Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
U O I And Anr vs J D A And Anr on 3 February, 2017
Author: M.N. Bhandari
Bench: M.N. Bhandari
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT
JAIPUR
S.B.Civil Writ Petition No. 7513 / 2015
1. Union of India Through Post Master General, Rajasthan Circle,
Jaipur
2. Post Master General, Rajasthan Circle, Jaipur
----Petitioners
Versus
1. Jaipur Development Authority Through Its Commissioner, JLN
Road, Jaipur
2. Dy. Commissioner, Zone-7, Jaipur Development Authority, JLN
Road, Jaipur
----Respondents
_____________________________________________________ For Petitioner(s) : Mr.RD Rastogi, Sr. Adv. with Ms.Manjeet Kaur For Respondent(s) : Mr.JK Singhi, Sr. Adv. with Mr.Saurabh Jain _____________________________________________________ HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.N. BHANDARI Judgment 03/02/2017 By this writ petition, a challenge is made to the order dated 16th April, 2015 passed by the Jaipur Development Authority Appellate Tribunal (for short "the Tribunal") so as the order dated 27th January, 2015 passed by the Jaipur Development Authority (for short "the JDA").
Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that a plot of land measuring 3016.186 square yards (2517.04 square meters) was allotted to the petitioner NO.2 for construction of Post Office. The amount of consideration was deposited by the petitioner No.2 - Post Master General, Rajasthan Circle, Jaipur on 18th March, 1987 (Annexure 2). The possession of plot was later (2 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] on given on 19th May, 1989 with the site plan and, according to which, the petitioners were entitled to raise construction to the extent of 35 per cent of the land, allotted to them. The petitioner No.2 - Post Master General submitted building plan for its approval to the JDA. The approval of the building plan was given on 07th January, 2003. The construction of the Post Office was completed within time given for it. They occupied the building/premises and started working therein.
The JDA served a notice to the petitioners on 08 th January, 2015 alleging that the petitioners have constructed building only on 855 square meters thus failed to utilised 1668 square meters of the land contrary to the terms and conditions of allotment. A reference of para 6 of the allotment order was given, though, it does not provide as to how much area is to be utilised for construction and how much is to be left. It is governed by the Building Bye-laws of the JDA. As per the Building Bye-laws, the petitioners were not entitled to raise construction beyond 35 per cent of the land, allotted to them. The petitioners raised construction after leaving set back as per the approved plan and Building Bye-laws and construction was completed within the period of two years from the date of approval of map.
The petitioners were surprised to know allegation of non-utilisation of the area in violation of para 6 of the allotment order. Para 6 of the allotment order does not specify or gives details of the area to be used. It provides period for completion of construction. The petitioners were never served with the notice alleging delay in completion of construction so as to invoke para 6 (3 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] of the allotment order. It is nothing but high-handedness of the authorities of the JDA that allotment of part of the land was cancelled alleging violation of Para 6 of the allotment order.
The JDA is occupying the land belonging to the petitioners and created a parking therein, causing difficulty to serve the public without set back of the building. The petitioners thus preferred an appeal before the JDA Appellate Tribunal but it was dismissed on 16th April, 2015 in ignorance of the issues raised therein. The judgment in the case of ONGC & Ors. Vs. Collector, Central Excise reported in 1995 Suppl. (4) SCC 541 has been referred ignoring that the judgment aforesaid has already been overruled in the case of Electronics Corporation of India Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2011) 3 SCC
404. The overruled judgment was relied to hold that the dispute between the Central Government and the State Government should be resolved through a Committee and liberty for it was given in reference to the overruled judgment. The Tribunal further held that JDA is having right to cancel the allotment in the public interest and, in view of the aforesaid, their action cannot be faulted. No provision for it has been referred.
Accordingly, the prayer is made that the impugned orders passed by the Tribunal and the JDA may be set aside with grant of compensation/cost of Rs.10 lac, as due to high-
handedness of the authorities of the JDA, not only Post Office had suffered but it caused even inconvenience to the public on occupying the area of set back.
(4 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] Learned counsel appearing for the respondent - JDA has defended action of the respondent. It is submitted that allotment of land was made on certain terms and conditions. The petitioner/s was served with the notice for violation of para 6 of the allotment letter. First notice was served on 08 th January, 2015 alleging uitlisation of only 855 square meters land leaving 1668 square meters. When the petitioners failed to give satisfactory reply, the JDA had cancelled the allotment of land to the extent of 1668 square meters and it was in the public interest. The Tribunal thus refused to cause interference in the said order. The JDA is having authority to cancel the allotment in public interest and, in the instant case, finding violation of para 6 of the allotment letter, cancellation has rightly been made thus this Court may not cause interference in the order passed by the JDA Appellate Tribunal as well as JDA.
I have considered rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and scanned the matter carefully.
The dispute herein is between agencies of the Union of India and the State Government. A land was allotted for construction of Post Office by the JDA vide its allotment letter dated 08th January, 1987. It was for a land measuring 3016.186 square yards (2517.04 square meters). The petitioners deposited the amount of consideration within three months and was accepted by the JDA. The possession of land was not delivered for more than two years and, finally, it was delivered on 19 th May, 1989 along with site plan permitting maximum construction to the extent of 35 per cent of the land, allotted to the Post Office. The (5 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] petitioners accordingly prepared the map for its approval keeping in mind that they cannot construct more than 35 per cent of the land, so allotted. It was not only as per the site plan but even as per the Building Bye-laws. One is required to keep set back as per the Building Bye-laws and, otherwise, cannot utilise the land beyond the percentage given therein. There is no allegation or anything on record to show that construction was not completed within the period of two years from the date of approval of map.
The petitioners were using the building on completion of construction somewhere in the year 2004. The JDA gave first notice to them on 08 th January, 2015 to explain as to why the land measuring 1668 square meters has not been utilised. It is in violation of Para 6 of allotment letter. A week's time was given to explain the aforesaid, failing which, to cancel the allotment. The non-petitioner - JDA then cancelled the allotment vide its order dated 27th January, 2015. The cancellation is in reference to para 6 of the allotment order thus it would be gainful to quote para 6 of the allotment order :
"6. Hkw[k.M dk fuekZ.k dk;Z vkoaVu i= dh frfFk ls 6 ekg dh vof/k esa izkf/kdj.k }kjk LohÑr ekufp=ksa ds vuqlkj izkjEHk fd;k tkosxk ,oa 2 o"kZ dh vof/k esa iw.kZ dj fy;k tkosxkA Hkou ekufp= vuqeksnu djokus dh ftEesnkjh Lo;a laLFkk dh gksxhA As per the para quoted above, an allottee was under an obligation to construct the building within the period of two years from the date of approval of map. The condition aforesaid does not specify as to upto what extent the land can be occupied for (6 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] construction or is to be kept vacant. The aforesaid is governed by the site plan given along with the possession and the Building Bye-laws. The allottee was not entitled to use the land beyond 35 per cent in compliance of the site plan as well as Building Bye- laws. The area kept vacant as per the site plan and even Building Bye-laws is treated to be unutilised area by the JDA and, accordingly, the land to that extent has been cancelled. The cancellation of the land by 1668 square meters has multiple consequences.
The first consequence is that remaining land, where the building exists, would be in violation of set back as per the Building Bye-laws. The petitioners have been made to suffer despite utilisation of land in accordance with the provisions of law. The cancellation to the extent of 1668 square meters is without consideration and it is even caused inconvenience to the Post Office and the public, as stated, because, what remained with the Post Office after cancellation of land to the extent of 1668 square meters, is only 849 square meters. The area of 855 square meters has been utilised for construction as per the impugned order dated 27th January, 2015 and earlier notice dated 08 th January, 2015 thus on the figures given in the impugned order, the remaining land has been assessed, the petitioners would be having no space with them for set back, etc. and, if, at all, it is left by the non- petitioner/s then it would be without proper set back and for their own parking, etc. It would be relevant to refer the Building Bye-laws, which does not permit construction on a land beyond permissible (7 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] limit. For different areas and different size of plots, set back are provided. A land for commercial purposes needs to have more set back than residential. The work of the Post Office may have been taken to be commercial thus they were under an obligation to keep set back as is required for the commercial property. Now, by virtue of the impugned order, there would be infringement of set back as per the Building Bye-laws.
Learned counsel for the JDA was given time to seek instructions for rectification of the error as the order was passed in ignorance of the provisions of law. The time was sought even to find out as to how much cost should be imposed on the JDA because due to their illegal action, not only it caused an avoidable litigation but inconvenience to the public, as well as to the Post Office.
On request of learned counsel for the non-petitioners, time was given to quantify the cost at their own. It may be taken to be compensation to the Post Office i.e. an agency of the Union of India itself. The JDA has failed to do so.
In the light of the facts given above, I find that the impugned order has been passed in ignorance of the terms and condition of the allotment order and even Building Bye-laws. The Building Bye-laws permit construction up to 35 per cent of the land allotted to the Post Office, thus it should be less than 35 per cent. In such circumstances, the remaining land is bound to remain vacant. It does not give authority to the JDA to cancel the allotment for keeping land vacant for set back or as per Building Bye-laws.
(8 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] I further find that the impugned order makes a reference of para 6 of the allotment order. The said para gives period for completion of construction and not for non-utilisation of part of land. Para 6 has been referred in the impugned order to make basis for cancellation of allotment to the extent of 1668 square meters, for which, the Post Office had paid due consideration on allotment of plot. The petitioner - Post Office was even paying lease amount regularly for the entire land. They could not use the land for the intervening period after its cancellation, rather, the JDA has used the land for parking after illegal cancellation of allotment of land.
Taking into consideration the aforesaid and as the Post Office was deprived to utilise the land, for which, due payment was made followed by lease amount, oral prayer for grant of compensation/cost of Rs.10 lac is considered and to make it reasonable, it is reduced to Rs.5 lac. The non-petitioner - JDA would deposit a sum of Rs.5 lac with the Rajasthan State Legal Services Authority at Jaipur within a period of five days from today with a copy of receipt herein and, at the same time, would handover the area of 1668 square meters to the Post Office within the aforesaid period.
Learned counsel for the petitioners further prayed that amount of compensation/cost should be recovered from the Officer, who had passed the impugned order causing litigation as well as inconvenience to the Post Office. A reference of judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Lucknow Development Authority Vs. MK Gupta reported in (1994) 1 SCC 243 has (9 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] been given. Para Nos.8, 10 and 11 of the said judgment have been referred and are quoted hereunder for ready reference :
"8. Having examined wide reach of the Act and jurisdiction of the Commission to entertain complaint not only against business or trading activity but even to service rendered by statutory and public authorities the stage is now set for determining if the Commission in exercise of its jurisdiction under the Act could award compensation and if such compensation could be for harassment and agony to a consumer. Both these aspects specially the letter are of vital significance in the present day context. Still more important issue is the liability of payment. That is should the society or the tax payer be burdened for oppressive and capricious act of the public officers or it be paid by those responsible for it. The administrative law of accountability of public authorities for their arbitrary and even ultra vires actions has taken many strides. It is now accepted both by this Court and English courts that the State is liable to compensate for loss or injury suffered by a citizen due to arbitrary actions of its employees. In State of Gujarat v. Memon Mahomed Haji Hasam, AIR (1961) SC 1885 the order of the High Court directing payment of compensation for disposal of seized vehicles without waiting for the outcome of decision in appeal was upheld both on principle of bailee's, 'legal obligation to preserve the property intact and also the obligation to (10 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] take reasonable care of it to return it in same condition in which it was seized' and also because the government was, 'bound to return the said property by reason of its statutory obligation or to pay its value if it had disabled itself from returning it either by its own act or by act of its agents and servants'. It was extended further even to bonafide action of the authorities if it was contrary to law in Lala Bishambar Nath v.
The Agra Nagar Mahapalika, Agra, [1973]3SCR777 . It was held that where the authorities could not have taken any action against the dealer and their order was invalid, 'it is immaterial that the respondents had acted bonafide and in the interest of preservation of public health. Their motive may be good but their orders are illegal. They would accordingly be liable for any loss caused to the appellants by their action.' The theoretical concept that King can do no wrong has been abandoned in England itself and the State is now held responsible for tortuous act of its servants. The first Law Commission constituted after coming into force of the Constitution on liability of the State in Tort, observed that the old distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign functions should no longer be invoked to determine liability of the State. Friedmann observed, It is now increasingly necessary to abandon the lingering fiction of a legally indivisible State, and of a feudal conception of the Crown, and to substitute for it (11 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] the principle of legal liability where the State, either directly or through incorporated public authorities, engages in activities of a commercial, industrial or managerial character. The proper test is not an impracticable distinction between government and non-
governmental functional, but the nature and form of the activity in question.
Even M/s. Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh : (1966)IILLJ583SC did not provide any immunity for tortuous acts of public servants committed in discharge of statutory function if it was not referable to sovereign power. Since house construction or for that matter any service hired by a consumer or facility availed by him is not a sovereign function of the State the ratio of Kasturi Lal (supra) could not stand in way of the Commission awarding compensation. We respectfully agree with Mathew, J., in Shyam Sunder v. State of Rajasthan: [1974]3SCR549 that it is not necessary, 'to consider whether there is any rational dividing line between the so- called sovereign and proprietary and commercial functions for determining the liability of the State'. In any case the law has always maintained that the public authorities who are entrusted with statutory function cannot act negligently. As far back as 1878 the law was succinctly (12 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] explained in Geddis v. Proprietors of Bonn Reservoir, (1878) 3 App. Cas. 430 thus, I take it, without citing cases, that it is now thoroughly well established that no action will lie for doing that which the Legislature has authorised, if it be done without negligence, although it does occasion damage to anyone; but an action does lie for doing what the Legislature has authorised, if it be done negligently.
Under our Constitution sovereignty vests in the people. Every limb of the constitutional machinery is obliged to be people oriented. No functionary in exercise of statutory power can claim immunity, except to the extent protected by the Statute itself. Public authorities acting in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions oppressively are accountable for their behaviour before authorities created under the Statute like the Commission or the courts entrusted with responsibility of maintaining the rule of law. Each hierarchy in the Act is empowered to entertain a complaint by the consumer for value of the goods or services and compensation. The word 'compensation' is again of very wide connotation. It has not been defined in the Act. According to dictionary it means, 'compensating or being compensated; thing given as recompense;'. In legal (13 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] sense it may constitute actual loss or expected loss and may extend to physical, mental or even emotional suffering, insult or injury or loss. Therefore, when the Commission has been vested with the jurisdiction to award value of goods or services and compensation it has to be construed widely enabling the Commission to determine compensation for any loss or damage suffered by a consumer which in law is otherwise included in wide meaning of compensation. The provision in our opinion enables a consumer to claim and empowers the Commission to redress any injustice done to him Any other construction would defeat the very purpose of the Act. The Commission or the forum in the Act is thus entitled to award not only value of the goods or services but also to compensate a consumer for injustice suffered by him.
10. Who should pay the amount determined by the Commission for harassment and agony, the statutory authority or it should be realised from those who were responsible for it. Compensation as explained includes both the just equivalent for loss of goods or services and also for sufferance of injustice. For instance in Civil Appeal No...of 1993 arising out of S.L.P. (civil) No. 659
of 1991 the Commission directed the Bangalore Development Authority to pay Rs. 2,446 to the consumer for the (14 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] expenses incurred by him in getting the lease-cum-sale agreement registered as it was additional expenditure for alternative site allotted to him. No misfeasance was found. The moment the authority came to know of the mistake committed by it it took immediate action by allotting alternative site to the respondent. It was compensation for exact loss suffered by the respondent. It arose in due discharge of duties. For such acts or omissions the loss suffered has to be made good by the authority itself. But when the sufferance is due to malafide or oppressive or capricious acts etc. of a public servant, then the nature of liability changes. The Commission under the Act could determine such amount if in its opinion the consumer suffered injury to what is called misfeasance of the officers by the English courts. Even in England where award of exemplary or aggravated damages for insult etc. to a person has now been held to be punitive exception has carved out if the injury is due to, ' oppressive arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants of the government' (Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts). Misfeasance in public office is explained by Wade in his book on Administrative Law thus.
Even where there is no ministerial duty as above, and even where no recognised tort such as trespass, nuisance, or negligence is committed, public authorities or officers may be liable in damages for malicious, (15 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] deliberate or injurious wrong-doing. There is thus a tort which has been called misfeasance in public office, and which includes malicious abuse of power, deliberate maladministration, and perhaps also other unlawful acts causing injury.
The jurisdiction and power of the courts to indemnify a citizen for injury suffered due to abuse of power by public authorities is founded as observed by Lord Hailsham in Cassell and Co. Ltd. v. Broome and Anr. (1972) AC 1027 on the principle that, 'an award of exemplary damages can serve a useful purpose in vindicating the strength of law'. An ordinary citizen or a common man is hardly equipped to match the might of the State or its instrumentalities. That is provided by the rule of law. It acts as a check an arbitrary and capricious exercise of power. In Rookers v. Barnard and Ors. (1964) AC 1129 it was observed by Lord Devlin, 'the servants of the government are also the servants of the people and the use of their power must always be subordinate to their duty of service'. A public functionary if he acts maliciously or oppressively and the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then it is not an exercise of power but its abuse. No law provides protection against it. He who is responsible for it must suffer it. Compensation or damage as explained earlier may arise even when the officer discharges his duty honestly and bonafide. But when it arises due to arbitrary or capricious behaviour (16 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] then it loses its individual character and assumes social significance. Harassment of a common man by public authorities is socially abhorring and legally impermissible. It may harm him personally but the injury to society is far more grievous. Crime and corruption thrive and prosper in the society due to lack of public resistance. Nothing is more damaging than the feeling of helplessness. An ordinary citizen instead of complaining and fighting succumbs to the pressure of undesirable functioning in offices instead of standing against it. Therefore the award of compensation for harassment by public authorities not only compensates the individual, satisfies him personally but helps in curing social evil. It may result in improving the work culture and held in changing the outlook (sic) in his book 'Administrative Law' has observed that it is to the credit of public authorities that there are simply few reported English decisions on this form of malpractice, namely, misfeasance in public offices which includes malicious use of power, deliberate maladministration and perhaps also other unlawful acts causing injury. One of the reasons for this appears to be development of law which, apart, from other factors succeeded in keeping a salutary check on the functioning in the government or semi
- government offices by holding the officers personally responsible for their capricious or even ultra vires action resulting in injury or loss to a citizen by awarded damages (17 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] against them. Various decisions rendered from time to time have been referred by Wade on Misfeasance by Public Authorities.
We shall refer to some of them to demonstrate how necessary it is for our society. In Ashby v. White (1703) 2 Ld. Ray. 938 the House of Lords invoked the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium in favour of an elector who was wrongfully prevented from voting and decreed the claim of damages. The ratio of this decision has been applied and extended by English courts in various situations. In Roncarelli v.
Duplessis (1959) 16 DLR (2d) 689 the Supreme Court of Canada awarded
damages against the Prime Minister of Quebec personally for directing the cancellation of a restaurant-owner's liquor licence solely because the licensee provided bail on many occasions for fellow members of the sect of Jehovah's Witnesses, which was then unpopular with the authorities. It was observed that 'what could be more malicious than to punish this licensee for having done what he had an absolute right to do in a matter utterly irrelevant to the Alcoholic Liquor Act? Malice in the proper sense is simply acting for a reason and purpose knowingly foreign to the administration, to which was added here the element of intentional punishment by what was virtually vocation outlawry.' In Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council (1956) AC 736 the House of Lords held that an action for damages might proceed against the clerk of a local (18 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] authority personally on the ground that he had procured the compulsory purchase of the plaintiffs property wrongfully and in bad faith. In Perrington v. Thomson (1959) VR 236 the Supreme Court of Victoria awarded damages for exercising a power the authorities knew they did not possess. A licensing inspector and a police officer ordered the plaintiff to close his hotel and cease supplying liquor. He obeyed and filed a suit for the resultant loss. The Court observed, 'Now I take it to be perfectly clear, that if a public officer abuses his office, either by an act of omission or commission, and the consequence of that is an injury to an individual, an action may be maintained against such public officer'. In Wood v. Blaire, The Times, 3, 4, 5 July 1957 a dairy farmer's manageress contracted typhoid fever and the local authority served notices forbidding him to sell milk, except under certain conditions. These notices were void, and the farmer was awarded damages on the ground that the notices were invalid and that the plaintiff was entitled to damages of misfeasance.' This was done even though the finding was that the officers had acted from the best motives.
11. Today the issue thus is not only of award of compensation but who should bear the brunt. The concept of authority and power exercised by public functionaries has many dimensions. It has undergone tremendous change with passage of time and change in socio-
(19 of 22)
[CW-7513/2015]
economic outlook. The authority
empowered to function under a Statute while exercising power discharges public duty. It has to act to subserve general welfare and common good. In discharging this duty honestly and bonafide loss may accrue to any person. And he may claim compensation which may in circumstances be payable. But where the duty is performed capriciously or the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then the responsibility to pay the lose determined should be whose? In a modern society no authority can arrogate to itself the power to act in a manner which is arbitrary. It is unfortunate that matters which require immediate attention linger on and the man in the street is made to run from one end to other with no result. The culture of window clearance appears to be totally dead. Even in ordinary matters a common man who has neither the political backing nor the financial strength to match the inaction in public oriented departments gets frustrated and it erodes the credibility in the system. Public administration, no doubt involves a vast amount of administrative discretion which shields the action of administrative authority. But where it is found that exercise of discretion was malafide and the complainant is entitled to compensation for mental and physical harassment then the officer can no more claim to be under protective cover. When a citizen seeks to recover compensation from a public authority in (20 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] respect of injuries suffered by him for capricious exercise of power and the National Commission finds it duly proved then it has a statutory obligation to award the same? It was never more necessary than today when even social obligations are regulated by grant of statutory powers. The test of permissive form of grant are over. It is now imperative and implicit in the exercise of power that it should be for the sake of society. When the Court directs payment of damages or compensation against the State the ultimate sufferer is the common man. It is the tax payers' money which is paid for inaction of those who are entrusted under the Act to discharge their duties in accordance with law. It is, therefore, necessary that the Commission when it is satisfied that a complainant is entitled to compensation for harassment or mental agony or oppression, which finding of course should be recorded carefully on material and convincing circumstances and not lightly, then is should further direct the department concerned to pay the amount to the complainant from the public fund immediately but to recover the same from those who are found responsible for such unpardonable behaviour by dividing it proportionately where there are more than one functionaries."
Further direction was to recover the amount aforesaid from the Officers proportionately from their salary. Para No.12 of the said judgment is also quoted hereunder for ready reference :
(21 of 22) [CW-7513/2015]
"12. For these reasons all the appeals are dismissed. In Appeal No. 6237 of 1990 it is further directed that the Lucknow Development Authority shall fix the responsibility of the officers who were responsible for causing harassment and agony to the respondent within a period of six months from the a copy of this order is produced or served on it. The amount of compensation of Rs. 10,000 awarded by the Commission for mental harassment shall be recovered from such officers proportionately from their salary. Compliance of this order shall be reported to this Court within one month after expiry of the period granted for determining the responsibility . The Registrar General is directed to send a copy of this order to the Secretary, Lucknow Development Authority immediately."
The amount of compensation was given due to mental harassment to the individual and herein it is to the Institution and the public at large. Thus imposition of compensation/cost is supported by the judgment aforesaid and, in fact, a direction could have been given to recover the amount aforesaid from the Officer, who passed the order but without an opportunity of hearing, it would not be proper. In view of above, the JDA is given liberty to recover the amount aforesaid from the Officer, who had passed the order but it should be after providing an opportunity of hearing.
In view of the aforesaid, this writ petition stands allowed. The impugned orders dated 16th April, 2015 passed by (22 of 22) [CW-7513/2015] the Jaipur Development Authority Appellate Tribunal so as the order dated 27th January, 2015 passed by the Jaipur Development Authority are set aside.
To see compliance of the directions, let this disposed of petition be listed on 09th February, 2017.
(M.N. BHANDARI)J. Preeti, PA/37