely implicated cannot be altogether be ignored.
49. It appears that there was a direction for reinvestigation. Reinvestigation was done by P.W.37. It is very disturbing to note that he has not done anything in the matter except to question a few persons, who had affixed their signatures in the mass petition. If there was any sincerity on his part, he should have picked the loose threads in the case and conducted a proper investigation. The conduct of P.W.37 cannot be appreciated.
50. Certain other aspects may also be noticed now.
Prosecution case is that after stabbing Latha to death the accused, in order to wipe off any evidence against him, he collected her jewelery and threw it into a river. It is inconceivable that a person, who wanted to destroy all the evidences of his act would retain the weapon of offence. The first attempt will be to get rid of that weapon rather than throw away the jewelery. Crl.A.639/2005. 45 Further there is no evidence to show that Latha had ornaments with her at the time of death.
51. It is also significant to note that M.O.19 and M.O.20 which are the clothes stated to have been worn by the accused at the time of the incident were seized by P.W.36. They were sent for forensic examination. Exts.P20 and P21 are the chemical reports. Ext.P20 is the report after examination of the nail clippings forwarded to the laboratory for chemical analysis. Ext.P20 shows that no skin tissues were detected in the nail clippings shown as items Nos. 1 and 3. It is very disturbing to note that cellophane tapes shown as item No.2 in the forwarding note could not be examined as the shirt and pants mentioned in the forwarding note were not forwarded to the Laboratory. Reference in Ext.P22 of pants and shirts must obviously relate to M.Os. 19 and 20. One is at a loss to understand as to what prevented the investigating officer from forwarding the pant and the shirt stated to have been worn by the accused at the time of the incident to the laboratory for examination. It is that the omission to procure report of dog squad and finger print expert assumes significance. It is not possible to say that whether the omission was deliberate or not. The chemical examination report too does not advance the case of prosecution much. Crl.A.639/2005. 46
52. Learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that defective investigation by itself is not a ground to ignore the prosecution case. He relied on the decision reported in Visveswaran v. State ((2003) 6 SCC 73) and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mansingh ((2003) 10 SCC 414).
53. It is true that a defective or improper investigation by itself may not be a ground to suspect the prosecution story unless it is shown that the acts are deliberate and has caused considerable prejudice to the accused. In the decisions cited there were other materials to come to the conclusion regarding the guilt of the accused. It was in the light of those facts that it was stated that merely because there are some defects in the investigation that by themselves may not prove fatal. In the case on hand, what is disturbing is the attitude of the officer, who had conducted reinvestigation. If only he had carefully gone through the records, he could have noticed the omissions and got them rectified. It is unfortunate that there was no such effort from his part to do so. It could thus be seen that the grounds relied on by the court below to find the accused guilty cannot be accepted. At best as already noticed a strong suspicion is created against the accused. But that by itself is not sufficient, as often noticed, the test is not to see if the act may have been committed by the accused, but that it must have been committed Crl.A.639/2005. 47 by him. The circumstance proved should be so clinching that they lead to the irresistible conclusion that it was the accused, the accused alone, who could have committed the act. If two views are possible, one in favour of the accused should be accepted.
54. It is not possible to accept the findings of the court below that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. For the infirmities and the lacuna already pointed out, this court is unable to hold that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the case beyond reasonable doubt. At best a strong suspicion is created against the accused.
55. Point No.IV) In the light of the finding on issue No.2, it becomes necessary to interfere with the conviction and sentence. In the case on hand it may be noticed that the court below had found that the accused was guilty of committing offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. Earlier it has been held that the prosecution has not succeeded in establishing the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If that be so, he is entitled to be acquitted.
56. In the result, this appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant are set aside and it is held that the prosecution has not succeeded in proving the case against the accused Crl.A.639/2005. 48 beyond reasonable doubt. If that be so, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt. It is true that an young lady and child have lost their lives. The act was cruel and bizarre. But that by itself is not a ground to fasten liability on any person without cogent and convincing reasons.
Resultantly, the conviction and sentence passed by the court below against the appellant are set aside and he stands acquitted for the offences punishable under Section 302 and Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code. If he is in custody, he shall be released forthwith, if his continued detention is not necessary in any other case.
A.K. BASHEER, JUDGE P. BHAVADASAN, JUDGE sb.